




Wojciech Misztal

**ETHICS
AND MORALITY**

MARIA OSSOWSKA'S
CONCEPT OF
SOCIOLOGY
OF MORALITY

translated into English by Jonathan Weber



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Preface

The book you now have before you is dedicated to the work of Professor Maria Ossowska, and marks the fiftieth anniversary of her death. It constitutes a tribute to a remarkable figure of the University of Warsaw, to her excellent research, and to her outstanding contribution to the development of sociology both in Poland and worldwide.

Maria Ossowska was not only a highly esteemed scholar but also a commentator on public life and a social activist. Her oeuvre has left a lasting mark in the history of science and academic achievements, while her courage in addressing challenging topics and concern for the fortunes of society continue to provide immense inspiration for successive generations of researchers.

All being well, with this book, you will gain a fuller picture of Professor Maria Ossowska and her legacy, and discover new, previously unknown aspects of her personality and thought. Professor Ossowska was highly valued both at home and abroad for her profound insight into social reality and for her original approach to ethical and sociological issues. This book is an invitation to explore Maria Ossowska's rich legacy, her passion and involvement, which have made her an inspiration to many. This is evident in the works of researchers in diverse fields of the social sciences, inspired by the richness of the scholar's thought. She was a pioneer in her field, and her contribution to sociology, ethics, and the philosophy of values is invaluable. She was not only a brilliant scientist but also a mentor and inspiration to many generations of researchers. So allow me to welcome you on this unique journey through the work of Maria Ossowska, an outstanding professor at the University of Warsaw.

Wojciech Misztal

Introduction

Polish sociology owes its high standing and recognition around the world to the achievements of Ludwik Gumpłowicz, Bronisław Malinowski, Leon Petrażycki, and Florian Znaniecki. This position was consolidated by the works of Stefan Czarnowski, Ludwik Krzywicki, Maria Ossowska, Stanisław Ossowski, Władysław Grabski and Józef Chałasiński. However, the prominence of Polish sociology declined after World War II. One of the reasons for this was the institutional crisis, for which sociologists were not to blame. Many researchers shut themselves away behind domestic issues, and there were few exceptions to this approach. One of them was Maria Ossowska, who was accused of avoiding Poland's sociological matters and literature. Her theoretical and methodological conception long remained largely unrecognised and underdeveloped.

Maria Ossowska's academic oeuvre constitutes an unquestioned and lasting contribution she made to the construction of a theory of morality. It is currently perceived as an outcome of the fight for the right of science and man's cognitive activity to be acknowledged among the greatest of values. After all, they embrace the right to satisfy one's curiosity about the world, and to discover the laws and mechanisms governing it, including the sphere of morality (Kiciński 1984, pp. 14–15). The innovative nature of this Polish scholar's work was simultaneously the leading cause of her solitude in academia. As such, one could agree with the statement that Maria Ossowska's work was, for Polish sociology, its sole but untapped opportunity for reasserting its position established before the war (Podgórecki 1995, pp. 276–278).

Maria Ossowska, née Niedźwiedzka (Niedźwiecka), was born on 26 January 1896 in Warsaw, as the daughter of Kazimierz and Aleksandra née Otwinowska.¹ Her parents belonged to the first generation of impoverished

¹ For Maria Ossowska's biographic notes, I cite Kiciński (1893a).

nobility (Kazimierz Niedźwiedzki took part in the 1863 January Uprising), who were forced to seek gainful employment in the cities. Having completed Mrs Walicka's private boarding school for girls in Warsaw, she took her school graduation examinations in Kraków as the schools in Congress Poland were not entitled to hold them. Following in her elder brothers' footsteps, she also decided to study philosophy, but her parents opposed her continued education and withheld their consent for her to go abroad. In 1915, the occupying German authorities permitted the opening of a Polish university in Warsaw. That same year, Ossowska commenced studies at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw. She was the first chairperson of the Philosophy Students' Academic Circle, and her scholarly debut was a review of Władysław Tatarkiewicz's book *O bezwzględności dobra* [lit. On the absoluteness of the good]. In 1921, she completed her studies in philosophy, writing her doctoral thesis on Stoic axiology under the supervision of Jan Łukasiewicz.

Later that year, she left for Paris on a scholarship to attend a seminar hosted by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. During her sojourn in France, she began corresponding with Bertrand Russell, and on his invitation, went to visit him in London. This was an acquaintanceship she was to maintain for years to come.

She returned to Warsaw in 1923, where she accepted a position as senior assistant at the University of Warsaw. In 1924, she married Stanisław Ossowski. In 1927, the Ossowskis became involved in the activities of the "Szkłane Domy" [lit. glass houses] Association, founded by members of the Warsaw Housing Cooperative in the Żoliborz district of Warsaw, where they lived. Among other things, they became involved in an educational campaign, giving lectures in courses provided by the Free Polish University. Between 1929 and 1933, Ossowska lectured on psychology and pedagogy in higher courses for teachers. She was also active in the Polish Philosophical Society, the Polish Psychological Society, and the Scientific Circle of the Mianowski Fund. Between 1925 and 1931, she published several works on semantics, and based on these, she obtained her postdoctoral degree in 1932. In 1933, she was appointed an associate professor at the University of Warsaw.

Her academic interests focused on issues in semantics, as reflected in the topic of her post-doctoral dissertation. In the years 1933–1935, she and Stanisław Ossowski went to England (London, Oxford, and Cambridge) on a research scholarship from the National Culture Foundation. While in London, she attended seminars led by George Moore, founder of the British school of analytical philosophy, and Bronisław Malinowski; her interest in the

descriptive study of morality dates from this time. She was working on her seminal work *Podstawy nauki o moralności* [lit. Foundations of the science of morality], the printing of which was prevented by the outbreak of war in 1939.

In 1935, Maria Ossowska and Stanisław Ossowski jointly published the paper "Nauka o nauce" (published in English as "The Science of Science" in *Organon* in 1936). After returning from England, Maria Ossowska was employed in the scientific department of the Mianowski Fund and in the editorial offices of *Nauka Polska* and *Organon*. In 1938–1939, she was the editor of the journal *Szkoły Wyższe* [lit. Higher schools of learning].

Maria Ossowska spent the years of occupation in Warsaw, during which she ran, on her initiative, a private seminar on the science of morality. In 1940–1941, she taught classes in history and Polish studies to students at the clandestine University of Warsaw. She was involved in the work of the "Żegota" Council to Aid Jews. In 1943, she published an article in the underground journal *W świetle dnia* on the ethics of mercantile relations, "Z etyki stosunków merkantylnych" [lit. On the ethics of mercantile relations], and in 1944, the normative "Wzór demokracji" [lit. The model Democrat], written for the heirs of Polish heritage – the young generation of post-war Poland. Tipped off by the Home Army underground about a death sentence having been issued on them by a secret extreme nationalist group, the Ossowskis left Warsaw for Legionowo, not far away, but carried on with their clandestine teaching. Maria Ossowska spent the period of the Warsaw Uprising in Bukowina Tatrzańska and remained there until the end of the war.

After the war, in 1946, she was appointed to the Chair of the Science of Morality at the University of Lodz. In 1947, her book *The Foundations of the Science of Morality* was published. In the same year, Ossowska was awarded the Victory and Freedom Medal for her activities during the occupation, and in the following year, she received the Warsaw Scientific Society prize. In 1949, she published *Motywy postępowania. Z zagadnień psychologii moralności* [lit. Motives of conduct. From the issues of the psychology of morality]. After returning to Warsaw that year, she lectured at the University of Warsaw, where she was employed as the Head of the Seminar of the History of Moral Customs and Doctrines at the Faculty of Humanities. In 1951, her department was incorporated into the Department of Culture, within which Ossowska ran the independent Department of Research into the History of Moral Norms. A year later, Maria Ossowska took up the Chair of the History and Theory of Morality at the University of Warsaw. Between 1952 and 1956, she was removed from active participation in science and teaching. Nevertheless, this was a period of intense research on the sociology of morality for her. As a

result of the political thaw, in 1956 she published *Moralność mieszczańska* [lit. Bourgeois morality], which she wrote in 1952. Also in 1956, she renewed her academic activity at the University of Warsaw, heading the Department of the History and Theory of Morality in its Faculty of Philosophy, where she worked until her retirement in 1966. She simultaneously headed the Department of History and Theory of Morality at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences until 1962. Apart from being actively involved in establishing the Polish Sociological Society, she also attempted to form a Sociology of Morality Section within the International Sociological Association. Ossowska was the founder and a long-standing member of the Society of Moral Culture. In 1960, she lectured at Barnard College, Columbia University, in the United States, on a systematic review of theories of the sociology of morality. Her work *Socjologia moralności. Zarys zagadnień* [lit. The sociology of morality. An outline of its issues], published in Poland in 1963, is closely related to the matters addressed in these lectures.

Starting in the 1960s, Maria Ossowska became involved in public activity, among other things, she was a signatory of the "Letter of thirty-four", she spoke out against the death penalty, she took part in discussions concerning the draft criminal code, and stood up in defence of people accused of activity against the state. She became an indisputable moral authority for a broad range of people.

In the year of her retirement, she published a work on the history of ideas: *Myśl moralna oświecenia angielskiego* [lit. Moral thought in the English enlightenment]. That same year, at an event marking the fiftieth anniversary of her scientific work, organised by the Council of the Faculty of Philosophy and by the Main Board of the Polish Sociological Association, Maria Ossowska delivered a lecture "On dignity". A year later, she presented a series of lectures on the social determinants of morality at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. The material delivered in them formed the basis for her book *Social Determinants of Moral Ideas*, published in 1970 as a revised version of her *The Sociology of Morality*. In the same year, in Poland, a book titled *Normy moralne. Próba systematyzacji* (*Moral Norms. A Tentative Systematisation*) was published, which was intended for a broader target of readers without theoretical ethical training. In 1972, she was awarded a First Degree State Prize for her lifetime achievements in science. *Ethos rycerski i jego odmiany* [lit. The chivalric ethos and its varieties], published in 1973, constitutes a work that was an expression of her long-standing interests in ethical issues among the aristocracy.

Maria Ossowska died in Warsaw in 1974. Most studies on Maria Ossowska's oeuvre focus on selected aspects of it. The rest, referring to her

findings, expound upon the sociological issues of morality as conceived by their authors. Essentially, there is a lack of synthetic grasps of Ossowska's works that focus on specific sets of issues within the framework of a particular concept. This book is an attempt to fill this gap with a synthetic presentation of the intellectual path taken by the scholar. Its leitmotif is the desire to lay out, in a synthetic form, Maria Ossowska's achievements in the area of the sociology of morality. Therefore, the chief intention has been to reconstruct the academic path behind the conception of the sociology of morality, which – by the criteria set for a science – has evolved into a fully fledged sub-discipline of sociology.

The approach taken to achieve this goal is pointing out the most important stages of the intellectual journey undertaken by Maria Ossowska, as she consistently pursued her programme of research on morality. Viewed synthetically, it was a research project that began with ethical findings – *homo ethicus* – and evolved into fully formed sociological concepts – *homo moralis*. The deliberations presented here are based on the fundamental assumption of the science of morality, as adopted by Maria Ossowska, that the researcher is consciously not guided by personal preferences towards the content being analysed. This is the principal research requirement accompanying the attempt made to collect, order and classify Maria Ossowska's views on the sociology of morality. And it is worth making such an attempt, despite, as Zygmunt Bauman wrote (*nota bene*, Ossowska's student), there being "no choice between an 'engaged' and 'neutral' way of practising sociology. A non-engaged sociology simply does not exist" (Bauman 2006b, pp. 333–334). However, engagement can be seen in many ways, and, therefore – sticking to the declaration made earlier – the demand that the researcher not be exempt from acknowledging their own biases and judgments shall be applied (Ossowska 1957b).

The intention of the research, admittedly no longer particularly original or innovative, is to demonstrate that the sociology of morality created by Maria Ossowska possesses a material and formal object, method, and also its continuators. Now, with the passage of over fifty years, her conceptions – commented on and elaborated upon – have become a permanent part of the legacy of sociology, not only in Poland but worldwide. Hence, the considerations here should be treated as a kind of commentary or presentation of the collected views of writers of studies on specific aspects of Maria Ossowska's work. My aim is to facilitate for the reader an interpretation of her oeuvre and the formation of their own opinion of it, as well as regarding the content of commentaries on her views.

In the analyses of Ossowska's works presented here, the main method of research involves linking a specific issue with a particular aspect of the problems of the sociology of morality. To fully understand the essence of deliberations in the sociology of morality, it is essential to reconstruct the main determinants and their resultant assumptions leading to its emergence. This is achieved through the characterisation of views held by selected precursors of the sociological direction of the study of morality, as a background to Maria Ossowska's programme for the science of morality.

The discussion of the different sections is supplemented by the history of morality, as this is one of the objects of consideration in the sociology of morality. The next step is to identify a formal object of sociological research in Maria Ossowska's deliberations. Her goal in these reflections was to build an analytical definition of the concept of morality. Despite the negative outcome of her research endeavours, she attempted to explicate this concept in her writings.

Omitting the order in which Maria Ossowska wrote her works was a deliberate research choice, one dictated by the logic of analyses aiming to find a material grasp of the object of studies in sociology. Hence, the reflections concerning ethos are based on the criterion of the historically shaped stratification and attractiveness of the lifestyles of social groups.² Fully elaborated sociological issues have found their comprehensive expression in the scholar's deliberations aimed at determining the relationship between morality and non-moral factors.

Morality has been examined in two ways: as a dependent variable and as an independent variable. These reflections have been complemented by methodological issues in the sociology of morality, including the tools, techniques, and research methods, as well as the theories that were applied and analysed by Maria Ossowska.

The deliberations conclude with, among other things, a review of the positions taken in regard to the sociology of morality constructed by Ossowska. The directions of the analyses presented here made it possible to distinguish proponents and continuators from questioners of and opponents

² Maria Ossowska used the spelling "ethos", emphasising the Greek origin of the word. As recently as 2000, in the third edition of her book *Ethos rycerski i jego odmiany*, this spelling was still in use, probably acknowledging that the term had not yet – in Ossowska's own words – "become fully domiciled in the language". Today, its spelling (in Polish) has been fully adjusted to conform to the Polish language, and in many sociological works, it is written as "etos". In this book dedicated to the work of Maria Ossowska and containing numerous citations from her writings, the spelling "ethos" that she used has been retained, for the purpose of preserving the orthographic uniformity of the text as a whole (editor's note).

to the conception proposed by Maria Ossowska. The most important themes in the reflections of these writers (Mariański, Bauman, Zdrenka), who addressed sociological moral issues, have been pointed out – out of necessity – in a selective manner. The works of a close circle of her students have been sourced, in a somewhat scattered form, for analyses and research characterisations of Ossowska's oeuvre. Conclusions regarding the possibility of forming new concepts within the theory of the sociology of morality round off the deliberations. A summary completes the whole, as an attempt to present a synthetic grasp of the achievements of Maria Ossowska – the First Lady of Polish sociology. Inspired by the work of Bauman, I was almost led to “the other side of the mirror” – to the conclusion that a possibility was emerging for universalising the description of behaviour widely considered immoral – while morality, as a phenomenon exposed to numerous hazards, distortions and modifications, remains an object of universal concern among researchers representing diverse axiological approaches.

Chapter 1

Criteria of the Science of Morality

From ethics to morality

There are at least three types of knowledge regarding morality. Depending on how the subject matter is approached, one can distinguish between meta-sciences relating to the issues of expressions containing moral qualifications or using objective language to speak of morality. This applies to the issues of moral judgments or their wording. They can be examined individually for their mechanisms of evaluation, motives or conduct. In the social context, attention is drawn to the pervasiveness of moral judgments. The second type of knowledge of morality deals with human behaviour with regard to moral values. This relates to conduct in general, or specific conduct taking into account the time, place, manner in which a decision was made, and attitude. The third kind of knowledge concerns moral value itself, where a distinction is made between content-based and formal approaches. An example of the latter would be Kant's duty, while that based on content (on the object) includes the ideal standard or real values perpetuated in the utterances of language, or in other cultural facts, as for example with Scheler and Hartmann (Kamiński 1968, pp. 197–198).

An investigation of moral issues can pursue autonomous theories of morality. Finding the ultimate basis of moral order often becomes the principal criterion for the legitimacy of moral norms. The study of the normativity of experiences often serves to formulate rules in moral upbringing. Psychological, sociological, ethnological, and historical characterisations concern moral views that occur in human communities. Semiotic, methodological or epistemological descriptions therefore pertain to systems of morality that already exist (Kamiński 1979, pp. 195–200).

In 1934, Maria Ossowska published an article in which she expressed her position on what ethics was and what it should address (Ossowska 1983, pp. 254–258). One can distinguish many diverse issues in the history of ethics that do not fit within the definition of ethics as a science of morality. In its

search for what was good, for what one should and what one should not do, ethics had grown into a theory of values living by its own logic. This became Ossowska's basis for questioning the scientific character of ethics. "Ethics [...] is not the science of morality in the sense in which botany is the science of plants. Botany describes plants. Only extremely rarely has ethics concerned itself with describing and explaining morality that already exists" (Ossowska 1983, p. 254). Ethics was concerned not with what people considered moral or immoral, but with what they should consider moral. And for this reason, she saw no possibility of using the term "ethics" to describe everything that history had defined under this common term (Ossowska 1983, p. 254). In her view, what ethics was interested in had changed. In antiquity, the focal point was the search for answers on how to avoid suffering and how to achieve happiness. As time passed, social matters grew in prominence. The issue of human coexistence gave birth to the concept of the moral good. "Those intuitions that we tie to the term 'moral' were born [...] when ethics began to ask what I owe to the people I live with" (Ossowska 1983, p. 255).

Ossowska included moral description, judgment and norms among the tasks of ethics understood as a general theory of values. Sometimes, when describing morality as it actually exists, ethics became the science of morality; it did so when describing motives behind conduct, the processes in the formulating of certain general norms, and it provided explanations as to why people reproved some things while praising others (Ossowska 1983, pp. 256–258).

For Ossowska, ethics was a discipline resolving what was morally right and what was morally wrong. This is understandable in light of the development of the paradigm of ethics. Formulated judgments and norms determining what to do and what to avoid are treated as ethical statements, making up part of this discipline. Ethics is, therefore, a part of the morality of the era in which it emerged. Morality here is understood as the entirety of judgments and norms pronounced in the era concerned. In such a view, every ethical judgment is simultaneously a moral judgment, although the reverse is not true since not every moral judgment is part of some ethical system (Ossowska 1957b, p. 15).

Precursors of descriptive studies of morality

Many authors tackled the issue of morality before Maria Ossowska. Those sometimes classified among the precursors taking a research stance close to Ossowska's include David Hume, Charles Montesquieu, Émile Durkheim,

Edvard Westermarck, Svend Ranulf, Thorstein Veblen, and Eugène Dupréel (Kiciński 1984, p. 12).

Ossowska considered Hume a codifier and simultaneously an observer of morality. He referred to experience as the main method of its investigation, placing the emphasis on those mental properties of human nature that are known as personal merit. They render a person an object of respect and love, hatred, contempt, praise or reproach (Ossowska 1966, p. 287). Hume wrote of human nature having "desires [...] of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, considered merely as such" (Hume 1952, p. 245). This causes man to possess a natural inclination to formulate and issue moral judgments. "Nature has [...] not plac'd in the mind any peculiar original principles, to determine us to a set of actions, into which the other principles of our frame and constitution were sufficient to lead us" (Hume 1952, p. 333). People's moral experiences, therefore, indicate no existence other than human existence. For moral distinctions, man is given sanction in direct experience. Consequently, morality does not require the sanction of revelation, nor does it demand reference to a world other than the temporal (Baczko 1971, p. 232).

According to Hume, the basis for issuing moral judgments is not reason but feelings. As he wrote, a recent philosopher had been most convincing with their arguments that morality was not to be found in the detached essence of things, but that it belonged entirely to each individual being's feelings (Hume 1919, p. 16). Reason does not provide any moral sanction for the existence of the world, since it does not provide moral sanctions (Baczko 1971, pp. 212–213). The leitmotif in Hume's ethics is reflection on the servile function of reason (Jedynak 1974, p. 67). "Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals" (Hume 1952, p. 254). Reason can therefore provide knowledge of the means for resolving, but will never provide knowledge of the ends (Jedynak 1974, p. 76). Participating in judgment, it instructs us about the properties of actions and their consequences, but is not in itself sufficient for exercising praise or moral condemnation (Ossowska 1966, p. 288). As Hume wrote, no value or moral standard derives from any knowledge of any fact or reason between ideas (Hume 1952, p. 254).

A transgression or virtue can be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which are not properties of external things but perceptions in the mind. It is similar with moral judgments (Ossowska 1966, p. 289). They occur when a feeling of approval or disapproval, of respect or disdain, and so on, joins

one's knowledge of an action and its circumstances. A feeling is active, while reason is passive (Baczko 1971, p. 230).

A feeling that is not accompanied by judgment can only be understood in two situations: when it is based on the conviction of the existence of something that is not there at all, or when the wrong means are used for achieving goals. Truth is subject to discussion, but taste is not. Morality teaches us duty, encourages virtue and discourages transgression. This is not achieved by appealing to truth; after all, if truth arouses neither desire nor aversion, it cannot affect our conduct. That only happens when the appropriate feelings are provoked (Ossowska 1966, p. 290).

This constitutes the essence of Hume's emotional theory of judgments. He shies away from a "socio-technical" concept of morality, claiming that it cannot be randomly formed or based on arbitrary grounds. One cannot formulate judgments simply because one likes or dislikes something. "A character is virtuous because we like it precisely in a particular way and really do feel that it is virtuous. The very experience of this feeling is our approval or admiration" (Ossowska 1966, p. 291). In Maria Ossowska's opinion, Hume became the precursor of the emotional theory of judgments, which was maintained in the 1960s by Scandinavian philosophers and psychologists. Let us make do with the assertion that Hume's views, portraying morality as a social phenomenon, made a far-reaching contribution to the formation of Maria Ossowska's stance towards the study of morality (Kiciński 1984, p. 12).

For Ossowska, Montesquieu was the first "sociologist of morality". The assertion of objective reality is the basis of his empirically oriented theory. Phenomena independent of one another are interrelated, historically variable, and cognisable, just as the principle of causality prevails in the social world as in all of reality. "Any or all effects have their causes: the climate and other physical causes evoke an infinite number of effects" (Wróblewski 1956, p. 77).

In the context of social conditioning, these causes may be moral or physical (Wróblewski 1956, p. 77). Montesquieu's attitude is unclear regarding both kinds of cause. Apart from stating that ultimately, climate decides, he brings moral causes to the fore. Their character is not fully defined due to the psychological nature of man (Wróblewski 1956, p. 83).

According to Montesquieu, morality is grounded on feelings, which are relative; they depend on taste. Taking the assumption that the reality being studied should be learned empirically and rationally, he separated valuation from cognition, thereby separating the process of investigating phenomena from their assessment. He studied morality as a social phenomenon, conditioned by geographical factors. Applying the principle of rationalism,

Montesquieu searched for the causes behind the formation of specific moral views (Wróblewski 1956, p. 80).

Montesquieu tied the study of social phenomena to the study of man himself by the methods of the empirical sciences. He wanted to conduct an empirical analysis of society and learn about human physiology, and used the historical-comparative method or participative observation, or relied on the accounts of others. The sociological and historical data gathered provided the basis for his conclusions, which he expressed through his belief in the historical variability of phenomena, their interdependence, and his recognition of the laws governing these phenomena (Wróblewski 1956, pp. 82–83).

Durkheim was the first sociologist to draw attention to the moral aspects of social reality. He legitimised the sociology of morality (Mariański 1989, p. 10). "Morality begins where affiliation with the group begins; man is a moral being because he lives in society" (Jacher 1973, p. 58). Morality fulfils a vital role as a cohesive factor and a manifestation of the social bond (Jacher 1973, pp. 58–59). Society is the source, the centre, and the purpose of morality (Mariański 1989, p. 11). According to Durkheim, the sociology of morality was intended to investigate how morality contributes to the ordering of social reality. To do so, it was necessary to clarify the essence of morality, define its role in society, and then explain the emergence and development of diverse moral concepts against the backdrop of societal growth (Jacher 1973, p. 59).

The essence of morality comprises the spirit, meaning a sense of discipline, affiliation with a social group, and the autonomy of the will, or, in other words, reflexive acceptance of the preceding two elements. A sense of discipline is the basis of all moral order. In Durkheim's opinion, discipline is the product of two notions: regularity and authority. Regularity here refers to the formation of dispositions that are independent of the person carrying them out. Authority constitutes a particular kind of moral compulsion. Autonomy of the will involves voluntary obedience to what one has recognised as the nature of moral reality, and consequently the voluntary acceptance of moral principles (Jacher 1973, pp. 59–63).

The domain of morality exists where the social domain begins. Morality is a product of the collective consciousness, of society as a whole. Society is the purpose and the creator of morality. In every period of development, social existence requires a set of rules of conduct as a certain existential minimum; morality constitutes the set of rules of conduct thus defined. Positive knowledge of morality, as a branch of sociology, has as its object moral facts, which belong to the category of social facts. Morality can be studied using the same methods as those used for analysing economic, legal, or religious

phenomena. All properties of moral facts are simultaneously properties of social facts (Jacher 1973, pp. 61–91). The term “sociology of morality” refers to all research on morality that is sociological in character (Mariański 1989, p. 12).

Durkheim considered morality a “product” of the collective effort of society. There are several interpretations of Durkheim’s assertion that morality is a social fact. Morality is a social fact because it constitutes a product of the group that imposes norms of behaviour on the individual. The individual cannot create norms (Ossowska 1986b, p. 261). Durkheim stressed that what is moral is what society recognises as moral (Mariański 1989, p. 12). Moral norms and judgments are social in character, also because of what they concern. They are supposed to speak of an individual’s conduct in relation to somebody else, of behavioural dispositions and feelings towards others (Ossowska 1986b, p. 267). Morality appears here as an act of solidarity with somebody, or as an act of self-denial for the benefit of someone else (Mariański 1989, p. 12).

Every moral judgment and norm is a product of specific social conditions (Ossowska 1986b, p. 267). Both their genesis and content are conditioned by specific and historically variable transformations occurring in society (Mariański 1989, p. 12). According to Durkheim, as society changes, so too does morality. There is nothing permanent in morality, since morality, just like the social structure, undergoes evolution (Jacher 1973, p. 64).

Durkheim was the founder of both a system and a school of sociology. His students, among others Lévy-Bruhl, applied the tenets of Durkheimian sociology in studies on religion, the economy, law and morality. They resulted in the emergence of new sociological sub-disciplines. Durkheim’s students, who gave lectures at the Sorbonne while Ossowska was studying there, represented a new style of thinking about ethics and morality. The sociology of morality at the time had not yet formed sufficiently for the issues it was to focus on to be explicitly defined (Mariański 1989, pp. 13–14).

Maria Ossowska accused Durkheim of hypostasising society.

A researcher valued by Ossowska for his empirical approach to the phenomenon of morality was Westermarck, who drew attention to the socially salient rules of conduct that constituted the object of moral valuation (Mariański 1989, p. 22). He grouped them in six general categories distinguished according to whom the intended effects of the conduct were supposed to apply (Smola 1984, p. 78):

Actions (or failure to act) directly concerning the interests of others. They are regulated by norms that are prohibitive in character or based on altruism.

They include: personal inviolability, respect for the truth, patriotism, charity, and comradeship in general.

- Actions (or failure to act) with a view to one's own well-being. Here, Westermarck distinguishes caring for one's own life and health, freedom, property and self-respect.
- Actions (or failure to act) in the area of sexual relations. In this respect, Westermarck has in mind marriage, incest, celibacy and homosexuality.
- Conduct towards animals.
- Conduct in relation to the dead.
- Conduct towards beings recognised as supernatural (Mariański 1989, p. 22; Smoła 1984, p. 78).

Westermarck demonstrated the diversity of moral convictions prevalent in diverse cultures. The next stage of his analysis was an attempt to identify the factors contributing to the formation of moral judgments. He considered living conditions, livelihoods, gender, age, level of education, class stratification, religion, magic, and racial, class and cultural prejudices. He developed a dynamic portrayal of these phenomena, discerning the complexity of moral issues, and emphasised the variability of morality determined by numerous factors simultaneously (Mariański 1989, p. 22).

Westermarck did not create a typology of morality. He accepted the diversity of forms of moral consciousness and the phenomenon of its retreat during certain periods of history. He expressed the belief that as humankind developed, the scope of features common to diverse moral phenomena would broaden (Mariański 1989, pp. 22–23). Some commenting on his works thought that the issues and topics he tackled concerned the sociology of morality, despite Westermarck himself never actually using that name. His theory of morality is of a more psychological and evolutionary nature than sociological. One could call it an ethological theory of morality (Mariański 1989, p. 23). However, his empirical approach laid the foundations for the sociology of morality.

Maria Ossowska valued Veblen for his theory of the leisure class. It was probably he who inspired academic research into bourgeois morality. Veblen drew attention to the social character of human activity in the context of institutional conditioning, classing customs and habits of thought defined by institutions among such activity. By social institution, he meant the prevalent ways of thinking, taking into account the specific social conditions and functions of the individual and society (Veblen 1971, p. 171). They influence people by generating instincts. The most important of these is the instinct to

do a good job, followed by selfless curiosity and a sense of commitment to the community (Górski 1971, p. 14).

A person's life in society is a struggle for existence, just as is the life of other species. This is why Veblen treats it as a process of selective adaptation. The development of social structures is a process of the natural selection of institutions, and their study is one of the main tasks of sociology. The psychological and physical attributes of the human race, group interests, and economic processes are factors that determine societal development. Throughout history, economic growth has featured three phases: of looting, quasi-peace, and manufacturing. Each phase had specific social classes. In the first and second phases, they were the slavers and landowners. This was when the concept of conspicuous consumption emerged, and when the leisure-oriented social class formed. A division was made between worthy and unworthy activities. The former included service to God, hunting and chivalry. Manual labour was treated as unworthy. In the manufacturing phase, economic activities gained dignity. The idea of leisure was complemented by that of ostentatious consumption, which was synonymous with the power and wealth of the new leisure class (Górski 1971, p. 16).

