

Brian Krostenko

DANCING, DECLAMATION, AND DEIPNOSOPHISTRY IN THE *DEIOTARIANA*¹

Abstract

This article argues that some formal features of Cicero's speech *pro rege Deiotaro* reflect Cicero's understanding of the ideological strains of those days. Some of the charges brought against Deiotarus seem likely to be true. Cicero's rebuttals of those charges seem weak by the normal conventions of courtroom argument. But the rebuttals draw on modes of speech appropriate for sophisticated dinner parties—literary criticism, poetry, and moral philosophy. The arguments are not necessarily more successful for that, but they do make an ideological point: if political decisions now depend on one man, that brings political decisions very close to questions of taste and sensibility, which in their turn become a valuable and even necessary source of arguments. This aspect of Cicero's rhetorical approach in the speech exploits the setting, Caesar's house: Cicero speaks as if he were in a place where, not forensic convention, but intellectual intimacy was the chief value. But Cicero's artful voice also lapses into patent sophism, making pointedly clever and painfully false argument. That, too, makes an ideological point: if the monarch must depend on intellectual intimates, he is also susceptible to flattery.

Keywords

stylistics, dancing, Cicero, Deiotarus

¹ Versions of this paper were presented at the University of Chicago, the University of Notre Dame, the Institute of History at the University of Warsaw, and the University of Washington. I am most grateful for the interest and thoughtful responses of those audiences. I also express my thanks to my research assistant, Hannah Vansyckel.

Introduction

After Caesar's ultimate victory, Cicero delivered three speeches before him, the so-called 'Caesarian speeches'. All of them defend or support persons who were on the wrong side in the civil war – Quintus Ligarius, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, and the Galatian king Deiotarus. All three speeches, as has long been recognized, are stylistically distinctive. This article explores an aspect of the *elocutio* of the speech for Deiotarus. The *elocutio* draws frequently upon what I will call the voice of the salon—where literature and philosophy have their place; where the political, the personal, and the aesthetic overlap; and where plausibility shades into sensibility and taste—and sometimes even yields to them. It is as if Cicero is speaking as a δειπνοσοφίστης—what some Romans called a *bellus homo*. The objective of this article is simple, and that is, by concentrating especially on one section of the arguments (22–26), to argue that these formal peculiarities reflect exactly Cicero's understanding of the ideological strains of those days. That is, aspects of the style are themselves as marks of Cicero's understanding.² Those days were strange, and that in my view is what led Cicero to speak to Caesar in a rather strange voice. My technique in service of that objective is also simple, and that is to read the speech might read an ode of Horace, with an ear alert to snatches and sounds of other prose and poetic genres. The *pro rege Deiotaro* is a kind of quilt of a rather odd sort, loosely woven.

And the whole case was an unusual sort of case. The defendant was a prominent client king from Asia Minor—a rare situation. Deiotarus (Δηϊόταρος) had been one of the 'tetrachs' or tribal chieftans of the Celtic Galatians of central Asia Minor (there were three tribes, and each tribe had four cantons or 'tetrarchies').³ His service in Roman wars in Asia Minor had won him commendation from

² The Caesarian speeches have justifiably attracted much attention both for their style and for their unusual circumstances. But the bridge between the two aspects has not been fully built. The chief interpretive thrust has been elsewhere. The speeches contain obvious instances of flattery; and careful analysis shows that the real legal or political issues are not always those that Cicero claims. Such features call into question the authenticity of Cicero's persona(e), and that has framed much of the scholarly response to the speeches, which, in varying proportions, sees them as as ironic and/or ingratiating (that perspective is explored in detail in Gagliardi 1997; see further below n. 20). But the ultimate concern of such responses is personal motive—Cicero's intentions vis-à-vis Caesar or his audiences—, and that leaves the speeches under-explored as a source of ideological insight into a disruptive moment in Roman history. This article, by contrast, while not excluding personal motives, provides such an ideological reading, precisely by building a bridge between the unusual form and the unusual circumstances. In that it follows the tenor of Gotoff 2002: 219–272 and Gotoff 1993.

³ Strabo 12.5.1; the tribes are the Trocmi, the Tolistobogii, and the Tectosages.

Sulla, Lucullus, and other Roman commanders⁴ and the moniker Φιλορώμαιος, 'Friend of the Romans'. In Pompey's settlement of Asia Minor in 63/62, Deiotarus' reward was sole chieftom of his own tribe⁵ and the grant of Lesser Armenia and part of Pontus,⁶ a settlement finally confirmed by the senate in 59. During Cicero's proconsulship of Cilicia, he sent Cicero aid against marauding Parthians.⁷ In the civil war of 49, Deiotarus chose the side of Pompey and was present at Pharsalus. Escaping with Pompey,⁸ he returned to Galatia and recognized the new order of things. He sought the help of Caesar's lieutenant Domitius Calvinus against the Bosphoran king Pharnaces II, who had seized Lesser Armenia (Pharnaces defeated their joint effort in December of 48).⁹ In the middle of 47, when Caesar passed through Asia Minor at last, Deiotarus met him near the borders of Galatia in suppliant garb¹⁰ and hosted him at his fortress near Blucium (Βλούκιον) in what is now Karalar.¹¹ He was with Caesar at Zela (Ζήλα, modern Zile), where Pharnaces was now defeated, and accompanied Caesar to Nicaea, where he formally disposed the lands of Asia. (The results there were mixed for Deiotarus: he was allowed to keep the title *rex*, but, to his chagrin¹² and over Brutus' objections,¹³ was stripped of Lesser Armenia).¹⁴ When the tetrachy of another Galatian tribe became vacant, he wrote to Caesar, then in the Spain, asking that it be granted to him.¹⁵

⁴ *Quid de patre [Deioto] dicam? cuius benivolentia in populum Romanum est ipsius aequalis aetati; qui non solum socius imperatorum nostrorum fuit in bellis, verum etiam dux copiarum suarum. Quae de illo viro Sulla, quae Murena, quae Servilius, quae Lucullus quam ornate, quam honorifice, quam graviter saepe in senatu praedicaverunt! Quid de Cn. Pompeio loquar? qui unum Deiotarum in toto orbe terrarum ex animo amicum vereque benivolum, unum fidelem populo Romano iudicavit* (Cic. Phil. 11.33–34).

⁵ Pompey, by way of simplifying the structures of governance in Asia Minor, appointed one tetrach for each tribe: Deiotarus for the Tolistobogii; his son-in-law, Brogitarus for the Trocmi; and for the Tectosages either another son-in-law Castor or Domnilius.

⁶ Strabo 12.3.13.

⁷ *Fam.* 15.1.6–2.2; *Fam.* 4.5–7; *Att.* 5.18.2; *Att.* 6.1.14; *Phil.* 11.33–34. Cf. *fuius imperatores ego et M. Bibulus in propinquis finitimisque provinciis; ab eodem rege adiuti sumus et equitatu et pedestribus copiis* (Phil. 11.13.34).

⁸ *Caes. BC* 3.4.3, App. *BC* 2.71, Plut. *Pomp.* 73.

⁹ Hirt. *Bell. Alex.* 34–41, 65–77; Appian *BC* 2.91. Two of the legions had been raised from the subjects of Deiotarus, organized and equipped in the Roman manner, but they fled after very little fighting.

¹⁰ *Bell. Alex.* 67.

¹¹ Mitchell 1993: 55.

¹² Cic. *Deiot.* 8; *Phil.* 2.93–96.

¹³ Cic. *Brut.* 5, *Att.* 14.1.

¹⁴ The sources are conflicting. Hirtius (*Bell. Alex.* 67–8) has Caesar leaving him the title of king but giving his tetrachy to Mithradates of Pergamus. Cicero, similarly, describes Deiotarus stripped of the tetrachy and his kingdom and also fined, though allowed to retain the title of king (*Div.* 1.15, cf. *Phil.* 2.37). Cassius Dio (41.63) has Caesar giving some of Deiotarus' kingdom to Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, but transferring to Deiotarus land he had taken from Pharnaces.

¹⁵ Cic. *Deiot.* 38. The tetrach was Mithridates of Pergamum.

The relationship of the accuser to the accused was also unusual: the charges were brought by Deiotarus' own grandson, Castor (Κάστωρ). His allegations, as Cicero represents them, were: that when Caesar was Deiotarus' guest in 47, Deiotarus had put in place a plan to murder him at a dinner party (15–22); that thereafter Deiotarus had raised a large army against Caesar (22–24); and that Deiotarus was ill-disposed (*animo alieno*) to Caesar, having above all shown unseemly glee at news of Caesar's travails in Africa in 46 (24–27). That glee had allegedly taken the form of reciting a nasty bit of verse and dancing naked at a symposium. Cicero sees a motive for the charges in a power struggle among Galatian factions.¹⁶ The suggestion makes good sense. Deiotarus' energy in aiding the Romans was matched by his energy in suppressing other Galatians. Though formally tetrach of only one tribe, he eventually brought most of Galatia under his sole control, in contravention of law and custom.¹⁷ He ousted his own son-in-law, Brogitarus, from a tetrarchy and possession of a fortress.¹⁸ He seized the territory of Domnilaus (Δομνέκλειος), another tetrach, who had died at Pharsalus. Deiotarus' rivals might well have now seen a chance to return the favor. Caesar, who had stripped Deiotarus of territory, certainly seemed to have punished him for disloyalty, and that could perhaps be taken as the sign of a distrust on Caesar's part that could be exploited.

And this odd case was heard—one cannot say 'tried'—in unusual circumstances. Caesar, now in a ten-year term as *dictator*, heard the case alone: he was judge and jury (the precise form of procedure is not clear but it resembles the *cognitio extra ordinem* common later).¹⁹ Furthermore, he had decided to hold the hearing not in a public venue but in his own house (on which more below). He was, one might say, not just judge and jury, but judge and jury in chambers. Last of all, he was the aggrieved party—judge and jury in chambers and plaintiff, all in one. And as if all that were not enough, the very purpose of the trial is not precisely clear. Caesar was probably not interested in the charges alone.²⁰ The situation in

¹⁶ The suggestion is Cicero's own; it seems plausible enough. Castor, in the fashion of such intrigues, was exploiting some perceived preference on Caesar's part: 'they [Castor et al.] had recognized that you [Caesar] were angry at him [Deiotarus] and friendly towards themselves' (*teque cum huic iratum, tum sibi amicum esse cognoverant*, 9).

¹⁷ ... Deiotarus, tetrarches Gallograeciae tum quidem paene totius, quod ei neque legibus neque moribus concessum esse ceteri tetrarchae contendebant, sine dubio autem rex Armeniae minoris ab senatu appellatus ... (Bell. Alex. 67). Cf. Strabo 12.5.1. Deiotarus' encroachments included ousting his son-in-law Brogitarus from the co-kingship that, according to Cicero (*har. resp.* 29, Sest. 56), he had secured by bribing the tribune P. Clodius Pulcher.

¹⁸ Cic. *Har. resp.* 29, Sest. 56.

¹⁹ It seems like an extension of the *cognitio*, in which a magistrate examined a case to determine the facts and issued a judgment without a jury, and in that sense a precursor to *cognitio* system of trial that largely replaced jury trials in the Empire. Cf. Bringmann 1986: 72–88.

²⁰ Caesar's purpose has been debated. For a summary and discussion of the three basic views—that Caesar's motives were personal but not geopolitical; geopolitical but not personal; or personal and geopolitical both—see Saddington 1993: 87–96, esp. 88–90.