Veblen shows the social mechanisms reinforcing a particular model of consumption and lifestyle, made up of cultural habits, religion, or women's emancipatory movements. He contrasts these properties with institutions strengthened by the industrial process, based on the instinct of work inherent in the individual. In his opinion, the engineering and technical cadres are the bearers of this instinct (Górski 1971, p. 17). Veblen's concept encompasses numerous themes that Ossowska incorporated into her deliberations. She used the term "leisure class" as a specific type of community to develop the concept of group morality.

Dupréel is classed among the sociologists who had a significant influence on Maria Ossowska. He initiated the deliberations of morality based on his conception of sociology. His best-known work is *Traité de morale*. Ossowska claimed not to know any comparable work in terms of the analysis of moral rules (Ossowska 1957a, p. 45; Wódz 1979, p. 59). Dupréel placed moral rules within the environment from which they originated. However, he did not refer to the Durkheimian thesis of collective consciousness, but applied his own concept of *rapport social*, which meant approval or disapproval. It is therefore something more than "social relations". The complementarity and similarity of positive judgments bring about the formation of social groups (Mariański 1989, p. 19; Wódz 1979, pp. 61–63). Society comprises numerous groups with contradictory value systems (Wódz 1979, p. 63). Morality is what members of a given group confirm through their behaviour, accepting the

necessity of making sacrifices to adhere to a particular rule (Mariański 1989, p. 19; Wódz 1979, p. 63).

Moral rules pertain to specific social groups. They are conditioned by demographic and class factors, by technology, and so on. The individual, wishing to belong to a given group, takes on the obligation to abide by the moral norms in force within it (Mariański 1989, p. 20). This obligation provides a person with the right to "initiative in subordination" because the person is free (Wódz 1979, p. 73). This explains two types of moral virtue: indirect virtues (honour) and direct virtues (justice and charity). Direct virtues are those that are useful in the life of society. Indirect virtues, in turn, are those whose existence cannot be separated from action in practice. Honour is a set of virtues adorning the individual who sets themselves complex tasks. Charity and justice are virtues useful in the interaction of specific social groups (Mariański 1989, p. 20; Wódz 1979, p. 73).

Dupréel distinguished three phases in the development of moral consciousness, which correspond to the three aspects of morality. The first is the phase of instincts that forms at a biological level. Individuals act according to their innate dispositions and biological instincts. The second phase sees the appearance of thought and behaviour in keeping with existing moral rules. This phase has a sociological aspect; legal institutions are established, and the concepts of responsibility and accountability are in effect. In the third phase, moral ideals are created. Moral rules do not determine the behaviour of the individual, since there is the possibility of liberating oneself from their influence. This phase is only achieved by a few creative individuals (Mariański 1989, p. 20).

The moral pluralism evident in Dupréel's concept emphasises the creative role of the individual. It is a kind of ideal of moral development. This leads to the overcoming of formalism and moral normativism in studies of morality, since the research analysis is transferred to the plane of moral values and human free will (Wódz 1979, p. 80). His conception of the virtues of honour and charity was used by Ossowska (Kiciński 1984, p. 12).

The programme for the science of morality

The year 1947 saw the publication of Maria Ossowska's *Foundations of the Science of Morality* (Ossowska 1957b). This was the outcome of many years of the scholar's deliberations towards an understanding of moral phenomena in a manner distinct from that practised until then in ethics.

The fundamental assumption of the research programme was observation of “what people consider good and what they consider bad, what they command be done and what they order themselves to refrain from, [...] what motives push people to a particular judgment and not some other, what motives guide them not only in judging, but also in their conduct” (Ossowska 1957b, p. 5). Maria Ossowska regarded her position as one of those possible and legitimate among the positions adopted in studies of morality. The stance of a dispassionate observer of moral phenomena was modelled on the work of a botanist studying plants or a linguist analysing linguistic phenomena (Ossowska 1957b, p. 5).

Undertaking research in the humanities while maintaining a dispassionate observer’s stance is a formidable challenge. The objects of scientific inquiry here are highly susceptible to the intermingling of axiological content. An additional hindrance is the impact of the particular cognitive perspective of the researcher, who on each occasion intermediates in conveying the theoretical content of the science at hand while also being personally immersed in the object of their research (Pycka, Misztal 1989–1990, p. 131).

The portrayal of moral issues thus presented has been defined as the science of morality. Ossowska’s intention was for the science of morality to be a discipline that judges nothing and does not prescribe anything. It strives solely to identify the motives that induce people to behave in a manner that is either praised or reproved within a given community. In writing her programme, Ossowska was convinced that one of the reasons for the weakness of ethics was the low level of descriptive reflection on morality. With the proposed approach, there would be a better understanding of the social conditioning and historical variability of ethical systems and stances. Advocates of disparate value systems would be able to perceive better the boundaries of the justifiability of their own ethical position, while also gaining a fuller understanding of the psychological mechanisms that adopting it entails.

The programme thus outlined is, in a way, consistent with the demands contained in the neo-positivists’ programme. “Essentially, we can acknowledge Ossowska’s self-definition as a scientist (with a positivist attitude to the normative disciplines), setting for herself in life the role of a person of science as superior to other roles, as sufficient explanation of the fact that Ossowska wanted to be a researcher of morality, but not a moralist” (Lazari-Pawłowska 1975, pp. 94–95).

The influence of positivism is most evident in the sections focusing on analysing evaluative statements. What clearly distinguishes the author of

Foundations of the Science of Morality is the absence of any “smuggling of one’s own hierarchy of values, characteristic of positivism, by means of the appropriate persuasive terminology denying the meaning of evaluative and normative statements” (Kiciński 1983a, p. 566). One therefore encounters the claim that these relationships are more logical than genetic in character; after all, the scholar grew up in the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw school, although it is difficult to discern a direct impact of positivism in the research programme laid out (Kiciński 1983a, p. 566).

In the science of morality, Maria Ossowska distinguished three basic divisions: metaethics, the psychology of morality, and the sociology of morality. And in these divisions, she then singled out groups of specific issues. To the basic divisions, she added the history of morality, embracing the history of ethical doctrines, general moral opinions, and the styles of action of social groups in particular eras.

The first division, termed metaethical, includes analysis of the specificity of a moral judgment and norms. The primary objective is to identify the common and distinctive properties of judgments and norms widely regarded as moral. The central issue is the distinction between moral norms and judgments and the set of norms and judgments as a whole. Their characterisation is tied to the issue of the actual object that moral norms and judgments refer to. Analysis of the possibilities and ways of justifying opposing positions is also included in this section. This is essential when a divergence of opinions emerges regarding the recognition of the moral character of judgments and norms.

The psychology of morality forms the second division of the science of morality. The different groups of issues here are defined as follows:

- The psychology of judging, concerning the motives governing praise and reprimand, circumstances mitigating the severity of judgments, and understanding the behaviour being evaluated.
- The psychology of conduct, which boils down to searching for the motives governing human conduct, that is, analysis of the phenomenon described as the dispute over human nature, resulting from the search for the concept of man.
- Experiences and dispositions widely interpreted as moral, which include moral feelings (such as a sense of duty, so-called noble indignation, a guilty conscience, and others).
- The objects of moral judgment: love, jealousy, envy, compassion, and so forth. Analysis of these feelings and intentions due to their specific type of connection with morality serves to explain the mechanism behind moral judgment.

- The psychogenesis of morality, which consists of manifestations of moral reactions in children, and the main stages of an individual's moral development.
- Moral typology, which boils down to the systematisation of moral descriptions of human characters.
- Pathological phenomena, for example, the mechanisms of moral scruple or moral blindness (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 10–12).

The third and final division in the science of morality comprises the sociology of morality, taking into account the historical treatment of moral issues. Ossowska was of the view that the matter of the social conditioning of morality was extensive, and it would be impossible for the programme to cover the topic exhaustively (Ossowska 1957b, p. 12). As she was later to admit, she did not have a clear understanding of moral issues at that time (Ossowska 1986b, p. 9).

The first group of tasks for the sociology of morality includes an analysis of the environmental determinants of morality. In the past, the development of this phenomenon was treated as if it were one-dimensional in character. Yet moral rules vary; after all, they depend on social class and environment, as well as on their time and place. This enables the reconstruction of the moral views of specific social groups.

Determining the connections between specific factors, on the one hand, and human behaviour and moral views on the other, makes up the second group of issues. The factors include climate, population density, demographic structure, the economy, the composition of social collectives, the political system, and the functional relationships that morality has with law and religion. Maria Ossowska included here the analysis of theories explaining morality's relations with other fields of culture.

The next thematic group's task is to ascertain these relationships in the moral development of a specific social group. The influence that mass movements or outstanding personalities exert on the development of morality is discussed here. This group also includes an issue formulated by Durkheim, of the advancing specialisation of work in society. As a consequence, man is being led from a state of mechanical solidarity to that of organic solidarity (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 12–14).

The outline of the research programme, thus set out, was consistently pursued by Maria Ossowska in her academic work. In the remaining part of her *Foundations of the Science of Morality*, she focused on the issue of metaethics and the search for attributes specific to moral norms and judgments. The main sections of her reflections contain characterisations of

descriptive and evaluative utterances. They function on different principles in ethics and in the science of morality. In ethics, a descriptive utterance plays an auxiliary role in the construction of a certain system of judgments and norms. In contrast, in the science of morality, judgments occur solely as an object of research (Ossowska 1957b, p. 43). "The judging that is of interest to us here is always the praise or reprimand of an object – an extremely provisional characterisation that we have to make do with, since 'judgment' in this sense is yet to constitute an object of our research" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 44).

In analysing evaluative and descriptive utterances, Maria Ossowska takes the positions of Franz Brentano and George Moore as her starting point. They assume that the differentiation of all general judgments, that is, descriptive utterances, is based on predicates. They are singular notions of a kind, comprising descriptive predicates that refer to empirical sentences and evaluative predicates. Descriptive predicates describe an object in a specific way, conveying its attributes. Evaluative predicates characterise the object differently, without going into its composition. An example of an evaluative predicate is the usage of the term "good" as of positive value, or "bad" as of negative value (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 44–45).

Ossowska demonstrates the weakness of such a distinction, since evaluative predicates are not essential for the uttering of judgments. But evaluations can be worded using descriptive predicates. This is evident when considering utterances from everyday life as an example (Ossowska 1957b, p. 47).

The next stage of her deliberations comprises two concepts of judgments and how they are justified. The first way of understanding judgments defines them as the set of all utterances containing the predicate adjectives "good" and "bad", and their derivatives. This is the narrower concept. However, according to the broader concept, all utterances expressing praise or reprimand, even if not included in the meaning of the utterance itself, would be judgments (Ossowska 1957, p. 48).

Distinguishing judgments based on predicates allows for the absolutisation of the notion of evaluation. Ossowska believes that differentiating descriptive and evaluative utterances based on descriptive and evaluative predicates is not as apparent as one might expect. For example, it is very difficult to determine whether a particular predicative expression evaluates or simultaneously describes and evaluates. Differentiating description and evaluation on the psychological basis of a specific expressive function of evaluations (repulsion or appulsion) leads to their relativisation (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 60–61). The same positive judgment

made by X might mean something totally different to Y (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 62–63).

In her conclusions, Maria Ossowska states that these deliberations were necessary above all for distinguishing moral judgments from among utterances of all kinds. This constitutes a fundamental problem for the entire science of morality. As a result, a closer analysis of the narrow concept of judgments led Ossowska to reject its usage. "Moral judgments most often do without expressions of this kind, and their verbal attire can be extremely diverse, due to which we will be forced to guide our studies not according to that verbal dress, but according to some other rather vaguely perceptible characteristics that we shall strive to specify" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 63).

Ossowska does not provide criteria for distinguishing morality. She proceeds to analyse the dispute over the nature of all kinds of evaluation. She considers the subjectivistic and objectivistic interpretations of evaluations and the arguments in favour of these positions. The main hindrance to resolving this dispute lies in the absence of a proper definition of the object of evaluation. "When analysing the meaning of evaluative utterances, both objectivists and subjectivists tended to be influenced by certain specific examples, and did not take the trouble to differentiate this diverse material that might claim the label of evaluation. In the meantime [...] certain suggestions may lead to moral judgments, others to aesthetic evaluations" (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 84–85). This dispute is treated by the author, with certain exceptions, as a question of the meaning of judgments. Attempts towards resolving what judgments actually are led her to the conclusion that they should be treated as utterances of different types. She emphasises the diversity of content in evaluative utterances, and sees limited possible application of each of the distinguished interpretations of judgments.

The naturalistic trend has a strong influence on the subjectivistic interpretation of judgments. An example of this is Moore's position, in which utterances containing predicative adjectives such as "good" and "bad" are defined using descriptive terms, thereby changing the judgment into a descriptive sentence. This is why Ossowska recognises that not all subjectivistic versions lead to naturalism. In her reasoning, she refers to two positions: one negates the recognition of judgments as sentences, and therefore as descriptive sentences, while the other attributes a hybrid character to the judgments. This is the view put forward by Petrażycki. The subjectivistic version, in the meantime, does not comment on the content of the judgment, only indicating the conditions of its formulation. This is the so-called catathymic quality of judgments (Ossowska 1957b, p. 86). "Therefore, not every variety of subjectivism is naturalism, just as not every

variety of naturalism has to be subjectivism [...], one can attempt to equate judgments with descriptive sentences that would be neither psychological sentences nor 'personal' utterances" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 86).

Ossowska takes the opposite position when it comes to resolving the dispute between objectivists and subjectivists, treating a judgment like any utterance expressing a specific type of sensation. Her criticism is expressed in the observation that "this broad concept of judgment does not apply to the matter of content at all, it characterises an attribute solely based on its expressive function" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 86). She is convinced that it becomes impossible to resolve this dispute in favour of the subjectivists. Regarding the catathymic version of subjectivism, a closer relation to the psychological concept is possible (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 86–87).

The justifiability of judgments is an interesting issue for Ossowska, and it is a position tied to the matter of their logical status. The question concerning the truth or falsehood of judgments was resolved negatively or affirmatively; judgments were denied logical value by those who did not regard them as sentences. Ossowska distinguishes three main theoretical positions acknowledging the logical value of judgments. The first of these holds that every judgment declares something truly or falsely about the object it grammatically applies to. The second treats judgments as masked psychological sentences about one's own or somebody else's current sensations or dispositions. Such usage grants psychological qualities to all sentences, and this position tends not to be taken into account in the dispute over the logical value of judgments. The difference between these positions lies in the relating of judgments to other aspects of reality. The third position attributes judgments with logical value. It treats them as utterances about specific objects about which they seem to pronounce deceptively. Despite all judgments being treated as false sentences, as introspective sentences, they are true depending on the intention of the one uttering the judgment (Ossowska 1957b, p. 89). "This position gives rise to some misunderstandings, since it is sometimes treated as a position that sees the possibility of attributing to one and the same judgment a certain logical value due to two different realities" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 89).

No solution to the matter of whether judgments can be justified based on their logical status is evident to Ossowska. She concedes the point to those claiming that judgments cannot be justified because of the impossibility of determining their logical value. "But, conversely, from the fact that judgments cannot be justified, or at least the fact that nobody to date has managed to do so, one cannot yet infer that they are neither true nor false at all, although this fact undoubtedly fosters the suspicion that they have been subjected to

a procedure for which they were not suited at all" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 90). Westermarck's and Russell's conclusions, that as it is not possible to resolve differences of opinion concerning logical status, they should be treated as differences in taste, she considers premature (Kiciński 1983a, p. 566).

Ossowska also argues against the position, quite common among ethicists, that certain groups of judgments are statements that are true or false in what they declare grammatically. Such a view was represented by, among others, Moore. He acknowledged the truthfulness of judgments without the necessity of justifying them. However, Ossowska is not convinced by the reasoning in favour of this position, which refers to the fact that there are unjustified assumptions in science. She claims that those few assumptions only exist due to the impossibility of verifying them. Regarding judgments, we would be dealing with a broad scope of statements which, despite their unjustifiability, would supposedly have logical value (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 91–92).

While agreeing that entire groups of true or false judgments exist, though unjustifiable, which do not require justification so much because their logical value is self-evident, various writers have disagreed on the scope assigned to them by Moore. "Judgments justifiable to Moore, concerning the rightness or wrongness of a particular kind of conduct, were, as is well known, essentially unjustifiable" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 92). In Ossowska's view, the obviousness on which trust in judgments not requiring justification was built is not that distinct. "The development of psychology has taught us that opinions imposed on us 'intuitively' are usually opinions instilled in us in early childhood. Hence probably the particular 'intuitiveness' of moral judgments compared to aesthetic judgments, for example moral judgments have been developed in us from our earliest childhood with an emphasis that nobody places on our aesthetic opinions, and with the demand of obedience and not initiative or personal deliberations on the matter" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 92). Attempts at justifying judgments in categories close to "obviousness", by referring to popular opinion, common sense, or the consensus of group experiences, evoke Maria Ossowska's further objections (Ossowska 1957b, p. 115; Kiciński 1983a, p. 567). Judgments here could be interpreted as psychological sentences regarding the current or potential experiences of a particular group. "But that train of thought is sometimes construed as erroneous, as the authors of this type of reasoning themselves agree, if their train of thought is made explicit to them. The elimination of this type of justification leaves us with only an immanent justification of the type practised in the *a priori* sciences. Judgments that appear to be empirical sentences on the surface would not justify themselves as empirical sentences

by checking, but by proving" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 115). Thus, logical value is only granted to judgments when they can be deduced from the overarching assumptions adopted, as is the case in the *a priori* sciences (Ossowska 1957b, p. 116). Ossowska proposes taking this statement into account when constructing models of ethical systems. Ethics, which in her view is commonly regarded as a normative science, in addition to judgments, contains norms. Their principal task is to determine not what is, but what should be. How these utterances are worded is based on rules that are quite indefinite (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 117–118).

Ossowska, in turn, analyses the kind of utterances containing the terms "should" and "ought", distinguishing three meanings and types of normative usage of these expressions. In the first meaning, norms are treated as elliptical expressions, containing a relation of equivalence as a necessary condition for defining the significant content of an utterance constituting a norm (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 120–121).

Ossowska observes that truth or falsity in the classic sense (meaning conformity of thought with reality) cannot be attributed to norms. However, one can justify norms by providing arguments in their favour (Ossowska 1957b, p. 121). By referring to judgment, we build a second way of using the term "should". At the same time, it constitutes a criterion for the distinguishing of norms. Following Czesław Znamierowski, Maria Ossowska distinguishes axiological and thetic types of norms. Znamierowski defined axiological norms as utterances guided by the value of a deed of some kind. Ossowska holds that norms of this type are formed based on a "judgment of some kind". Thetic norms, on the other hand, are established by the act of will of the acting subject (Ossowska 1957b, p. 125; Misztal 1991–1992, pp. 121–123). In the last meaning, the expression "should" is of an advisory nature. Its use leads to the distinguishing of rules known as hypothetical imperatives (Kant), imperatives of practical consequence (Broad), or teleological rules (Lande) (Ossowska 1957b, p. 126).

In her conclusions, Ossowska distinguishes three types of norms: axiological, thetic and teleological. The criterion for this division is the manner of argumentation in favour of each. The division made on the basis of judgment "rather muddled than clarified itself in the course of further analysis" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 132). Distinction based on the principle of similarity of the manner of reasoning in favour of norms did not yield satisfactory results. "As a noteworthy result, one should mention the possibility, arising based on these inquiries, of recognising all reasoning in favour of norms as reasoning implying judgment. The gradability of the predicative adjectives 'good' and 'bad', and the non-gradability of the word

'should', does not hinder the transition from judgments to norms, as it may have seemed at first glance, since, as has been mentioned, the word 'should' also conveys certain preferences" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 133).

There are also other divisions and ways of formulating norms. Ossowska distinguishes norms of duty and norms of the ideal. The significance attributed to norms of duty lies in a person's specific behaviour in each situation in which they may behave in that way. Norms of the ideal concern actions that apply to all objects (Ossowska 1957b, p. 133). Utterances containing norms take the form of indicative, conditional and imperative sentences (Ossowska 1957b, p. 135). Imperative sentences display certain relations with the norm. This is a type of genetic relationship in which the existence of a command preceding the norm is assumed. A "logical" relationship of another kind between a norm and a command involves referring to the command in a situation of the norm in question being challenged. The third kind of relationship is psychological. It is expressed in the equating of the psychological reaction towards norms and towards commands (Ossowska 1957b, p. 138). In tackling the issue of the logical value of norms, Ossowska claims that arguments in favour of the truth or falsity of norms have failed to convince her. "Neither the fact of applying the words 'true' or 'false' in relation to norms, nor the wording of norms in the form of allegedly declarative sentences, entitles us to that" (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 141–142). With regard to norms, this does not signify a total abandonment of the criterion of truth. "One can talk of their truthfulness or falsity in a sense other than traditional, for example by construing certain norms as true due to other previously recognised norms" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 142). We are then deprived of the possibility of resolving a dispute when there are conflicting norms deriving from contradictory ethical systems. Norms may be attributed with a kind of logical value other than the traditional. This is their specific characteristic of rightness or wrongness (Ossowska 1957b, p. 142). Arguments that reinforce norms can be grasped in the general schema of inference characteristic of logical sentences. Rightness can usually be attributed to those norms that can be deduced from judgments and norms previously recognised, including those whose relation to reality is obvious or based on common sense. Ossowska treats Kant's categorical imperative as a kind of "new" criterion for the rightness of norms. Another type of reasoning is the equating of a norm's rightness with its purposiveness (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 142–147).

The conclusions that Ossowska draws are similar to those pertaining to judgments, and consequently, also to specific ethical systems. Her review of norms and judgments reaffirmed her conviction that, irrespective of

their character, one cannot disregard the role played in shaping them by motivation, convictions, and a thorough understanding of the situation being evaluated. Judgments and norms resulting from a conscious and purposive application are more effective than those formulated in a situation of cursory knowledge of the facts or without a clearly defined purpose. "The sets of our judgments and norms may also benefit in formal terms, shifting from a state of chaos to an ordered state" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 159).

In her work *Motywy postępowania* [lit. The motives of conduct] (Ossowska 1958), Maria Ossowska fully realised her programme for the psychology of morality she sketched out in *Foundations of the Science of Morality*, conducting analyses of the motives related to people's moral lives. Her psychology programme had already been largely completed before the war in the text "Jakie zadania ma przed sobą badacz moralności" [lit. The tasks ahead of the researcher of morality] (Ossowska 1983, pp. 333–340; 1957b, Chapter I). Its section on the psychology of judging had been the subject of analyses dedicated to norms and judgments, but was supplementary to the understanding of the chief issue, that is, the phenomenon of morality. Analysis of the dispute concerning human nature opens the discussion. Tackling the genesis of the matter, Maria Ossowska adopts the notion of human nature understood as a "certain set of dispositions vested in man with persistent constancy" (Ossowska 1958, p. 14). Throughout history, it has been addressed by almost everyone who has shown interest in moral issues. "Sometimes they [views – W.M.] were expressed quite explicitly, at other times they could only be plucked directly from a discussion" (Ossowska 1958, p. 15).

In searching for answers concerning the "true" nature of man, Ossowska considers the conditions necessary for it to be correctly determined, given by Roger Bacon. The first of them assumes that human nature is best learned in a person's private life. One can determine whether the person is guided by their own opinion or whether they follow norms binding within a given social environment. Ossowska doubts whether such a concept, based on the opposition of "natural" and "made for show to others (affective)", could constitute any research tool (Ossowska 1958, pp. 18–19). The following condition pertains to situations in which feelings are vehemently expressed. The predicative adjective "natural" is equated here with the term "externalising without restraint" (Ossowska 1958, pp. 18–19). Ossowska also discredits this condition, recalling the principles that we impose upon ourselves voluntarily, restraining our behaviour. The last of Bacon's proposals seeks a person's true nature in a situation hitherto unknown to them. After all, they cannot then make use of habits acquired beforehand. "This last

opposition, as a special case of opposition, innate or acquired, inherits all of its difficulties" (Ossowska 1958, pp. 20–21). Ossowska adds that habits can be treated as second nature to man.

Worried about putting off her readers, in her concluding critical remarks on human nature, Ossowska indicates the validity of using this term. "The analogies between human organisms are so undeniable that discerning 'human nature' as a set of attributes determined by biological factors common to humans by no means seems unreasonable. This issue is alive in science, and holds the full right of citizenship there" (Ossowska 1958, p. 24).

Ossowska firmly believes that naturalism is a position harshly berated by critics for three reasons. Opponents of social reform used the biological foundations of life to maintain conservative positions. Aversion to biological factors was driven by the possibility of being "accused" or saddled with the stigma of racism. Certain factors, recognised as a generalised manifestation of the human psyche, were discredited by the development of sociology. Biological elements in the human psyche were reduced in favour of the social factor (Ossowska 1958, pp. 25–26). According to Ossowska, the understanding of human nature as a specific set of dispositions conditioned by common biological properties will diminish as sociology develops, but it cannot cease to exist. Nevertheless, psychological sub-disciplines must deal with specific issues, abandoning the generalisations made earlier (Ossowska 1958, p. 27).

The motives of human conduct were also a factor influencing the formation of the concept of human nature. Ossowska analyses the meanings that, due to the component of moral judgments, are given to motives, and emphasises the homonymy of this expression. "In the first and broadest usage, a motive can be any factor determining or jointly determining a person's behaviour. In colloquial usage, the kind of understanding whereby that which motivates must be psychological is more widespread than the understanding of motive in the previous sense" (Ossowska 1958, pp. 28–30). In the third, dynamic view, motives are understood as being "guiding forces of some kind", the springs of action explaining the repetitiveness of certain behaviours (Ossowska 1958, p. 31). "In the fourth, no less common meaning, the concept of motive is connected solely with purposive action (and here of course we have in mind purposive action as action that has a purpose, and not as effective action when one speaks of somebody's deliberate efforts or deliberate commands)" (Ossowska 1958, p. 32). The list of interpretations of the term's meanings concludes with the concept indicating an absence of motives in certain actions. The motivational set then embraces judgments that influence the choice of specific values and manners of conduct

(Ossowska 1958, pp. 34–35). In Maria Ossowska's opinion, all concepts are connected by their consistent treatment of motive as a factor conditioning a given person's behaviour (Ossowska 1958, p. 36). Motive here is a condition sufficient for some kind of action to be taken. This is the "psychic factor by which we ultimately halt in our regression, searching for the first psychic factor in the chain of conditionings. We are therefore closest to the third concept of motive, which wanted to see some kind of elementary 'forces' in motives" (Ossowska 1958, p. 36).

These considerations are complemented by an analysis of expressions denoting motivational relationships, such as "to be guided, to be governed by something". These relations consist in the conformity of the action with a specific value, principle or plan. Ossowska analyses the significance of these expressions in relation to the dispute regarding the primacy of feelings or reason in human nature (Ossowska 1958, p. 41).

In the first sense, being guided by reason is associated with possessing a well-established yet arbitrary hierarchy of values and judgments. Being governed by reason is connected to the planned nature of conduct that this hierarchy of values has determined. In the second interpretation, a person guided by reason adapts their conduct to a particular hierarchy of values and convictions, living in a disciplined, anticipatory manner. The next interpretation is of someone who accepts the hierarchy of values of people possessing moral authority, being governed by reason. It may also be the case that someone judging another's conduct believes they have a similar system of values. In the final version of the meaning, one is guided by reason when one is capable of expressing views free from the influence of feelings and not constituting a rationalisation of our emotions (Ossowska 1958, pp. 42–43).

Deliberations concerning human nature aimed to extract the diversity of these concepts, which became the basis of various ethical systems or influenced moral judgments in interpersonal relations (Ossowska 1958, pp. 43–45). Being governed by pleasure constitutes a separate issue to which Ossowska devoted an extensive section of her reflections on hedonism. She focuses on the topic understood as telic action and excludes from the scope of this theory actions that are not connected to self-knowledge or that do not play a role of factors conditioning human behaviour (Ossowska 1983, p. 570). She distinguishes strivings "for pleasure" and "on account of pleasure", as well as strivings "to avoid unpleasantness" and "on account of unpleasantness". This is because people make a mental shortcut when speaking of pursuing pleasure and avoiding unpleasantness. Apart from some exceptions, what is meant is the aspiration for something for the sake of pleasure, and the

avoidance of something on account of unpleasantness (Ossowska 1958, p. 146).

According to Ossowska, the distinctions made in the analysis indicate contradictions. "We have shown that one and the same authors, in fighting hedonism as 'theories of being governed by pleasure' in one sense were hedonists in another sense of this term" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 146).

In her review of the varieties of hedonism, Ossowska emphasises that she has no emotional ties with this theory (Ossowska 1958, p. 147). The reason for tackling this matter was her desire to clarify misunderstandings that led to hedonism being given a pejorative hue. In Ossowska's opinion, the hedonistic theory, which attempts to explain human actions through a single principle – the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of unpleasantness – is false and sterile in terms of theory (Ossowska 1958, p. 148; Kiciński 1983a, p. 571). After all, it omits destruction, self-aggression and masochism. "However, we consider it [hedonism – W.M.] a not very instructive thesis, because it seems to us in a situation similar to the thesis proclaiming that everybody aspires to satisfy their own needs" (Ossowska 1958, pp. 148–149). Ossowska, therefore, has no fondness for hedonism. She strives meticulously to give order to the inaccuracies and clarify the misunderstandings that have arisen around this issue.

Ossowska analyses the phenomena of egoism and altruism in the same way that she treated the issue of hedonism. In her understanding, egoism is a kind of human disposition. The predicative adjective "egoistic" is used to describe human behaviour. The word was first introduced in the eighteenth century in the *Great French Encyclopaedia*. Like hedonism, over time it became burdened with a certain ambiguity (Ossowska 1958, p. 149). Ossowska considers the semantic variants of the term; how egoism is grasped constitutes the basis for the discrepancies in interpretation. It is sometimes seen as a kind of drive, as behaviour on account of good or evil, as the mental state of an acting human being, or as a "lack of consideration for others" (Ossowska 1958, pp. 150–151). The term "egoist", along with other terms used to define egoism, is also analysed (Ossowska 1958, pp. 151–67).

Taking hedonism as a model, Ossowska treats egoism as a theory striving to explain all human behaviour. "The situation resembles our discussion of hedonism. It was said there that everybody pursues pleasure, while the substantial differences between people are related to what a person finds pleasurable. Here you could say that in everybody's conduct it is about oneself, but major differences occur between people depending on what matters they recognise as their own, on the scope that their own 'self' assumes" (Ossowska 1958, pp. 167–168). She demonstrates the weakness of

this position, indicating the impossibility of linking the theory of egoism to human aspirations aiming for personal gain. This is only possible in a situation of a conflict of interests (Ossowska 1958, p. 170). In her opinion, neither the proponents nor the opponents of this “theory of universal selfishness” ever defined the object of the dispute. What was contested depended on the manner of reasoning a party to the dispute opted for.

Opponents of egoism invoked social instincts. Their existence, justifying altruism, is attributed to people capable of making sacrifices for the benefit of others (Ossowska 1958, pp. 187–193). Maria Ossowska analyses specific types of altruism. Altruism is a herd instinct; it is mutual help, solidarity, sensitivity to praise and reprimand. In her analyses of this phenomenon, she displays an attitude of distrust; she limits herself to demonstrating inconsistencies or contradictions in writers’ views, but leaves the issue itself without comment (Ossowska 1958, p. 225).

The final chapter in the psychology of morality comprises an analysis of man’s moral nature (Ossowska 1958, pp. 245–314). Among other matters, it encompasses deliberations on the theory of conscience and its origins, as well as an examination of the moral sense. Ossowska discusses a guilty conscience and its component parts, among which she classifies anger, shame, fear, as well as violation of social instincts and self-tormenting tendencies. The following subject of analysis is the sensitivity of conscience, feelings of guilt and sinfulness, and the moral sphere in a person’s life.

There was an evident predominance of content analysis during her deliberations. Towards the end of the analysis, Maria Ossowska explains her position. Taking the analysis of conscience as an example, she posits that it constitutes a “lasting disposition to make moral judgments and to experience the emotions associated with them”. In contrast, a guilty conscience has within itself “some kind of self-condemnation” (Ossowska 1958, p. 314). The sphere of moral judgments was taken here as defined and given, without any clarification, despite the author being aware of its heterogeneity. “However, temporarily disregarding these difficulties was necessary to be able to move on at all and obtain certain results, the aforementioned heterogeneity of which – as it seems to us – essentially does not undermine” (Ossowska 1958, p. 314).

In the conclusions, Maria Ossowska presents her own theoretical position, completing the deliberations conducted in *Motives of Conduct*. She holds the view that no researcher can justify the theoretical superiority of one system of moral norms and judgments over another. Such a preference can only be governed by certain pragmatic or self-interested concerns of the researcher. “Many years of reflection over moral norm and judgment in various human

environments have at the same time led us to the conviction that, other than a certain stock of such judgments and norms, changing with the group that their follower belongs to, there is also a certain albeit rather modest number of them whose universality is above the group level" (Ossowska 1958, p. 314). For example, Ossowska cites the principle of reciprocity, one of the oldest and most widely recognised rules governing interpersonal relations. Solidarity towards members of one's own group is also such a principle. Their recurrence does not attest to the rightness of these norms, but is tied to needs that occur in all people. These needs are of a fixed nature, recurring in fluctuating circumstances (Ossowska 1958, p. 316). "These needs are determined by certain social relations, so elementary that they can be found in every human group, and by certain properties ultimately connected with the organic structure common to human beings. Properties that, due to their undeniable universality, can already be included in the concept of human nature with no substantial risk" (Ossowska 1958, p. 316).

As can be seen, Ossowska's views align with those of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Hume regarding these issues. While endeavouring not to ignore the achievements of any of these schools of psychology, Ossowska created an entirely humanistic work. This was probably achieved thanks to the assumption of the uniqueness and complexity of the individual psyche. This is not conducive to the easy creation of generalisations concerning the motives of human conduct (Kiciński 1983a, p. 573). The choice of egoism and altruism as the main objects of research analysis testifies to Ossowska's specific theoretical preferences. With regard to the concept of morality, the position in which the leading role is played by preferences for one's own or another's well-being stands out.

Chapter 2

The Problem with Defining Morality

Assumptions and criteria

The conceptualisation of terms is a natural stage in the research process. It leads to the definition of the object of research in a given science. Achieving precision is a crucial stage that enables the application of concepts in empirical studies. Maria Ossowska, when embarking on the construction of an analytical definition of morality, had to reckon with a particular tradition existing behind the trend of reflection on this issue. The most crucial factor influencing her actions was the experience she gained while analysing positions manifested in ethical thought. This found its full expression in her research programme for the science of morality. As one moves away from all philosophical assumptions and with the demand for a total absence of assumptions, defining morality comes across as one of the central issues.

The adoption of definitional assumptions was a cause of the difficulties she encountered while creating an analytical definition of the concept of morality (Kiciński 1989, p. 53). They had already appeared when Ossowska attempted to find specific attributes in moral norms and judgments in her *Foundations of the Science of Morality*. She intended to establish a neutral definition of morality. She continually enriched her reflections on the topic with new insights and observations. "Her attempts to characterise this phenomenon and grasp its essence are, irrespective of the formal result in the form of a strict definition, of momentous cognitive value. They also led Ossowska to use a concept of morality in her works that was sufficiently unambiguous for its further explication to become possible" (Kiciński 1984, p. 27). Subsequent works focusing on moral issues testify to Ossowska using the concept but without choosing to define it strictly.

In the preface to *Foundations of the Science of Morality*, Ossowska writes that morality is an illusory concept: "For it is impossible to analytically distinguish classes of phenomena belonging to the sphere of morality" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 7). This assertion is the result of considerations contained

in her earlier work, *Moralność jako fakt społeczny* [lit. Morality as a social fact], in which Ossowska analysed diverse positions striving to define the social character of morality, which was then included in her *Socjologia moralności* [lit. Sociology of morality] (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 259–277).

Ossowska was interested in two semantic variants. The first deals with the moral sense and moral judgment, bearing in mind a specific disposition for reacting to a particular kind of stimulus and judgment. Usage of the word “moral” is neutral, since it is devoid of elements of praise or reproach. We do likewise when considering feelings and scruples associated with a specific type of experience. They are moral sensations, for example, a guilty conscience, a sense of duty, and so on. Sometimes they are sensations constituting the object of praise, such as jealousy or gratitude. They are also dispositions that the general public feels play a momentous role in the development of morality (Ossowska 1957b, p. 6). In the second case, the meaning of the word “moral” has a distinctly positive hue. It is the opposite of the pejorative expression “immoral”. Honesty and love of neighbour are moral, while lying and hatred are immoral. There are also two other ways of understanding the term “moral”. Namely, one speaks of moral wrong, or narrows down one of the two semantic variants of the concept of morality. However, this matter was not within Ossowska’s sphere of interest (Ossowska 1957b, p. 7).

Constructing such an analytical definition of the concept of morality that would be grounded on colloquial intuitions constituted another attempt. This was one of the proposals of Maria Ossowska’s research programme. She claimed that it could be achieved by basing it on what people in a given environment consider moral. The next step would involve taking action to identify their common properties. The crucial difficulty here lies in the fact that neither conjecture nor intuited opinions can be entirely eliminated. This is characteristic of all analytical definitions that reconstruct the meaning of an expression in keeping with colloquial intuitions. These intuitions are always spoken of to a greater or lesser degree at face value. The proposed solution, aimed at eliminating uncertain conjecture, essentially involves applying the questionnaire survey method. That in turn generates significant technical difficulties (Ossowska 1957b, p. 9). “The importance that people attach to moral matters must be attributed to the fact that the surveys in this area are so hopeless. This is felt acutely by the researcher of morality, who has to treat this method of work, often of value in other fields, with great distrust” (Ossowska 1958, p. 313).

Maria Ossowska demonstrated the impossibility of building an arbitrary definition of morality. In keeping with the postulate contained in her research

programme, she carried out a critical review of the concept of morality. Narrowing down the field of discussion, she reduced the area of her interest to those proposals which, through description, aimed to grasp the actual state of the phenomenon of morality (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 160–161).

One path to arriving at this is the semantic analysis of the concepts of moral judgment and moral norm. Recalling her deliberations regarding the moral specificity of the terms “good” and “bad”, Maria Ossowska formulates questions concerning their distinct moral character. She links this with the necessity of using only these terms for uttering moral norms and judgments or those deemed moral (Ossowska 1957b, p. 161). Analysing the term “good” in the statement “it is better to experience wrong than to inflict it”, or “it is better to acquit ten guilty people than to punish one innocent person”, she finds it impossible to indicate a factor defining the moral character of this expression. “‘Better to experience wrong than to inflict it’ means neither ‘more favourably’ nor ‘more pleasantly’, yet this negative characterisation is perhaps all we’d be able to say about the meaning of this word” (Ossowska 1957b, p. 161). “Therefore, it is not on the meaning of the word ‘good’ in this case [good citizen, good chess player – W.M.], but on the nature of the model we refer to, and on the properties whose possession determines the fulfilment of this model, that the feeling of a particular judgment as moral or not depends” (Ossowska 1957b, p. 163).

The same is true with the word “bad”, which can be used in similar contexts with different meanings. Apart from familiarity with the situational context, one needs to know what the person making the utterance is judging (Ossowska 1957b, p. 162). The words “good” and “bad” do not warrant qualification as moral judgments. One has to know how to define a given judgment as moral to be able to declare the moral character of an utterance using these words (Ossowska 1957b, p. 162). One should therefore already have the criteria of morality beforehand to be able to define what is and what is not moral. This refers to moral judgments as well as moral norms justified by judgments (Ossowska 1957b, p. 163).

Attempts have been made to justify norms using the term “should”, but without reference to judgments. Ossowska focuses on analysing an effort to connect this term with the term “duty”. The intention was to demonstrate the moral character of utterances using the expression “should”. In Ossowska’s view, this is not the right way to go, since there are situations when the usage of the term “duty” has no moral character, and cannot be translated into the language of moral duty (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 163–164).

Ossowska closes her deliberations on the specific character of moral judgments and norms using the terms “good” and “bad” with conclusions

similar to those she arrived at in the second chapter of *Foundations of the Science of Morality*. "Our result is the same in both situations: we are incapable of giving specific moral meanings of these words, which leads us to presume that judgments and norms become moral not because special terms have been used in them, but because these terms take on some kind of semantic shade for us when occurring in judgments and norms that we have already acknowledged previously on the basis of some other features as moral" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 165). Whereas the sphere of human activity in attributing moral sense to judgments and norms is evident to Ossowska, the basis of this recognition, meaning that the disposition to attribute a moral character to judgments and norms, remains unexplained.

The next attempt at defining morality is an analysis of moral norms and judgments based on the experiences that accompany them. These include the sense of duty specific to moral rules, a guilty conscience linked to the violation of these rules, and the experience of reproach or recognition associated with moral judgment. The psychological criteria also include specific motives behind the formulation of moral norms and judgments.

The supreme character of moral norms is expressed in their particular imperativeness and is linked to a specific sense of duty (Ossowska 1957b, p. 166). Such a thesis has persisted since Antiquity, when the Stoics first formulated it. In respect to this, Maria Ossowska formulates questions concerning whether we experience a sense of duty in regard to all moral rules, and also whether this sense of duty differs in something or in some way from the feeling experienced in other situations (for example in the intensity or quality of the sensations) (Ossowska 1957b, p. 167). Here, Ossowska draws attention to the ambiguity of the claim about the peculiarity of imperative experiences related to moral norms (Kiciński 1989, p. 67; Ossowska 1957b, p. 167). She rejects the position, treating it as a proposition of "by moral rule understanding every such rule to which this sensation is connected" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 168). This leads to a relativisation of the concept of moral norm. For each X, a moral rule is any rule towards which X has experienced, is experiencing or will experience a sense of duty. In the absence of such an experience for Y, the same rule is no longer a moral rule. Since Ossowska seeks to establish a definition of morality based on properties common to moral norms, she is not concerned with its justification (Ossowska 1957b, p. 168).

The second type of interpretation assumes that we react with a sense of duty to all norms regarded as moral in the environments with which we are connected. Ossowska observes that it is uncertain whether such a reaction can be universal in scope or whether it will only occur among individuals

who acknowledge these norms as legitimate (Ossowska 1957b, p. 18). When we only take these people as the basis for defining reaction, we are in danger of "creating a vicious circle, since by attempting to distinguish the 'certain' [i.e. those recognising the rightness of moral norms – W.M.], it would undoubtedly turn out that they are people with particular moral development, and the characterisation of morally developed people would lead us, sooner or later, to invoking a moral law whose distinctiveness we were supposed to search for" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 168).

Other difficulties arise from the existence of moral rules that, while prescribing particularly difficult things, are not imperative in character (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 168–169). This next doubt is expressed in the questioning of the imperative nature of moral norms in relation to the moral development characteristic of the average person. In her examples, Ossowska indicates situations in which people forgo observing moral norms due to economic benefits, while sometimes the behaviour of uncompromising perfectionists is a cause of conflict (Ossowska 1957b, p. 169; Kiciński 1989, p. 68).

For Maria Ossowska, the psychological nature of the sense of moral duty is unclear. The notion is assumed to denote a complex state of awareness, comprising convictions and emotional factors. The main reason for her doubt here is the modest number of analyses of this experience, as well as the unsystematic state of reflection concerning the nature of moral duty (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 169–170). For Ossowska, the main source of analysis comprises the findings of the work by the psychologist Pierre Bovet, according to whom the sense of duty experienced in relation to moral commands is, in a qualitative sense, similar to the sense experienced in other situations (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 170–171). Ossowska also refers to an observation by the American philosopher Frank Sharp, concerning the behaviour of a convalescent who eats despite having no appetite – out of a sense of duty (Ossowska 1957b, p. 172). "A final resolution to this matter may only be brought about by observation or psychological experiment, but the results of research to date seem to deny the hope that through the sensations we feel about moral rules, when faced with the possibility of transgressing them, one could isolate these rules" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 172; Kiciński 1989, p. 69).

A characteristic experience in the situation of moral norms being violated is a guilty conscience. Maria Ossowska claims the difficulties here are analogous to those occurring in the analysis of the sense of duty. "And here, the proposal of acknowledging as a moral rule a rule whose violation evokes a guilty conscience in a given X would lead to a relativisation of the concept

of moral rule. And here the recognition that one can characterise moral rules by referring to a guilty conscience, if their transgression provokes remorse among people characterised in such and such a way, would risk a vicious circle" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 174).

Ossowska asks whether it is possible to determine characteristics peculiarly common to all sensations of that type (Ossowska 1957b, p. 175). She stresses in her reflections that she does not know such attributes for a guilty conscience. After all, there is no single characteristic that encompasses the entirety of the experiences associated with it. Feelings of anxiety or shame are frequently components of these experiences that are singled out. However, sometimes situations described as having a guilty conscience do not contain these components. "Others have pointed out that we have experiences similar to a guilty conscience when we violate our own addictions, when we break customary practices that clearly have nothing to do with morality, or when we have not actually violated any moral rule but have only created appearances as if we had violated one" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 175). One cannot, based on an analysis of a guilty conscience, determine the specificity of moral rules and define what morality is. An even less tangible state is that of peace of conscience. Following William James, Ossowska gives the example of a certain lady for whom the certainty of being well dressed was a greater source of peace of conscience than that offered by religious consolation (Ossowska 1957b, p. 175).

She links the inability to single out morality on the basis of a guilty conscience to the disproportionality of the strength of one's remorse in relation to the scale of the breach of the moral norm in question. "The deliberate hurt of somebody in a conversation is unquestionably regarded as more reprehensible than the distress caused by carelessness, yet one can verify through experiment that people who fully accept this hierarchy of wrongdoing are usually more anxious about the distress caused by recklessness or lack of forethought than as a result of the hurt caused with premeditation" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 176).

Moral judgments are linked to a specific experience of reprimand or recognition. For Maria Ossowska, this is another criterion for defining moral facts. The main point of contention is how these experiences are organised. While Ossowska distinguishes positions treating these experiences as emotions evoking "conviction feelings", expressed in evaluative judgments, for others, they are emotional reactions deriving from the judgment formulated beforehand. There is also a position that allows for both options, distinguishing primary and imitative judgments. This is represented, for example, by William McDougall (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 176–177). Despite

the extensive literature on moral repulsion and appulsion, this issue lacks an adequate empirical grounding. "Those who have attempted to separate feelings connected to moral judgment into a separate class of feelings did not know how to do so in a purely psychological manner. When considering feelings related to moral judgment, they tended to take into account the entirety, comprising feeling and conviction [...], while the peculiarity of this whole usually proved to be a peculiarity of the object or the content, and not a peculiarity of the feeling accompanying this conviction" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 177).

In Ossowska's opinion, Westermarck acted similarly with the theory of moral feelings. He became embroiled in a detailed characterisation of the beliefs, objects and conditions that accompany feelings (Ossowska 1957b, p. 178). She conducted a thorough analysis of this position. "The feelings accompanying recognition and reprimand belong, according to Westermarck, to the broader class of feelings that he calls retributive emotions" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 178). Feelings connected to praise belong to feelings of the gratitude type, while those linked to reprimand belong to feelings of the blame type. They differ from ordinary gratitude and blame in three key qualities: selflessness, impartiality, and a sense of generality (Ossowska 1957b, p. 178). For Maria Ossowska, selflessness as portrayed by Westermarck is a special case of impartiality, while she considers the trait of generality a derivative of impartiality. This is because this feeling is linked to an individual's conviction that others would share the feelings they experience and the views they express in their place. In Ossowska's opinion, the conviction that one's own judgment is impartial constitutes the basis for qualification (Ossowska 1957b, p. 179). To justify his view of the impartiality of moral feelings, Westermarck cites the numerous demands for impartiality found in ethical systems, for example, Kant's categorical imperative. Ossowska sees this as a misunderstanding. "The fact that impartiality in conduct has been evaluated positively by moralists cannot support the idea that we have to believe in the impartiality of our feelings and of the judgments that are the expression of these feelings, that these judgments may be regarded as moral praise or reprimand (in the sense of 'belonging to morality')" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 180). We are therefore dealing with a mixing of the criteria for the legitimacy of moral judgment with the condition essential for this judgment to be acknowledged as one belonging to the class of moral judgments (Kiciński 1989, p. 72).

Maria Ossowska thinks that the issue of distinguishing moral norms and judgments by means of the simple and complex sensations accompanying them requires supplementing. Firstly, one should consider whether every

judgment and norm acknowledged as moral in a given environment is accompanied by sensations of this kind. Secondly, are only they accompanied by them? (Ossowska 1957b, p. 181). The sceptical results of the analysis with regard to psychological characterisation do not yet constitute an indicator of expectations. Ossowska warns that taking this path will not make it easy to achieve more constructive results (Ossowska 1957b, p. 181).

The motives behind the behaviour of social groups, forming moral norms and judgments, constitute the final stage in the analysis of the psychological criteria of morality. Ossowska begins her deliberations on this topic with a brief description of morality as a social fact. The group genesis of feelings accompanying moral norms and judgments is treated here as their common property. The theories of resentment and precaution were highlighted among the theories of motives explaining the group recognition of a particular set of moral norms and judgments (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 182–184).

Resentment (from the French *ressentiment*) denotes a motive consisting of jealousy, envy and blame. Theories of resentment generally refer to social situations involving antagonistic groups, and the positions of Nietzsche, Scheler and Westermarck are analysed in detail. According to Nietzsche, the Jews – who carried out a transformation of values – should be attributed with the creation of a morality guided by resentment. Weakness was called merit, impotence – kindness, cowardice – patience, and the impossibility of revenge – forgiveness. Morality guided by resentment shows little variation; it is the morality of the physically weak. One could take Christian morality as an example (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 185–186). Scheler, supporting this theory, sees in resentment the feeling that shaped bourgeois morality. In contrast to Christian morality, it is born of hatred, and its character is one of protest and neutralisation. The demand for equality also derives from resentment (Ossowska 1957b, p. 186). For Westermarck, resentment “is the reaction by any person, irrespective of their group affiliation, to personal wrongdoing, whether actually experienced or imagined”. The condemning of X for deed C, of which X was the perpetrator, is an expression of our resentful feelings towards X, whose conduct we have considered hurtful” (Ossowska 1957b, p. 187). This stance is part of a set of theories that link the motive of punishment to vengefulness.

Maria Ossowska emphasises that Max Weber was very critical of the theory of resentment. He argued that one of the predominant motives in building religious and ethical systems is the need to come to terms with the idea that good can do bad, and bad can do good. It is the need to cope with the disparity between fate and merit (Ossowska 1957b, p. 189).

Another type of theory posits that the need for precaution lies at the root of the genesis of moral norms. In recognising this need as universal, it does not recognise the systems of moral norms and judgments as a product of the group. It sees in them the product of a human individual, without reference to group membership (Ossowska 1957b, p. 189). This concept may be tied, although it does not have to be, with the theory of conflict in human coexistence. Ossowska counts Rudolf Holzapfel and Tadeusz Kotarbiński among the representatives of this direction of thought, devoting more of her attention to these two. In his concept of the phylogenesis of morality, Holzapfel states that people continue to feel the hostility of their environment, and this is why their efforts take the direction of constructing and improving defensive measures. They have evolved to overpower motives through reprimand and praise. "When that reproof and praise began to tackle the egoistic or altruistic properties of desires, the manner of valuing known as 'morality' was born" (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 189–190). In Ossowska's opinion, this is a theory that views the tool of precaution in terms of, among other things, moral norms and judgments.

Kotarbiński draws attention to the "voice of conscience", which reckons with the opinions of revered persons: effective and brave, both in battle and in care. We are dealing here with the equating of venerability with bravery in combat and in care. What distinguishes this type of precaution is the way judgments are worded by people who do not require support. Maria Ossowska points out that many revered people were known for their ineptitude in caring and in fighting in life. Therefore, bravery cannot be equated with prowess in these areas (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 190–191).

In Ossowska's opinion, these opinions discern the foundation for formulating moral norms and judgments in personal factors (in repulsions or appulsions). They guarded the interests of those who proclaimed them, narrow group interests or feelings and judgments common to all people (Ossowska 1957b, p. 191). Both theories are applied to groups characterised by low social status. Ossowska cites Bernard de Mandeville's position, attributing the creation of morality to privileged groups, who cleverly pit one passion against another to subordinate them to their influence (Ossowska 1957b, p. 191). Marxists relate this conviction to bourgeois morality, seeing it as an instrument of domination. In Ossowska's view, they rightly perceive class interest behind numerous moral norms and judgments, without extending this observation to embrace moral life in its entirety (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 191–192).

Ossowska concludes her reflections on the psychological criteria of moral norms and judgments with a critical assessment of the research findings. She

does not believe the deliberations were without result, since they eliminated certain orientational possibilities.

In her introduction to the analysis, Maria Ossowska draws attention to the fact that the objects of moral judgment were frequently those that should never have been seen together. The experiences described as intention and motive are an example of this. Intention is a psychological characteristic that categorises a given experience as a manifestation of will. Motive, on the other hand, is an experience defined as a functional characteristic, in other words, due to the presumed role the given experience plays in the causal chain. Motive is also considered to include intention (Ossowska 1957b, p. 194).

The fact that every judgment is not only an evaluation of something, but also an evaluation because of something, constitutes an additional obstacle (Ossowska 1957b, p. 195). Both defining the object and establishing the criteria for assessment are fundamental difficulties. In the dispute over what is actually the object of moral judgment, Ossowska distinguished three interpretations and conducted a detailed analysis of Westermarck's position. The actual object of moral judgment is the object of evaluation formulated correctly given previously recognised rules or opinions (Ossowska 1957b, p. 196). This is expressed in the statement: "Whoever lies does wrong". This position is exposed to the charge of indeterminism, attempting to demonstrate that guilt or merit is not an actual object of moral judgment. In Ossowska's opinion, this is a false view (Ossowska 1957b, p. 197). "In the meantime, it seems to us that one could defend the view that to attribute guilt to somebody is nothing other than condemning them morally, while attributing somebody with merit is tantamount to expressing one's moral recognition of them" (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 200–201).

In the second interpretation, the search for the actual object of moral judgment means tracing those moral judgments that are primary in relation to other judgments acknowledged as secondary, as derivative. This dependence may be of a logical phylogenetic or psychogenetic nature (Ossowska 1957b, p. 197). Ossowska points out that primary and secondary judgments are moral judgments. In both cases, their objects are the objects of moral judgments. Those closest to her are those who, when extending the psychology of moral evaluation, attempted to determine the actual object of moral judgment (Ossowska 1957b, p. 201).

According to the third interpretation, the actual object of moral judgment is what people have in mind when they utter moral judgments. In Westermarck's opinion, only people are the actual object of moral judgment. We express feelings of blame when judging negatively, or gratitude when judging positively. These are retributive emotions. Judgments of deeds are

secondary judgments, because the primary attitude towards people has shifted to the deeds themselves. In the initial phase, all judgments were utterances about people (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 197–178). Maria Ossowska considers this position the closest to her convictions. She believes that Westermarck's observations should be systematised and enriched (Ossowska 1957b, p. 201). She favours the position proclaiming that moral judgments are judgments of people, and goes on to analyse the properties of moral judgment expressed in praise or reprimand.

Awareness of the deed is classed among the conditions essential for the occurrence of a moral judgment (Ossowska 1957b, p. 201). Making moral judgments dependent on convictions of a moral nature is connected to the view that moral rules are only binding when one is aware of them being binding. Maria Ossowska distinguishes three types of understanding of conscious action: (1) being subject to moral judgment is connected to the conviction that one is familiar with the content of ways of performing the action; (2) awareness is expressed in the knowledge of the consequences of the deed performed; (3) knowledge of the negative moral judgment linked to a given action is assumed (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 202–204).

Ossowska takes the position of axiological neutralism. She investigated whether human actions are subject to both negative and positive moral judgment, focusing on reprimand, since morality is prohibitive in character (Ossowska 1957b, p. 205). "The intuitions concerning conscious action as an essential condition for being an object of praise are even more obscure than the intuitions about the requirement of 'awareness' as an essential condition for being subject to reprimand, while the matter of praise does not appear symmetrical with respect to the matter of reprimand" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 205).

Awareness of one's own actions as a condition for being subject to moral judgment is expressed in the phrase "to know what one wants". Ossowska cites Kotarbiński, defining a person who "knows what they want" as one who knows how to answer the question about what they are aiming for and how they intend to achieve it. In her opinion, this definition excludes all deeds for which the motivation is unconscious from the range of objects of moral judgment. When making a moral judgment, people's orientation is not based on the goals the person being judged believes they are pursuing, but rather on the goals that people attribute to this person. In this way, they judge a particular conduct in which the person does not know what they want (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 206–207). "Thus, knowledge of what one wants does not seem to be necessary at all for being subject to moral judgment, or at least reprimand" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 208).

In the colloquial view, besides knowledge of the content and consequences of a deed, a necessary condition for moral judgment is the attitude of will. According to the commentary to the Penal Code, Ossowska adopts the understanding of the volitional attitude as the connection of the perpetrator's knowledge and convictions, characterising intentional action (Ossowska 1957b, p. 208). She draws attention to situations of moral condemnation of deeds committed unintentionally or recklessly. Dispositions that lead a person against their own will to negligence or the violation of others' interests are also exposed to moral condemnation. Therefore, they are dispositions to which the categories of intentionality do not apply (Ossowska 1957b, p. 209).

Free will is a condition of conscious action. This is related to soundness of mind and responsibility (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 210–211). Maria Ossowska analyses situations in which man has the capacity to act, or in which he is denied this capacity, and succumbs to moral compulsion (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 211–219). "At first glance, will does not seem to be a factor fully on par with the others. [...] People are commonly subjected to moral judgment, for the inability to act caused by a lack of the appropriate desires or decisions, if those judging believe that a normal person could in the given circumstances have desired or taken the decision, that is, if they presume that some *morbid abulia* [lack of will – W.M.] or the like did not stand in the way here" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 214).

The inability to act, which may have an external or internal cause, depends on whether or not one is able to oppose the influences determining one's behaviour (Ossowska 1957b, p. 212). There are situations in which one is faced with moral compulsion as a practical necessity of a particular kind, making it difficult to issue consensual opinions. Where such an impossibility has been ascertained, one is exempt from moral judgment. In the case of practical necessity, or a so-called higher necessity, moral judgments vary considerably (Ossowska 1957b, p. 218).

According to Ossowska, the relationship between moral judgments and freedom of will has no practical significance. "It is a matter discussed by theoreticians that has little influence on life in practice and its judgments" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 227). Freedom of will is understood here as the freedom to act. It is something that all people are supposed to be entitled to, depending on whether determinism or indeterminism turns out to be the true or false view with regard to human action (Ossowska 1957b, p. 219). Should this be resolved in favour of determinism, moral judgments in relation to deeds, feelings, desires, and beliefs could be called into question (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 222–223, 227–228). In Ossowska's opinion, the issue

of freedom of will has no future as a theoretical problem. Neither does she see demonstrating the impact that the state of one's organism has on an act of free will as a possibility (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 223–224, 227). She agrees with Moritz Schlick that people behave as if they were determinists in the judgments of others' conduct. Colloquial determinism recognises the conditioning of decisions or intentions by the beliefs or desires preceding them. In certain situations, however, people shirk from recognising that certain physical factors precede judgments. "Having thus freed the spirit from the body, people consider themselves entitled to formulate moral judgments constituting an expression of blame or recognition in relation to the doer" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 225).