Asia Minor was not settled, and the procedure gave Caesar a chance to review the persons, places, and politics of a region which that was defensively important and through which his contemplated Parthian campaign would take him.²¹ But whatever Caesar's interests, the symbolism of the case was heavy. While Caesar's earlier decision had been punitive—Deiotarus lost territory—it also showed Caesar's famous clemency: Deiotarus had kept his title and, perhaps, even his life. If Caesar's decision after this procedure appeared to be punishing Deiotarus further, that might stir up old anxieties and call his *clementia* into doubt. In a sense Caesar's postwar policies were also on trial.²²

The charges

The critical issue was therefore Deiotarus' trustworthiness—another debated topic²³—in particular as perceived by Caesar. Were his previous services to the Romans mere acts of convenience? Had he appeared in suppliant garb as a ruse to lure Caesar into an ambush? Had he accepted Caesar's clemency insincerely, keeping an eye open for chances to work against him later? Were Deiotarus' resentments so deep that he could not be trusted in the future—if, for example, Caesar marched against the Parthians the next year?

Worse for Deiotarus two, or perhaps all three, of the main charges had the look of truth. The charge about an army certainly did:

The other [part of the charges] was that Deiotarus has raised a great army against you. I'll speak briefly about the army, as with the other charges. Deiotarus has never had the sort of forces that would let him make war on the Roman people; rather they have been the kind that let him defend his border from raiding parties and brigandage and send aid to our commanders. Furthermore, whereas he used to be able to maintain greater forces, now he can hardly support the scanty forces he does have. But, one could object, he sent [word] to this Caecilius fellow: but those he sent he cast into chains because they refused to go. I won't even ask if it's plausible that the king had troops to send; or that those that were sent didn't obey; or that those who disobeyed orders in such an important matter were [only] bound and not executed. But, in any event, when he was trying to send troops to Caecilius, there are two possibilities: he may not have known that that cause was lost—or he may have been under the impression that this Caecilius was an important figure. But Deiotarus

²¹ So Saddington 1993.

²² Cf. Gotoff 1993: xxxix: '... the implications of [Caesar's] decision would not have been purely judicial. Other client kings whose behavior during the Civil War had been ambiguous would have had a more than passing interest in Caesar's decision.'

²³ For a survey of assessments of Deiotarus' character, cf. Hanchey 2015: 65–66, n. 6. See also Coşkun 2005: 127–54.

knows our men well: he would have disregarded him, whether because he hadn't come to know him or because he actually did!²⁴

Cicero is referring to Quintus Caecilius Bassus. Bassus had served under Pompey in the Civil War. After Pharsalus he fled to Tyrus (Tyre) in Syria. When, in 46, rumors reached Syria that the African war, where Pompeians still had substantial forces in the field, was going poorly for Caesar, Bassus incited to mutiny two legions of the proquaestor Sextus Iulius Caesar, whom Caesar had placed in command there the preceding summer.²⁵ Bassus seized Apamea (now Qalaat al-Madiq), where he would hold out until his troops defected at the end of 44.²⁶ It would have made good sense for Deiotarus to send him aid in 46.²⁷ Deiotarus had heard the same rumors as Bassus about Caesar's travails.²⁸ Perhaps he found it hard to believe that the Caesar who had barely escaped disaster at Alexandria would escape again against better opposition. Perhaps he thought it prudent to cooperate with a bold revolutionary in command of two legions. Perhaps he hoped for Bassus' help against other local potentates. Perhaps he was simply hedging his bets in a situation that was, yet again, shifting and unclear. Whatever Deiotarus' motives exactly, helping Bassus was a way to preserve himself, and that was one art of which Deiotarus was a past master.

A second charge was also plausible or at least had a chilling precedent. Castor alleged that Deiotarus planned to murder Caesar when he was Deiotarus' guest. The plan was to lure Caesar to a room where armed men were waiting: 'This is Castor's allegation:

"When you arrived at the fort at Blucium and lodged at the home of the king, your host, there was a particular place in which the items that the king had decided to gift you with had been arranged; his intention was to take you there after your bath on

²⁴ [22]. ... *altera exercitum eum contra te magnum comparasse. De exercitu dicam breviter, ut cetera. Numquam eas copias rex Deiotarus habuit, quibus inferre bellum populo Romano posset, sed quibus finis suos ab excursionibus et latrociniiis tueretur et imperatoribus nostris auxilia mitteret. Atque antea quidem maiores copias alere poterat; nunc exiguas vix tueri potest. [23]. At misit ad Caecilium nescio quem: sed eos, quos misit, quod ire noluerunt, in vincula coniecit. Non quaero quam veri simile sit aut habuisse regem quos mitteret aut eos, quos misisset, non paruisse, aut, qui dicto audientes in tanta re non fuissent, eos vinctos potius quam necatos. Sed tamen cum ad Caecilium mittebat, utrum causam illam victam esse nesciebat an Caecilium istum magnum hominem putabat? Quem profecto is, qui optime nostros homines novit, vel quia non nosset vel si nosset, contemneret.*

²⁵ It was those very rumors, according to Cicero, that had 'stirred up Caecilius in his madness' (*furiosum ... Caecilium excitaverunt*, 25). On Sextus, cf. *Bell. Alex.* 66.1, *Livy Peri.* 114, *Appian BC* 3.77, 4.58, *Cassius Dio* 47.26.3.

²⁶ *Appian BC* 3.77 provides two slightly accounts. In the first, Bassus was simply an advisor to Sextus Caesar. The second, which *Appian* attributes to (Scribonius?) Libo, is followed here. Cicero's treatment (below 000) makes it clear that Bassus was a Pompeian.

²⁷ *at misit ad Caecilium nescioquem*, 23.

²⁸ *Deiot.* 25.

your way to lie down to dinner; armed men had been stationed in that very spot for the purpose of killing you.²⁹

Certainly the story—with gifts, dinners, and baths—is an almost mythic violation, or rather would-be violation, of *ξενία*. But there was a very real recent precedent. As it so happens, it is quite like the way several Galatian tetrachs were killed—and perhaps almost Deiotarus himself. Mithridates VI of Pontus, panicked after the defeat of his general Archelaus at the Battle of Chaeronea in 86, attempted to forestall rebellion by subject peoples and other in Asia Minor by various measures. Not trusting the loyalty of the Galatian chieftans, he killed them off, rather like a mafia don, either by ambush or at a dinner to which he had invited them.³⁰ Deiotarus was one of three who escaped his attempts. Caesar doubtless knew of a similar incident from the civil war between Marius and Sulla: P. Tullius Albinovanus, a legate of the Marian C. Norbanus, marked his defection to the Sullan side by inviting Norbanus' officers to a dinner where he killed them.³¹

A third charge was also plausible. Deiotarus had not only heard the rumors about the African war. He had allegedly reacted with delight, a sign of a 'hostile attitude' (*alienus animus*). When he first heard them, he recited a nasty bit of verse:

And so when he received the news that Domitius had been lost in a shipwreck and that you [Caesar] were besieged in a fortress, he applied to Domitius a Greek verse to the same effect as one we have in Latin: 'Let friends die, if foes go down beside.' Deiotarus would not have recited that verse if he were unfriendly towards you: a line so wild from a man so mild? And how was it that he was friendly to Domitius, if he really was unfriendly to you? And why would he *have* been unfriendly to *you*—the man who, by the laws of war, could even have killed him but who, as he recalled, established him and his son as king?³²

Later Deiotarus allegedly also danced with delight:

And then what? What's next from this lowlife? He says that Deiotarus, overcome by happiness at this [= Caesar's trouble], steeped himself in wine and danced

²⁹ *Cum, inquit, in castellum Blucium venisses et domum regis, hospitis tui, devertisses, locus erat quidam, in quo erant ea composita, quibus te rex munerari constituerat: huc te e balneo, prius quam accumberes, ducere volebat; erant enim armati, qui te interficerent, in eo ipso loco conlocati* (Deiot. 17).

³⁰ καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τοὺς Γαλατῶν τετράρχας, ὅσοι τε αὐτῷ συνῆσαν ὡς φίλοι καὶ ὅσοι μὴ κατήκουον αὐτοῦ, πάντας ἔκτεινε μετὰ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν χωρὶς τριῶν τῶν διαφυγόντων, τοῖς μὲν ἐνέδρας ἐπιπέμψας, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ διαίτῃ μῆδ' νυκτός, οὐχ ἡγούμενος αὐτῶν οὐδένα οἱ βέβαιον, εἰ πλησιάζοι Σύλλας, ἔσσεσθαι (App. Mith. 46).

³¹ P. Tullius Albinovanus, a legate of the Marian C. Norbanus, murdered many of Norbanus' officers at a dinner (Appian BC 1.91).

³² *Itaque cum esset ei nuntiatum Domitium naufragio perisse, te in castello circumsederi, de Domitio dixit versum Graecum eadem sententia qua etiam nos habemus Latinum: 'Pereant amici, dum inimici una intercitant.' Quod ille, si tibi esset inimicissimus, numquam tamen dixisset: ipse enim mansuetus, versus immanis. Qui autem Domitio poterat esse amicus, qui tibi esset inimicus? Tibi porro inimicus cur esset a quo, cum vel interfici belli lege potuisset, regem et se et filium suum constitutos esse meminisset? (25).*

naked at a symposium. Is there a cross that's punishment enough for this thug? Has anyone ever seen Deiotarus dancing or drunk at any time? That king possesses every virtue, as I'm sure you know, Caesar, but above all a singular and admirable frugality—although I know this word is not usually used in praise of kings. To be called a frugal man doesn't seem particularly praiseworthy for a king: strong, just, severe, stern; chivalrous, generous, beneficent, liberal—these are kingly praises. Frugality, by contrast, is a personal quality. But, say what you will, I still think frugality, that is, restraint and temperance, is a great virtue. And Deiotarus' frugality, from the beginning of his life, is widely known and recognized by all of Asia, by our magistrates and legates, and also by the Roman *equites* who did business in Asia (*Deiot.* 26).³³

The last part of the charge cannot be understood without a short detour into the semiotics of dancing naked. The way Cicero states the accusation makes dancing naked³⁴ the direct result of drunkenness. To bring out that link, drunkenness is foregrounded by a colorful phrase. *Se vino obruisse*, literally 'covered himself over in wine' or 'obliterated himself in wine', with a verb that properly means 'bury over' or 'inundate,' appears first here in Cicero. He would later use it of Antony—once also when he was naked.³⁵

Drinking and dancing naked at banquets certainly did go together but not always not in quite that way. Cicero himself accuses some opponents of having danced naked, and the accusations are revealing. Quintus Apronius, a constant companion of Verres during the latter's governorship of Sicily, supposedly danced that way at a *convivium*: 'He was beside him on the tribunal, alone with him in his bedroom, host of his banquets—in particular on the occasion when, as the praetor's young son lay nearby, he began to dance naked at a banquet' (*ille erat in tribunali proximus, in cubiculo solus, in convivio dominus, ac tum maxime cum accubante*

³³ *Quid deinde? Furcifer quo progreditur? Ait hac laetitia Deiotarum elatum vino se obruisse in convivioque nudum saltavisse. Quae crux huic fugitivo potest satis supplici adferre? Deiotarum saltantem quisquam aut ebrium vidit umquam? Omnes sunt in illo rege virtutes, quod te, Caesar, ignorare non arbitror, sed praecipue singularis et admiranda frugalitas: etsi hoc verbo scio laudari reges non solere. Frugi hominem dici non multum habet laudis in rege: fortem, iustum, severum, gravem, magni animi, largum, beneficum, liberalem: hae sunt regiae laudes, illa privata est. Vi volet quisque, accipiat: ego tamen frugalitatem, id est modestiam et temperantiam, virtutem maximam iudico. Haec in illo est ab ineunte aetate cum a cuncta Asia, cum a magistratibus legatisque nostris, tum ab equitibus Romanis qui in Asia negotiati sunt perspecta et cognita (26).*

³⁴ *Nudus* comprises both full nudity and various states of undress, including wearing only the undergarments. Gotoff 1993: 25, supposes that Cicero means the latter way, but it is worth noting that that meaning for *nudus* is apparently a Hellenism and is securely attested first in Augustan poetry.