The analysis of the relationship between freedom and virtue in Stoicism concludes the review of positions pertaining to the issue of freedom and moral judgments. This relationship with freedom is of a different nature. Freedom is not a condition essential for being subject to moral judgment. Having a view defining what is good and what is bad is a sufficient condition for a person to be free. The only goods are moral goods. This assertion is accompanied by the conviction that they are attainable, regardless of the circumstances. Ossowska recognises that a discussion concerning the Stoics' position is beyond the scope of the subject matter (Ossowska 1957b, p. 226).

Ossowska stated that the conditions for being subject to moral judgment are not sufficient for proclaiming all moral judgments. Those judgments referring not to human conduct but only to beliefs, desires, feelings and dispositions were not classed among them. Regarding human deeds, not every action would be subject to judgment. An example is negligence as a specific form of a deed. Emphasising the asymmetrical nature of praise and reprimand as attitudes among those judging, she indicates the situation of writers overlooking the issue of praise (Ossowska 1957b, p. 227). She confirms Westermarck's thesis that a human being is the object that people have in mind when formulating moral judgments (Ossowska 1957b, p. 228). She takes determinism into account in judging and asks whether the necessary conditions discussed for formulating judgments apply to all moral judgments, or only to legitimate moral judgments. Is this inconsistency in the pronouncing of judgments, or are we dealing here with unjust judgments? In Ossowska's opinion, the formulation of judgments is a deed like any other, and as such, it can become the object of moral judgment. However, this is not a vicious circle situation, since moral judgments are governed by the very choice of properties. They are not part of the characterisation of the moral judgment itself, but only play the role of motives in the selection of conditions. As an example, she offers a judgment criticising moral judgments

for failing to consider specific conditions as unjust. This judgment does not break from the general characterisation of moral judgment (Ossowska 1957b, p. 230).

The conditions for being subject to moral judgment, as analysed by Ossowska, were considered essential. Westermarck's considerations focused on reprimand, since this was where the conditions for formulating judgments became most evident. The theories analysed gave only marginal treatment to praise.

The next section of Ossowska's deliberations addressed the properties that an object must have and that are sufficient for it to become an object of moral judgment. In judgment theories, it is difficult to determine whether their authors are describing morality that already exists, or whether they are merely realising their moral postulates. Ossowska took descriptive theories, mainly aimed at positive moral judgment, as the object of analysis (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 231–232). The first of the conditions analysed is the doer's specific mental state, with "conformity to conviction", goodwill, effort, selflessness, and sacrifice as the objects of the deliberations. The acting person's conviction constitutes a certain attitude towards the deed undertaken, and is one of the essential and sufficient conditions for moral judgment (Ossowska 1957b, p. 233). In Ossowska's opinion, action in keeping with one's own conviction must assume the belief that something is good, and that the good should be realised. There is not only a particular judgment here, but also conformity with a certain normative utterance (Ossowska 1957b, p. 234). However, there are situations in which judgments must be made, for example, choosing the best way back for someone lost in a forest, or selecting a particular colour by a painter. This has nothing to do with moral judgment. "It is difficult here to look more deeply into the matter, especially since – as far as the colloquial practice of moral judgment is concerned – the condition of acting in keeping with one's own conviction does not seem to be particularly popular" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 235). Ossowska observes that in colloquial life, people pronouncing moral judgments tend not to take the moral opinions of the deed's doer into account (Ossowska 1957b, p. 235).

Good will, as a condition for moral judgment, is expressed in the desire for something good because it is good. To fulfil the condition of positive moral judgment, it must simultaneously be a good wanted by the doer and by the person judging. In a situation where opinions diverge, there is no praise, but at most, the reprimand is revoked. Ossowska notes that recognition can only be obtained in the case of positive performance of the intended deed (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 235–236). She considers good will, the fact that the doer "had good intentions", and action in keeping with the doer's conviction,

as conditions that serve more to justify than to pronounce moral judgments (Ossowska 1957b, p. 274).

The Kantian theory of duty as an act performed against inclinations is, for Ossowska, a classic example of the relationship between moral judgment and effort. A positive hue of moral judgment can be acquired by an act that is accompanied by effort. This constitutes an essential condition for the judging of a particular deed (Ossowska 1957b, p. 237). In the descriptive theories of morality, Ossowska distinguishes two types of relationship between praise and effort – the first links positive moral judgment with the effort put into carrying out the deed. In the second, the emphasis is on the role of recognition as a factor that encourages and, consequently, inclines people to undertake difficult deeds requiring effort (Ossowska 1957b, p. 238).

Kenneth Frenkel's views served Ossowska's critique of the criterion of effort. Frenkel considers the resolve for a deed, undertaken in conditions of selflessness and effort, the object of positive moral judgment. Effort constitutes an essential condition for a deed's positive judgment. Its consequence is the resolution made, which is sometimes understood as the direct consequence or effect of a previously developed and established tendency (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 238–239). Such a position leads Maria Ossowska to reflect on the relationship between the concepts of effort and sacrifice. She, for example, indicates a man jumping into the water without thinking to rescue a drowning person. She demonstrates the discrepancy between Frenkel's views and popular opinion. In Frenkel's opinion, the rescuer would have had to survive their decision. If the doer's behaviour did not involve effort, or was not an effect of an acquired disposition, then Frenkel – contrary to popular opinion – would have to deny this deed the right to praise (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 239–240). "Put forward as a necessary condition by Frenkel, it [effort – W.M.] constitutes, in his proposal, one of the parts of the condition sufficient for being subject to moral judgment" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 241). In Ossowska's opinion, effort frequently constitutes an important factor in moral judgment. It is also sometimes taken into account as a component of aesthetic and economic judgments. However, it does not seem to be a condition essential for formulating moral judgments (Ossowska 1957b, p. 241).

Selflessness belongs to the mental state of the person performing a deed that is judged morally. It comprises non-selfishness, non-malice and impartiality. Ossowska analysed the views of Frenkel, Znaniecki, and Dupréel, who addressed the relationship between this condition and moral judgment. According to Frenkel, moral resolutions cannot be concerned with one's own good or another's wrong. They cannot single anybody out, and must be

independent of others' influence. Ossowska cites Frenkel, asserting, among other things, that risking one's life to save the life of one's own child is not considered moral. It is a false sentence, as a description of an actual way of judging (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 241–242). Frenkel's considerations are oriented towards a description in keeping with reality, but they contain statements that indicate his application of his own concept of morality. In Ossowska's opinion, this is the fundamental cause behind Frenkel's judgments diverging from popular opinion. "Striving for [...] one's own good does not come across at all as selfish, up to a certain limit, but is rather an expression of noble and perfectionist aspirations" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 244).

The theory of morality presented by Frenkel is primarily oriented towards the consideration of praise, while it does not address reprimand. Ossowska notes that positive and negative moral judgments fully exhaust the scope of the latter. "This neglect of reprimand is inherent in the majority of theories defining the object of moral judgment by reference to the motives of the action, or more broadly, to the state of the person performing the deed being judged" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 244).

In his concept of self-interest and disinterestedness, Znaniecki sought to distinguish between altruistic and hostile deeds. Ossowska cites examples of his remarks illustrating typical issues related to the notion of disinterestedness. He considers conversation, the purpose of which is to convey information, a self-interested act. On the other hand, a conversation aimed at generating the appropriate mood is selfless. "The contingent definition of what is self-interested, by means of the notion of usefulness (a person is self-interested when striving for something useful to them), only shifts the difficulties, and does not resolve them" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 243). With Znaniecki's analysis of disinterestedly hostile acts, which require the effort and dedication characteristic of praise, Ossowska was able to criticise theories linking disinterestedness with a positive moral judgment. Znaniecki demonstrated that hostile disinterest was a phenomenon that frequently occurred in the lives of individuals within society. Thus, the concept of disinterestedness can only be upheld when it is treated as a morally positive disposition, leading to one forgoing one's own benefits for the sake of the good of others (Ossowska 1957b, p. 43).

Dupréel, writing about morally praiseworthy deeds, referred to the notions of disinterestedness and sacrifice. He distinguished four kinds of deed, a common property of which is the absence of personal interest of the person performing the deed. They are difficult or unpleasant, since they require sacrifice on the part of the deed's doer. At the same time, this determines their moral value. For Maria Ossowska, this is another example of

the difficulties associated with the notion of disinterestedness. The second property characterising moral praise is being subject to the law. It is not certain whether this refers to an attitude of submission towards a particular moral norm or a certain class of deeds covered by a common rule. Ossowska does not see how one could obtain an answer to the question concerning the condition of being subject to the law: does it apply to the one judging, or – because of obedience – the psyche of the one performing the deed? (Ossowska 1957b, p. 245).

The properties that characterise the effects of human achievements constitute the last of the conditions analysed in regard to being subject to moral judgment. What gives such positions the advantage is that they can be formulated symmetrically for both praise and reprimand, embracing the entire scope of moral judgments (Ossowska 1957b, p. 246). Moral orientation is the simplest form. It expresses praise or reprimand on account of the pleasure or unpleasantness caused by a given deed (Ossowska 1957b, p. 247). Such a position is taken by Hume, among others. Merit involves possessing specific psychological properties that are pleasant or useful to oneself or others. Ossowska extends Hume's statement regarding personal merit to embrace the entire class of objects of moral assessment. She faults him for simplifying the complicated area of moral issues. Hume's theory does not hold true in the claim that all deeds bringing pleasure deserve recognition. Likewise, in regard to the assertion that only such deeds are moral in character. "One will not consider as morally positive the deed of a person who had wanted to taunt his interlocutor with an ironic remark, but in the meantime consoled the latter because he had not noticed the irony" (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 247–248). The example given by Ossowska is intended to illustrate the important role played by the doer's intentions in judging. Other examples indicate the existence of obligations that command deeds not achieving hedonistic values, as well as means for pursuing a goal that are not morally indifferent. The person upon whom pleasure is bestowed is important for moral judgment. In Ossowska's observation, colloquial morality makes a difference between how one treats oneself and one's fellow beings. "This asymmetry in the treatment of a person's actions regarding oneself (or with oneself in mind) and regarding others (or with others in mind) is so important for our morality, that all theories introducing identical treatment of self and neighbour [...] are, as a description of the actual state of things, doomed in advance to disqualification" (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 248–249). Ossowska links the position on moral judgments, qualifying a person's conduct with regard to the good of the group, with the view that good is understood as an expression of group opinion. "For as long as this group is

not hypostasised, then a social happiness-inducing quality is a happiness-inducing quality for one's neighbour, while the word 'society' or 'community', and so forth, serve only to accentuate the altruistic colouring of these positions, to accentuate that our pleasure is not equal, in judgments, to somebody else's. The differences here are rather a matter of hues" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 250). There are also theories according to which moral judgments of deeds are made because of the consequences for interests, for health, or for social development. Ossowska writes: "In general, these theories suffer from a lack of explanation as to how this good fortune, interests, or health should be understood" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 250). She reduces moral relations from a group dimension to individual relations, and does not find sufficient grounds for recognising the consequences of a deed as an adequate determinant of moral judgment.

Maria Ossowska analysed theories recognising morality as having the goal of bringing about harmonious interpersonal relations. This is the issue of the moral judgment of a person's behaviour towards others. In Ossowska's opinion, one cannot support the thesis that moral judgments always concern conduct, intentions, or feelings directed towards someone. This is prevented by duties towards oneself that are subject to moral judgment, as well as dispositions or behaviours addressing things (Ossowska 1957b, p. 251). On the other hand, the view that moral judgments are always judgments on account of somebody deserves deeper analysis. The problem is whether this property in a given social group belongs to all moral judgments, or only to them. Ossowska distinguishes two opposing positions here. The affirmative orientation cites personal virtues (honour), purity of heart or personal dignity, recognising them as an object of praise or reprimand for the sake of the good of coexistence (Ossowska 1957b, p. 252). Opponents of this view refer to truthfulness, which we value even though its consequences are not always beneficial for the good of the whole. We condemn murder, even though the removal from the group of a person threatening the safety and lives of the whole may have beneficial consequences, and so on (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 252–253). In her conclusions, Ossowska states that "not all judgments considered moral in the surrounding environment evaluate human conduct by its effects on the harmony of coexistence" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 254). The good of coexistence is also important in evaluations that form the basis of, for example, the Criminal Code or traffic regulations (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 255–256). Ossowska distinguishes the most typical positions, linking morality with the good of social coexistence. The first position defines morality as a "lubricant relieving friction" in societal life. This has been described in ethics as a "rational" position. Ossowska recalls that the proponents of this

orientation were involved in combating moral rules built on authority, custom or tradition (Ossowska 1957b, p. 255).

Another view linked colloquial morality to the concept of morality serving to alleviate social tensions. According to Ossowska, this is an unentitled and artificial connection (Ossowska 1957b, p. 255). Based on the view that morality determines the rules for the hygiene of coexistence, it exists wherever coexistence occurs. The concept of internal discipline is its contradiction. "Wherever man acts governed by discipline of this kind, we may talk about morality, which is therefore not inseparably connected to life in the community" (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 255–256).

In Ossowska's opinion, the judgments that people make are not homogeneous. The criteria governing the act of judging change under the influence of numerous circumstances. Due to the consequences of deeds, in moral judgment, one should not mistake the judgment of conduct in regard to the result with judgment of conduct in relation to the extent to which the doer has reckoned with the consequences of their actions (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 256–257). The opposite position is that the judgments of deeds are independent of their consequences. This is because the properties vested in deeds "by themselves" are the basis of the judgment, since deeds are "internally good" or "internally bad". Morality, therefore, has intrinsic value that can be ascertained intuitively (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 257–258).

Maria Ossowska distinguished three types of interpretation of the concept of a "deed in itself". In the first interpretation, a deed in itself comprises what is left after the elimination of the consequences that have occurred. Moral judgments do not take into account the properties that evoke specific consequences of a deed (Ossowska 1957b, p. 257). For Ossowska, this is a concept of little significance. "This barely significant negative characterisation is undoubtedly right about numerous cases of moral judgment, but it would be wrong to extend it across all moral judgments" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 260).

In the second interpretation, it is those properties of the deed that remain after elimination of its consequences and its doer's mental state, meaning their intentions and efforts, and so on, that are judged. The properties of a "deed in itself" would be perceived sensorially by some observer or other. Ossowska does not feel that deeds of this kind would be the object of moral judgment, "although undoubtedly in certain cases they are not meaningless to our judgments" (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 258–261).

"Here the properties belonging to a deed in itself would be those, and only those properties, that would belong to the connotations of its name" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 259). The example of telling a lie illustrates this concept,

understood as consciously telling an untruth to mislead someone. Neither the momentousness of the situation, consideration of the person, nor mutual interpersonal relations are taken into account here. The deed's properties, comprising variable circumstances and psychological factors, are the basis for its qualification (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 259–263). This position suggests that deeds are judged due to an existing typology of behaviours. "The definition of most transgressions, as well as praiseworthy deeds, involves some kind of description of the doer's mental state, while the consequences this person anticipates seem also to come into play frequently" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 260). This enables ready-made labels to be pinned to deeds, which significantly facilitates judgment. Moral confusion is easy when there are no established templates to follow. Such an assertion is the consequence of being restricted to deeds as an object of moral judgment, since moral dispositions, wants, convictions, and also envy and other inclinations are all subject to moral judgment. Ossowska distinguishes two stances here: (1) We judge human dispositions for the consequences of deeds; (2) We judge irrespective of them. Both positions seem confirmed by facts in everyday life (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 263–264).

There is also a position of compromise, which recognises the doer's mental state, the properties of the "deed in itself", and the properties of the state of the thing created by this deed as the basis of judgment. The proponents of this view include Moore, who recognises the theory of the right deed. The main condition for the rightness of a deed is the moral duty to realise the greatest good in the universe. This exposes Moore to the charge of utilitarianism, emphasising the good realised by the deed. The circumstance of the public more often recommending the realisation of the lesser good than other alternatives constitutes a further hindrance. A weakness of Moore's theory is therefore that its ethical demands deviate from the opinions expressed in everyday life. There is an unequal attitude here towards both the creation and the sharing of the good (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 264–265).

Durkheim's concept represents an opposite position. In his opinion, a moral judgment of a deed is the result of a rule of some kind. His view is that its content is indifferent, since it depends on its being established by the group in question. Breaking the rule, on the other hand, is a violation of group feelings. In her interpretation of Durkheim's views, Maria Ossowska indicates an inconsistency. When writing about group feelings, he emphasised their fluidity and variability. Distinguishing moral rules based on the reactions of the group means that the "moral rule would always have to be relativised regarding group feelings, while the rule of one and the same

content would at some times be moral, and at others not" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 266). Her criticisms of Durkheim's concept do not prevent Ossowska from discerning elements in it that deserve attention. His views stand out in their emphasis on conventional elements in morality understood as a product of the collective consciousness (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 267–268).

Maria Ossowska spotted a discrepancy in views regarding "judgments colloquially considered moral". Using the experience gained in her analysis, she observed that when applying the term "rightness of a deed", we are not judging the person but only their deeds, since we are anticipating their consequences. When bearing in mind the morality of a deed, we are judging the person according to the motives of their action (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 269–270).

Władysław Tatarkiewicz attempted to resolve these controversies. He distinguished four kinds of ethical judgment: of value, of rightness, of morality and of merit. Maria Ossowska also analyses Moore's proposal, which boils down to an assessment of the value, rightness, morality and merit of deeds. (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 270–271). In her opinion, some of Moore's concepts are the product of a theoretician, while the judgments singled out by Tatarkiewicz are recognised as moral in colloquial life, although he had wanted to narrow down their scope to just one of the proposals put forward. Ossowska claims here that she will consider all types of judgment moral, because they are colloquially recognised as moral. "It is not our place to resolve what should, due to such or other personal demands we may have, be considered moral, but to ascertain what is colloquially interpreted as such" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 272). She considers both proposals a typology of moral judgments.

In her conclusion of these reflections, Maria Ossowska once again observed a negative result. After all, it is not possible to indicate such properties of an object based on which one could proclaim moral praise or condemnation. The reason for this is the complicated structure of moral life, no characterisation of which is capable of describing. Both the deliberations and the analysis of the conditions for being subject to moral judgment reaffirmed Ossowska's conviction that the object of moral judgment is the person.

"By denying judgments their personal character, however, we simultaneously deny them their moral character, while the words 'good' and 'bad' begin to take on a different meaning" (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 274–276).

Maria Ossowska analysed areas of morality and its related fields, the following becoming the object of her interest: law, custom, rules of good upbringing, tact and beauty. The criteria for differentiating morality from

related areas were intended to reveal the attributes specific to the area of moral phenomena. She identified ways of distinguishing between legal norms and moral norms, the first of them being the manner of wording. Ossowska did not share the view that what differentiated them was the conditional form of legal norms, the scale of the punishment for their violation, or the pragmatistic qualities of legal norms (Ossowska 1957b, p. 279).

The proposal to differentiate these norms by genetic means, based on an enactment performed by a legislative body, seems too narrow to Ossowska. That is because it does not cover situations in which there is no legislative body, while the rules of conduct between those governing and the governed do not have the character of legal provisions (Ossowska 1957b, p. 279). Moral and legal norms were set against each other by giving the conditions of obligatoriness. Moral norms are marked by autonomy, whereas legal norms display heteronomy. In Ossowska's opinion, the weakness of this division lies in the adoption of additional conditions. Both kinds of norms are objective in character. Whereas legal norms have absolute binding force, people have to accept and internalise moral norms (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 279–280).

The basis of another distinction in the area of norms consists of the type of sanctions one risks for violating them. For moral norms, this means public condemnation; for legal norms, it means punishment. The problem lies in the way sanctions are implemented. If condemnation and punishment were to be separate or to occur together, we would be dealing with the exclusion or crossing over of these norms' scopes (Ossowska 1957b, p. 280). The manner of validity or lack thereof provides the basis for distinguishing between these norms. For legal norms, this means, for example, codes and statutes, while for moral norms, it is the feeling of rightness. Maria Ossowska recognises these as secondary properties (Ossowska 1957b, p. 280).

The final criterion differentiating norms is their content. One position holds that moral norms reach inside a person, while legal norms only regulate their external behaviour. Another position attributes moral norms an imperative character, and legal norms – an imperative-attributive character. Such a stance was recognised by Petrażycki, whose distinction Ossowska considered an interesting proposal, but exposed to numerous interpretative errors, such as, for example, disregarding the division or the concept of a claim (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 280–284). "Legal feeling is supposed to be something commonplace, and particularly momentous in social terms, while the moral feeling is choosier, but less significant for social order. We value the latter more because it is rarer" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 284). In her conclusions, she observes modest effects of the juxtaposition of the two extensive fields.

"Whoever looks at moral rules and legal provisions from the point of view of the functions they fulfil in coexistence (e.g. Malinowski) has it all coming together in a single whole, while those who take a different stance obtain different results" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 284).

Comparing morality with the sphere of mores and customs constitutes another attempt at seeking its specificity. The relationship between the two norms, moral and related to customs, is sometimes perceived as being very close. Maria Ossowska analyses the main ways of distinguishing between these rules. The first of them is the genesis of the two types of norms. With customs, rules are contractual in character, while the genesis of moral rules is natural. Ossowska strongly discounts this distinction. "The concepts of things flowing from nature and things flowing from contract are, as is well known, particularly obscure, while the border separating one from the other is particularly difficult to determine" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 287). "When the matter is thus presented, even a cursory observation is sufficient to conclude that it is difficult to think about distinguishing moral norms with the aid of this criterion" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 288).

Moral norms also differ from the norms of mores and customs in the fact that they apply irrespective of whether or not they are observed. This distinction is based on the conditions under which they are applicable. Customary norms exist because they are universally observed and accepted. Ossowska, citing the distinction between the autonomy of moral norms and the heteronomy of customary norms, points out that this distinction has the character of a demand rather than an assertion. In her view, all these oppositions are incidental and occasional comparisons of two large and inconsistent fields (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 289–290).

A new distinction is the search for differences in others' reactions in situations where norms of the two types are violated. Public reaction is expressed through the ridicule of deeds that violate norms of mores and customs, while the violation of moral norms elicits outrage. Ridicule is sometimes a reaction to ignorance, while outrage is the result of the deed's doer disregarding the demands of the social environment. Defining the quality of sensations would therefore enable the distinguishing of moral and customary rules. This, in turn, would risk the necessity of relativisation, which is hard to reconcile with opinions encountered in colloquial life (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 290–292).

Another criterion for distinguishing moral rules from those of customs is the motives causing them to be observed. Maria Ossowska analysed Malinowski's proposal that the rules of conduct be classified based on the criterion of the motives and sanctions inducing people to comply with them.

The application of the criterion of motives regarding moral rules necessitates the division of morality into smaller, detailed divisions. Ossowska considers this classification creative and provides an adequate description of the mechanism of societal life. However, it does require the prior classification of motives. Performing this division deprives us of the option to maintain the traditional classification, with its distinct moral, legal, and social rules. Tradition created this division without any distinct rule of classification. According to Ossowska, who considers theories that describe moral phenomena in everyday life, this constitutes the basic cause of the difficulties in defining the concept of morality (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 293–294).

A content analysis of moral and customary rules concludes her deliberations on the distinction between these phenomena. The rules of mores and customs relate to the external side of behaviour, while moral rules take the person's intentions into account. Customary rules are a form of behaviour that already exists, while moral rules serve to express the ideals of conduct.

In the third way of distinguishing, moral norms are attributed the role of customary rules by the aid of which correct conduct is defined. Ossowska observes that in such a situation, one should know how to distinguish morally upright conduct from similar expressions used in a different sense (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 294–295).

Ossowska regards as misguided the attempt to draw a demarcation line between customs and morality, since one has here a juxtaposition of two inconsistent wholes, similarly to the situation of comparing morality with legal norms. After all, customary and moral norms are of a different nature. To make her deliberations more concrete, Ossowska limits her analyses to the juxtaposition of moral norms with a selected type of customary norms, namely, the rules of good upbringing (Ossowska 1957b, p. 295). They turn out to be a conglomeration of rules of various types, cemented together more by tradition than by particular properties. Moral rules also occur among them (Ossowska 1957b, p. 305). The case is similar to the notion of tact, which intervenes when directives formulated by moral rules lack precision. "It is doubtful whether one could find any properties in all kinds of behaviour interpreted as tactless that are common to and peculiar to behaviour" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 309). Tact and morality only intersect to a small degree. Not every tactless conduct is a moral transgression, and not every moral transgression – a lack of tact" (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 308–309). Therefore, there is no possibility of demonstrating the distinctness of moral rules in juxtaposition with the concept of tact.

The search for distinctness of the moral sphere led Maria Ossowska to juxtapose moral judgment with aesthetic judgment. She writes that "tradition persistently connects goodness with beauty" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 318). The interconnectedness of the two fields enabled moralists to treat aesthetics as a *sui generis* "dustbin", to which they consigned those issues they were unable to cope with in their own moral theories (Ossowska 1957b, p. 310). Ossowska distinguishes features common to both types of judgment – aesthetic and moral. There exist such attributes of the object of moral judgment that are not taken into account in aesthetic judgments. However, they occur in conjunction with qualities that are subject to aesthetic evaluation. Another connection between them is expressed in the secondary performance of aesthetic judgment of behaviour subject to moral judgment. The conclusion is similar to previous ones: the scopes of morality and aesthetics intersect, which makes it impossible to distinguish between them (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 314–316).

The *differentia specifica* of moral judgment lies in its planned nature, deviating from that in the other types of judgment. Moral considerations usually occur in conjunction with considerations of a general axiological nature, and the existence of judgments other than moral is assumed. A distinguishing feature of moral judgments is their secondary nature (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 318–319). Ossowska analyses three ways of understanding the secondary nature of moral judgments. Psychological secondariness involves them being dependent on a different kind of valuation. The value given to things of some kind constitutes the basis for formulating a moral judgment for conduct concerning the said things. An example could be the prohibition of inflicting suffering in conjunction with the belief that suffering is something bad in a non-moral sense (Ossowska 1983, p. 508). From a psychological point of view, it is impossible to have moral judgment without the acceptance of other judgments preceding it (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 320–321).

The dependence of moral judgments on non-moral ones is defined as a logical dependence. It is expressed in the justification of moral judgments based on a supreme non-moral value (Ossowska 1983, p. 508). The ethical system is based on non-ethical premises, and the relationship between these judgments is like that between a means and an end. "Morally praiseworthy action serves the realisation of states of affairs valuable in a manner other than morally, and for this very reason deserves this recognition" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 321).

The third type of secondariness in moral judgments is linked to how deeds are performed and the achievement of dispositions enjoying moral

recognition. This is expressed in a specific attitude oriented towards action for the sake of a goal that is non-moral in character. Moral merit is best achieved when it is not directly sought after. Moral values must have a resultant form. "We are self-sacrificing [...] not when we think of being self-sacrificing, but when totally preoccupied by the thought of others" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 321). Moral good is achieved incidentally while pursuing other intentions. It is Ossowska's firm belief that secondariness thus understood does not determine the distinctiveness of moral values. "The thing is that [...] this property, rightly looked upon for a certain section of our moral life, has been too hastily generalised" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 322). One who wants to achieve results deserving moral recognition should remember the moral dimension of actions taken (Ossowska 1957b, p. 322). Whether or not a secondary nature applies to all moral values may be questioned. It is difficult to determine the grounds on which a preference for dignity or pleasures is described as higher within the adopted role model. Dignity that serves self-defence is not convincing (Ossowska 1957b, p. 508).

An analysis of the place of moral judgments within the system for classifying judgments concludes the deliberations, focusing on the comparison of morality with related fields. It deals with Ralph Perry's classification of values. Maria Ossowska analyses three types of value classification distinguished by Perry. The first is grounded on a division of mental life. Thought, feelings and will correspond to such goods as truth, beauty and goodness (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 321–322). "It is rather difficult to interpret the first type of classification mentioned by Perry as a classification, because it is essentially a kind of inventing of ultimate goals of some kind, or the tossing around of slogans" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 324); Ossowska does not address this classification (Ossowska 1957b, p. 325).

The second type of classification, considered psychological by Ossowska, involves the assumption that values are a function of needs or interests. The types of need form the basis of this classification. Ossowska gives the example of a division based on this criterion. She distinguishes organic, specific, social, socio-cultural, and personal values. However, this classification raises numerous doubts for Ossowska. "For moral good, one should probably look for room in this division above all in the group of social good, although they would also undoubtedly also find room both in the group of specific values and in the group of personal values" (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 323–325).

The third type, defined as historical, distinguishes values that were formed over time and subsequently institutionalised. These are groups of cognitive, moral, economic, political, aesthetic and religious values. Maria Ossowska does not see how this division could be maintained. "I

am not familiar with any more noteworthy efforts for a more thorough characterisation of these groups forged by tradition, except for attempts to characterise the moral sphere, which we have addressed in earlier sections" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 325). One cannot adequately define types of value distinguished on the grounds of the criteria of historical division (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 323–326). The scopes of the objects subject to judgments cross one another, while the borders between the divisions are fluid and illegible. Value classifications apply to objects that are subject to regular and widespread judgments. The moral domain is one of the groups of objects that are subject to judgments formed by tradition. It is an incoherent and multifaceted whole (Ossowska 1957b, p. 326).

In her deliberations over the concept of morality, Ossowska strived to find its qualities in the course of historical analysis. She distinguished in antiquity the ethical issue combined with the matters of personal happiness and suffering. In her opinion, there were then two positions regarding ethics: Stoic thought and Epicurean thought. Both addressed the fundamental issue of how one should behave to avoid suffering in life and what to do when this suffering is inevitable, which constitutes a condition of happiness. Ethicists – representatives of practical philosophy – appeared here as sages playing the role of spiritual shepherds (Kiciński 1989, p. 14; Ossowska 1957b, p. 331).

The second approach embraces views belonging to a "different train of thought". The object of interest here is the concern with one's own quality and perfectionist aspirations (Ossowska 1957b, p. 332). The ethical postulate was the pursuit of personal perfection, often achieved through suffering and self-denial. These were purported to be peculiarly human qualities, despite diverse answers being given to the question regarding what was inherent in human nature. The role models sketched out by ethicists had various attributes, postulates of life in keeping with reason. Recommendations were for the full development of potential, or, conversely, moderation and harmonious human development. Perfectionist aspirations were a trait of *sui generis* aristocratism, characterised by an isolation from the masses and living without setting themselves challenges (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 331–333). Ossowska concludes her ponderings over this trend by asserting that not every perfectionist issue is a moral issue. Moral issues constitute a fragment of perfectionism. The pursuit of perfection appears to be a possible object of moral recognition due to the morally valuable properties of a role model or the special kind of motives that lead us to adopt this model (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 334–335).

The third trend in ethical reflection is the set of issues related to the principles of harmonious coexistence in society. This is the issue of the proper

relations between people. It concerns everyone who desires instruction on how to organise human coexistence for it to be harmonious, and what to demand of the individual for them to be able to contribute to this collective harmony. This matter concerns not only the good of the individual, but also the good of others (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 335–336; 1983, pp. 300–310).

The typological concept was supplemented with new elements. Ossowska concluded that among the issues related to the trend of examining happiness conditions in a personal dimension, one should include the norms of bourgeois morality. These norms included the idea of individual happiness guaranteed by money. Happiness here, unlike in the case of the Stoics, is achieved not through self-denial but through possession and the virtues conditioning it. Whereas the Stoic model of happiness was elitist in nature, the bourgeois model – described as the morality of prudence – held a mass quality. It depended on circumstances and was characterised by a fluctuating concept of success and catalogue of the virtues required to achieve it (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 244–245).

Separate sections were singled out within the trend concerning the principles of coexistence. They embrace the issues of personal autonomy and the norms prescribing that this be respected. They also address the issue of respecting a person's worth. "From the point of view of actual consequences, all moral rules in the scope of 'the hygiene of coexistence' have as an effect support for the human sense of security" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 247–249).

The ethical stances presented by Maria Ossowska do not exhaust the wealth of moral issues. However, what is important is that ethicists have frequently not appreciated the tripartite face of morality, which has often led to misunderstandings. Such was the case among ethicists, who, when analysing the concept of one of the three types of practice, strived to apply to it a measure drawn from the thought of a different trend. For example, attempts were made to derive moral deeds from the emotional solidarity between people, as well as from the supreme motive of deeds judged positively. No account was taken of the fact that the efforts of perfectionists were motivated by a different sense of dignity. A moralist, seeing morality as the hygiene of coexistence, has to pay attention to what has been achieved for this coexistence. The frequent transference of a perfectionist judgment of a deed based on the effort put into it is an example of misunderstanding. This is a misunderstanding resulting from the heterogeneity in moral issues being overlooked (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 337–338).

In Ossowska's opinion, the ideas characteristic of the trends listed above are entitled to the term "moral" to a varying degree. The concept of personal happiness is classed within the area of ethical issues, mainly due to historical

tradition. For perfectionism, the kind of perfection this concerns is not a matter of indifference. Directives relating to the principles of coexistence are the closest to morality in today's sense (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 245–246).

Characterisation of moral judgment based on existing criteria for distinguishing them was also an attempt at defining what morality is. A particular feature of moral judgments is their generalisability, understood in various ways. For moral judgments to meet this condition, they must possess a specific set of features. When uttering a moral judgment, we must consider the global result, meaning the usefulness that this judgment evokes on a mass scale. According to Ossowska, few people proclaim their judgments following reflection (Ossowska 1983, pp. 509–510).

A moral judgment is made when the person proclaiming it is prepared to apply it to anyone whose conduct is taking place under similar circumstances. The judgment's impartiality should be confirmed by this readiness. Here, Ossowska shares Robert Merton's position that the same property is sometimes interpreted differently in relation to oneself and to others: "We say we're unwavering, you're stubborn, he's a bit thick" (Ossowska 1983, p. 510).

Moral judgments should be worded such that everyone can accept them, irrespective of whether they are the perpetrator or the victim of a particular deed. The impartiality of opinions has to be limited to certain cultural circles. Moreover, in a specific cultural circle, one encounters incompatible moral opinions, for example concerning abortion. In Ossowska's opinion, colloquial intuitions tend to accept this criterion rather as a criterion for the rightness of a moral judgment than for whether the judgment belongs in the sphere of morality. Impartiality is therefore not a universal disposition. And that, in turn, limits the possibilities of formulating moral judgments (Ossowska 1983, pp. 510–511).

One should always be able to justify moral judgments, which refers everyone to general rules that are above the specific situation concerned. Ossowska denies this criterion, the quality of operability. It is rather a criterion for the rightness of a moral judgment than a criterion for determining its moral character. We are dealing here with the conditions necessary for belonging to the moral sphere, or an attribute so strongly connected to moral character that its presence confirms the moral character of the judgment in question. However, this is not a definition of morality. When accepting the criteria given for what is moral, one has to state at the same time that moral judgments are proclaimed extremely rarely (Ossowska 1983, p. 510).

One of the criteria for distinguishing is the asymmetry observed in the judgment of conduct. Actions that are subject to moral judgment are directed at somebody or towards oneself. A significant quality of moral

judgment is the asymmetrical treatment of oneself and others, whereby the same conduct is judged differently in oneself and in others. "The conditions placed before an object for it to be subject to condemnation proved, in many cases, asymmetrical in relation to the conditions for being subject to recognition, although no distinct rule could be determined in this asymmetry" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 347). Ossowska also had doubts concerning the extent to which this criterion applies to all moral judgments. The perfectionist trend makes it impossible to regard this quality as universal for all moral judgments (Ossowska 1983, pp. 511–512).

Maria Ossowska was unable to identify a definitional property for the concept of morality. "We have not arrived at a particular property that would have definitional qualities of some kind for the concept of morality" (Ossowska 1983, p. 512). In her opinion, attempts to construct an analytical definition of morality are doomed to failure from the outset (Ossowska 1986b, p. 252).

This negative finding led Ossowska to consider how to define the concept of morality. It was therefore a general mistake to strive to embrace the diverse phenomena with a single formulation. The reason for this is the firm belief that morality constitutes a coherent area. Ossowska does not see the construction of an analytical definition of morality as impossible, but rather understands the difficulties in this respect.

Moral judgments and norms have been shaped through history by numerous factors. The history of ethical thought combined diverse issues and responses into a single trend. The same problems were resolved differently in different social groups. Those who came up with the solutions to moral problems took care to keep their judgments consistent with the social opinion of their era (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 327–328). "By holding this opinion, as a certain defined entity, and on the whole overestimating its uniformity and universality, they created a certain fiction, sometimes called common sense, other times public opinion, or the public conscience" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 328). Researchers of foreign cultures, striving to determine the scope of moral norms, set about their investigations "with a ready-made conceptual net fashioned by the culture in which they themselves had grown up. [...] The picture obtained constituted solely the answer as to how others react to things that, in the researcher's cultural circles, are condemned. At the same time, various local peculiarities of moral judgment could slip through the holes of this net" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 181).

The development of sociology challenged the conviction that views encountered in everyday life can be related to unfamiliar or alien environments. The task of the ethicists is therefore not to describe and

systematise the views of colloquial opinion (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 328–329). “Our morality is by no means treated in books on ethics as an incoherent whole; that has yet to be demonstrated” (Ossowska 1957b, p. 375).

It is a phenomenon shaped by the influence of diverse traditions and different group experiences. Contemporary morality is a multifaceted and axiologically incoherent phenomenon. Ethicists have been too hasty in treating the object of their reflections as a definite whole. This has been the cause of many failures and disagreements between representatives of different ethical currents. Ossowska treats the diversity of issues as a reason to justify the difficulties in distinguishing moral judgment (Ossowska 1957b, p. 342). “Constructing an analytical definition could expand our knowledge of what people are thinking when they talk about morality, but the creation of some kind of coherent whole from these opinions is chimerical” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 256). The only thing that connects its incoherent elements is the term they share.

The absence of a definition of morality should not discourage the researcher. “The only directive that flows from this state of affairs is the directive not to understand morality in too narrow a sense, because practice imposes the necessity of linking its study with the study of the general hierarchy of values recognised in a given society” (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 14–15). In some cases, the researcher’s moral feeling determines how the scope of morality is delimited. One should therefore bear in mind that “setting the boundaries for the concept of morality is already a moral matter, just as the choice of jury is already a moral accession” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 253). One should seek a universal character in moral norms, despite the persisting differences between moral systems operating in society. “And it is necessary to hurry with this research before the improvements in communication erase cultural differences and introduce universality through the standardisation of upbringing, rendering it impossible to resolve [...] the issue regarding universality despite these differences” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 192).

The concept of morality is described by Ossowska as a linguistic class bound by a common name, but not a coherent whole from the perspective of a particular theory. It is a concept similar to the concept of culture in a specific situation. Some writers feel that it is impossible to construct a definition that encompasses beliefs, ceramics, and a society’s methods of building. Yet these same writers cannot manage without the concept of culture (Ossowska 1986b, p. 512). Ossowska compares the concept of morality to the concept of dairy food, a warehouse of mixed goods, or a shop where customers can

buy food and medications and drink a cup of coffee (Ossowska 1957b, p. 375; 1986b, p. 14).

Maria Ossowska included theories describing morality in line with colloquial opinion among the issues forming the object of analysis. "The morality described was that [...] of a European fashioned by Christianity and, as one should add after Dupréel, a person particularly scrupulous in moral terms" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 360). It is likely that Ossowska's semantic intuitions regarding her personal understanding of the concept of morality were also the object of analysis. They play an important role in the course of definitional procedures and assist in the interpretation of one's own associations (Kiciński 1984, p. 22). These intuitions seem not to have been taken sufficiently into account, or at least they were not more clearly sketched out. This likely relates to her primary motive, which serves to demonstrate the perceived heterogeneity in moral issues. One of the goals of her deliberations was to show the paradox that morality, treated in ethical systems as a coherent whole, is an incoherent phenomenon in societal life that is defined in diverse ways. It is hard to resist the impression that Ossowska implicitly applied a definitional criterion of morality. She was probably aware of the influence her own convictions had on the shape and manner of her utterances, although she declared a stance of impartiality.

A characteristic feature of Maria Ossowska's considerations is the emphasis she placed on respecting intuitions related to all defining criteria. She often questioned the relevance of a criterion under analysis by citing intuitions incompatible with it and related to a criterion of a different kind. Such a procedure fundamentally prevented the construction of an analytical definition of morality. On the other hand, it significantly deepened knowledge of this phenomenon (Kiciński 1984, p. 23).

Ossowska treated the criteria defining morality in a manner intended to construct a correct classification of all judgments and norms. That would have made it possible to treat judgments and norms separately, as well as to create classifications occurring in all environments investigated. "Moral norms, and presumably also social norms, are therefore treated here as highly objectivised entities, and their equally objectivised character is subjected to testing using criteria referring to individual experiences" (Kiciński 1989, p. 74). This position seems justified given the remaining criteria analysed by Ossowska for distinguishing moral norms and judgments. Her methodological requirements and way of reasoning are characterised by stringency in the verification of theories, as well as the establishment of strict criteria in the definition of notions (Kiciński 1989, p. 74). The definition of a moral norm encounters fundamental difficulties due to the adoption of

the criterion for the complete classification of norms of this kind (Ziemiński 1966, pp. 47–48).

Maria Ossowska's research programme was very extensive, since it concerned numerous issues. The attempts to create a neutral definition were aimed at enabling its application in studies regarding diverse societies, eras and cultures. She was interested in morality as a multidimensional phenomenon, comprising various elements, including norms, judgments, values, role models, stances, and so on. Therefore, the research stance she adopted, in keeping with the skills requirements of the Lvov-Warsaw School, aimed to create a definition of morality that could be applied in all fields dealing with morality, including in the sociology of morality. A special feature of her style of practising science was the harmonious combination of logical precision with historical and anthropological perspectives (Nowak 1972, p. 6).

Despite the negative outcome of her deliberations, Maria Ossowska elaborated on the criteria that enable one to distinguish certain phenomena typical of morality. Influenced by Westermarck and Dupréel, she held that morality refers to the sphere of human behaviour, and that the object of moral judgment is the person. Egoism, hedonism, and altruism, which constitute the chief objects of research analysis, testify to Ossowska having specific theoretical preferences. In her opinion, morality was shaped primarily through the pursuit of one's own or someone else's interests.

The concept of morality

In the final phase of Maria Ossowska's academic work, her position underwent significant modification. In her studies "Dwa piony w moralności" [lit. Two divisions in morality] (Ossowska 1983), "O pojęciu godności" [lit. On the concept of dignity] (Ossowska 1983) and *Moral Norms. A Tentative Systematisation* (Ossowska 1985b), she defined what she understood by the term morality. She expressed her opposition to the opinion of ethicists, asserting that the role of morality could be grasped in a simple formula of averting suffering. She criticised the position in which morality was boiled down to a "happiness-giving" function. In her opinion, "this concept is too broad, because there is no reason to eulogise over the merit of a nurse who relieves the suffering of a patient by injecting morphine" (Ossowska 1983, p. 547). However, she opposes those opinions that treat the felicological area of morality as falling within the trend relating to the principles of social coexistence. She points out that, apart from Bentham, "ethicists wishing to make [people – W.M.] happy [...] with happiness worthy of a human, [...]"

wishing to eliminate friction and conflict from coexistence, never thought about removing creative conflicts from them" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 246).

Dignity

Despite her reservations, Ossowska recognises the role of moral rules in the struggle against suffering as indisputable. She ties her theoretical position to Dupréel's concept of moral virtues. "But there is also a second division in morality, in which the central concept is no longer pleasure or distress, but the concept of dignity and the respect due to it" (Ossowska 1983, p. 548). Ossowska distinguished two semantic variants of the concept of dignity.

The first variant attributes dignity to every person by virtue of their holding a privileged place in nature and possessing an immortal soul. A person can thereby control their urges through reason and shape their own existence according to the hierarchy of values they subscribe to. A person cannot lose this kind of dignity, since it is a permanent quality they have, and is non-gradable. Ossowska does not address such dignity, understood as an inalienable property of every human being (Ossowska 1985b, pp. 52–53).

As for the second variant of dignity, in Ossowska's view, some people are not entitled to it. It is connected to those qualities a human being can acquire or lose through their conduct (Masarczyk 2008, p. 108). An essential condition for having dignity, thus understood, is possessing a personality that constitutes an individual feature of every person. In another sense, according to Ossowska, the right one, not everyone has a personality – only those who shape their own "self" according to a certain standard, in keeping with a specific hierarchy of values. Ascribing personality to somebody in this sense is an expression of recognition. The possession of personality thus understood is a condition for possessing dignity (Ossowska 1985b, p. 58; Masarczyk 2008, p. 109).

Ossowska adopts the meaning of dignity, thus understood, and describes it as a provisional definition of the kind of dignity that is of interest to her. Therefore, dignity is something that is possessed by a person who knows how to defend the values they recognise. Defending them is connected to self-esteem. It manifests itself in situations of danger and fulfils a defensive function. By commanding respect, it constitutes a kind of "protective shield" for the person (Ossowska 1983, p. 518; 1985b, p. 59). Dignity is absent in a person giving up their own worth, demeaning themselves or allowing themselves to be humiliated. "Different things can be degrading in different cultures, but the directive not to demean oneself through behaviour considered degrading in a given culture – for achieving personal gain of

some kind – seems to apply very broadly” (Ossowska 1983, pp. 518–519; 1985b, p. 59).

One might think that Ossowska held reservations regarding the understanding of dignity she had adopted, as it was granted only a formal character, since it is unclear in this definition what values are involved. They are undoubtedly values considered worthy of defending by the given community. As she observes herself, these values can be entirely different between communities. For example, for some, it may be shameful to be idle, while for others, it may be shameful to take on work (Masarczyk 2008, p. 110; Ossowska 1985b, p. 61). The issue of recognition within the social sphere also presents a problem. According to the role models adopted, the individual’s hierarchy of values should be in harmony with what deserves recognition in the milieu concerned. As an example, the protagonists of Homer’s epics did not search for values in their environment since they already had them, while the milieu was only to help them assess to what degree they had realised these values. Thus, the notion of respect occurring in this definition of dignity does not constitute a criterion for whether a given deed is praiseworthy or not. After all, if respect were the ultimate criterion of whether a given deed is worthy or otherwise, then conformists of all kinds would be more deserving of respect than a person who defends someone else in defiance of society (Masarczyk 2008, p. 110; Ossowska 1985b, p. 71).

After Kotarbiński, Ossowska views dignity as a derived quality, conditioned by the presence of other attributes. “Dignity is the property of one who for other reasons deserves respect, who is aware of this fact, and who makes an effort to be such and to be treated according to the relevant gauge of respect” (Ossowska 1985b, p. 59; Masarczyk 2008, p. 110). She treats the concepts of dignity and honour interchangeably. The ideas mentioned above are incomplete symbols, while the specific context lends them meaning on each occasion. And this is why Ossowska believes that one should not ask “what is dignity?” or “what is honour?”; one can only ask “what does it mean that somebody behaved with dignity?”, or “what does it mean that somebody acted honourably?”. “Both of these terms are sometimes defined by purely formal attributes, and in both some kind of specific content is implied” (Ossowska 1985b, p. 61; Masarczyk 2008, p. 111).

Assuming that a person must earn their dignity, Ossowska proposes two norms that are intended to defend it. The criterion enabling one to differentiate rules commanding a reduction of suffering from rules occurring in the defence of dignity is the difference in reactions to situations where norms are violated, and the type of motives inducing one to observe them. Dignity belongs to the order of ornamental or personal virtues. It

was Ossowska's firm belief that aesthetic factors intervene strongly in how they are judged. Conventional elements appear to a greater degree in ornamental virtues than civil virtues, since what is considered offensive and what is not is often a matter of convention, just as convention has it that the removal of epaulettes degrades a military man (Ossowska 1985b, p. 75). In ethics, this is linked to the perfectionist trend. Respect for a human being as such leads to the observance of ornamental virtues. Where dignity has been lost, the prevailing feeling is one of shame or insensitivity to others' opinions (Ossowska 1983, pp. 521, 549). Civil virtues, also called soft virtues, serve obedience to the harmonious rules of coexistence in society, and the avoidance of as much suffering as possible. They include kindness, self-sacrifice, responsibility, and compassion. In the event of them being violated, the reaction is a guilty conscience, distress due to the wrong inflicted, or indifference to others' misfortune (Ossowska 1983, pp. 521, 549).

The rules recommending personal virtues are advisory in form. They are directives formulated by Kant and Marx. Ossowska repeats after Kant: "Do not treat man solely as a means, but always as an end". Then, citing Marx, she believes that man is the supreme being for people, understanding this rule as opposing the hypostasizing and deifying of collective entities (the state, society) (Ossowska 1985b, p. 72). The rules relating to principles of coexistence sound self-entitled. This is expressed by directives such as "have dignity and respect the dignity of others".

The dangers threatening the divisions distinguished in morality, on a societal scale, emphasise yet further their separateness, confirming the validity of the distinction made. Civil virtues are threatened by the centralisation of social initiative by the supreme authorities, resulting in the spread of indifference in people's attitudes to others' fortunes. Despotism of all kinds has a negative impact on the growth of dignity, contributing to the spread of mutual distrust and a sense of hopelessness (Ossowska 1983, p. 549; 1985b, p. 73). Ossowska includes the following in the set of behaviours considered unworthy: defamation, humiliation, lack of concern for others' welfare, flattery, displaying blind obedience, converting good deeds into money, opportunism, lying to raise one's own authority, giving and taking tips, allowing oneself to be deceived – naivety, treating a person as an object, loss of restraint (being unable to refrain from gluttony, addiction, laziness, petty lying), a woman's participation in a beauty contest (which is her expression of consent for the public estimation of her charms), vulgarity in sex life, the denial of entitlements (parental, occupational, civil) (Ossowska 1985b, pp. 53–59). Andrzej Kojder (2015) notes that Maria Ossowska does not undertake an analysis or even a more thorough description of the behaviours

she recognised as insulting dignity. Even more surprising, in his opinion, is Ossowska's total omission of much more serious social situations in which dignity is presumably violated. Among such situations he gives: humiliation, degradation, dehumanisation, the instrumental treatment of another, torture, rape, social exclusion, misery, poverty, exploitation, and slave labour (Kojder 2015, p. 52).

Summary

In the concept of morality that she constructed, Ossowska refers to two currents of moral ideas. These are perfectionism and the principles of hygiene in social coexistence. The norms resulting from them prescribe the realisation of a specific role model and organise social coexistence according to a particular ideal. In the strict sense, morality is created by two sets of ideas (Mariański 1989, pp. 173–174). The functional systematisation of moral norms,¹ presented in her book *Moral Norms. A Tentative Systematisation*, testifies to Maria Ossowska's full awareness that she was using a concept of morality shaped in this way.

¹ Maria Ossowska distinguished seven types of moral norm there: (1) moral norms in the protection of life; (2) moral norms in the defence of dignity (have dignity and respect others; do not slander, do not humiliate, see to others' welfare; behaviours negating dignity are: flattery, displaying blind obedience, converting good deeds into money, opportunism, gluttony, lying to raise one's own authority, taking tips, letting oneself be cheated – naivety, treating a person instrumentally); (3) moral norms in defence of autonomy (e.g. do not use violence against others, do not abuse animals); (4) moral norms in the defence of privacy (e.g. do not be too curious; transgressions are: excessive confidentiality, familiarity, indiscretion, lack of subtlety); (5) moral norms serving the need for trust (e.g. do not lie, do not denounce, be loyal; transgressions are: hypocrisy, deception, denunciation); (6) moral norms guarding justice (always be just, repay with good, do not do evil, do not lead to unjustified or too extensive claims); (7) moral norms in regard to social conflicts (e.g. avoid hatred, do not exploit others, follow the principle of justice and equality, be tolerant, do not be aggressive).

Chapter 3

The Concept of Ethos as a Cognitive Tool

Aristocratic ethos

Antiquity

The idea of investigating morality in conjunction with other values was an attempt to overcome the difficulties resulting from the absence of a precise concept of morality. Maria Ossowska proposed the concept of ethos here, and through her subsequent works analysing moral phenomena, she arrived at such a concept, fully formed. "As for ethos, it is the lifestyle of a particular community, the general – as some propose – orientation of a culture, the hierarchy of values it has adopted, formulated either explicitly or interpretable from human behaviour" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 5). "When we speak both of ethos and of lifestyle, it is about some set of behaviours characteristic of a particular group, behaviours determined by the hierarchy of values it has adopted, while it is generally believed that one can discern a certain dominant in these values, some kind of chief standard from which derivative values can be deduced" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 256). Ossowska intended ethos, as a fundamental concept for the sociology of culture, to be applied to groups. Within its scope, the concept went beyond the area of ethical inquiry. Interest in ethos was expressed in the establishing and analysis of the specifics of moral phenomena. Ossowska considered it advisable to apply the concept of ethos due to the difficulties related to distinguishing between moral judgment and moral norm (Ossowska 1985b). A further argument was the secondary nature, noticed and ultimately accepted, of moral judgments, which are strongly linked to what is valued within a given group (Ossowska 1986b, p. 255).

Deliberations regarding the ethos of the knightly elite constituted a realisation of the research postulates. Ossowska devoted her book *Ethos rycerski i jego odmiany* [lit. The chivalric ethos and its varieties] (Ossowska

1986a), to describing its essence. The primary objective of the analysis was to present a picture of morality that could be adopted as an ideal type in the sense given to this expression by Weber (Ossowska 1986a, p. 21). Role models and their related concept of imitation were the fundamental elements of analysis for Ossowska, who saw in them the object of societies' aspirations and a tendency to become similar, guided by one's conviction, to some degree or other conscious, of the positive value of the person imitated (Ossowska 1986a, p. 20).

The ancient Greeks were the first to consciously apply role models for the purpose of shaping their wards' personalities. Ossowska regards Homer's epic as a description of the life of the knightly elite. Knowledge of one's own genealogy was a key feature of the noble model, contributing to the consolidation of the group and strongly influencing public opinion. Specified origin was an essential condition for class membership. Nobility was also associated with a type of physical appearance. Tall and well-built, a man was expected to emanate strength. He had to be athletic, had to be eloquent, and possess social refinement. A central feature of Homer's protagonist is the attention to honour, as well as the desire for fame and distinction. That was why an encounter between two knights entailed constant comparison as to who was better (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 22–25). Order and social relations within this group involved the mutual display of honour. The nurturing of one's own honour was linked to sensitivity towards ridicule. Generosity and hospitality were among their duties, as too was the principle of reciprocity (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 25–26). Among the well-known features of the early Greek nobility was praise of paederasty, an important element of this group's ideology (Ossowska 1986a, p. 37). After Veblen, Ossowska lists occupations that do not disgrace people at the top of the social ladder: the exercise of power, religious ceremonies, sports, and war. She also added the administration of agricultural property here. The heroes of Homer's epics own farms, but are also engaged in expeditions of looting (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 26–27).

Combat, and how it was conducted, was determined by rules based on the principle of reciprocity and mercy. These rules commanded that he who asked for mercy be spared, that an emissary be respected, and that agreements made under oath be honoured, while also allowing for the burying of the dead and the avoidance of boasting over the corpse of the defeated. Open battle was valued more highly than resorting to subterfuge. Reasons for going to war were private revenge, the breaking of an oath, or ingratitude. There was no patriotic motivation (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 27–30).

Peacetime marked a period of revelry and ostentatious idleness. Familial life in an atmosphere of harmony was valued. Monogamous marriage, however, did not preclude having concubines in practice. The wife was bound by chastity before marriage and fidelity once married. Women could take an active part in social life since their intellectual qualities were not denied. Old age was valued both within and outside the family, due to the refinement and life experience it entailed (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 32–33).

Ossowska, citing Arthur Adkins's functionalistic analysis, draws attention in her summary to the distinctive features of the role model under analysis here. She points out the absence of a distinction between aesthetic, praxeological and moral judgments. Moral responsibility was negated, which implies the impossibility of distinguishing deliberate from unintentional deeds. It is not the one who causes harm who is discredited, but the one who experiences it. The Homeric values correspond to society to the degree to which they are connected to the qualities ensuring the continuity of existence. The absence of a guardian state means that rivalry is valued the highest, along with the social class that provides continuity and development for the rest of society (Ossowska 1986a, p. 34).

This view is felt by Ossowska to overestimate the uniformity of society. After all, the warrior's strengths serve not only defence, but also attack. Battles are conducted for reasons of revenge, for the purpose of raising one's prestige, or because of a desire for gain. "That functionalism can be charged not only with overestimating the uniformity of this society, demanding on each occasion explanations concerning what serves whom, but also overestimation of the uniformity of the ethos itself" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 35). Praise of courage here is linked to praise of generosity. Ossowska points out that if courage served the warrior, then generosity served those he gifted to (Ossowska 1986a, p. 35).

The emphasis on the upbringing of youth is a feature particularly distinguishing the social elite. The feeling of shame is the most potent stimulus for taking action, or for desisting, since recognition is the gauge of a person's value. In this ethos, there is no room for individual conscience: there is an evident lack of interest in the social consequences of actions (Ossowska 1986a, p. 6). The Homeric role models are, above all, the models of warriors. Aristotle's concept of a "justly proud" person, which complements the above models, contains directives concerning times of war and times of peace. "For the 'justly proud,' noble origin and money are essential" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 41). Thus, this person should be magnanimous, worthy of great things, and essentially deserving of them. He was to possess the skill of maintaining the right balance between exaggerated modesty and conceit. He had to be

tall, unhurried and composed, while he was calm in his speech, and avoided animated gesticulation. The greatest good for him was the recognition of the nobly born. He was generous, truthful and open. Because he was self-sufficient, he surrounded himself with things of beauty but of little use. While restraining his haughtiness towards people of lower status, he was expected to display it to those in high positions. He was not allowed to use force against the weak. Because life was not the highest value, he was not allowed to shy away from danger, even at the cost of losing his life (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 38–40).

Homer and Aristotle include courage and generosity among the main knightly virtues. In his description of the “justly proud” person, Aristotle emphasises their sense of autonomy and self-sufficiency. The knight should therefore avoid expressing admiration or showing that he cares about something, as this demeans him. Gainful occupations are forbidden since they make slaves of people, apart from which they absorb time that could be allocated to mental activity, and lower the level of the intellect (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 41–42). Maria Ossowska describes the role model of ancient Greece as follows: “we have here a fully formed image of a member of the idle class, who can afford to play the role of statesman but has to hold in contempt physical labour and any paid work, and must avoid the stigma of occupation” (Ossowska 1986a, p. 42).

Next to Homer’s, another role model of ancient Greece is the Spartan. Here Ossowska refers to Popper, in whose opinion the overriding features of this style are a conservative tendency regarding political system and taboos, particularism or universalism retaining the division into “us” and “them”, commercial self-sufficiency, the aspiration to dominate over one’s neighbours, and anti-humanitarianism together with the exclusion of egalitarian, democratic and individualistic ideologies.

Ossowska uses the concept of individualism in several senses. In one of these meanings, individualism was not a trait of the Spartans, due to their camp-based lifestyle. Namely, they did not demonstrate individualism understood as conformity in terms of customs or as a basis for the unconstrained expansion of the individual, opposing the subordination of the individual’s interests to the interests of the group (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 58–59).

The situation of women was different in Sparta than in the other Greek *poleis*. Legislation, guided by erotic considerations, encouraged the Spartans to follow the cult of valour. Women bestowed their affection on heroes alone. Mourning only applied to those who did not lose their lives in battle, or who did not return as victors (Ossowska 1986a, p. 62). The law prohibited Spartans

from trading in land. Additionally, men were forbidden from possessing gold or silver. Land could only be gifted or bequeathed. As a result, four-fifths of the land was in the hands of the women, to whom the ban on possessing expensive metals did not apply. Consequently, they had a significant influence on public life. For Ossowska, the equality of the Spartans was similar to the equality in George Orwell's *Animal Farm*, where all animals were equal, but some more equal than others (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 56–57).