³⁵ *Phil.* 3.31, 13.31. The word is uncommon of wine; our instance is its first use (cf. *TLL* 9.2.153.63–66), which the *TLL* considers an extension of the literal use of *obruo* with fluids. The *OLD* classes the meaning with 'overwhelm', as with sleep, but that is mostly a later sense.

praetextato praetoris filio saltare in convivio nudus coeperat, Ver. 2.3.23).³⁶ It was supposedly also the practice of the young rakes who supported Catiline. Cicero sarcastically imagines they will do well in mountain military camps because all that nudity has toughened them against cold: ‘But maybe they think it will be easier for them to endure the winter because they’ve learned how to dance naked at banquets!’ (*nisi idcirco se facilius hiemem toleraturos putant, quod nudi in conviviis saltare didicerunt*, Catil. 2.23). The longest account of such dancing in Cicero depicts feasts in the house of Aulus Gabinius, consul of 58. The passage first addresses, then describes, Gabinius’ colleague in the consulship, Calpurnius Piso, the chief target of Cicero’s invective:³⁷

[to Piso] Do I have to recount the feasts of those days? your happiness and expressions of joy? the uninhibited drinking-bouts with your repugnant droves? Who ever saw you sober in those days? or saw you doing anything worthy of a freeman? or saw you in public at all? That was when your colleague’s house resounded with singing and cymbals and he was dancing naked at banquets—though doing that circle-dance wasn’t quite enough to make him fear the wheel of fortune! [to the senate] But Piso here, not so elegant a glutton and not so musical, lay in the filth and mire of his Greeks—a banquet of Lapiths and Centaurs, to hear how people talked about it, at the time of those great civic griefs! It’s hard to say what Piso did more of there: drinking, vomiting, or squandering.³⁸

The details reveal what is wholly or mostly true of the other instances of dancing: these were deliberate performances at Hellenized festivities meant to celebrate confidence and power. First, these were performances—if a mark of madness, then of ‘sober madness’ (σώφρων λύσσα), in the suggestive oxymoron of the *Carmina Anacreontea* (1.2.6). Gabinius was not frolicking drunk; he was dancing a particular dance, the ‘circle dance’ (*orbis ... saltatorius*),³⁹ evidently to the accom-

³⁶ What I have rendered ‘young’ is literally ‘dressed in a *toga praetexta*’, that is, not yet having assumed the *toga virilis*, so younger than fourteen or fifteen.

³⁷ *quid ego illorum dierum epulas, quid laetitiam et gratulationem tuam, quid cum tuis sordidissimis gregibus intemperantissimas perpotationes praedicem? quis te illis diebus sobrium, quis agentem aliquid quod esset libero dignum, quis denique in publico vidit? cum conlegae tui domus cantu et cymbalis personaret, cumque ipse nudus in convivio saltaret; in quo cum illum saltatorium versaret orbem, ne tum quidem fortunae rotam pertimescebat. hic autem non tam concinnus helluo nec tam musicus iacebat in suorum Graecorum foetore et caeno; quod quidem istius in illis rei publicae luctibus quasi aliquod Lapitharum aut Centaurorum convivium ferebatur; in quo nemo potest dicere utrum iste plus biberit an vomuerit an effuderit* (Pis. 22).

³⁸ For a similar contrast between Piso and Gabinius, making the one a dullard and the other fop-pish, cf. *Sest.* 17–21.

³⁹ Arnobius (*Adv. Nationes*, 2.42) records a dance of the same name: ‘Was it for this He sent souls, that beings of a sacred and august race should here practise singing and piping; that they should swell out their cheeks in blowing the flute; that they should take the lead in singing impure songs, and raising the loud din of the castanets, by which another crowd of souls should be led in their wantonness to abandon themselves to clumsy motions, to dance and sing, form rings

paniment of ‘singing’ and ‘cymbals’. His dancing is not a simple matter of drunkenness: Piso is also drunk but cannot join in, because he is not as *musicus* ‘musical’ (or perhaps ‘delicate, refined’) as Gabinius. Catiline’s young rakes ‘have learned’ how to dance (*didicerunt*), consciously adopting or even studying the practice. The verb is also used earlier in the same passage: ‘These boys, vogue and voluptuary, have learned not only how to love and be loved, or to dance and sing, but how to brandish dangers and sprinkle poisons’ (*hi pueri tam lepidi ac delicati non solum amare et amari neque saltare et cantare, sed etiam sicas vibrare et spargere venena didicerunt*, *Catil.* 2.23). Not only does their repertoire also include singing, but they are called *lepidus*, which in the late Republic often describes stylish performers or performances.⁴⁰ Apronius, too, should probably also be thought of as a performer rather than a reveller. He regularly served as host at Verres’ banquets (*in convivio dominus [erat]*)⁴¹ and ‘particularly so’ (*tum maxime*) on the occasion when he danced naked: Cicero almost seems to have in mind the figure of the parasite, who might arrange for the food at a banquet (*obsonator*) and dance at the affair as well.⁴²

Second, these performances have a Greek character. In Gabinius’ house Piso lies with Greeks, and the relevant aesthetic category, as we have seen, is μουσικός.⁴³ Catiline’s pretty boys are doubtless Hellenized, too: the stylishness of *lepidus* almost always had Greek overtones.⁴⁴ They also know how ‘to love and be loved’: Cicero is recalling the sympotic roles of ἐραστής ‘lover’ and ἐρώμενος ‘beloved.’ The Hellenic character of Apronius’ performance is less clear. But what is clear is a third feature: his use of the banquet as an assertion of self-confidence and power. He was the chief of tithe-collectors⁴⁵ and was now the close associate of a Roman governor, not only *in convivio dominus* with Verres but also *in tribunali proximus* and *in cubiculo solus*, and in other instances in the *Verrines* he asserts

of dancers, and finally, raising their haunches and hips, float along with a tremulous motion of the loins?’ (*idcirco animas misit, ut res sancti atque augustissimi nominis symphoniacas agerent et fistulatorias hic artes, ut inflandis bucculas distenderent tibiis, cantionibus ut praeirent obscenis, numerositer et <cierent> scabillorum concrepationibus sonores, quibus animarum alia lasciviens multitudo incompositos corporum dissolveretur in motus, saltitaret cantaret, orbes saltatorios verteret | et ad ultimum clunibus et coxendicibus sublevatis lumborum crispitudine fluctuaret*).

⁴⁰ Krostenko 2001: 64–72.

⁴¹ For that meaning, cf. *TLL* 5.1.1913.1–17 *is qui (domi suae) convivium praebeat*.

⁴² Cf. e.g. part of the boast of Periplectomenus, a *senex lepidus*: *vel hilarissimum convivam hinc indidem expromam tibi | vel primarium parasitum atque obsonatorem optimum; | tum ad saltandum non cinaedus malacus aequet atque ego* (*Mil.* 667–9).

⁴³ Whereas the Greek μουσικός means not only ‘musical’ but also ‘elegant,’ the Latin version is confined more narrowly to the former (cf. *TLL* 8.0.1702.79–1703.14); Cicero’s is the first instance.

⁴⁴ Krostenko, *Cicero, Catullus*, 84–85 and *passim*.

⁴⁵ *Eorum omnium qui decumani vocabantur princeps erat Q. ille Apronius, quem videtis* (2.3.22).

himself over persons and municipalities through banquets.⁴⁶ Gabinius and Piso's celebrations occurred during their consulship—and after Cicero's departure into exile. Those were happy times for the consuls: they had acquiesced in Clodius' thirst to avenge himself on Cicero, and they could now look forward to the rich provinces Clodius had promised them, Macedonia and Syria. Hence the *laetitia* and *gratulatio* of Gabinius' house. The same sort of self-assurance is apparent in the *pueri* who supported Catiline. Their political confidence and even arrogance, symbolized by their alleged willingness to stab and poison, is also symbolized by their sympotic indulgences.

To dance naked at a symposium, then, was not only to play the Greek: it was to use a Greek idiom to celebrate one's confidence and power. That is probably how Deiotarus would have understood the activity. The celebration suited his culture. The Galatians were Celts, but by the middle of the first century BC their aristocracy had embraced the aristocratic Hellenistic culture of the Eastern Mediterranean.⁴⁷ Deiotarus himself 'had connections with Athens, where his status was put up probably during the 50s BC, as well as with other cities of the Greek East, such as Nicaea, Laodicea, and Ephesus.'⁴⁸ He was the recipient of a Greek translation of Mago the Carthaginian's famous agricultural treatise.⁴⁹ He also had regular social intercourse with the Roman elite—according to Cicero, he knew everyone who passed through Asia Minor⁵⁰—themselves often practitioners of that same aristocratic culture. For the same reason, Deiotarus is very likely to have recited a verse just as Castor alleged. Reciting Greek gnomes was, naturally, an affect of Hellenized elites, if Caesar himself is any guide.⁵¹

The celebration and the verse also suited Deiotarus' political leanings. As we have seen, he had been a Pompeian, and Caesar had punished him. He had not been so convinced of Caesar's ascendancy as not to send aid to Caecilius Bassus. Nor had he been so content in Caesar's ascendancy as not to send out pickets of spies to Ephesus and Nicaea to catch news from the West.⁵² And the celebration suited the occasion eminently. Caesar had barely escaped disaster at Alexandria: Deiotarus must have found it hard to believe that he would escape again against

⁴⁶ *Ver.* 2.3.31, 62, 65.

⁴⁷ Mitchell 1993: 35.

⁴⁸ Mitchell 1993: 35, citing *IG* II² 3429 and *Cic. Deiot.* 25.

⁴⁹ *Cic. Deiot.* 25, Varro *RR* 1.1.10 (*hosce ipsos utiliter ad VI libros redegit Diophanes in Bithynia et misit Deiotaro regi*).

⁵⁰ *is, qui optime nostros homines novit* (*Deiot.* 25; cf. 26).

⁵¹ Caesar was famously fond of quoting a pair of lines from Euripides' *Phoenissae*: 'For if it is necessary to do wrong, it is a very beautiful thing (κάλλιστον) to do so for the sake of tyranny (τυραννίδος περί); in all other matters piety should be maintained' (εἴπερ γὰρ ἄδικεῖν χρη, τυραννίδος περί | κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν, τᾶλλα δ' εὐσεβεῖν χρέων, 524–5).

⁵² *Deiot.* 25.

better opposition. Second, the prospect of a change in power opened up the prospect of regaining the territories he had lost. Does that bring up another part of the sympotic ideal? Deiotarus was now very old. As Cicero notes, by way of suggesting Deiotarus was too old to have danced, several men were now required to hoist him into the saddle.⁵³ He must not have been much to look at as a dancer. But part of the sympotic ideal was a return to youth—*τὰς φρένας νεάζειν* ('to grow young at heart'), to paraphrase one of the *Carmina Anacreontea* (39.5). That would have been an appropriate feeling for Deiotarus: the prospect of regaining the territories he had lost meant a return to an earlier state of affairs. If Castor was not telling the truth, he had crafted his accusations artfully, not least because the judge himself doubtless grasped the semiotics of symposia and naked dancing and more broadly the role of aestheticism in politics. Caesar was a man who well understood that *auctoritas* could paradoxically be expressed through *lepos* and *venustas*, that impressive stature could be expressed through foppish elegance: he shaved his legs, he belted his tunic loosely, and after hard battles he let his men wear perfume.⁵⁴ He understood perfectly well that elegant displays were not the opposite of political ruthlessness but a way to express them.

Cicero's rhetorical tactics

The truth seems obvious, and it must have been obvious to Caesar: Deiotarus, a wily king from a part of the world full of wily kings, made obeisance because he had to but was still planning, perhaps hopefully, in case things turned out the other way—the classic temporizing of the Eastern despot (and many other politicians). What arguments could Cicero make? His overall strategy, in terms of ancient rhetorical theory, is to appeal to *probabile* (Deiotarus' previous conduct and general character make his hostility unlikely)⁵⁵ and to *consecutio* (Deiotarus' subsequent conduct disproves hostility).⁵⁶

But it is a striking feature of the speech that those appeals frequently do not hold up to scrutiny. The argument about the army is evasive. First, it is short. Of Castor's three main charges, Cicero spends most of his time in the speech refuting the charge that Deiotarus had planned to murder Caesar (15–21); but geopolitical untrustworthiness, and in particular demonstrable or probable hostility, were likely to have figured more significantly in Castor's presentation: it must have been clear

⁵³ *Deiot.* 28.