The chief criterion of morality in Sparta was the interest of the state. According to Popper, it was a collectivist, tribal and totalitarian morality. Ossowska cites this opinion, contrasting it with her own view. Unlike Popper, Werner Jaeger recognised the Spartans' morality as the embodiment of the political-military ideal, deeply rooted in human nature. It is the politicisation of the heroic *areté*, held in general esteem. Ossowska does not refer to the Spartans' ethos as knightly (Ossowska 1986a, p. 59). In her opinion, the term "knightly" is associated with content alien to Sparta. She understands the knightly ethos as the ethos of the governing class, materially independent, indulging in hunting, feasting or sports in times free of war. For these reasons, she concludes that "we may call the Spartans' ethos knightly on a par with the ethos portrayed by Homer" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 60).

Sparta's distinctiveness from Athens prevented Ossowska from using the terms "knight" and "knightly", prompting her to use the term "warrior" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 72). This is why, when describing the two ethos, she writes: "Ancient Greece left us two different models of the ruling warrior" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 60). The similarity of these models lies in their emphasis on courage, regarded as the supreme virtue of the warrior, and contempt for all other activities. There are many more differences, however, since the ethos depicted by Homer valued individualism and harmonious family life. A sensitivity to the beauty of human figures was valued, while the role of reason and experience acquired through travel was also highlighted. The ethos of the Spartans, in turn, is distinguished by a herd quality, obedience, no need for independence, xenophobia, little importance given to intellect, the censoring of foreign views, low aesthetic culture, and the subordination of art to the interests of power (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 60–61).

Ossowska discerns a certain analogy with the life of the Spartans in the description of the Germanic peoples. The recurrence of certain sets of traits among the warriors constituting the ruling elite is interesting here. Contempt for all occupations other than the crafts of war is significant. The strictness of customs in the area of eroticism is accompanied by an emphasis on having numerous offspring. This is a factor enhancing prestige, as is having numerous servants. Loyalty to the authorities, pursuing personal

distinction, and rivalry are also attributes that contribute to the similarities in the lifestyles of the Germanic peoples and the Spartans. The idling between successive wars was accompanied by compulsory hospitality combined with the giving of gifts.

Ossowska used descriptions drawn up by Julius Caesar and Tacitus to analyse the lifestyle of the Germanic peoples. She draws attention to the conscious departure from this model by the Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg. As too susceptible to the influences of Roman culture and Christianity, the Germanic people were not recognised as the ancestors of the "master race". The conscious reference to the lifestyle of mediaeval knighthood was used by the Nazis to identify themselves as the heirs to the chivalric virtue of honour. "With Tacitus and Julius Caesar, the Germanic peoples were distinguished based on different features than the Germans in Hitler's and Rosenberg's understanding [...], I mention them to illustrate how different orientations can be associated with the concept of honour" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 69).

The ethos of knighthood

Ossowska recognises the lifestyle of the mediaeval knights as one of the varieties of the knightly ethos. Twelfth-century court novels and earlier works celebrating the deeds of the knights of the Round Table and Charlemagne became the basis of her research analysis. The main features characterising the ideal knight coincide with the traits of the ancient Greek hero. A knight should be of noble birth, which is a distinguishing feature of this social group. The privilege of being a knight could be received for outstanding valour in battle, or could simply be purchased. And a knight should radiate strength, good looks and charm, emphasised by his attire, adorned in gold and precious stones. His main concern was to uphold the prestige gained in battle. Constant rivalry, demanding courage bordering on contempt for life, is the defining measure of stratification within the group. The duties of loyalty and fealty, virtues ensuring the retention of group member status, required courage. According to Ossowska, fear of being suspected of cowardice frequently led to the elementary rules of strategy being broken, resulting in the knight's undoing (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 70–73). Unrelenting effort towards maintaining or pursuing greater prestige was no obstacle to the continuation of the elite character of the social bond. Class solidarity did not apply solely to the duty to take revenge for an insult suffered personally or by one's kin. The family proved united when it came to revenge, and there was also collective responsibility. All family members bore the consequences.

In everyday life, the family showed a low level of cohesion. The knight was usually away from home, while the children were educated at foreign courts (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 73–74). The knight's most important duties included care of widows and their children, as well as special gratitude towards the one who dubbed them a knight. The knight had a duty of loyalty towards the lord he served, and had to protect him from harm. As a vassal, and based on reciprocity, he had to serve his lord faithfully with advice and maintain secrecy in all matters (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 75–76).

The style of fighting was defined by the principles of fair play, dictated by respect for one's opponent, pride, and a game-like attitude, as well as a fear of reciprocation and humanitarianism. "Respect for one's opponent, pride, and elements of play led to the pursuit of a level playing field in combat" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 77). One of the customs among knights was to remain on the battlefield after having won a battle, to allow kin or friends of the defeated to challenge them to a fight. A knight was not allowed to take advantage of somebody else's weakness. Killing an opponent who had his back turned, or who had lost his weapon or horse, was considered unbefitting of a knight. In addition, a knight could not withdraw from the battlefield. Horse, armour and sword all played an important role in his life; they were granted a personal character, and over time horse riding became a "noble pastime of the aristocracy" (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 77–80).

In her analysis of the knightly ethos, deliberations concerning the situation of women hold a special place. "Being in love was among the duties of a knight" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 80). A knight's care and adoration could only be for women of the same class as the knight came from. Love, generally consummated, had to be faithful and overcome the greatest of difficulties as well as prolonged separations. The phenomenon of women's adoration first appeared in France in the twelfth century. According to Ossowska, "this cult should be regarded as play in which, in essence, the woman gets a 'kick up the ladder'" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 82). This was still a world ruled by men, one full of rape and violence. Wife-beating was widespread, often leading to permanent injury. "Marital infidelity, taken as granted among the men and by no means detracting from their perfection, entailed among women – in the legends of the age – their burning at the stake" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 83).

Based on her observations, Maria Ossowska attempts to reconstruct the code of morals and customs among the mediaeval knighthood. She recognises love as a form of battle, in which women have a certain power over men, though granted to them "with a grain of salt". Although it is permitted to cheat women, they cannot officially be opposed. Money, spent generously, is essential in love. Poverty is something to be ashamed

of. Love in marriage does not relieve one of "the obligation to maintain love relationships outside of it" (Ossowska, 1986a, p. 85). Love is defined as a phenomenon accompanied by constant anxiety, uncertainty as to the reciprocation of feelings, stealth in encounters, and an ever-present feeling of jealousy. This is why there can be no talk of love in marriage. The morality of the era was therefore affected to a greater degree by antiquity than by Christianity, which tended to be superficial (Ossowska used the term "Christian varnish") (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 85–86). The Christian virtues of humility and forgiveness contrasted with pride and vindictiveness. It was easy to "redeem" sinful deeds by entering a monastery towards the end of one's life. Living in a double hierarchy of values was not particularly difficult. Ossowska shares Johan Huizinga's opinion that a hefty dose of pretence was necessary to maintain the fiction of the knightly ideal (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 86–87). Most importantly, in her opinion, is that the chivalric ideals played a special role in European culture, including in contemporary times, regardless of the manner of their realisation (Ossowska 1986a, p. 89).

The ethos of the knights of the Middle Ages bears similarities to the ethos of Homer's "knights" and the Germanic peoples modelling themselves on the latter. Warfare and gains from the cultivation of the land constituted the foundation of their existence. Further features in common are the pursuit of the greatest possible prestige, courage, honour, shame, and generosity. In Ossowska's opinion, this does not constitute a prerequisite for the formation of such an ethos. Sparta is an example of a community structure that was primarily engaged in warfare, and it did not generate such an ethos (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 93–94). At this point, Ossowska cites Dupréel's opinion that the ethos of the group at the peak of the social hierarchy is determined by the class-differentiated social structure. This inclines the lower classes towards either admiration or hostility and the creation of their own value system. The knightly ethos placed an emphasis on the pursuit of fame and an aspiration for extraordinary things that were difficult to achieve. It should be treated as a reaction to the threat to their privileged position. It justified their own privileges and prevented members of the lower classes from permeating into this social group. Dupréel's thesis seems to be confirmed by historians' opinions on the formulation of chivalric codes during the late Middle Ages (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 94–95). At that time, the "growth in the influence of the bourgeoisie began to force a defensive codification of their own interests" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 95).

Ossowska described the culture of chivalry as a culture of competition. Referring to the position taken by Margaret Mead, Ossowska draws attention to the distinction between competition and rivalry, since what matters

in rivalry is beating others, regardless of what one is rivalling over. "In competition, the emphasis is on the goal, while the attitude towards other competitors is a secondary matter" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 97). Such behaviour is individualistic, understood as an activity that pursues a goal without consideration for others. There is no position here admitting the depreciation or exploitation of another (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 97–98). The knightly ethos is individualistic since it is characterised by greater care for one's own image and prestige than for the interests of the group. "It was striving for difficult things among people seeking personal distinction" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 84). In Ossowska's opinion, the "competitive tendencies" present in this ethos may be considered basic. One cannot fully explain this ethos by referring to the primal need for security (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 97–98). She also draws attention to the empirical thesis of functionalism, proclaiming that "norms accepted in a given society always serve sensible needs of some kind, as otherwise they would not take root" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 99). In its most defensive form, this thesis asserts eufunctionality in relation to the need for survival.

Ossowska points out that the chivalric ethos "often proved suicidal and led to the massacre of entire battle units" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 99). Nevertheless, it survived for several hundred years and experienced a revival in the Romantic era.

Courtly ethos

Maria Ossowska defines the "court" as an institution uniting people dependent on a particular wielder of power and wealth. The heyday of court culture came during the Renaissance, and the new type of existence required different role models. Ossowska used the textbooks printed at the time on courtly manners and good upbringing as the source for her analyses (Ossowska 1986a, p. 100). The cultural ideal of personality had undergone a change. Now, a person of average height was looked upon favourably, as providing them with sharpness of mind and dexterity in sport. Non-noble origin was admissible, although it did make one's career much more difficult. Those of noble birth had an easier start in life. An acceptable occupation was that of a knight, but unlike the mediaeval knight he was largely demilitarised. Tournaments, horse riding, spear throwing and playing ball sufficed. In battle, he had to be guided by honour and courage. Perfectionism was expected in all areas of interest, and knowledge in the humanities was prized in every man. Knowledge of Greek and Italian, as well as poetry, history, rhetoric, and music, was mandatory. One was not allowed to expose oneself to the

charge of having a trade, while a lack of concern was expected regarding the disclosure of one's talents (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 101–102).

The pursuit of glory, avoiding the stigma of specialisation and plebeianism, and practising sport all constituted attributes of the chivalric ethos cultivated at court. The social role of the elite had changed. "At court, a man is valued not according to his qualifications in armed combat, but according to what he contributes to this 'amusement-and-revelry' culture" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 103). Dwarfs, black children, jesters and exotic animals provided the amusement. The time devoted to enjoyment was filled with tournaments, races and hunting, along with feasts, masquerades and balls.

After Kazimierz Chłędowski, Ossowska includes lust for power, love, and vendetta among the main motives behind the activities of this era's knighthood. Although it was no disgrace to commit the greatest of crimes, there could be no forgiveness for insult or wrongdoing. Preserving one's good name depended on the observance of rules of battle during tournaments, and on the defence of one's own honour. Glory was achieved through difficult things, while fundamental human tendencies were the fear of shame and the seeking of fame (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 104–107). Women, providing an atmosphere of gentility, were expected to display sophistication in the arts. Skills in dancing, playing instruments (with the exception of the trumpet), and painting were recommended. There was little esteem in the institution of marriage, and sex life was frequently treated cynically, with fidelity taken as a practice evoking umbrage (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 102–108).

Ossowska classifies this model among the varieties of chivalric ethos. Competition in this case is solely verbal in character. There are no religious elements; it is a secular ethos. "The aristocracy will only begin to invoke religion when truly threatened by the dissatisfaction of the underlings, and when they recognise that religion – for the latter and not for themselves – may play the role of a safeguard" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 109).

The guidelines for people engaged in court diplomacy constitute a role model different to that of the nobility. To succeed at one's own or a foreign court, then "above all one has to be pleasing to others, be likeable, and 'win human hearts and desires'" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 110). A diplomat should hail from a good family, since that reinforces his prestige and determines the respect for the ruler to whom he is sent. If not a nobleman, he must be rich, since that protects him from accepting bribes. Composure, discretion and patience are essential for fulfilling the role of ambassador. A knowledge of the psyche, combined with the skill of giving bribes, which enables the securing of favourable influence, is valued. A diplomat is obliged to be familiar with the law and the genealogy of the country's ruler, since that

facilitates orientation concerning how power is really distributed in the country in question.

An ambassador's honesty should be limited, since the good of the country he represents releases him from the absolute observance of moral norms. Therefore, the ambassador does not have to carry out unjust commands from the ruler. However, he is expected to execute the rest, including those that are questionable (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 111–113).

According to Ossowska, the interest in diplomacy testifies to the formation of the diplomat as a profession. "This occupation does not bring disgrace. At the same time, it requires the appropriate financial resources, and the prestige provided by good birth" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 114). The aristocracy long kept this occupation exclusively for themselves in countries where they were deprived of political influence.

The chivalric tradition has been the object of criticism, particularly strong in the eighteenth century. Ossowska counts Mandeville, Montesquieu, Bentham and La Bruyère among its harshest critics. She draws attention to themes common in their remarks regarding the courtiers' lifestyle. For example, the virtues of honour only applied to people of one's own social class. Honesty, fidelity and veracity did not concern conduct towards the lower classes. The central concept of honour constitutes an expression of self-interest, the demand for distinctions and accolades for oneself. Morality shaped under the influence of the virtues of honour prescribes attention to the beauty, greatness and extraordinariness of deeds. Severity in fulfilling duties not defined by legal norms is greater than in the past, and this is a motive that induces people to perform deeds that are difficult and demand effort. Courtly morality, unlike democratic morality, commands one to be guided by personal taste and to avoid situations exposing one to shame (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 117–120).

The spread of this lifestyle was conducive to the strengthening of the attitude of slavish servility, often combined with wickedness. The concept of dispositional people, capable of anything and prepared for everything, refers to this period. Their slogan, as Pauline Smith writes, is "to adapt" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 120). A courtier is characterised as a person devoid of openness, helpfulness and kindness towards others. Contempt for the traditional virtues of the knightly ethos is characteristic of this courtly lifestyle. Ossowska fully shares Montesquieu's opinion, describing this ethos as full of contradictions, since alongside one another are ambition and idleness, pride and humiliation, and fear and hope related to the monarch's weaknesses. Traits found among a majority of courtiers are hypocrisy, contrariness, an

inclination to betray, and a disregard for civil duties (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 120–121).

Ethos of the gentleman

The heir to the tradition of the knightly ethos is the role model of the gentleman. This formed between the thirteenth and the first half of the twentieth century in England. Maria Ossowska considered it the model with the greatest integrative power, the model that exerted the most broad-reaching influence on society, and which penetrated beyond the borders of England. A gentleman is someone who does not work with their hands, who is well-born or the son of a well-born man. The term was not tied to any group affiliation and only applied to those preparing to take on a variety of leadership functions in the country (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 122–123; 1966, p. 98). In her analyses, Ossowska emphasises how the indicators of the gentleman model change throughout history. The most interesting of them is the progressing democratisation. Starting from noble birth and qualities of character, definitions of the word “gentleman” contemporary to Ossowska indicated that the term was understood as a form of addressing people that had been washed of class and moral content (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 124–129).

In her initial reflections concerning the gentleman model, Ossowska drew on the works of Mandeville and Locke. “Our gentleman is the owner of a landed estate, within which is the principal, ancestral estate. It is magnificent and comfortable at the same time” (Ossowska 1966, p. 175). It is also surrounded by large, skilfully designed gardens, supposed to testify to the owner’s good taste. The man residing in this estate, deserving to be called a gentleman, should be studiously brought up and educated. He is always elegant and seems unaware of this fact. His manner of speech is courteous, simple and understandable, not sophisticated or vulgar (Ossowska 1966, pp. 175–176). Just like Aristotle’s “justly proud” man, a gentleman shows respect to people of lower standing. He is well educated and is expected to be fluent in Latin and have a passive knowledge of Greek. Competence in the fields of rhetoric, law, philosophy and – in particular – ethics is also essential.

The practising of painting, music and sculpture is recommended. Sport is dominated by tennis, swimming, horse riding, and hunting, as well as team games (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 125–129; 1966, pp. 98, 177). Neither good looks nor strength, both features important in the ethos of the mediaeval knights, are demanded of a gentleman. What sets him apart is the way he speaks and his possession of a suitable financial foundation. Contrary to the traditions of the nobility, he is exemplarily solvent and does not tolerate any debt. He

manages his estate efficiently, without becoming overly entangled in the financial complexities of business. In summing up her analysis of Mandeville's and Locke's views, Ossowska writes that the model of the gentleman is the model of an "overly refined" man. All the traits of this personality are based on his pride and his love of fame. Concern for his good name, characteristic of the knightly ethos, is also a feature of the gentleman (Ossowska 1966, pp. 98–99, 176).

It was a gentleman's "duty" to have servants. Avoiding the stigma of possessing a profession meant that, up till the beginning of the twentieth century, they were precluded from physical gainful work, although the career of a clergyman was admissible. The gentleman's main duties included serving society in a senior position, which was most often a position in the diplomatic service. Honour and chivalry were the hallmarks of their style of behaviour, while essential traits of character included composure, discretion, self-confidence and truthfulness. There was an emphasis on competitiveness and a drive to excel. The rules of fair play applied in combat, meaning they were not allowed to take advantage of an opponent's weaknesses (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 130–135). "This is not – evidently – a set of Christian virtues, although, as in John Milton or Thomas Arnold, it is sometimes susceptible to Christianisation. One is rather reminded of Aristotle's 'justly proud' man" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 134).

The transformations that the model of the gentleman went through were caused, among other things, by the aspirations of the advancing social class of the bourgeoisie. Making a fortune made it possible to acquire an education and refinement, qualities required of a gentleman. Daniel Defoe is regarded by Ossowska as an advocate of the bourgeoisie's access to participation in the life of the upper classes. He distinguished between gentlemen by birth and gentlemen by upbringing. Locke paid considerable attention to upbringing and education (Ossowska 1966, p. 98). In Defoe's opinion, only gentlemen by upbringing are genuine, since, as a rule, they display a higher level of intellect (Ossowska 1986b, p. 169). A man who is a gentleman by social advancement must display undeniable personal qualities, such as an impeccable manner and education. Ossowska notes that "manners [...] serve both to protect one against loss of class and to achieve social ennoblement" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 172). The nurturing of bourgeois and chivalric virtues was conducive to a gradual fusion of moral patterns in England. "We encounter them already fused in Galsworthy's *The Forsyte Saga*" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 174).

Analysis of the changes that took place during the Restoration and the Victorian era holds a special place in Maria Ossowska's deliberations. The bearer of the new model in the eighteenth century was the English

aristocracy, a class closely tied to the countryside and characterised by a culture of revelry. A notable feature of this class was its lack of consideration for public opinion in matters concerning sex life. The façade-like nature of marriage was combined with a tendency towards fickle relationships (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 137–139). The influences of courtly culture were evident in everyday life. “Feasting, combined with abundant liquor, was interspersed with hunting or gambling” (Ossowska 1986a, p. 139). Income allowed for independence from the crown, which was why the aristocracy was constantly in opposition. This rift intensified further when, in the nineteenth century, Queen Victoria married the German Prince Albert. The Royal Court became an advocate of the virtues of duty, punctuality, diligence and family life. Customs related to sex life were strict, with divorces, remarriage by widows, and gambling on Sundays all scorned (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 143–144).

Alongside the historical transformations, Ossowska recorded the distinctions made within the group of the “well-born”. Over the centuries, it had expanded to embrace lower levels of the social hierarchy. However, divisions and antagonisms persisted. The hierarchical social structure signified a distinction between the aristocracy and the nobility. To belong to the aristocracy, one had to possess land, have money, and cultivate chivalric tradition (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 145–148). This division did not have sharp boundaries, and Ossowska admits the “rightness of those who point to the fluidity of the transition from the titled to the enriched bourgeoisie” (Ossowska 1986a, p. 150). Differences persisted, however, in education. The lack of intellectual culture that the nobility was frequently charged with was something alien to the aristocracy. Different distinctions are visible in the English and French ethos. Differences in climate make duty the most crucial virtue for an Englishman, and honour for a Frenchman (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 150–151).

When formulating her assessment of the model of the gentleman, Maria Ossowska cites Russell’s opinion. Once boorishness and propensity to rape has been eliminated, what remains is something that allows for the preservation of personal integrity and contributes to the strengthening of trust in social relations (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 151–152). The emphasis on the set of virtues adorning the individual and regulating interpersonal relationships indicates a convergence of Ossowska’s views with Russell’s position.

Reflections on how the chivalric ethos was received in the United States complete the analysis of the model of the gentleman. As in feudal England, moral virtues related to the notion of honour are pursued in America.

Ossowska cites the views of Alexis Tocqueville, who analysed the feudal and American concepts of honour. They are two different concepts. In morality, Tocqueville distinguished between directives universally valid and rules of honour that are local and variable in character, depending on the conditions (Ossowska 1986a, p. 167). Feudal honour was an expression of the views of the class standing at the peak of society, which had to make an effort to hold on to its position. Therefore, they were virtues that had "their greatness and splendour, and which can easily be reconciled with pride and a fondness for power. It [the class at the peak of society – translator's note] is not afraid of violating the natural order dictated by conscience, placing these virtues above all others" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 168). The aristocracy owes its existence to war, which is why courage and loyalty are held in the highest esteem. The conditions prevailing in America favour totally different virtues. The primacy of industry and trade favoured the retention of "peace" virtues. The pursuit of wealth and the courage to overcome difficulties on the road to success become the most important. Marital fidelity and industriousness, virtues that were despised or disregarded by the aristocracy, are valued. This is because social mobility is not conducive to the stability and expansion of the virtues of honour. "When the tiers disappear in a community, and everyone becomes equal and similar, honour transcends barriers and becomes national" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 169).

Ossowska notes Tocqueville's ambivalence, revealed in his assessment of the aristocratic and democratic models of a man of honour. He regards the democratic course of development as providential, since it leads to a more just political system. The aristocracy had aesthetic and creative qualities, which gave it an advantage in the area of personal refinement (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 169–170).

For Maria Ossowska, Tocqueville's opinion, anticipating the demise of models of the gentleman type in the United States, is premature. "Styling oneself as an English gentleman remained attractive in certain circles until recent times, although various other models have developed alongside this model in this great continent" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 170).

Ossowska recalls that the culture created by the knights has been described as a culture of competition. The chivalric ethos is an individualistic ethos, since competition is fundamental to it. Ossowska's reflections focus on the functionalistic thesis according to which norms accepted in a given society always serve specific needs. This ethos cannot be fully understood without referring to the primal need for security. In the ethos of the knights, the central concept is that of honour. Its concept was shaped in conditions of social inequality. Maria Ossowska draws attention to the consensus of

opinions regarding this issue. In her opinion, the stability of societal life and the degree of isolation of a given group should also be taken into account. "Here, for example, I have in mind the kind of isolation that prevailed among our highlanders before the invasion of tourists changed the image of the Tatra Mountains" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 175).

Bourgeois ethos

While analysing the knightly ethos, Ossowska notes the development of a role model of the middle class, a model that was initiated by Hesiod. A distinctive feature of this model is its peaceful, agrarian orientation. Earning one's wealth without recourse to violence was recommended. "Making one's fortune through work was something that Hesiod heartily supported, believing that 'shame had become used to poverty, while wealth is tied to courage'" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 43). Attitude in life is often characterised by caution, distrust, and a constant state of safeguarding. The principle of *do ut des* rules in relations with other people: "Give to those who give, and respond to greed with your own greed" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 44). The emphasis is on economic self-sufficiency, which is to be ensured through work, order, and thrift. In pursuing this goal, the man is to be helped by a resourceful and industrious wife.

Ossowska finds a similar image of man in the works of Aesop. "There is no room for generosity in his ethos. Work is his treasure" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 47). Attitude towards others is framed in terms of losses and gains. Lying, anger, or keeping bad company can cause significant damage and, as such, should be avoided. What counts above all in friendship is help, and so one should only become friends with those who may help in some way. Neither origin nor fame, nor beauty, nor outward appearance are valued in the analysed models. The judicial functions of the gods are greatly emphasised. Justice and the law are respected much more strongly here than in the chivalric ethos (Ossowska 1986a, pp. 46–47).

Hesiod's and Aesop's directives are considered by Ossowska to be closer to the bourgeois than the noble ideals. "Analogies with bourgeois morality contribute to Aesop's particular success in eighteenth-century England. [...] I am sure the distinctness of this ethos from that of Homer does not require more detailed comment" (Ossowska 1986a, p. 48).

The next stage in Ossowska's work involves reconstructing the moral views of the bourgeoisie. This is a specific type of morality considered in conjunction with elements recognised as morally indifferent.

Ossowska consciously refers to the notion of ethos. "This notion of ethos will also come to our aid, as it is impossible to detach morality from this broader background" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 27). She treats ethos as a methodological, exemplary concept. Thanks to its attributes of flexibility and fluidity, it allows one to grant order to reality where science cannot yet take measurements, while the ordering reveals a variety of transitional forms of the phenomenon under study (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 377–378). By applying the concept of ethos as an ideal type in Weberian terms, it differs in its construction method. It is not, as Weber would have liked, a set of attributes in pure, never-realised form, but just a set of the most common attributes, and as such attributes occurring the most widely within the social reality being studied (Mejbaum 1989, p. 85; Ossowska 1986b, pp. 376–380).

Maria Ossowska assumes that bourgeois morality comprises a set of directives and only those deeds that are sanctioned by them, considered typical of various European circles from the mid-nineteenth century to the present (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 13, 27). It would be hard to determine whether they originated within or outside of the bourgeois milieu. Bourgeois morality, as a representative set of views, displays a certain resemblance to Christian morality. "Christian morality does not exist as a homogeneous historical creation, and one cannot find any such homogeneous model even in the Gospels" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 12). A specific type of it, in which "soft" virtues prevail, is common to those for whom Christianity is entirely alien. Ossowska believes that Christian morality thus understood does not have to be the morality of Christians.

When analysing bourgeois morality, Ossowska probably follows the concept of Puritan morality, which emerged as a result of the gathering of certain repetitive features common to the ethics of various sects (Ossowska 1985a, p. 12). Such is the character of reflections focusing on bourgeois morality, which Ossowska treats as an attempt to examine the issues of the sociology of morality. Their goal was to demonstrate that morality restricted to a single section of time and space, in a society differentiated in terms of class, splits into a variety of moralities (Ossowska 1985a, p. 9).

Ossowska conducts a thorough analysis of the notions of bourgeoisie and the petite bourgeoisie, social groups distinguished on the basis of diverse criteria. She cites examples of the bourgeoisie being treated as a social group equipped with its own, separate rights, and juxtaposes them with the nobility, the clergy, and urban commoners. Another kind of portrayal has a member of the bourgeoisie as *homo oeconomicus* residing in a city. The bourgeoisie is a group defined on the grounds of an ecological factor and by its participation in production. When comparing the studies of Edmond

Goblot and Józef Chałasiński, Ossowska concludes that they view the bourgeoisie as a group comprising the so-called “society” in cities, but not belonging to the aristocracy (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 14–16).

For Marx and Engels, the bourgeoisie meant the privileged class as a whole, as opposed to the proletariat. They also included the nobility among the bourgeoisie, despite this going against the etymological meaning of the word “bourgeoisie” (from the French “bourg”, meaning town or city). The petite bourgeoisie in turn comprised independent shopkeepers and craftsmen, as well as peasants (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 18–20). Ossowska notes that this division eliminates the middle class, situating the petite bourgeoisie between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (Ossowska 1985a, p. 27).

Divisions of another kind distinguish petty, middle, and upper bourgeoisie. The petite bourgeoisie comprises people with an elementary education, living from their work, and having at most a single servant. The middle bourgeoisie refers to individuals in occupations that require secondary or higher education, who do not own their own means of transport. This group also embraces all their relatives and those with whom they maintain a home. The upper bourgeoisie comprises the rich, who typically have a secondary or higher education, employ numerous servants, and possess their own means of transport (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 14–16). The bases used for the divisions vary and include both economic and moral criteria. What the divisions have in common is the conviction that one enters a social class not individually, but with one’s family.

The most varied category is that of the petite bourgeoisie. According to a review of positions held, this collective consists of groups comprising petty officials, shopkeepers, craftsmen, lower-ranking military personnel, clergymen in lower positions, teachers, and peasants (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 21–23).

The classics of bourgeois morality

Benjamin Franklin

When embarking on her study of bourgeois morality, Maria Ossowska drew on the views of Benjamin Franklin as a representative of this state. It turned out that she was unable to give any motive for choosing him other than that he represented “a certain ready-made picture of bourgeois morality” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 24). She firmly believed that Franklin’s views were the most suitable for analysis. “However, one had to have the whole already

outlined in one's mind to assess that it was Franklin who was suitable for it as a model" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 25).

Franklin came from a petit bourgeois background, and he addressed mainly this group in his guidelines for life. In his view, work constituted the basis of all value. Man, understood as an animal creating tools, should display a stance characterised by sobriety, self-reliance, and worldly aspirations (Ossowska 1985a, p. 79). Virtue should be measured by utility. This is a position close to that taken by Hume, proclaiming the uselessness of asceticism as not bringing any benefits to man. Self-denial, mercy and temperance retain their character irrespective of whether they are the result of effort. The same utilitarianism characterised Franklin's position regarding religion. He recommended and left religious practices to women (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 79–80). In his opinion, the personality ideal was that of a person "worthy of credit". This was ensured by the virtues of industriousness, economising and dependability in fulfilling payment obligations. Economising is connected to the cult of a balanced budget. And this, in turn, is tied to planning and method. Franklin's list of virtues, serving everyday methodical self-improvement, included temperance, economising, orderliness, perseverance in one's resolutions, industriousness, honesty, justice, moderation, neatness, sexual purity, and humility (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 83–85). Ossowska considers method an attribute characteristic of the bourgeois ethos. She realises that every social class has people with perfectionist ambitions, and examples of such people are also to be found among the nobility: "The difference is that, in areas inheriting chivalric traditions, method was not one of the slogans they preached, and it did not lend style to the group" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 86).

Ossowska also considers attitude to money an important attribute of the bourgeois ethos. Counting time as money, combined with the desire for such an attitude to be universal in character, is the attribute she believes is seen as that most strongly differentiating Euro-Atlantic culture from Asian culture. "Young capitalism offers people an incomparably more democratic independence, an independence acquired through money" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 88). The mottoes proclaimed by Franklin have no religious pathos or rigour. But it is a fact that "for him, virtue is dependent on making money" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 89). People owe money not only virtue, but also social standing.

In the ethos of the knights, virtue depended indirectly on wealth, since social position was granted by birth. Yet money and economic matters were, in a way, to remain unnoticed. "With Franklin, nobody is ashamed to talk about money; here you can openly admit to making money" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 91).

Franklin's position concerning sex life is significant. His recommendations lean towards limiting this sphere of life to the bare minimum and maintaining good health. The choice of a wife should be preceded by deep thought and consideration. Women are advised to work at home, raise children, and attend church. They should also be proficient in arithmetic and bookkeeping. Ossowska sums this up briefly – as a “limited programme” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 92). Franklin's views concerning art were expressed when discussing his position on poetry. He recognised practising it so long as it served to improve style. As the years passed, his views became increasingly rigid, and he considered the pursuit of poetry ridiculous, on a par with poverty or accepting titles (Ossowska 1985a, p. 93).

Leon Battista Alberti

Two opposing positions stand out in studies delving into Franklinism. Some saw in it a new phenomenon connected to Puritanism (Weber), while others discerned its beginnings in Italian capitalism (Sombart). Maria Ossowska, keen on resolving this dispute, devoted part of her deliberations to the views of Alberti, a representative of early capitalist thought. Her analyses dealt with the role of money, work, wealth, and the moral virtues of the role model. She used her conclusions for comparing the views of Alberti and Franklin (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 252–274).

Franklin's guidance was intended for the masses. Alberti, on the other hand, addressed his views to a narrow social group that could afford to purchase a landed estate and industrial enterprise. Ossowska claims that money did not play the same role for Alberti as it did for Franklin (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 252–274). “There is no coupling here of economic activity with religion, no treating of getting rich as a religious-moral vocation, and no dependence of virtue on wealth” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 275). In terms of life attitude and morality, Ossowska treats Alberti as a representative of the grand bourgeoisie, a group characterised by a fusion of bourgeois and chivalric-noble elements. “Alberti was said to excel in the art of horsemanship, while in his treatise on the family he recommended that a man defend his wife, home and homeland with sweat and blood” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 275). The bourgeois stance was accused of lacking an understanding of beauty. “Meanwhile, Alberti constantly takes an aesthetic point of view” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 276). He sees human weaknesses as having the characteristics of ugliness. He is a proponent of showing the beauty of the human body. Morality for Alberti has a dimension full of grace and joy. Leaving aside the humour with which Franklin worded his recommendations, Maria Ossowska

notes that Puritanism treated morality as something serious and austere (Ossowska 1985a, p. 276).

Ossowska's general conclusion is that it would be wrong to treat Alberti as a precursor of Franklin. "His mood is the mood of the ancients, not the mood of the Old Testament; his moderation is their moderation, and not the mediocrity of the petite bourgeoisie" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 382). She emphasises that she has not resolved whether one can find the spirit of capitalism in Alberti's views. Her comparisons were like a juxtaposition of the two ethos. One has the impression that, in support of her thesis, Maria Ossowska cites the view of Engels, which, regarding the precursors of capitalism, rules out "bourgeois narrowness", inherent in the petite bourgeoisie, the primary addressees of Franklin's works (Ossowska 1985a, p. 278).

Volney (Constantin François de Chasseboeuf de)

Franklin was raised in an atmosphere of Puritanism, which was conducive to a capitalist stance. For Maria Ossowska, it was the situation of the bourgeoisie in a Catholic country before the bourgeois victory that was of interest. Such a country, in which the bourgeoisie possessed a vision of a new man, was France of the eighteenth century. This vision had been formed by moral teachings unrelated to religion, contained in civil catechisms. One such catechism was that compiled by Constantin François Volney, faithfully depicting the moral slogans of the day's French bourgeoisie (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 279–280). Its purpose was to make people aware of the laws of nature and to construct a morality freed from religion, capable of transforming the world. Morality here was understood as an exact science, comprising simple and unchanging elements. They create a complex whole, similar to the organisation of the human body. Maria Ossowska discerns in Volney a precursor of the sociology of customs. Its founder, Durkheim, wanted to base ethical norms on it. Volney made the biological constitution of man the basis of norms (Ossowska 1985a, p. 286).

In the model of the citizen created by Volney, there are, in Ossowska's opinion, many views coinciding with Franklin's position. This model is that of an active person, which, in the light of the law of nature, constitutes a virtue. The chief attribute of a virtue is its utility for the individual and for society, and not asceticism. Work is the best form of shaping various virtues, and provides a person with sustenance and wealth while maintaining temperance and forethought. Financial dependability is the most important criterion when judging a person. Like Franklin, Volney believes that virtue is a

sufficient condition for wealth (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 292–293). The gauge of a person's virtue is their budget. Based on a person's attitude towards money, one could determine their honesty, responsibility and patriotism. "A person's attitude to money becomes symptomatic of his moral standing" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 294).

Social relations are governed by the principles of justice and reciprocity. Justice is expressed in the recommending of such deeds as we ourselves would like to experience. Reciprocity is expressed in the pursuit of mutual interests. "Do not steal or do not kill is simply a matter of good calculation, just like the matter of mercy. [...] It follows from the principle of reciprocity that one can only make up for harm by way of restitution" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 298). Maria Ossowska considers Volney a writer striving to build a social order based on what he considered the natural inclination to pursue one's own interests. "This is how Volney understood the rationality of his morality" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 299).

Volney's views were addressed to the middle bourgeoisie. He spoke as a codifier of a new class, opposing the feudal models and religious ethics. "Franklin wrote kindly pieces of *Advice*, Volney formulated his apodictic *Catechism*" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 311). Ossowska notes that the morality of Franklin's ilk was not necessarily connected to Protestantism, since it was also evident in a Catholic country. In her opinion, the fight against religion, involving the proclamation of hedonistic views, was dictated by speaking out against the religious ethics linked to the old order. A consequence of this situation was that the outcome of happiness or suffering was taken into account when evaluating the effects of an action. This made it possible to ascertain or justify something, thanks to which ethics was freed from Revelation and subjected to the authority of reason (Ossowska 1985a, p. 308). Also significant for Maria Ossowska is the fact that asceticism and rigorism, attributes of both the Puritans and early Italian capitalism, are not fixed components of the morality of the offensive social classes. The issue of why the French bourgeoisie chose to fight against religion, while in England religion was used for one's own ends, remains open (Ossowska 1985a, p. 311).

Daniel Defoe

An analysis of the English model of the merchant, created in the eighteenth century by Daniel Defoe, completes Ossowska's reflections on the main themes in bourgeois morality before Franklin. As there was no upper class in America, Franklin was not interested in its role models. In England, on the other hand, the position of a wealthy merchant allowed one to move from

the bourgeois to the nobility. Advancement to the upper class was ensured by the set of bourgeois virtues, guaranteeing wealth. Defoe believed that the possession of money was an indispensable condition of virtue. Maria Ossowska identifies numerous parallels between the catalogue of specific virtues that guarantee wealth and Franklin's views. And so a merchant must be hard-working, attentive, frugal, patient and composed. Caution, honesty, and systematic bookkeeping are also recommended (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 141–150). Breaching the principles of merchant solidarity by lowering prices is unacceptable. Features common to both are the spreading of religious tolerance and belief in science and rationality, combined with a dislike of the clergy.

Defoe is more ingrained in Puritan culture than Franklin, although over time the "Freemason clearly prevails over the Puritan" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 180). In Ossowska's opinion, the lack of any thought concerning social advancement in Franklin's views indicates a fundamental difference between the two thinkers. In Defoe's considerations, the model of the merchant remained valid until he became rich and moved up into the gentleman class. Social advancement, as understood by Franklin, meant acquiring riches and respect within one's class. "The fact remains that with both Defoe and Franklin, everybody is supposed to get rich" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 181). Maria Ossowska notes that Franklin's slogans are delivered jovially, with humour, whilst in Defoe "one always senses some kind of false note" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 180).

Bourgeois morality in the light of selected theories

Maria Ossowska devoted a section of her deliberations to selected theories concerning the factors shaping the bourgeoisie's moral models. Werner Sombart belonged to those theorists who attributed a specific type of people with the shaping of bourgeois models. In Ossowska's opinion, he drew attention to the bourgeois understood as a certain type, and not as a social condition. The practice of pursuing wealth had already been known in antiquity and the Middle Ages. The bourgeoisie, in turn, contributed a different perspective on these matters. The action programme formulated by Alberti was designed to achieve wealth through personal virtues (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 18–183).

The bourgeois attitude is succumbing to change. A new type of capitalism has developed, in which the classic bourgeois virtues have been objectified and transferred to the enterprise. Large businesses are emerging, shaping the mature face of capitalism by detaching the enterprise's assets

from the home budget. Two varieties appear in the psychological type of man: the entrepreneur type and the bourgeois type. Genetic factors are decisive here: an entrepreneurial man must be of a conquering nature, marked by the traits of a good organiser, implementing far-reaching plans. The skills of negotiation, quick orientation, boldness, and composure are essential for this purpose. Yet a man of bourgeois nature is concerned, orderly and dutiful. He methodically observes a surplus in income over expenditure, giving economic activity a sanctified character (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 184–185).

Sombart's typology is questionable and evokes Ossowska's criticism. Italian capitalism was no different from the ancient variety, except in the object of wealth: money, rather than land, was accumulated. Ossowska finds it unclear who the person with these capitalistic (suggesting an entrepreneur) and bourgeois dispositions is. Biological grounds determining a particular type is unacceptable, "and Sombart himself contributes to its ridicule by including Rockefeller among those with a bourgeois nature for keeping a ledger, supposedly hereditarily determined" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 186). The most serious charge levied against Sombart appears to be that he underestimated the significance of social factors. "Everyone today understands all too well the extent to which commercial aptitude is a function of social position" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 187).

Scheler conducted similar observations. He distinguished the biopsychic types of risk-taking and fearful people. Those who are fond of risk and danger are often full of self-esteem, carefree, and trusting. This allows them to be self-denying, generous, and judging others for who they are, not according to their utility. A bourgeois is a vitally impaired, fearful type, constantly concerned, distrustful, and calculating. His uncharitable world outlook is evident in his constant comparison with others. In Scheler's opinion, envy as the chief attribute of the bourgeoisie constituted the foundations beneath the slogans of the French Revolution (Ossowska 1985a, p. 189). Maria Ossowska notes that Scheler's views regarding the bourgeoisie are not based on any specific material. He draws up his characterisation based on intuition. "That intuitive insight speaks with the same language used widely to criticise the petite bourgeoisie at the end of the last century and in the first quarter of this century" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 188).

Maria Ossowska analysed the position taken by Eduard Spranger, who distinguished a type of economic man, guided by the principle of utility understood as the capacity to satisfy existential needs. His catalogue of moral virtues indicates a connection with economic efficiency. What counts most here is industriousness, economising, responsibility, and a fondness for order.

This is a person to whom aesthetic experiences are alien. He is marked by rationality understood as being opposed to acting on impulse. An economic attitude favours egoism. Elbowing one's way through is accompanied by the principle of reciprocity, expressed in the exchange of services (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 189–192).

In criticising Spranger's position, Maria Ossowska points out the contradictions in his views. Usefulness in this sense leads to the recognition of a smallholder peasant as a type of economic man. All of his efforts are focused on satisfying the needs essential for staying alive. But Spranger believes otherwise. For him, Rockefeller is the epitome of the economic type of man; a person who does not have to concern himself with existence. This is possible for Spranger thanks to a transformation of the notion of usefulness. From biological survival, utility transforms into an unsatiated lust for satisfying economic needs. For Ossowska, this is a characterisation with a high level of abstraction and indeterminacy. The type of person he describes was shaped by certain forms of European capitalism. Spranger attributes to him the power that holds in all conditions. In Ossowska's view, Spranger's imagination does not reach beyond the economic forms he has become accustomed to, since in the type of economic man described, she cannot discern those features that are supposed to have a distinctly business-related character (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 190–192).

It is Ossowska's firm belief that psychoanalysts have a peculiar view of possession and money. They consider interest in money a substitute interest, appearing in the place of interest in one's own excrement. "The 'anal-erotic' type, who is particularly interested in his own excrement, is later the financially(!) active type" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 194). This type is particularly attached to metal money and is more willing to part with paper money. The middle classes expanded their activities when paper money began to circulate. Attachment to metal money is a sign of fondness for collecting. The other attributes associated with possession are method, stubbornness, cleanliness, and a tendency to control others and propagate ideas. Based on these claims, Ossowska concludes that the social conditions favouring the bourgeoisie preferred erotic anal types, which meant that "they began moving into the fore in this period" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 195).

Maria Ossowska concludes her review of theories focusing on typological inquiry with her own remarks. Her reservations are raised by the overestimation of the role played by biological markers in the shaping of the bourgeois type of morality. In Sombart's and Spranger's theories, there is a noticeable lack of a delimited scope of the characteristics of economic man. The conclusions manifest a tendency towards a hasty generalisation

of the findings from specific social conditions. The connection between the identified features and the presumed background as framed by psychoanalysts is not convincing at all (Ossowska 1985a, p. 195).

Representative attributes of the bourgeois ethos

Religion

The spread of bourgeois morality was accompanied by the growth of Puritan sects. This phenomenon occurred with particular intensity in countries where capitalism was rapidly developing. Weber provided the most suggestive illustration of the influence these sects had on the formation of bourgeois morality. His views (Weber 1994) have been the subject of many analyses. Ossowska's analysis and critique focused on highlighting the logical relationships in Weber's views. Her critique was simultaneously a review of the factors that – in Weber's opinion – could have contributed to the growth of the spirit of capitalism, exhibiting a strong connection with Puritanism (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 198–205).

Ossowska formulates several theses in relation to Weber's core claims. In the first, she states that the growth of Puritan ethics coincided with the development of the spirit of capitalism. In the second, Puritan ethics contributed to the growth of the spirit of capitalism. In Ossowska's opinion, the most important thesis is the one that combines the set of moral beliefs with the advancement of capitalism. The same character is evident in the claim that acquiring wealth, understood as an ethical-religious mission, is a new phenomenon in Puritanism as a mass movement (Ossowska 1985a, p. 205).

With regard to the first thesis, Ossowska draws attention to the difficulties in determining what the relations between Puritan ethics and the spirit of capitalism concern. The main reason is the lack of a clear definition of what the "spirit of capitalism" entails. In Weber's notion, it is the set of Franklin's instructions. Ossowska, citing Lujo Brentano's position, notes that the "spirit of capitalism turns out to be related to Puritan ethics, since we define it by means of the constituent parts of this ethics" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 206). More noteworthy is the fact that the pieces of advice given by Franklin are universal in character. In this case, Maria Ossowska agrees with Brentano's statement, ruling out the possibility that Puritanism has given birth to the spirit of capitalism as a mass phenomenon. She adds that "Puritanism favoured

capitalism, wiping out certain human resistance impeding its development" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 207).

Franklin's advice may be considered the professional ethics of the petit bourgeois. Ossowska finds Weber's claim questionable, postulating the convergence of the spirit of capitalism and Calvinist ethics, which constitutes, *par excellence*, a Puritan ethic. The pieces of advice from Franklin are devoid of religious elements and "the burden of science concerning predestination, science that Weber attributed with such a role in liberating the spirit of capitalism" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 208).

Another charge relates to the lack of a sufficient explanation for the connection of faith in predestination with the spirit of capitalism. For Ossowska, Weber's thesis on the role of faith in predestination, which liberates the drive to get rich, is questionable. Such a phenomenon also occurred in sects that did not accept the dogma of predestination. Therefore, the virtues recommended by Puritan ethics actually enabled its followers to become rich (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 212–213).

A more important and more relevant thesis of Weber's is the view that Puritan ethics contributed to the development of capitalism. This is supported by the fact that Puritanism spread mainly among the bourgeoisie. It was found in Protestant countries where the development of industry was concentrated primarily in the hands of Puritans. This allowed Weber to put forward the more general thesis that where Puritanism appeared, the effects that followed were similar. Maria Ossowska agrees with Weber's historical thesis concerning the links between wealth accumulation and Puritan ethics. This is pointed to by the examples of England, the Netherlands and the United States. However, the thesis that the nature of these relations was that of a general law needs amending. Ossowska, citing Ranulf, indicates that Calvinism had not always liberated the spirit of enterprise. "And therefore: Puritan virtues contribute to getting rich, with the provision that certain social conditions are met" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 215). She voices other reservations in relation to the tendency noted in Weber of overestimating the role of Puritanism. Citing Lujo Brentano and Richard Tawney, she draws attention to the underappreciated role that Catholics played in the development of capitalism in the Netherlands.

The political writers of the Renaissance (principally Machiavelli) contributed no less to the development of the spirit of enterprise. An important factor, overlooked by Weber, was the discovery of new lands, along with the related economic transformations, and the significant population growth in Western Europe. The exclusion of Puritan sects from involvement in public life should be recognised as a significant factor, and is also one

that is overlooked. According to Weber, the activities of the Puritan sects should be recognised as the capitalism of pariahs, differing in its ordered and methodical style of action from the rowdy Jewish capitalism. "Not the development of capitalism, however, but only its nature could then be linked to religion" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 216). Weber displayed insufficient recognition of the heterogeneity of Puritan doctrine. In its initial stage, the Calvinist form of Puritanism opposed unconstrained capitalist expansion. In the end, it yielded, freeing the man of business from scruples. Maria Ossowska claims that Puritanism did not equip people of business with a clear conscience right from the start. The principle of "business is business", stating the specificity of the laws governing economics, struggled to pave its way. The right economic conditions had to be present for it to become established. The law of supply and demand, which justified price increases, also held an ethical function (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 215–218).

Among the critics cited by Ossowska, Weber's view that the mission for getting rich proclaimed in the Puritan ethics was something new as a mass phenomenon aroused the most reservations. Quoting Brentano's position, Ossowska indicates the trade in northern Italy, which has been a longstanding tradition since antiquity. The recommendation to serve God through work was well known in the Middle Ages. In scholastic ethics, according to Sombart, there is no ideal of poverty. Saint Thomas did not oppose the possibility of social advancement through getting rich. He only recommended the virtue of the golden mean between stinginess and extravagance. The ban on charging interest on monetary loans was tied to the recommendation to invest. Profit here had to be connected to risk. This practice had a significant impact on the development of capitalism. The fundamental attributes of bourgeois morality took shape in the craft guilds. Discerning the precursor of capitalism in Alberti aroused Weber's reservations, and Ossowska agrees with Weber (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 219–222).

In recapitulating her remarks concerning Weber's views, Ossowska attaches little importance to the thesis of connections between Puritan ethics and the development of the spirit of capitalism. Due to the ambiguities that have arisen, it would be hard to take a distinct position here. Ossowska's historical thesis regarding the favourable impact of Puritan ethics on the phenomenon of wealth accumulation is not in doubt. It only requires the condition of reference to a specific time and place (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 222–233).

In Ossowska's opinion, Weber's conviction that a new and broad-reaching ethical style formed in connection with Puritanism is correct. Weber's

comments regarding the role of Puritan sects in the uncoupling of guild solidarity and in paving the way for economic individualism seem equally pertinent. Weber asserted an uneven relationship between Puritan ethics and the development of capitalism. Ossowska notes that he did not explain why English capitalism accepted views that a few centuries earlier had been unacceptable to capitalists in northern Italy. Catholicism had developed an ideology whereby, after becoming wealthy, one could alleviate one's conscience through almsgiving (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 223–224).

Weber viewed the teachings of predestination as fuelling the drive to become wealthy. At the same time, he pointed to a set of bourgeois virtues contributing to the growth of wealth. Maria Ossowska observes that belief in predestination does not necessarily prompt one to reduce the hope of redemption to the criterion of economic success. After all, the drive to become rich is a phenomenon that should be understood in the context of the economic conditions of the time. Weber's tendency to overestimate the role of the religious factor was a result of overlooking how Puritanism was received in conditions other than those in England, the Netherlands or the United States. Calvinism, adopted in various classes and conditions, brought varied effects (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 224–225). And this, in Ossowska's opinion, upsets the thesis of the special role of the religious factor. The example of Franklin, whose views are devoid of religious elements, testifies that faith in predestination is not sufficient to fully explain actions aimed at achieving economic success. "If that faith were to be significant for Calvinism, then it raises the question as to whether Franklin was well chosen at all for demonstrating the influences of Calvinism" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 224).

Maria Ossowska notes the historical heterogeneity of the development of Puritanism. The initial resistance to capitalism ultimately gave way to its total acceptance. These concessions, in Ossowska's view, were made under the influence of economic development. One cannot resolve the matter of which of the phenomena in question occurred earlier. Ossowska takes Ranulf's view of the co-occurrence of both (Ossowska 1985a, p. 225).

Economising

One of the cardinal virtues of bourgeois morality is economising. Maria Ossowska sought to clarify the misunderstandings surrounding the failure to recognise its multifaceted nature. She distinguishes two kinds of economising: saving money and economising in terms of utilitarian goods.

There are four main ways to save money. The first of these is "scrimping" – setting aside money, but in a way that can most easily take on an irrational

form, becoming an obsession. Ossowska sets this kind of saving against the kind that derives from the need for having security (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 117–118).

Yet another kind of saving is when one finds it difficult to part with one's money, which is frequently tied to scrimping. Ossowska draws attention to attempts to separate the inclination to hoard money from having difficulty spending it that were made in the Gospels and by Church fathers. The spiritually impoverished are understood there as people unable to retain an independence in relation to what they possess (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 118–119). Economising is sometimes understood in relation to the meaning of the Greek word *oikonomia* – and this is the original meaning of the notion of economics – as maintaining a balanced budget and ensuring order in the home. The planned management of resources does not require sacrifices; only rational planning of expenses is necessary (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 119–120).

The final form of saving money, distinguished by Ossowska, is economising as the opposite of wastefulness. There is little application of the demand for sacrifice here; what is important is how money is used. The notion of wastefulness is relativised to the hierarchy of values of the person judging and the budget of the person being judged. In Ossowska's opinion, there are relatively fixed and widespread hierarchies of importance in every social group, which enable a certain stability in the concept of wastefulness. In its most extreme form, wastefulness involves spending money on items deemed unimportant by the person making the judgment. The more strongly this is linked to the inability to satisfy needs the person judging considers important, the more negative their judgment will be (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 120–121).

Economising with utilitarian goods has three versions. The first is tied to the demand for use. Here, economising is expressed in the maximum usage of one's possessions. This applies to both people and the production process. "The capitalist beginner is thrifty in his personal expenditure. Once he has made his money, then the economising is the job of the enterprise" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 124). This is not based on avoiding expenditure, but on the harmonious connection of the individual elements (Ossowska 1985a, p. 125).

Economising is also expressed in the postulate regarding the prevention of destruction. It aims to limit expenditure and satisfy one's need for durability. Alongside the rational forms of behaviour, Ossowska also distinguishes irrational forms. These occur in situations of economising "against the voice of reason, which dictates that one know how to destroy

on time something that is doomed sooner or later to destruction" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 128).

The final form of economising, where goods are concerned, is linked to the hedonistic practice of delaying the using up (or wearing out) of what is the best. The new variant of the notion of economising that occurs here "implies some kind of hierarchisation of objects by the person economising" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 128). In Ossowska's opinion, this kind of economising is associated with the planned nature of the using up (wearing out), the aim being to multiply the pleasure. This is a rational activity only when the conditions are stable. In situations where the circumstances are changeable, Ossowska considers this form of economising irrational.

The social conditions of economising contain some aspects of amusement. Ossowska links the delay in wearing out (or using up) the best items with satisfying the need to treasure something special. Planned spending within a budget does not involve scrimping or difficulties in spending. Neither does it exhibit any connection with the other forms of economising, related to utilitarian goods. The economising recommended by Franklin did not involve ensuring security, but rather the constant circulation of money. Mottoes of economising were not a significant component of noble morality. The manifestation of one's freedom from economic concern made this class distinct and determined the nobility's social prestige. Only to a small extent did economising evoke aversion. People who were thrifty, but not forced to be so by circumstances, risked being accused of being stingy or mean. Pettiness, in turn, was a charge risked by those preoccupied with economic matters in situations where a totally different system of values was expected of them (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 129–136).

Envy as a trait of the petite bourgeoisie

Envy was associated with Puritanism as a characteristic of moral practice. In studies regarding the bourgeoisie, envy was connected with the tendency to scrutinise others' lives maliciously. An expression of this practice was the taking of offence due to others' behaviour, regardless of whose interests were violated. The moral practices of the bourgeoisie were not without influence on directives, which were reflected in criminal law. Maria Ossowska analysed Ranulf's views of the issue of moral indignation as a disposition peculiar to the petite bourgeoisie (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 226–227, 238).

One should presume that it was Ossowska's interest in this area that triggered numerous studies on the subject of envy as a characteristic trait of bourgeois morality. Another factor was that Franklin, in Ossowska's view, was

a classic codifier of bourgeois morality. Moral indignation, as an expression of envy, is considered a phenomenon occurring within the *petit bourgeois milieu*. This is a collective that is unable to express its opinion in literature, journalism, or legislation. It therefore manifests an austerity similar to that of the Puritans. Here, Puritanism is treated as a certain kind of morality in which sadism, constituting an inherent component of bourgeois morality, is manifested (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 226–228). The empirical verification of the thesis regarding envy involved the singling out of phenomena confirming Ossowska's position (Ossowska 1985a, p. 228).

The validity of Ranulf's thesis seems to be confirmed in those examples in which the *petite bourgeoisie* and the evident tendency towards punishment play a special role. Starting with ancient Athens, where pride, blame or envy were reasons for punishment, we then see similar phenomena in seventeenth-century English Puritanism and French Jansenism. Maria Ossowska notes that, with regard to Puritanism and Jansenism, we may be dealing with a period of struggle against the privileged. "But if the interests of struggle were to be imposed on it, it would cease to be disinterested" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 230). She also notes that rigorism was only a feature of bourgeois morality until one became wealthy. Ossowska views the harshness of judgments, primarily directed at the less affluent, as a means of protecting one's own interests. The example of the United States, where strictness tends to weaken as affluence increases, testifies to this. "Respectability, which is ensured by social position based on money, takes the place of strict virtue" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 231).

A consequence of the forced discipline imposed by the moral rigorists was the resentment of the *petite bourgeoisie*. Here, Maria Ossowska indicates difficulties in defining the notion of *petite bourgeoisie*, and also has reservations concerning the concept of disinterested tendency to mete out punishment. Ranulf applied an economic criterion when distinguishing the *petite bourgeoisie*. For Ossowska, these criteria are too fluid, not always giving certainty of resolution. Ranulf saw shopkeepers and craftsmen in this class, yet one should also include Bohemia and certain intellectuals (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 234–235).

For Ossowska, the disinterestedness of the tendency towards giving punishment is an ethically neutral term. Ranulf's efforts constantly aimed to demonstrate that there were no interests behind the actions of the *petite bourgeoisie*. In Ossowska's view, it is impossible to shed doubts regarding the extent to which the severity of condemnations found in a particular group was classified as self-interested or disinterested. Her other objections concern the style of Ranulf's deliberations, as they lack analysis that considers social

stratification. The economic factor, which conditions the quality of life, is considered in complete isolation, and as such, it is not possible to ascertain any relationships at all with other variables (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 235–236).

Ranulf's central thesis proclaims that any group in which the living conditions are similar to the conditions of life among the *petite bourgeoisie* can manifest a tendency towards disinterested punishment. It is in relation to this particular phrase that Ossowska expresses her most serious objection. She words it in the form of a question: "Why do the financial restrictions of the proletariat not have the same consequences? Because I am unaware of any theorist having noted such a tendency in the proletariat" (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 236–237). Her thesis that mutual kindness is a function of the standard of living seems convincing. However, that should contribute to the dissemination of an inclination for disinterested condemnation among the proletariat, yet there is no such phenomenon. "If it is absent among the proletariat, then some hidden additional factor triggers it in the *petite bourgeoisie*" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 247). Despite numerous reservations and a lack of conviction regarding Ranulf's arguments, Ossowska sees an example of dependability in his work. She was impressed by the way Ranulf organised his research. "Although the findings of his research seemed questionable to us, the matter at hand is interesting, and the method brilliantly illustrates all the difficulties encountered by induction in the social sciences" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 382).

Reception of Franklinism

United States

Maria Ossowska analysed the impact of Franklin's views on the development of morality in the United States, using the studies of the Lynd brothers conducted between 1929 and 1935 as her basis. The object of study was a medium-sized "classic" American city located deep in the country's interior. In Ossowska's view, it was a city whose tone was set by the *petite bourgeoisie*. The study findings enabled a reconstruction of the moral stance of an average inhabitant. Their duties towards family and society included the independent pursuit of wealth. They were convinced that the way to the top was open to frugal and hardworking people, while those not aspiring to wealth, and to whom a pragmatic approach to life mattered mainly, were excoriated. Education, a pro-society approach, and otherness are met with

distrust and suspicion. Constant optimism is recommended. Kindness is mandatory in interpersonal relations (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 93–98).