⁵⁴ Tunic and shaving: Suet. *Div. Iul.* 45; Perfume: Suet. *Div. Iul.* 67.

⁵⁵ *Rhet. Her.* 2.3.

⁵⁶ *Rhet. Her.* 2.8.

to Castor, as it surely was to Caesar himself, that Deiotarus might not have another chance to get close to Caesar's person, but that, if he was hostile, he would have ample opportunity to work against Caesar's interests. It is therefore all the more peculiar that Cicero draws attention to his own brevity (*de exercitu brevi dicam*).

Second, Cicero flips the charges about the army: doubtless the main charge was that Deiotarus had sent aid to Bassus, not that he had raised a 'large army'. The existence of the army is the issue, not its size; its size is a red herring, as Caesar must have seen. Cicero also imagines that Deiotarus would not have given Bassus any regard because he knew all the important Romans (*quem* [sc. *Caecilium*] *profecto is qui optime nostros homines novit vel quia non nosset vel si nosset contemneret*, 23)—but Deiotarus' assessment of Bassus' character was hardly relevant to his geopolitical calculations. Bassus had two legions under his command and was nearby. It was prudent to appease him.

The charge of attempted murder Cicero attacks from many angles. To name here only some: Deiotarus would never have done something that would rouse the world against him (15); he is upstanding, as everyone knows, and thus would never have conceived such a plan (16); it would have been easier to use poison (18); if Caesar searches his memory, he will recall nothing amiss at the dinner (20); the accusers' claim that by sheer luck Caesar twice avoided the room where the assassins were waiting makes no sense (19, 21)—that story is like the plot of a novel (*at quam festive crimen contexitur*, 18). The arguments are at root a 'dilemma', in which exclusive alternatives are each disproved.⁵⁷ Deiotarus wouldn't have wanted to do it; but if he had wanted to do it, he would have devised a better plan. That is a structure of which Cicero is fond in defense cases and not in itself a sign of obfuscation.⁵⁸

The problem is that neither half of the dilemma really holds up. For example, it would have been savage, Cicero imagines, for Deiotarus to even want to murder Caesar: that would mean that he 'did not fear the conqueror of the world' (*victorem orbis terrarum non extimescere*, 16). But when Caesar was at Blucium in 47, the Pompeians still held Africa and Spain. The world had not been conquered. Cicero's phrase retrojects onto Deiotarus a confidence in Caesar's final victory that Caesar surely suspected Deiotarus did not then have. As for moving men from one spot to another, Deiotarus certainly could have done so (21); but it is logical to assume that if there was a plan, it would have included not only the killing but also other elements: for example, separating Caesar from his retinue; putting Caesar in a vulnerable position; concealing the crime from them as long as possible; setting up a scapegoat; and escaping. A sudden change of venue might have

⁵⁷ *Rhet. Her.* 4.52 calls the related figure of thought *divisio*.

⁵⁸ See Craig 1993.

affected such aspects of the plan. Clytemnestra had the axe the whole time, but Agamemnon was much harder to kill in the courtyard than in the bathtub.

The arguments used to refute the third charge, that Deiotarus recited nasty verse and danced naked out of joy at Caesar's travails, are likewise unpersuasive. Deiotarus, claims Cicero, could not have recited the verse for three reasons. First, the verse is 'brutal' or 'savage' (*immanis*), but Deiotarus is 'mild' (*mansuetus*). But, as Caesar well knew, the politics of Asia Minor were brutal, and the sentiment of the verse suited them quite well. Second, Cicero posits a kind of model of friendship in which it has transitive properties: if A is friendly to B, and B is friendly to C, then A must also be friendly to C. Roman *amicitia*, of course, did not work that way (nor does human friendship generally; otherwise we would all be friends with our friends' friends on Facebook). Third, Cicero claims that Caesar's mercy earned Deiotarus' gratitude. That was surely what Caesar hoped, but he doubtless also knew it was not always the case. As for the dancing, Deiotarus, says Cicero, wouldn't have danced naked because he is frugal, and *frugalitas* means restraint and temperance. That is manifestly untrue. In the late Republic *frugalitas* was quite close to English 'frugality'.⁵⁹ That is, it was a narrowly pecuniary virtue, the opposite of *luxuria*. Furthermore, in other rhetorical contexts, Cicero assigns *frugalitas* to the past, to the countryside, and to *novi homines*—that is, to people who, for various reasons were *unable* to 'keep up with Joneses'.⁶⁰ That is, *frugalitas* is not only pecuniary, it is often also a virtue born in the first instance of necessity, and it really doesn't have much to do with naked dancing as such, except in the loose sense that Hellenized symposia were expensive; still less does *frugalitas* have to do with Deiotarus' alleged hostility to Caesar.

⁵⁹ *Frug-* in older Latin does indeed seem to show a broader sense that is near to Cicero's; at all events *frugi* can serve as the opposite of *malus*, *nequam* and *improbus*. Cf. *si malus aut nequamst, male res vortunt quas agit: | Sin autem frugist, eveniunt frugaliter* (Pl. Pers. 452–3), *ut enim frugi servo detur potius quam servo improbo* (Pl. Cas. 268). It is not clear, however, that *frugi* in this sense is an unrestricted approbative, since many of the instances are applied to slaves. Cf. the examples that appear in the TLL 6.1. 1457.7–16, e.g. *ita servom par videtur frugi sese instituere* (Pl. Amph. 959), *servi facinus frugi* (Au. 587), *servo frugi* (Cas. 255).

⁶⁰ PAST: *iam vero hominum ipsorum iudices ea patientia virtus frugalitas que est ut proxime ad nostram disciplinam illam veterem, non ad hanc quae nunc increbuit videantur accedere* (Ver. 2.7.173). Cf. *Sed non haec, inquit, villa, quam aedificaverunt maiores nostri, frugalior ac melior est quam tua illa perpolita in Reatinolē* (Varro Rust. 3.2.3), *omnibus tribus his generibus sunt bini gradus: superiores, quos frugalitas antiquae, inferiores, quos luxuria posterior adiecit* (Rust. 3.3.6), *antiqua frugalitas*, Sen. (Consol. Polyb. 11[12].3.5), *cum parior apud priscos esset frugalitas* (Colum. 10 praef. 1), *imaginem quandam priscæ frugalitatis* (Plin. 1.22.4). COUNTRYSIDE: *aratoribus laboriosissimis frugalissimisque hominibus* (Ver. 2.3.86), *homines sunt tota ex Asia frugalissimi sanctissimi, a Graecorum luxuria et levitate remotissimi, patres familias suo contenti, aratores rustici* (Flac. 71). On the previous two categories: *Italia, quae multum adhuc verecundiae, frugalitatis atque etiam rusticitatis antiquae retinet* (Plin. Ep. 1.14.4). *novi homines: odistis hominum novorum industriam, despiciitis eorum frugalitatem, pudorem contemnitis* (Ver. 2.3.7).

It's hard to escape the impression that such arguments were not even intended to work as arguments in any strict sense—that is, to actually persuade Caesar. He would have seen their defects instantly. He was, after all, politically astute, rhetorically accomplished, and intellectually perceptive. To me, the arguments sometimes seem to have the perverse effect of drawing attention to the probability of the charges. But it is not enough to see *that* the arguments are weak; rather, the question should be *how* they are weak. That is, are there *patterns* of weakness that point to Cicero's deep rhetorical strategy? Do some or all of the weak arguments have commonalities that make clear what Cicero is doing? If the arguments are not supposed to work as arguments, then what is the work that they *are* doing?

To those questions there is, I think, a tolerably precise answer. And here we return to the circumstances of the speech, specifically to Caesar's position, politically and literally. Politically he was alone atop the Roman Republican world: he held its highest office, and permanently; the functions of the state were collapsed into him. And literally speaking, Caesar was at home, in his own house; that was where he held the hearing. Now, Caesar might have had good reasons not to hold the hearing more openly: an (apparent) ally whose help might be needed on a Parthian campaign would have been embarrassed; and alleged plans to rebel against Caesar or murder him would have been aired in a public forum. And of course the specific legal form of the meeting might have allowed a closed or limited venue. But Roman culture was sensitive to the symbolic expression of political status. This is a sensitivity that is in fact expressed in our speech. Blesamius, Deiotarus' agent in Rome, had reported to him that Caesar was *in invidia* in the city: the placement of his statue among those of the kings had given offense, and he was not receiving applause on public occasions (33). In such a culture, Caesar's choice to hold a hearing in his own house could be taken as a symbolic assertion of his own singularity. Caesar, on that view, had made the political domestic. That, I suggest, is where Cicero's rhetorical approach comes from: he reverses the equation. Where Caesar made the political domestic, Cicero makes the domestic political. It is as if Cicero concluded that, (a) if public argument and debate were now foreclosed, and (b) if therefore political judgments now depended on one man's personal decisions, (c) then that brought political decisions very close to questions of taste and sensibility, which in turn made taste and sensibility a valuable and even necessary source of arguments.

Let me expand on the elements of that idea—first, (a) that 'public argument and debate is now foreclosed'. That is exactly the situation described in the *exordium*. Cicero begins his speech by detailing the difficulties of pleading the case. He is pleading for a king (1) and an honored king at that (2); and the king has cruel and unworthy accusers, including Castor, his own grandson (2), and a slave (3). Furthermore, the king's alleged victim, Caesar, is also the judge (4), and the case is

being heard inside Caesar's house (5). It is to this last difficulty, at the end of the *exordium*, that Cicero devotes the most attention:

I am troubled, too, by the very strangeness of the location: the case is far more important than any other ever argued in public debates, yet I must argue inside the walls of a private house—outside of the full gatherings that are the arena for an orator's talents. I must be satisfied with your eyes, your face and expressions, must gaze upon you and only you; to you and only you must the whole speech be directed. That certainly gives me very ample reason for hoping we shall come to the truth—but rather less room to fire the spirit, to thrust and contend like an orator. For if I were pleading this case in the forum, C. Caesar, even if you were listening and raising questions, what energy the assembly of the Roman people would bring me! For what citizen would not be well disposed to a king whose whole life he remembered was spent in the wars of the Roman people? I would see the senate house (*curiam*), gaze upon the forum (*forum*), call upon the very sky (*caelum*)! Then, as I recalled the rewards Deiotarus received from the immortal gods (*deorum immortalium*), from the Roman people (*populi Romani*), and from the senate (*senatus*), there would be no way speech could fail me. But all that is curtailed by the walls of a house; the case may be important, but the setting gives no room for dramatic pleading; and thus it falls to you, Caesar—an experienced speaker, after all—to imagine for yourself how I must feel. In that way, not only your sense of justice, but also your careful attention can reduce this anxiety of mine.⁶¹

This passage is not built of platitudes but implies a complex dynamic. The energy Cicero awakens is, at least in part, a redirection of the energy the people provide him (*quantam mihi alacritatem populi Romani concursus adferret*).⁶² That inter-

⁶¹ 5. Moveor etiam loci ipsius insolentia, quod tantam causam quanta nulla umquam in disceptatione versata est dico intra domesticos parietes, dico extra conventum et eam frequentiam in qua oratorum studia niti solent: in tuis oculis, in tuo ore voltuque acquiesco, te unum intueor, ad te unum omnis spectat oratio: quae mihi ad spem obtinendae veritatis gravissima sunt, ad motum animi et ad omnem impetum dicendi contentionemque leviora. 6. Hanc enim, C. Caesar, causam si in foro dicerem eodem audiente et disceptante te, quantam mihi alacritatem populi Romani concursus adferret! Quis enim civis ei regi non faveret cuius omnem aetatem in populi Romani bellis consumptam esse meminisset? Spectarem curiam, intuerer forum, caelum denique testarer ipsum. Sic, cum et deorum immortalium et populi Romani et senatus beneficia in regem Deiotarum recorderer, nullo modo mihi deesse posset oratio. 7. Quae quoniam angustiora parietes faciunt actioque maximae causae debilitatur loco, tuum est, Caesar, qui pro multis saepe dixisti, quid mihi nunc animi sit ad te ipsum referre, quo facilius cum aequitas tua tum audiendi diligentia minuat hanc perturbationem meam.

⁶² Cicero uses *alacritas* in the *Philippics* to represent the 'energy' of the people in a comparable way: *frequentia vestrum incredibilis, Quirites, contioque tanta quantam meminisse non videor et alacritatem mihi summam defendendae rei publicae adfert et spem recuperandae* (Phil. 4.1). In two other instances it is resident in them: *eos consules habemus, eam populi Romani alacritatem, eum consensum Italiae, eos duces, eos exercitus, ut nullam calamitatem res publica accipere possit sine culpa senatus* (Phil. 7.20), *di immortales! qui ille nuntius, quae illae litterae, quae laetitia senatus, quae alacritas civitatis erat! nihil umquam vidi tam omnium consensione laudatum* (ad Brut. 2.5). The word is not otherwise a part of Cicero's theoretical language of rhetoric; in philosophical works it corresponds to ἡδονή.

play between orator and people extends to the content of the speech. The people would not have been hearing of Deiotarus' faithful service for the first time: rather, they had memories of their own (*meminisset*). Cicero's task would have been to use his rhetorical skill to reinforce and justify those memories. He would have done by enumerating, in his own act of memory (*recordarer*), the categories of favors Deiotarus enjoyed—a typical form of *amplificatio*. And Cicero's act of memory would be jogged by the environs: the three kinds of benefits match three elements of the scene (*curiam ~ senatus, forum ~ populi Romani, caelum ~ deorum immortalium*). In the model of oratory implicit in this passage, then, the orator is not a puppeteer; rather, he depends upon the audience's energy and knowledge, directing the former and refining the latter by way of his own knowledge of rhetorical technique and history. He is an augmented and incarnate version of the people.

But now, in Caesar's house, arguments that depend on the refinement of collective memory in the presence of the collective recalling benefits to that collective are not possible. What arguments are possible? That depends on understanding the context, which means, not only what the context actually was, but what Cicero represents it to be. And for Cicero Caesar has replaced the civic hierarchy. *In tuis oculis, in tuo ore voltuque acquiesco*, he says, *te unum intueor, ad te unum omnis spectat oratio*. ("I must be satisfied with your eyes, your face and expressions, must gaze upon you and only you; to you and only you must the whole speech be directed"). The tricolon is not empty amplification. Rather, echoes of language and correspondence of structure suggest that Caesar has replaced civic space as the source of Cicero's energy:

spectarem curiam	ad te unum omnis spectat oratio
intuerer forum	te unum intueor
caelum denique testarer ipsum	in tuis oculis, in tuo ore voltuque acquiesco

The last pair deserves special notice. The gods are no longer the warrant for Cicero's claims; it is as if Caesar has usurped that function. Whether that usurpation is another trace of the birth of imperial ideology, of which there are many traces in the late Republic, is a question I here leave aside.

In short, (b) 'political judgments now depended on one man's personal decisions'. What sorts of arguments are therefore possible? One possible approach is deference or even obeisance: to profess confidence in or respect for Caesar's justice or decency. That approach does appear in the speech. For example, when Cicero confesses that he is anxious that Caesar is both judge and plaintiff, he also maintains that 'this inequitable circumstance becomes entirely equitable thanks to your prudence' (*re enim iniquum est, sed tua sapientia fit aequissimum*, 4). Likewise, Caesar could not truly be considered a tyrant, as Deiotarus' agent had reported, because his victory was not marked by the killings that had followed other victo-

ries in civil wars (33). Or again, Caesar's compassion does not need to be evoked; it comes to him naturally (40).

But that deference is not the only approach Cicero uses. Rather, he also exploits—and redefines—the context: Caesar's house. If private houses prevented certain kinds of discourse, they also allow and even encourage others. They were the appropriate venue for philosophical and literary conversations and for declamation. They were the appropriate venue for intellectual interchange, a regular feature of the *convivia* of the elite. This, of course, was not a *convivium* but a hearing. And it was not really taking place *intra domesticos parietes*, which implies ordinary domestic space; rather, Caesar was then *pontifex maximus*, and he lived in the *Regia*, which stood in a very prominent location. This was not a private townhouse, still less a country villa. But Cicero, I submit, pretends, or half-pretends, that the venue is a *domus* of exactly that kind. He speaks as if he were in a place where intellectual intimacy is a chief value, and taste and sensibility are important valuing standards—let me call it the world of the deipnosophist. In other words, (c) political decisions are now very close to questions of taste and sensibility. This, to my mind, is a response to Caesar's supremacy that is almost impish. It is as if, as part of his *inventio*, Cicero's thoughts ran something like this: 'You, Caesar, have closed the doors of your house to public recollections and to the energy of the street; that means you are running politics like a *salon*; that must mean one moral valuing standard you think is appropriate is that of the dinner table; and it must mean that the voice you wish to hear is the voice of a *saloniste*; I shall be glad to provide you with such a voice.' This is, *mutatis mutandis*, the very kind of conceit that underlies much Hellenistic poetry and that Caesar surely would have understood. Is there is a mark of this affect in *acquiesco*? Cicero does not use *acquiesco* metaphorically until the end of his life.⁶³ The context is typically one of turmoil or difficulty; the verb describes, not simple 'rest,' but 'respite' or 'relief' ('*motu animi liberari*,' *TLL* 1.0.423.38). But the sources of the comfort are noteworthy: they are virtually always philosophy,⁶⁴ conceived of as a relief and departure from the strains of political life; and letters to or from friends.⁶⁵ That is, *acquiesco* suits intellectual and personal intimacy of the very kind that I am suggesting is critical to the arguments of the *Deiotariana*. The word seems to imply not simple 'rest' but a certain sort of relationship between Caesar and Cicero.

⁶³ *TLL* 1.0.423.37–61.

⁶⁴ *Div.* 2.5, *Fam.* 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 9.3.2. Cf. *Fin.* 3.6, *in nomine tuo*, of Brutus, whom Cicero *habe[t] aequissimum eorum studiorum, quae mihi communia tecum sunt, existimatorem et iudicem*. Similarly *Att.* 12.18.1 of the shrine Cicero intends to build to his dead daughter's memory, of which he writes *habeo ... nihil temptatis rebus omnibus in quo acquiescam*; by means of that shrine *profecto illam consecrabo omni genere monumentorum ab omnium ingenii sumptorum et Graecorum et Latinorum*.

⁶⁵ *Att.* 7.12.3, 9.10.1, 9.10.10, 11.10.2, 13.13.13.

Deipnosophism

Let us return from this point of view to some of the arguments which I described above as weak. Cicero, as we have seen, claims that Deiotarus would not have recited a ‘savage’ verse (*immanis*) because he is mild (*mansuetus*). From the point of view of rhetorical theory, that is an argument *ex probabili*, but it is simply stated rather than really argued. I suggest, however, that Cicero’s argument is considerably more substantial than it might appear—but only if it is viewed in the light of the verbal conventions, not of the courtroom or hearing, but of the sophisticated dinner party. Among the customary diversions of such parties were verbal play, for example involving double meanings, and literary criticism. The full meaning of Cicero’s assertions do not appear, in my view, unless his language is read in terms of exactly those practices.

The effect begins with the very compactness of the assertion *ipse enim mansuetus, versus immanis*. *Mansuetus* and *immanis* are sometimes contrasted, but never in Cicero are they so close to each other. The words share a very similar syllable,⁶⁶ so that their proximity makes a partial rhyme (whence my translation ‘A line so wild from a man so mild’; perhaps closer to the effect is ‘A line of such malice from a man of such polish’). The result is to draw the listener’s attention, not only to the idea, but also to those particular words (especially if Cicero somehow emphasized them, as I can’t help thinking that he did). The rhyme does with sound what underlining does with ink.

The emphasis sets those two particular words before the hearer’s mind, like themes for what is to follow. Their denotations and connotations can come more easily into play. Thus with *immanis*. The word has two poles of meaning, ‘wild, savage’ and ‘huge, vast, disproportionate’.⁶⁷ A particular kind of ‘disproportion’ or ‘ungainliness’ is sometimes meant. Quintilian recognizes *immanitas* as a fault of voice, classing it with rough, and thick, as opposed to thin, soft, or high, sounds: *deinde* [sc. *vox*] *non subsurda rudis inmanis dura rigida rava praepinguis, aut tenuis inanis acerba pusilla mollis effeminata* (Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.32).⁶⁸ With *immanis* he seems to have in mind a ‘groaning’ or ‘rumbling’ quality,⁶⁹ perhaps like what

⁶⁶ The syllables were not perfectly identical: *mānsuētus* was probably *mā[n]suētus* (i.e. the vowel was probably nasalized and the -n- may not have been realized as a full consonant).

⁶⁷ *TLL* 7.1.439.28–9 ‘I praevalet notio saevitiae, crudelitatis (de moribus sim.) vel dirlitatis, atrocitatis sim. (de aspectu)’; 7.1.330.43–4 ‘II praevalet notio enormitatis i.q. modum excedens, ingens, nimius.’

⁶⁸ Loeb: ‘if it is not, on the one hand, dull, ill-formed, coarse, hard, stiff, hoarse, or thick, or, on the other hand, thin, empty, grating, feeble, soft, or effeminate.’

⁶⁹ Cf. *fit sonus inmanisque pedum tenuisque rotarum* (Stat. *Theb.* 6.420) where *inmanis* applies to marching feet and is contrasted to *tenuis*, the ‘thin’ or perhaps ‘shrill’ or ‘high,’ sound of the wheels.

linguists now call ‘creaky voice’ or ‘glottal fry.’ At any rate *immanis* is elsewhere attracted to roars and groans, as in Vergil’s description of a wave: *utque volutus | ad terras immane sonat per saxa* (*Georg.* 3.38–9, sc. *fluctus*).⁷⁰

On first glance it might seem that only the first sense of the word is appropriate to our verse. Its meaning, with its callous disregard for the death of friends, is obviously ‘savage’ or ‘brutal.’ But the other meaning is also appropriate. The form of the verse is ‘ungainly’ and ‘clumsy,’ or, if the auditory meaning can be retrojected to Cicero, even ‘roaring’: the technique of the verse is not smooth. The Greek original is probably the partial trimeter attested in Plutarch, ἐρρέτω φίλος σὺν ἐχθροῖς.⁷¹ Cicero’s Latin version of the verse, an iambic senarius, has three elisions after the caesura (*pereant | ami | ci, † d[um] ini | mic[i] un[a] | inter | cidant*). By Cicero’s time that pattern of elisions would probably have seemed rough.⁷² It is possible to be more specific: in the 106 other iambic senarii composed by Cicero himself, only five lines have a comparable pattern of elisions—and then, it seems, only when a special effect was being sought. All five lines come from a passage with an agonized speaker. In the *Tusculan Disputations* (2.20)—the dialogue Cicero was working on at the same time as this speech—Cicero translates from Sophocles’ *Trachiniae* 1046 ff. the words of Hercules just after he has donned the fatal cloak dipped in Centaur’s blood. Two of the lines occur together and describe Heracles’ torment:

iam de | color | em † san | guin[em] om[ni] | [em] exsor | buit:
sic corp | us † clad[e] | horribil[i] | absumpt | [um] exta | buit

⁷⁰ Cf. *TLL* 7.1.441.28–35 (‘vehemens de sono’); so *mons parturibat, gemitus immanes ciens* (Phaedr. 4.23.1), *inter utrumque fremunt inmani murmure venti* (Ov. *Trist.* 1.2.25), *barbaricum atque immane gemens* (Sil. 12.456), *inmania frementem leonem* (Amm. Marc. 22.16.16). Statius applies the word to clashing or clanging (*quis duri silicis gravisque ferri | immanis sonus*, *Silv.* 4.3.1–3) and to a low rumble or drone (*Theb.* 6.420, previous note; cf. *ex susurris inmaniter strepentis exercitus*, Amm. Marc. 16.6.1). On the evidence of Quintilian, where *immanis* plainly refers to a specific quality of voice, I take *immanis* in these instances to refer not only to the size, but also to the quality, of the sounds described; to put it another way, I see expressions like *immane gemens* as constituting a (partial) cognate accusative (‘groaning a roar[ing sound]’).

⁷¹ = *adesp.* 363 Nauck. The proverb is also attested in the form ἀπόλοιτο καὶ φίλος σὺν ἐχθροῖς. I am prepared to suggest that Cicero translated the text into Latin in the original discourse context. Lebreton 1938: 7 speculates that chez Cicero Cicero recited the verse in Greek, with whom he did use Greek in a letter (*Fam.* 13.15), but substituted the Latin for publication. But that leaves unanswered the question, why even quote the verse at all? Cicero might easily have paraphrased (‘... that Deiotarus registered satisfaction ...’) or summarized the verse’s content (‘... a verse which expresses delight in the misfortune ...’) or its character (‘an unseemly verse’). Quoting the verse in full, in any language, in order to argue against it was not only unnecessary but served the prosecution’s purposes by recalling to Caesar a vivid symbol of Deiotarus’ (allegedly) brutal pragmatism. It is precisely the translation of the verse into Latin, as I will argue, that is meant to alter the way the verse seems—one piece of a semiotic strategy that it is the purpose of this article to describe.

⁷² For a full study of Cicero’s handling of the senarius, see Soubiran 1984: 69–80.

‘[By the cloak] has all my pale⁷³ blood already been drained away.
thus my body consumed by horrific ruin has wasted away.’

Another describes a monstrous victim of Hercules’ hand:

Haec interemit tortu multiplicabili

Dracon| [em] aurifer| [am] optu| t[u] adserv| ant[em] ar| borem?

‘Was it this hand that slew in its manifold twist

the dracon guarding by its gaze the gold-bearing tree?’

In two other instances, the monstrosity is present lexically: *non Grai| a vis| , † non barb| ar[a] ul| l[a] inman| itas* ‘not the might of Greece, not any barbarian savagery’; and *quas peragr| ans † und| iqu[e] omn| [em] ecferi| tat[em] ex| puli* ‘Which traversing, everywhere I drove out every monstrosity.’ For Cicero, eliding all possible vowels in the second hemistich of a senarius, perhaps especially with a four-syllable word at line end, evidently gave the effect of something grim or ungainly, which he used to describe or symbolize monstrosity.⁷⁴ Broadly comparable in effect is Vergil’s famous *monstr[um] hor| rend[um], in| form[e], in| gens, cui| lumen ad| emptum* (*Aen.* 3.658) of Polyphemus.

In short, the verse is *immanis* in two senses: in sentiment ‘savage’ and in technique ‘ungainly’. Both main elements of the meaning of that word are brought into play precisely by quoting the verse in Latin in its ungainly and probably antiquated form. And it is that form, I suggest, that makes the argument: it preserves the content of the original line but recasts its associations. Recasting the line makes its aesthetics symbolic of Cicero’s interpretation of Deiotarus’ character. From the unsentimental minimalism of the original Greek—the form in which Castor surely quoted the verse—we have instead a roughish line that would men of taste would not take as a motto. That recasting has three effects. First, Deiotarus implicitly becomes one of those men of taste. Second, aesthetics and politics are conflated: men of taste don’t utter crude lines, be they crude in technique or crude in sentiment. And third, Caesar and Cicero’s superiority is implied: judging who has taste implies that one is oneself a man of taste.

Those effects shed clearer light on *mansuetus*—for it, too, is used in more than one sense. Why *mansuetus* and not *mitis* or *clemens*? *Mansuetus* originally meant ‘tamed’ or ‘domesticated,’ like animals (**manu-sueto-* ‘made used to the hand,’ like Greek χειροθήτης). The word was extended to mean ‘calm’ or ‘placid’ and

⁷³ Sophocles has χλωρόν αἷμά μου, apparently ‘my fresh blood’ (so Jebb). Cicero seems to have taken χλωρός in the sense ‘pale, colorless’ (so Ewbank)—with the accusative perhaps felt by Cicero as one of effect (‘[The cloak] has soaked up all my blood into colorlessness’ = ‘soaked it up and taken away its color’)?

⁷⁴ The particular case ending elided may have contributed to the effect of harshness: Cicero quite liberally elides oblique cases but elides a nominative only once, *noctem| paven| tes † timi| d[i] adnec| tunt na| vitae*.

sometimes extended further to mean ‘kind’ or ‘civilized’⁷⁵ (like Greek ἡμερος). Just as two senses of *immanis* apply to the verse, so multiple senses of *mansuetus* apply to Deiotarus: he is ‘clement’ in his exercise of power; he is ‘civilized’ in his cultural norms; he is perhaps even ‘placid’ in his literary tastes (Cicero uses *mansuetus* of the Muses of philosophical writing).⁷⁶ Deiotarus, who is ‘one of us’, would not revel in brutality nor traffic in poetry that is aesthetically and morally ugly. Here, then, is the second effect just noticed: aesthetics and politics are conflated. *Mansuetus* bridges both domains.

Another linguistic feature of *mansuetus* is also relevant. The word never fully grew away from its morphosemantic category: a participle that implies a change of state. That is, the word describes not being in a condition *tout court* but having entered a condition and therefore having left off some other. These connotations are clear enough in many attestations. Even in its metaphorical meaning *mansuetus* means not simply ‘kind’ but connotes ‘with aggression repressed,’ be it through one’s own agency or another’s. The *Rhet. Her.*, for example, uses the word of a magistrate who avoids cruelty in his exercise of power.⁷⁷ Cicero uses it of peoples who have become civilized.⁷⁸ He also uses it, as I noted, of the Muses of philosophical writing—as distinct from oratory and thus a symbol, not just of writing, but of writing that sets aggression aside.⁷⁹ Deiotarus has been *assimilated* to high culture: he has left the brutality and tastelessness of Galatian culture behind. Here is again the third effect just noticed: whether or not that is true is not a judgment for Deiotarus himself but for Cicero and Caesar. It is the master who decides who is tame.

My interpretation imagines Cicero playing a fairly sophisticated literary game with Caesar. Whether that interpretation is correct in all its details, the two men obviously shared a literary culture; and, more to the point, elsewhere

⁷⁵ ‘Kind’: TLL 8.0.330.67 i. q. *placidus, mitis, clemens* (for examples, cf. n. 77); ‘Civilized’: TLL 8.0.330.56 2 *latiore sensu fere i. q. cultus, civilis* (for examples, cf. n. 78).

⁷⁶ *Scripsi etiam—nam ab orationibus diiungo me fere referoque ad mansuetiores Musas, quae me nunc maxime, sicut iam a prima adolescentia delectarunt—scripsi igitur Aristotelio more, quemadmodum quidem volui, tres libros in disputatione ac dialogo ‘de oratore’* (Fam. 1.9.23). Cf. Cic. Orat. 62–3, Prop. 1.9.11–12.

⁷⁷ *Ipse ... supplex mansuetus et misericors in potestatibus ostendetur fuisse* (Rhet. Her. 2.25). Cf. *illud quaero, cur tam mansuetus in senatu fuerit, cum in edictis tam ferus fuisset* (Phil. 2.23), likewise *agri denique ipsi tam beneficium, tam salutarem, tam mansuetum civem desiderant* (Mil. 20), *ut et acerrimus in Caepionis invidia renovanda et in meis moribus erga meos necessarios declarandis mansuetissimus viderer* (de Orat. 2.201).

⁷⁸ *Deinde propter rationem atque orationem studiosius audientes ex feris et inmanibus mites reddidit et mansuetos* (Inv. 1.2), cf. *nulla gens est neque tam mansueta neque tam fera ...* (Leg. 1.24), as two developmental poles of human culture.

⁷⁹ It is worth quoting Propertius: *plus in amore valet Mimnermi versus Homero: | carmina mansuetus lenia quaerit Amor* (1.9.11–12).

in the speech Cicero appeals to their shared knowledge of literary criticism. The instances are worth recalling here. When Cicero first heard Deiotarus would be accused of attempted murder, he surmised that poison was involved: 'But I have to tell you, Caesar, that at first, when the way I was given to understand the case was that Phidippus—a physician and a royal slave who had arrived as a part of [Deiotarus'] delegation—had been corrupted by that young man, this is the suspicion that struck me: "He suborned the physician as a witness, and he's going to make up some kind of charge involving poison." Not that that's in any way true, but it's a typical way of making accusations."⁸⁰ Cicero is not simply making a counterargument from probability, that poison would have been easier to use; rather, he is predicting an opponent's gambit based on experience and putting that process of prediction on display in a way that would be appreciated by another lawyer. The argument is not rhetorical but metarhetorical. Caesar and Cicero are members of the same guild.

There is another similar moment shortly thereafter. The allegation about attempted murder included the claim that Deiotarus had set an ambush in a room in which gifts for Caesar were laid out but that Caesar had avoided the attack. In the words Cicero puts in Castor's mouth, 'You were saved by the same good fortune which has often saved you: you said you weren't ready to have a look just then' (*tua te, inquit, eadem quae saepe fortuna servavit: negavisti tum te inspicere velle*, 19). Cicero mocks the claim, asserting 'But what a cleverly crafted indictment!' (*at quam festive crimen contextitur!*). *Festivus* carries the point. *Festivus* is something of a technical term for 'entertaining' or 'engaging' narratives. Thus the *Rhet. Her.*, where 'narratives about persons' (*illud genus narrationis, quod in personis positum est* = διήγησις κατὰ πρόσωπα) must have, among other things, *sermonis festivitas* 'an entertaining style' (1.13). Cicero gives a full description of the features such a narrative must have, which include 'hidden motives' (*dissimulatio*), 'changes of fortune' (*fortunae commutatio*), and a 'happy outcome' (*iucundus exitus rerum*).⁸¹ *Festivus*, in short, is a term of rhetorical criticism. *Festivus*, like *mansuetus*, links Caesar and Cicero as discriminating judges, here excluding rather than including—but the exclusivity of their own group remains the same.

⁸⁰ *Ego mehercules, Caesar, initio, cum est ad me ita causa delata, Phidippum medicum, servum regium, qui cum legatis missus esset, ab isto adolescente esse corruptum, hac sum suspitione percussus: 'Medicum indicem subornavit; finget videlicet aliquod crimen veneni.' Etsi a veritate longe, tamen a consuetudine criminandi non multum res abhorrebat* (17).

⁸¹ *Hoc in genere narrationis multa debet inesse festivitas, confecta ex rerum uarietate, animorum dissimilitudine, gravitate, lenitate, spe, metu, suspitione, desiderio, dissimulatione, errore, misericordia, fortunae commutatione, insperato incommodo, subita laetitia, iucundo exitu rerum* (Inv. 1.27), *sed et festivitatem habet narratio distincta personis et interpuncta sermonibus* (*de Orat.* 2.328). *Festivitas* is also a characteristic of extended narrative humor (*de Orat.* 2.219, 1.243).

Of course Cicero's appeal to taste and sensibility does not really disprove Castor's allegation about the verse. That kind of allegation—about an event that supposedly happened in Deiotarus' court—was in any event almost impossible to disprove. But Cicero's objective, so it seems to me, is not 'proof' but a kind of ethical restructuring—or, as I put it above, since political decisions are now 'very close to questions of taste and sensibility', then 'taste and sensibility are a valuable and even necessary source of arguments'. Cicero makes space for different valuing standards—and for another kind of *ex probabili* argument. Instead of a scheming petty king, Deiotarus becomes a Gentleman, Third Class. Here, as in classical invective, which does not fabricate but exaggerates, there must be a grain of truth: Deiotarus, who was, after all, known to many Romans of high station, must have been elegant enough in manners to provide Cicero with a point of departure. I noted above three effects of Cicero's aestheticizing arguments. Perhaps there is also a fourth. Cicero's voice, paradoxically, highlights Caesar's solitariness: Cicero is speaking as if he and Caesar share tastes and sensibilities—but whether that is true is ultimately Caesar's own judgment. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. If Cicero makes Caesar think about beauty, Cicero is also making Caesar think about how he, Caesar, sees the world. That is a point to which I will return.

Philosophy

Literary criticism and verbal play were not the only kind of discourses appropriate to the elite *convivium*. Philosophical discourse also played an important role. A Menippean satire of Varro suggests that practical philosophy and not dialectic was the right kind.⁸² That, too, is a voice that Cicero affects and adopts. As we have seen, Cicero stretches the meaning of *frugalitas* to include *temperantia* and *moderatio*. He also does so elsewhere. These very same glosses on *frugalitas* appear in another passage:⁸³

⁸² Krostenko 2013: 113–139, esp. 118–21.

⁸³ *veri etiam simile illud est, qui sit temperans—quem Graeci σώφρονα appellant eamque virtutem σωφροσύνην vocant, quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, non numquam etiam modestiam; sed haud scio an recte ea virtus frugalitas appellari possit, quod angustius apud Graecos valet qui frugi homines χρησίμους appellant, id est tantum modo utilis; at illud est latius; omnis enim abstinentia, omnis innocentia (quae apud Graecos usitatum nomen nullum habet, sed habere potest ἀβλᾶβαιαν; nam est innocentia adfectio talis animi quae noceat nemini)—reliquas etiam virtutes frugalitas continet. Quae nisi tanta esset, et si is angustius, quibus plerique putant teneretur, numquam esset L. Pisonis cognomen tanto opere laudatum. ... Eius enim videtur esse proprium motus animi adpetentis regere et sedare semperque adversantem libidini moderatam in omni re servare constantiam. Cui contrarium vitium nequitia dicitur (Tusc. 3.16).*

[The foregoing] gives us a broadly accurate definition of the character of a temperate person—whom the Greeks call *sôphron*, and the virtue *sôphrosinê*. I myself sometimes name the virtue ‘temperance’ (*temperantia*), sometimes ‘moderation’ (*moderatio*), and occasionally even ‘modesty’ (*modestia*). But I rather think the virtue is properly called ‘frugality’ (*frugalitas*). That idea has a narrower range for the Greeks, who call frugal persons *chrêsimos*, which means no more than ‘useful’; ‘frugality,’ however, has a wider meaning.⁸⁴ For all self-restraint, all innocuousness (innocuousness has no regular name in Greek but might be called *ablabeia*, because innocuousness is the disposition ‘to harm (-blab-) no one (a-)’)⁸⁵—[these and] the other virtues as well come under the category of ‘frugality.’ If ‘frugality’ were not as important as I’m saying, and if it were as narrowly defined as many people suppose, it would have been no praiseworthy thing for L. Piso to have ‘Frugi’ as an agnomen. ... [The] chief characteristic [of *frugalitas*] is to guide and soothe the appetites and to preserve in all circumstances a constancy that is opposed to covetousness. The corresponding vice is ‘self-abandonment.’⁸⁶

The connection to Cicero’s defense of Deiotarus’ *frugalitas* is plain. The two passages share three features. Both passages use the same glosses, *temperantia* and *moderatio*. Both passages assign *frugalitas* major importance (in the speech, *virtutem maximam iudico*; here *reliquas ... virtutes frugalitas continet*). Both acknowledge that most people have a more limited view of *frugalitas* (in the speech, *ut volet quisque, accipiat*; here *si is angustiis, quibus plerique putant teneretur*), an acknowledgement that Cicero is stretching or rethinking the meaning. It is not surprising to find these shared features: the speech and the philosophical dialogue belong to the same year and perhaps even the same span of months, and the topic of *frugalitas* was obviously on Cicero’s mind.⁸⁷ That contemplation had an obvious source,

⁸⁴ Not originally: *frūgī*, a dative, was ‘for use, usable, suitable.’

⁸⁵ An etymological gloss: *in-noc-ens* ~ ἀ-βλάβ-εια. I translate ‘innocuousness’ rather than ‘innocence’ because the former preserves the etymological sense of the Latin, the former having shifted in sense to ‘free of guilt’.

⁸⁶ It is worth noting the continuation of the argument: *Sed quia, nec qui propter metum praesidium reliquit, quod est ignaviae, nec qui propter avaritiam clam depositum non reddidit, quod est iniustitiae, nec qui propter temeritatem male rem gessit, quod est stultitiae, frugi appellari solet, eo tris virtutes, fortitudinem iustitiam prudentiam, frugalitas complexa est (etsi hoc quidem commune est virtutum; omnes enim inter se nexae et iugatae sunt): reliqua igitur et quarta virtus [ut] sit ipsa frugalitas. Eius enim videtur esse proprium motus animi adpetentis regere et sedare semperque adversantem libidini moderatam in omni re servare constantiam. Cui contrarium vitium nequitia dicitur* ‘But since the name “temperate” is applied neither to someone who abandons his post out of fear (an example of cowardice), nor to someone who out of greed fails to return what was left with him secretly (an example of injustice), nor to someone who has handle affairs badly out of rashness (an example of stupidity), temperance comprises all three virtues: courage, justice and prudence (that is typical of virtues: they are all joined and interconnected with each other). In short, the fourth remaining virtue should be “temperance”. That is because its chief characteristic is to guide and soothe the appetites and to preserve in all circumstances a constancy that is opposed to covetousness. The corresponding vice is “self-abandonment”’ (*Tusc.* 3.17).

⁸⁷ For the dates of Cicero’s literary productions at the end of his life, cf. Durand 1903: 173–183.

made clear in the *Tusculans* passage: the language of Greek ethics and in particular the elusive and important σωφροσύνη.⁸⁸ Cicero's use of *frugalitas* in our speech, in short, is a sidewise glance at that word through the medium of philosophical language.

Why use that language here? The parallel of the verse is instructive. The culture of the Galatian aristocracy, as we have seen, was Hellenized or partly Hellenized, and, it would seem, Deiotarus embraced that culture with particular enthusiasm, enough to earn honors in Greek cities and the company of prominent Romans. That participation was semiotically polyvalent. It might be taken to mean that Deiotarus was relatively highly cultured; or it might be taken to mean that Deiotarus was simply particularly ambitious. Castor's accusation imagines a Deiotarus of the former kind; but Cicero's deipnosophistic defense implies a Deiotarus of the latter kind. That is, Cicero teases out an ambiguity in Deiotarus' persona and resolves it in his favor. The same can be said of Cicero's use of philosophical discourse here. Deiotarus, one may hazard, may not have appeared the most elegant of kings, not by the standards of courts farther west. Cicero implies, in a letter to Dolabella, that Deiotarus' hospitality gifts were 'little presents (*munuscul[a]*) loosely woven of thick thread'⁸⁹—not especially fine stuff, it appears. Here is a king who has *frugalitas* in the sense noticed above—'frugal', in a more or less pecuniary sense. That, paradoxically, may have made it all the more believable that he danced naked at a symposium as he was accused of doing: he had been mulcted of territory and was all the poorer (relatively). But Cicero, exploiting his thinking about the Latin philosophical vocabulary, invests Deiotarus' *frugalitas* with a deeper meaning, as being a mark of σωφροσύνη. Here, too, Cicero teases out an ambiguity in Deiotarus' persona and resolves it in his favor.

The same three effects noticed above can thus also be observed here, *mutatis mutandis*. Deiotarus becomes a man, here not of taste, but of wisdom. Second, politics is here conflated, not with aesthetics, but with philosophy: Deiotarus' slightness becomes, not a prod to an ambition that might have made him glad to see Caesar fall, but the mark of a restraint that would have made him unlikely to revel. And third, Caesar and Cicero's superiority is again implied. It is especially telling in that regard, to my mind, that whereas the *Tusculans* passage names

⁸⁸ Socrates' interlocutors in the *Charmides* offer four equally attractive but quite disparate definitions: calm orderliness (τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, 159b), modesty (δοκεῖ τοῖνον μοι, ἔφη, αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ αἰσχυνητῶν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰδώς ἢ σωφροσύνη, 160e), doing one's own business (ὅτι σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, 161b), and self-knowledge (τὸ γινώσκειν ἑαυτόν, 164d). Rademaker 2005, traces the development over time.

⁸⁹ *sed ego hospiti veteri et amico munusculum volui mittere levidense crasso filo, cuiusmodi ipsius solent esse munera* (Cic. *Fam.* 9.12.2)

σωφροσύνη overtly, our speech does not. Caesar would have known what Cicero had in mind without his naming it. Cicero, in Caesar's house, speaks here in a way, as the *Tusculans* passage makes clear, that is entirely typical of his philosophical works, where Greek technical vocabulary puts a strain on Latin, which almost cannot be understood without knowing the Greek first. That, to my mind, is a mark, not only of the philosophical culture that Cicero and Caesar shared, but also of their special status: they can communicate through calques and allusion. Such communication, like the language of literary criticism noticed above, draws a line around Caesar and Cicero. Cicero and Caesar, together, as if they were at table or in the villa, can use their rarefied theoretical knowledge to assign things to their proper categories. And therefore, just as with the verse, there is also a fourth effect. Cicero recognizes that the meaning he assigns to *frugalitas* and its application to a king can be questioned. That places the burden of interpreting Deiotarus onto Caesar. That is exactly what Caesar is asked to do when Cicero attempts to refute the charge of murder. Caesar is asked to plumb his recollections: *obsecro, Caesar, repete illius temporis memoriam, pone illum ante oculos diem, voltus hominum te intuentium atque admirantium recordare: num quae trepidatio? Num qui tumultus? Num quid nisi modeste, nisi quiete, nisi ex hominibus gravissimi et sanctissimi disciplina?* (20). The question is whether Deiotarus ran a moderate and calm dinner — in other words, a dinner that manifested σωφροσύνη. This is not Cicero using his memory to help the audience sharpen their shared memories of Deiotarus' service; this is Cicero using his and Caesar's knowledge of Greek philosophy to prompt Caesar's personal memory of Deiotarus' demeanor at table.

Sophism

Both the above passages, then, have an appeal to Cicero and Caesar's shared private culture, and both take advantage of the kinds of discourse permitted at a *convivium*, where literary criticism, verbal play, and philosophy were used to reaffirm interpersonal bonds. In my opinion those 'voices' register Cicero's view of the change in the ideological terrain caused by Caesar's collapsing of state functions into himself. While Cicero implies that he and Caesar are fellow savants, which of course they surely were, I have also been suggesting that Cicero's voices in these passages also highlight Caesar's isolation and the burden that now lies upon him. Caesar's isolation is illustrated by another 'voice' of Cicero's, which draws not upon what I have been calling the 'deipnosophistic', but which is something closer to 'sophistic' as usually meant: clever, witty, even elegant — and manifestly false. As we have seen, it is a striking feature of the speech that Cicero's appeals to *probabile* do not hold up to scrutiny. I noted above that in addressing the argument

that Deiotarus had sent aid to Caecilius Bassus, Cicero had claimed that Deiotarus wouldn't have sent aid to someone he held in low regard. It is worth looking at the argument entire:

At **misit** ad Caecilium nescio quem: sed eos, quos **misit**, quod ire noluerunt, in vincula coniecit. Non quaero, quam veri simile sit aut habuisse regem quos **mitteret** aut eos, quos **misisset**, non paruisse, aut, qui dicto audientes in tanta re non fuissent, eos vinctos potius quam necatos. Sed tamen cum ad Caecilium **mittebat**, utrum causam illam victam esse nesciebat an Caecilium istum magnum hominem putabat? Quem profecto is, qui optime nostros homines, vel novit quia non nosset vel si nosset, contemneret (24).

But, one could object, he **sent** [word] to this Caecilius fellow: but those he **sent** he cast into chains because they refused to go. I won't even ask if it's plausible that the king had people to **send**; or that those that were **sent** didn't obey; or that those who disobeyed orders in such an important matter were [only] bound and not executed. But, in any event, when he was trying to **send** [word] to Caecilius, what was the case: that he didn't know that that cause was lost, or that he was under the impression that this Caecilius was an important figure? But Deiotarus knows our men well: he would have disregarded him, whether because he hadn't come to know him or because he actually did know him!

Where above verbal play opened up a space for Cicero to defend Deiotarus, here the effect is different: verbal play is obfuscating. Cicero uses *mitto* evasively. *Mitto ad*, with no direct object, means 'open lines of communication with,' not 'send troops to.'⁹⁰ Cicero applies that collation to Deiotarus: *At misit ad Caecilium nescio quem* and *cum ad Caecilium mittebat*. That affects the meaning of *eos quos misit* and *eos quos misisset*, as if the sent parties were simply legates and emissaries and not soldiers. Verbal play also appears in the repetition of forms of *nosco*—and is also obfuscating. As I noted above, Deiotarus' assessment of Bassus' character was not relevant to his geopolitical calculations. But the echoing forms are a bid to introduce a frame of reference, personal connection.

Not only the verbiage but also the structure of the argument is obfuscating. Cicero appears to put forward two, apparently exclusive (*utrum ... an*), alternatives: Deiotarus may not have known the Pompeian side was vanquished or he may have had a high opinion of Caecilius. But these are not really alternatives. The second alternative is refuted on the grounds that Deiotarus would not have trafficked with the likes of Caecilius, whereas the first is allowed to stand. Thus the ostensible alternatives actually amount to just one argument: one puts forward a positive reason for Deiotarus' contacts with Caecilius; the other actually reinforces that reason by denying an alternative. As for the probability arguments

⁹⁰ Cf. *TLL* 8.1184.79–11.85.2 *expresse nuntios uel epistulas nuntiandi, mandandi, arcessendi, cognoscendi causa. a absolute* 8.1184.79–11.85.2.

(*non quaero quam veri simile sit ...*), they take the title that Caesar had allowed Deiotarus to retain—*rex*—as literally as possible, as if Deiotarus could and should issue a death sentence whenever he pleased. That is obviously unrealistic. He may well have felt unable to do so—a peremptory execution might, for example, have provoked resistance, according to who exactly was being executed—and he might not have wanted to execute insubordinate officers, legates, or troops for a host of other reasons.

It is difficult to imagine that all of this—Cicero's use of *mitto*, his repetition of *nosco*, the false dichotomy, the exaggeration of (or at least emphasis on) Deiotarus' kingly power—was not perfectly obvious to Caesar. Cicero's indirection seems to draw attention to the weakness of Deiotarus' position. It is almost a deliberately vain display of sophistic technique. That, I think, is exactly the case. Consider another example. The argument about the hostile verse, as we saw, ends as follows: 'And how was it that he was friendly to Domitius, if he really was unfriendly to you? And why would he *have* been unfriendly to *you*—the man who, by the laws of war, could even have killed him but who, as he recalled, established him and his son as king?' (*qui autem Domitio poterat esse amicus, qui tibi esset inimicus? Tibi porro inimicus cur esset a quo, cum vel interfici belli lege potuisset, regem et se et filium suum constitutos esse meminisset?* 25). As I have already noted, Cicero here posits a model of friendship with transitive properties, as though, if A is friendly to B, and B is friendly to C, then A must also be friendly to C; and he claims that Caesar's mercy earned Deiotarus' gratitude. This, too, strikes me as sophistic—a kind of twisting of the meaning of *amicus* to make it seem improbable that Deiotarus would be hostile. Again, it seems unlikely Caesar would not have noticed that sophistry, which, to my ear, is close to the pointed cleverness of the declamatory style.

Another passage is worth recalling here. Deiotarus had a man in Rome, one Blesamius, who kept him apprised of the pulse of the city; what he passed on was not flattering to Caesar:

What a clever collection of charges! 'Blesamius,' he says—an excellent man whom you know, whose name he used to speak ill of you—'wrote to the king on several occasions that you were regarded with ill-will; that you were thought a tyrant; that people were deeply upset that your statue was placed among the kings; that you had stopped being applauded [in public].' Isn't it obvious to you, Caesar, that [Deiotarus' accusers] have gathered up these allegations from the gossip of city malcontents? How could Blesamius say Caesar was a tyrant. What, did he see the heads of many citizens? Many people harassed and beaten and killed? Many houses torn down and destroyed? The forum filled with soldiers? What we have always experienced in civil strife we did not see in your victory. You're the only one, Caesar, in whose victory the only ones to die were under arms. How can Blesamius, who is the citizen of a kingdom, consider a someone to be a tyrant, when we free people, born to highest

degree of liberty, consider him not only not a tyrant but the most clement of victorious generals? As for the statue, who is complaining about it—a lone statue after all, when there are so many others to see? Should we scorn the statues of a man whose victory monuments we do not scorn? Or maybe it's the place that's causing the ill-will? But there's no place more distinguished for a statue than the Rostra. And what can I say about the applause? You've never wanted it; sometimes the very wonder of a stunned audience suppresses it; and perhaps people didn't cheer because nothing vulgar seems worthy of you.⁹¹

The argument, like that with *festivus*, has a metarhetorical element, labeling the cleverness of the charges (*acute conlecta*). But missing here is the sense of Caesar and Cicero working together. On the contrary Blesamius seems not to have gathered anything 'cleverly' but to have reported exactly the sorts of things people were indeed saying, as Caesar must have known. More important, the argument is, again, obviously sophistic. It is Cicero, rather, who is 'clever'. The placement of the statue among the kings obviously suggested Caesar was a monarch; that the Rostra was a more prestigious place was irrelevant. The argument that there were many statues and Caesar's was only one is almost silly. So is the argument that applause was too vulgar for Caesar. If these were no more than the 'gossip of city malcontents' (*urbani malevolorum sermunculi*), they were hardly worth repeating, still less trying to refute so feebly. The arguments about Bassus and Caecilius just noticed are different only by degree.

It's hard to escape the impression that such arguments aren't really supposed to work as arguments. And that, I think, is exactly the point. Cicero's literary critical and philosophical friendship in a sense illustrate the promise of Caesar's singular position. If he would govern the world from within his house, there must and will be friends whose judgment he can trust. But Cicero's manifestly specious arguments illustrate something else. That voice, the voice of the sophist or declaimer—also a voice appropriate to a private venue—*can't* be trusted. In the culture of the small cultured group there is both promise and danger.

⁹¹ 33. *At quam acute conlecta crimina! 'Blesamius' inquit—eius enim nomine, optimi viri nec tibi ignoti, male dicebat tibi—'ad regem scribere solebat te in invidia esse, tyrannum existimari, statua inter reges posita animos hominum vehementer offensos, plaudī tibi non solere.'* Nonne intellegis, Caesar, ex urbanis malevolorum sermunculis haec ab istis esse conlecta? Blesamius tyrannum Caesarem scriberet? Multorum enim capita civium viderat, multos iussu Caesaris vexatos, verberatos, necatos, multas adflictas et eversas domos, armatis militibus refertum forum! Quae semper in civili victoria sensimus, ea te victore non vidimus. 34. Solus, inquam, es, C. Caesar, cuius in victoria ceciderit nemo nisi armatus. Et quem nos liberi, in summmilibertate nati, non modo non tyrannum, sed clementissimum in victoria ducem vidimus, is Blesamio, qui vivit in regno, tyrannus videri potest? Nam de statua quis queritur, una praesertim, cum tam multas videat? Valde enim invidendum est eius statuis, cuius tropaeis non invidemus. Nam si locus adfert invidiam, nullus locus est ad statuam quidem rostris clarior. De plausu autem quid respondeam? Qui nec desideratus umquam a te est et non numquam obstupefactis hominibus ipsa admiratione compressus est et fortasse eo praetermissus, quia nihil vulgare te dignum videri potest.

Does that mean that Cicero's speech doesn't hold together? That he means friends can be trusted—except when they can't be? That, I think, is exactly what he means. Such is the problem of being a tyrant, and that plays out in the problem of speaking to one. The stylistics of the speech reveal ideological strains. The Republican political system was inescapably a system of rivalry and agonism that was partly concealed by its own normative language: personal bids for power and private vendettas were couched in the absolute language of order and justice. But Caesar had no vetoing colleague. He had collapsed into himself state functions formerly conducted agonistically. But that closure also left an opening: if politics is now a matter of an extraordinary self, then 'private' idioms—the language of friendship, the language of shared tastes, the language of culture—gain in potency. Cicero works in such arguments, as recognizing the current order of things. But circles of friendship and shared tastes and culture, overlaid with politics, also open the door to flattery and deception: Cicero acknowledges that aspect of the new order too. His 'voices', in my view, track exactly the shape of the ideological terrain with all its contradictions. Was that part of what Cicero meant when, in the letter to Dolabella already mentioned, he says that the speech was a mere *oratiuncula* and, like Deiotarus' gifts, was 'loosely woven of thick thread'? Was he reflecting specifically on the fact that his arguments could not be 'tight' precisely because the old order had gone loose?

Bibliography

- Bringmann, K. 1986: 'Der Diktator Caesar als Richter? Zu Ciceros Reden 'Pro Ligario' und 'Pro Rege Deiotaro', ' *Hermes* 114: 72–88.
- Coşkun, A. 2005: 'Amicitiae und politische ambitionen im Kontext der *causa Deiotariana*', in A. Coşkun (ed.), *Roms auswärtige Freunde in der späten Republik und im frühen Prinzipat*, Göttingen 2005: 127–154.
- Craig, C. 1993: 'Form as Argument in Cicero's Speeches: A Study of Dilemma', Atlanta.
- Durand, R. 1903: 'La date du « de divinatione »', in *Mélanges Boissier: recueil de mémoires concernant la littérature et les antiquités romaines dédié à Gaston Boissier*, Paris: 173–183.
- Gagliardi, P. 1997: *Il dissenso e l'ironia: per una rilettura delle orazioni 'cesariane' di Cicerone*, Napoli.
- Gotoff, H.C. 1993: *Cicero's Caesarian Orations: A Stylistic Commentary*, Chapel Hill.
- Gotoff, H.C. 2002: 'Cicero's Caesarian Speeches', in J. May (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Cicero*, Leiden: 219–271.
- Hanchey, D. 2015: 'Perturbatio, frugalitas, and bene beateque uiuendum: Ciceronian Philosophy as Ciceronian Defense in *Pro Rege Deiotaro*', *Illinois Classical Studies* 40.1: 63–83.
- Krostenko, B. 2001: *Cicero, Catullus, and the Language of Social Performance*, Chicago.

- Krostenko, B. 2013: 'Etymologizing the *Convivium*: Varro's *nescis quid vesper serus vehat*', *Palamedes* 8: 113–139.
- Lebreton, J. 1901: *Études sur la langue et la grammaire de Cicéron*, Paris.
- Mitchell, S. 1993: *Anatolia: Land, Men, and Gods in Asia Minor*, vol. 1, Oxford.
- Rademaker, A. 2005: *Sophrosyne and the Rhetoric of Self-Restraint*, Leiden.
- Saddington, D. B. 1993: 'Preparing to Become Roman: the 'Romanization' of Deiotarus', in U. Vogel-Weidemann (ed.), *Charistion C.P.T. Naudé*, Pretoria 87–97.
- Soubiran, J. 1984: 'Le sénateur tragique de Cicéron', *Ciceroniana* 5: 69–80.

Brian A. Krostenko

krostenko.2@nd.edu

Department of Classics
University of Notre Dame
IN 46556, USA