The family commands exceptional prestige and constitutes an area of activity reserved above all for women. “A woman cannot be overly intelligent, too aggressive and independent, excessively critical or too distinctive” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 98). While providing support for the men, they should remain in the background, not taking part in public life. Interests related to culture, socialising and morality are admissible. The conflict between Christian attitude and ruthlessness in business has generated two distinct moral systems among these people. It turns the ruthlessness in business into helpfulness and generosity in neighbourly relations. Religiosity is reduced to elements of convenience and pleasure. Belief continues in the immortality of the soul, but the thought of damnation is fading (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 98–99).

The period of the Great Depression in the 1930s brought about changes in the system of moral beliefs for the average American. Levels of intolerance, nationalism and aversion towards strangers rose, while optimism and the sense of security declined. An upper-middle class emerged due to the expansion of large-scale industry, resulting in a split within the middle class. Small businessmen and merchants are now confronted with a group of “white collar” officials, people with fixed wages, not performing any manual labour. It is a group characterised by an absence of personal responsibility, drive and initiative. Their work is anonymous in character. In Ossowska’s opinion, this is an ideal far removed from the Franklinian self-made man (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 99–100).

Based on her analyses, Maria Ossowska concludes that the mottoes proclaimed by Franklin remain pertinent. Puritan ethics, marked by its substantial energy, contributed to the control and management of a huge land, arousing the recognition of opponents to this style of activity and the methods applied (Ossowska 1985a, p. 347). The function that moral directives had fulfilled up to then underwent visible change, losing their original avant-garde character. They serve rather as slogans supporting conservative tendencies, and do not have a dominating influence on upbringing. The role of economising was substantially reduced, linked to the development of cheap mass production and the growth of consumption. The main goal of the middle class’s aspirations has changed. The need for security and safeguards supplants the traditional aspiration for financial success (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 100–101; 1986b, pp. 358–361). There is an emerging desire to come together and work as a team. And this necessitates a reduction in the professional capacity of individuals. A new ideal of man, “without corners”, finding it easy

to make new acquaintances, appears. This is a “person with whom one works well, a person who in no way is extreme, is not excessive in anything, who is pleasantly smooth” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 354). This comes together with a new type of ethics, allowing one to easily reconcile with the unpleasant necessity by granting it moral sense. The central ethical assumption is the conviction of the superiority and importance of collective life. The interests of the individual are aligned with the interests of the group. Performing in a group enables us to create works exceeding the capabilities of the individual. “Thus the pressure that society is beginning to exert to an ever greater degree on the individual is morally justified” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 354). That requires a different catalogue of virtues than that of Puritan ethics. What is desired now is a person who knows how to deal with people, a friendly person sensitive to others’ opinions. The independence recommended by Franklin is giving way to the command to submit to somebody’s directives (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 354–355).

In her analysis of the transformations taking place in the morality of US citizens, Maria Ossowska draws on the views of David Riesman. During the period of industrialisation, which brought an end to significant population growth, the energetic type of person prevailed. “All that parents needed to do was equip their children for the unknowable plight with an inner core of diligence, perseverance, and self-discipline”. Puritan ethics fulfilled this function perfectly, equipping man with this “inner core” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 356). Changes emerged with the rise of public officials as a distinct group and the formation of an upper-middle class. The new ideal of man is geared towards an external, “radar-like” orientation. “So, for example, they cannot display a bad mood, and they must not be haughty towards others, which is beginning to be more important than honesty” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 357). The qualities of humanistic culture are increasingly being appreciated. The widespread adoption of a consumption attitude further blurs the boundaries between work and leisure. Focusing not on possessing, but on use and the quality of the experience, is becoming important.

The difference lies in the scope of this phenomenon’s influence in relation to Puritanism. The hedonistic stance has democratised and expanded to include groups of elderly people, unwilling to give anything up. The relationship between making one’s money and possessing has reversed. “A young married couple begins by using, hoping that somehow things will be all right with paying back the instalments” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 358). The “radar” orientation is contributing to a growth in tolerance for different lifestyles. Puritanism established distinct boundaries between good and evil. People with an external orientation are characterised by uncertainty,

which is conducive to the avoidance of standing out, of distinction, and results in moral indignation being out of fashion (Ossowska 1986b, p. 359). The prevalent orientation is based on others' judgments and the effects of actions taken. Uncertainty of judgments is linked to a need for a commonly recognised system of values.

Visible changes have taken place in the sphere of sex life. Puritanism, calling for restraint, treated sex as an area serving procreation. There is a discernible tendency towards the openness of erotic relations defying disapproval. In Ossowska's opinion, this testifies to the secularisation of ethical thought. The increasing number of members in religious organisations is connected, in her view, with the need for a community of values. Citing the opinion of Clyde Kluckhohn, she describes American culture as "deeply irreligious". Belief in judgment and punishment beyond the grave constitutes a motive for the conduct of a small number of people (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 361–363).

The spread of the new lifestyle in America does not mean that Puritanism is totally disappearing. Ossowska believes the new type of other-directed man was the Weberian ideal type. In reality, one encounters numerous combinations of the types distinguished by Reisman. According to Maria Ossowska, many factors contributed to the shape of the moral face of the United States at the time. Among the most important of these, she includes the reduction in the rapid population growth, the emergence of monopolies, and excessive bureaucracy. She considers the change in the profile of industrial production, now mainly consumer-oriented, to be significant. This has been favoured by activities in advertising, promoting stances of snobbism and wastefulness. Taxation policies have dampened the pursuit of wealth, and an additional factor has emerged: fatigue resulting from the stress generated by the fast pace of life.

Maria Ossowska draws attention to the role of psychoanalysis as a factor exerting significant influence on the transformation of morality in America. Puritan ethics shaped the tough, determined and rational kind of man. In psychoanalysis, however, the image of the individual in conflict with the demands of life in society is shaped. Mental health and harmony with one's surroundings become the formative goal. The main slogans are love and security. "Thus we have man growing up incapable of exertion and risk, man seeking support in some form of association, fleeing from personal responsibility" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 367).

Ossowska emphasises the heterogeneous influence of the factors conditioning the transformation of morality in the United States. Some factors had a direct impact, while others contributed to changes in attitudes,

furthering the pursuit of new goals. The role of specific factors expressed itself in the reduction of proponents of the Puritan ethos. The ideology sanctioning the changes explained the necessity of the transformations, meant to satisfy better the needs of the new “white collar” class. Concerning this observation, Ossowska notes the Puritan tendency to strive for success. “The entrepreneur not equipped with Puritan virtues did not get rich, the cantankerous bureaucrat did not get promoted” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 269). This assumption stems from the conviction that society always prepares people so that they want to do what they have to do anyway (Ossowska 1986b, p. 369). The problem of establishing a link between the transformations of morality and other processes raises numerous hypotheses, which, in Ossowska’s opinion, require in-depth reflection. She was not concerned about recreating a complete picture of man in America; instead, her fundamental goal was to record the changes that took place in the catalogue of bourgeois virtues over a specific period.

Poland

Franklin’s views also had their supporters in Poland. The first translations of his writings appeared towards the end of the eighteenth century. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Franklin’s autobiography was published together with the full collection of his instructions. Ossowska notes that Franklinism reached Poland via France. Franklin’s *Pieces of advice* were supplemented by the publication in the early twentieth century of *Gawędy Jana Oracza* and *Obrazki Jana Oracza*, collections of sermons by the English Baptist preacher Charles Spurgeon (Ossowska 1985a, p. 104). These teachings primarily addressed farmers and craftsmen to popularise a model whose imitation was intended to ensure happiness and success in life. They contain Franklin’s classic pieces of advice, recommending methodical diligence, economisation, distrust of the outside world, and love of one’s own home (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 101–106). “Both the form of these teachings, and their content, along with the good-natured and jovial mood, resemble Franklin’s guidelines” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 106). The difference lies in the emphasis on the expansion of knowledge closely related to the nature of one’s occupation. The next differentiating factor is the departure from Franklin’s advocated civil stance in favour of the selfishness promoted by Puritanism. In Ossowska’s opinion, it is an expression of social blindness, the consequence of which is recommending patience and calm to rural workers in a situation of having earnings insufficient to live on. “Such simple-minded opium for the masses would not have been found with Franklin” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 107).

Maria Ossowska also records the impact of homegrown Franklinism, since a creditworthy, hardworking and frugal role model was promoted. He is most often a craftsman with expertise who values family life. Sex life is kept behind the walls of restraint, which enables control over feelings. The woman, in keeping with her inherent nature, should fulfil the role of wife, mother and housekeeper (Ossowska 1985a, p. 110).

A separate section of Ossowska's reflections focused on the declassed nobility's reception of Franklin's views. Here she relied heavily on Jan Kott's views. When comparing the Polish intelligentsia with similar social categories in Western Europe, she drew on studies by Goblot and Chałasiński. An important element in Poland that distinguished the way Franklinism was popularised was the pathos accompanying it. Pathos was necessary; it was meant to emphasise the greatness of Franklinism, juxtaposing its models with the nobility. Thus understood, it was a militant Franklinism. The foundation of all moral actions is calculation. Economisation leading to prosperity is connected to a set of complementary virtues. We encounter a catalogue of virtues typical of Puritanism, namely order, method, simplicity, austerity of manners, and temperance. The ideology propounded had the character of a religious mission, setting itself the goal of raising the country's prosperity. This type of morality formed in parallel with the ideology of the modernist *Młoda Polska* (Young Poland) period. In Maria Ossowska's view, this testifies to a confrontation between the two tendencies in the intelligentsia. Support for Franklinism was expressed in an onslaught against the nobility, and in endeavours aimed at eliminating the taint of what was bourgeois. Opponents joined the fight against the bourgeoisie (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 111–116).

A new social group formed in Poland in the second half of the nineteenth century, referred to as the intelligentsia. Unlike in France, it comprised mainly degraded nobles. The situation of a similar group in France, *la bourgeoisie*, was comparable to that of the Polish intelligentsia. Ossowska believes that in Goblot's work on the attributes of the bourgeois elite in France, one can find the most important traits of the Polish intelligentsia distinguished by Chałasiński (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 278–280). "Besides, they can be found not only in France, but in societal groups in other countries as well" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 280). The main characteristic of this group is its fear of falling into a lower social class. Unlike the aristocracy, which constantly holds onto its position, class degradation in the urban elite entails a loss of social status. Constant attention is required to maintain one's superiority and distinctness. Intellectual, aesthetic, and moral education constitutes a barrier that serves to keep them fenced off from the bottom rungs of society. Courtesy played an

important role. Tied to morality, it was characterised by a specific set of traits described as servility, self-denial and gentleness. Maria Ossowska emphasises the distinctive aversion with which the intelligentsia regarded the popular masses. She was convinced that this phenomenon also occurred in the social groups of other European countries (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 280–283).

Another important feature of this group is the attention to reputation and social respectability. This is dictated by a sense of superiority that has no justification, which imposes the necessity of constantly updating the privilege of being respectable. The absence of grounds justifying this group's position inevitably led to its demise. Maria Ossowska shares the opinion of both writers that what proves a dependable value will undergo democratisation, while illusory values will have to be exposed (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 283–286). Another significant feature of this group was its aversion to otherness. The bourgeois social elite rejected those values that it believed held a flavour of chivalry. Bourgeois morality is characterised by mediocre virtues. There is a distinct tendency not to stand out in any way, to respect the principle of conformism and correctness (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 285–286).

The intelligentsia is also bound to its residences and is unproductive. Physical exertion was admissible only for pleasure, as something voluntary or for hygienic reasons. Economic matters remained largely unnoticed, and for example, discussing money was forbidden. The model of the well-raised man embraced – as obligatory – the possession of superfluous items. “Not only in our country, but elsewhere as well, one had to look as though one was not doing anything” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 289). Fleeing the stigma of having an occupation determined the amateur nature of intelligentsia culture. Both one's own reputation, and that of one's referrer, helped in making a career. Respect for professionalism originated in the United States and later spread to Europe (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 289–291). Education was ornamental, and was characterised by a predominance of the arts and ancient literature. The mathematical and natural sciences paved their way with great difficulty, at the expense of the study of ancient languages, which had previously given people a sense of superiority (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 291–292).

Maria Ossowska demonstrated the dominant part played by the role models of the nobility, a phenomenon present both in Poland and France. This is another analogy between the role model of a member of the Polish intelligentsia and that of the French man of society. Wherever the bourgeoisie prevailed, the attractiveness of noble models persisted. According to Ossowska, the role of the political factor is underappreciated in the picture portrayed by Chałasiński. In Poland, one must bear in mind the distinct nature of the three partitions. This fact means that one cannot generalise

in judgments regarding the Polish intelligentsia, since it is possible to distinguish within it a portion with culture-creating ambitions, and a group living according to the model of the decent and creditworthy man (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 292–297).

In the 1960s, Ossowska conducted a brief reflection on the formation of the national ethos within the changing demographic and economic reality of the Polish People's Republic, drawing attention to the transition to new models being too fast. According to Riesman, the phase of industrialisation in America coincided with the rise of Puritan ethics. Ossowska asks why there was no analogy in Poland. Was it the result of private ownership being abolished, or was it connected with the increase in bureaucracy? In her opinion, bureaucracy is making Poland similar to contemporary America, favouring the formation of an externally oriented type of man. Industrialisation is bringing us closer to the America of yesterday (Ossowska 1985a, p. 365).

Noble models and bourgeois models

Maria Ossowska undertook the job of checking the two theses regarding the relationship between aristocratic and bourgeois morality. The former held that the victorious class imposes its models on the conquered classes. In the second thesis, the distinctness of the antagonistic classes' models is asserted, and is most evident in the phase preceding the ultimate settling of the dispute as well as during it. At the moment of achieving supremacy, the winning class abandons its models and adopts new ones, which were hitherto the models of the privileged class. Ossowska set herself the task of verifying these theses, and she also analysed the history of the role models of the bourgeoisie. She considered the issue of the mutual relations between the bourgeois and noble models equally interesting. The scope of her analysis concerning the interference of role models embraced France, England and Germany. Regarding ancient times, Ossowska believes Aristotle's praise of the middle class was misplaced. When talking of the aristocratic model of the "justly proud", she sees in Aristotle's position the effect of the doctrine of the golden mean. In her opinion, this has nothing in common with the social and political views of Stagyrte (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 312–315).

In seventeenth-century France, the noble model of the refined man prevailed. There was a considerable distance between the royal court and the bourgeoisie. "The greater exclusivity of the nobility in France did not lessen the appeal of its models, and perhaps even contributed to their

greater charm" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 322). The eighteenth century witnessed the growing criticism of the noble models. The role of trade and its peaceful mission on an international scale is stressed. The merchant's role model is highly valued. Thanks to the encyclopaedists, the role of the craftsman became appreciated. The charm of the nobility, however, does not disappear. Bourgeois writers, valuing the noble models, propose combining the qualities of the knight and the dependable merchant.

Nineteenth-century literature was dominated by the motif of the bourgeoisie adopting the models of the nobility. Romanticism, recognised as a bourgeois movement, flourished under the banner of the cult of chivalric models and traditions (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 320–332). In Maria Ossowska's view, the nobility in France had models that proved very enduring. "Anyone who knows France a little knows that the appeal of the nobility even endured there in the years between the wars" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 334).

The late seventeenth century in England was characterised by the dominance of the role models of the nobles. Ossowska, analysing Locke's views, notes new features in the image of man that he promotes. The subservience towards models of the nobility is combined with an appreciation for the "bourgeois atmosphere of Aesop's fables" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 335). Craftsmanship and the study of accounting were recommended.

In the following century, a visible attack on the barriers to the advancement of the enriched bourgeoisie is evident. Typical vices of the nobility are stigmatised, the most common of them being ignorance, arrogance, wilfulness and financial unreliability. In this respect, the bourgeoisie has a clear sense of superiority. At the same time, there is noticeable appeal in the nobility's models. The demands that personal qualifications gain the advantage in the model of the gentleman marking class position testify to this. "Propriety, which henceforward is to determine whether one is a gentleman, remains under the spell of the nobility's models" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 337).

These models retained their appeal throughout the nineteenth century. Among other things, the royal court contributed to this through its advocacy of models keenly imitated by the middle class. The Victorian era saw the consolidation of the upper middle class. In Ossowska's opinion, the bourgeoisie "became deceptively similar to the nobility in their manners, morals, speech, appearance and their customs" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 341). The bourgeoisie still held onto their morality, and the inclination to take risks or perform selfless deeds was avoided. Scrupulousness was expected in the management of money. An impeccable wardrobe furthered both

respectability and one's sense of security, which was threatened by eroticism and aesthetic interests. The aristocracy adopted certain features of the bourgeoisie. In Maria Ossowska's opinion, this was expressed in the keeping of commitments, in treating time seriously, and in the precision of forms of socialising, resembling commercial contracts (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 341–343).

In Maria Ossowska's view, one could make an overall characterisation of the phenomenon of the intermingling of role models in regard to France and England. However, it would be difficult to relate this to Germany, the fundamental difficulty here being that different regions of Germany have separate histories. Ossowska narrows down her analysis to the cities of the Hanseatic League. The exclusivity of the nobility was one of the factors contributing to the formation of bourgeois morality, which is why the German bourgeoisie did not imitate the nobility but opposed it. The inaccessibility of the nobility led to a tendency in the German bourgeoisie to compensate in the form of a cult of personality. The nineteenth century was a period of gradual amalgamation of noble and bourgeois elements. Chivalric traditions became widespread in the wealthy bourgeois families. There was a distinct tendency towards personal prominence. The aversion towards the nobility is also associated with the *nouveau riche* bourgeoisie. Germany's imperialistic era led to the breakdown of the barriers separating the nobility and the bourgeoisie. The wealthy bourgeoisie then adopted the lifestyle of the nobility, for example by buying noble titles, or building – and maintaining – castles in their country estates (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 343–348).

In her conclusions, Maria Ossowska referred to the theses posited at the beginning of the deliberations concerning the attitude of the victorious classes to the conquered classes. Analysis of the interference of role models enabled their verification. In the relations between the classes, the victorious class adopted the role models of the defeated class or imposed their own models on them. Maria Ossowska also notes a third possibility, that of the "gradual fusion of the models of the winning class, with the persistent appeal of the defeated class's models in this case" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 349). Such an eventuality is even noticeable in France, where the defeated class lost all political significance. Ossowska believes that "the morality of the *haute bourgeoisie*, whose state of possession had been reinforced, constituting a fusion of the two preceding moralities, was created there (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 72, 195–196). In her opinion, the thesis attributing rigorous morality to the class aspiring for power, as opposed to the morality of the class already holding power, proved unjustified. The moral style of the classes reaching for power had become diversified (Ossowska 1986b, p. 196).

The peasant ethos

Maria Ossowska's characterisation of the types of morality is complemented by her reflections on the peasant ethos and the worker ethos. The latter contains a characterisation of the role model of the proletarian, based on an analysis of Marx's views. In her deliberations concerning the peasant ethos, she referred to the concept of class understood in the Marxian sense, in which the peasantry does not constitute a homogeneous whole. One can distinguish a group of people who own land and employ labour. There are also farm workers who do not own their own land. After Robert Redfield, Ossowska accepts that what really distinguishes the peasantry is the reference to the city: "so you cannot speak of peasants when there is no urbanisation" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 76).

The period covered by these deliberations is that of pre-industrial times, when the family structure was patriarchal. The division of labour into male and female work was a characteristic feature. Children's total dependence on their parents contributed to the infantilisation of the young generation. Working on the farm strengthened family bonds, which in turn favoured the development of inner discipline (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 49–51). An ethos rooted in "old traditions barely subject to change" was common among the entire class. Land, and the respect felt for it, was a common value (Ossowska 1986b, p. 75). Everybody was connected by the firm belief that working on the land was something better than trade. Exertion and its related values were appreciated. Moderation and sobriety were preferred, while the role of sexual experiences was ignored. Violence and aggression were frowned upon (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 75–76).

The process of industrialisation made it necessary to shift to a different kind of discipline, this time imposed from outside. The type of bond connecting the family also changed. Relations between parents and children became emotional (Ossowska 1986b, p. 51). Ossowska realises that this description is anachronistic in regard to many societies undergoing industrialisation (Ossowska 1986b, p. 76). Her reflections on the peasant ethos are marginal, put together while analysing the factors conditioning the phenomenon of morality. The modest amount of research material, specifically academic studies on the subject, testifies to Ossowska's limited interest in the peasantry.

The worker ethos

According to Ossowska, a characterisation of the worker ethos is hindered by the scarcity of material on the subject. "When a labourer took up the pen, he was usually no longer a labourer" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 72). The description of the proletariat that one encounters among nineteenth-century social reformers is, to a greater degree, a product of the imagination than a description based on empirical study. "In those descriptions, the proletariat constituted something uniform in terms of their system of values" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 73, 378). Maria Ossowska carried out a reconstruction of the role model drawn from Marx's writings. "Man and the realisation of his model constitute the central issue for Marx, while his ethics displays striking anthropocentrism" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 376). An integral part of this model is the description of the proletariat. "Proletarians [...] are united, supra-national, fraternal, self-sacrificing" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 378). The role model that Marx postulates resembles, in certain respects, Ossowska's renaissance model, personified by Leonardo da Vinci: "today a man will do this, tomorrow that, he'll be able to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, and critique after dinner, yet in doing so not becoming either a hunter, an angler, or a critic" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 378). In this model, an important role is played by work, through which man is supposed to achieve his complete self-fulfilment. This is only possible through participation in the life of society. "Our renaissance model is enriched with the cult of labour and interpersonal solidarity" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 379).

Confronting this model with reality, Ossowska discerns variation within the worker ethos. This is demonstrated by studies conducted among the American proletariat, in which – based on their different lifestyles – three social classes were identified. At the forefront are the qualified labourers, who position themselves in the lower middle class. The supreme value here is respectability, for which belonging to some kind of religious organisation is a prerequisite. Emphasising the importance of one's own role for society is an equally important attribute (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 73–74). The next class down among the workers comprises the semi-skilled. They are devoid of hope for promotion, and as such, their concerns in life do not reach beyond the present, beyond getting by. As for the lowest group, it comprises those with no qualifications and lacking steady employment. "Apathy and a lack of interest in education are what they have in common. The families they form are precarious, and they have a large percentage of children out of wedlock. There is a high percentage of criminality among them" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 74).

The transformations that have taken place in the morality of the proletariat bring to light the steadily increasing influence of the petit-bourgeois lifestyle. In their behaviour, the labourers are becoming more like low-level officials, which is seen in the increase in their sense of security and the strengthening of family bonds. "The home draws him away from his workmates, and in his opinion [the labourer's – W.M.] the trade unions do their own thing also without his involvement" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 75). The ever-increasing influence of mass culture is evident, while interest in general matters is in decline. The notions of class struggle or solidarity in fighting for social justice have no appeal for workers, as they are satisfied with their lot. Social barriers are becoming increasingly blurred, and education and cultural horizons are the most significant factors in stratification (Ossowska 1986b, p. 75).

When writing about the transformations in the worker ethos, Maria Ossowska refers to the studies by Ferdynand Zweig. They covered the transformations of the ethos among English workers. Quite how this characterisation applies to the situation of the proletariat in socialist countries, therefore, remains in the realm of conjecture. Ossowska, in assessing the situation of the working class, refers to Veblen's hypothesis, assuming that the lower classes imitate the models of the class directly above. The proletariat was "infected by the petite-bourgeois spirit", while this class's models constitute the main object of the proletariat's aspirations (Ossowska 1986b, p. 82).

Chapter 4

Ways of Representing Moral Phenomena

Maria Ossowska, in demonstrating the multi-thematic nature and incoherence of morality as a social phenomenon, established the foundations of sociological research into the matter. The distinctness of moral phenomena, to the extent within which attitudes and behaviours qualified as moral are varied, gave rise to the sociology of morality. The discrepancy in moral phenomena does not constitute sufficient justification for them to be tackled by sociology; it has to be shown that the diversity of moral norms and behaviours has social correlates, causes, and consequences (Karpiński 1989, pp. 60–61). Therefore, demonstrating the impossibility of constructing a reportable definition of morality in a manner allowing for its unqualified acceptance paradoxically contributed to research focusing on the social aspects of moral phenomena.

A central issue in the sociology of morality is the influence of non-moral phenomena on the morality of social groups. No less significant are deliberations concerning areas of societal life conditioned by morality. Ossowska had already analysed Durkheim's way of understanding morality as a social fact before the war. The main problem boiled down to the question about whether morality was a social fact (Ossowska 1986b, p. 259). Her deliberations addressed moral judgments and norms on the assumption of knowing what they are.

In Ossowska's opinion, there are at least four interpretations of the claim asserting that morality is a social fact. In the first, the judgments and orders that we are governed by in our behaviour are the product of the group. Society grants the judgments it formulates a certain worth, frequently independently of their properties. Durkheim's position is referred to as conventionalism or social decretalism. Norms that impose themselves on the individual as imperatives are the product of society. A criminal deed is condemned because it offends the social consciousness, and not because

it is criminal. Here, morality depends on social recognition. Ossowska joins those attributing to Durkheim the hypostasising of society. In her opinion, Durkheim's views exhibit inconsistency. This applies to his remarks on the matter of the social genesis of judgments. The final instance for the acknowledgement of a judgment as moral is society, or – in certain situations – the individual. This nonuniformity also becomes apparent in his remarks on the attainment of moral ideals during moments of particular tension in society's life. They can therefore be interpreted in two ways: either by applying the concept of the hypostasized society, or by managing without it (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 260–263). In her criticism of Durkheim's views, Maria Ossowska cites the opinions of those who defended individuals' initiatives in shaping morality. Pointing to the relativism of this conventionalism, they "defended the universal and immutable hierarchy of values" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 262).

In the second interpretation, judgments and norms are moral in character because of the subject matter they concern. Referring directly to the principles of coexistence, they are deeply intertwined with societal life. Their social character is secondary, since "that which they concern would not exist if it were not for coexistence" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 264). A person can only be a moral being because they live in society. Therefore, morality depends on solidarity. The assumption here is that any deed subject to moral judgment must be directed towards an individual "other than its doer". The condition for the moral qualification of a deed is that it constitutes an action directed at a member of society, which means reckoning with the interests of the individual or the group (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 264–265). Deeds towards oneself also constitute action in relation to society. Ossowska observes a misunderstanding here: "a deed towards somebody is mixed up here with a deed judged on account of somebody" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 266). Every moral or immoral deed, constituting a deed towards others as members of the group, is judged on account of its resonance in coexistence. It is Ossowska's conviction that the interpretation of the phrase "towards somebody" as meaning "on account of somebody" is a new assertion that requires separate analysis.

Morality in the third interpretation is a social fact because the norms governing our conduct are a function of social conditions. The content of moral judgments depends on how a given collective is formed, as morality is a product of specific social conditions, and that leads to relativism. Critics suggested that unchanging and independent judgments were hiding beneath varying rules, as seen in the example of punishment for the defiling of an object of worship. Only the objects of worship are changing, while the

rule remains the same (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 267–268). Ossowska appears to share the position of proponents of this interpretation of morality as a social fact, since she cites examples of positions from the history of ethics in which morality was thus understood.

In the fourth and final interpretation, morality is a social fact because every moral judgment contains a social justification. Therefore, that which complies with the interests of society is moral. “Morality constituting the hygiene of coexistence only against the background of coexistence gives food for thought” (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 268–269). A classic example of a moralist conceiving morality, thus, is Thomas Hobbes. Ossowska describes his position as social utilitarianism, different to that presented by John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. In her criticism, she cites remarks by Hobbes’s antagonists, who presumed that to know what is good for society, one would have to know “what society itself serves,” as Alfred Fouillée said (1905, quoted in Ossowska 1986b, p. 269). Frédéric Rauh claimed that the possibility of a sociological explanation of moral norms should be treated as a hypothesis. In his opinion, moral judgments might have taken into account some purely human element, independent of the social reality (Ossowska 1986b, p. 270).

The previous interpretations can be clearly found in Durkheim’s work; however, his stance regarding social utilitarianism is unclear. One can notice comments confirming and others inconsistent with utilitarianism in his views. He discerned numerous irrational elements in moral rules, which stand in contradiction to the conviction that links the rules of hygiene in coexistence with the rationality of moral judgments. In his comments on social interest, it is not always clear whether he means the benefit of society as a whole, or the interests of individuals regardless of their group affiliation (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 271–272).

In regard to the fourth interpretation, Ossowska notes that every position depends on how one understands the words “morality” and “moral”. Acknowledging that moral norms always concern interpersonal relations necessitates distinguishing between moral norms and legal norms. The interpretations of morality as a social fact singled out by Ossowska are varied and independent of one another. In her opinion, this is a list of the most important interpretational possibilities intervening in disputes concerning the social character of morality. In practice, they interweave, and any attempt to establish dependencies is doomed to failure (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 273–276).

In Ossowska’s view, the social origin of a particular phenomenon is not a sufficient criterion for it to qualify for sociological research. Accepting such a view would entail the necessity of including the entire science of

language in sociology. Practising the sociology of morality as one of the sections of the theoretical sciences of morality entails the assumption that moral phenomena are socially conditioned. This, in turn, means that they are phenomena that vary in changing conditions. "If that were not the case, the sociology of morality would have nothing to study" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 13). The sociology of morality, as a branch of the science of customs, was designed in Durkheim's school, and its ontic status was established. In Ossowska's view, the vaguely stated methods of research reveal that Durkheim and his students had not realised what issues might come into play here (Ossowska 1986b, p. 12).

The main task that Ossowska set herself regarding the sociology of morality was to gather, organise, and compile observations from the sociology of morality. These were "scattered among various authors". The number of hypotheses posited by writers not aware of the range of issues at hand is also astonishing. And this is why those hypotheses should be checked, to realise in which direction one should conduct research (Ossowska 1986b, p. 17). One of the main branches of the sociology of morality is the analysis of factors shaping the morality of social groups. Morality is treated here as a phenomenon conditioned by the social phenomena preceding it. What we are dealing with is the influence of "human behaviours and attitudes on account of certain norms, without violation of the norms themselves, or [...] themselves modifying these norms" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 19). One should consider both the object and how factors affecting morality have an impact.

Her reflections begin with an analysis of the impact that the physical environment exerts on morality. This matter is discussed in light of the concepts referred to. Ossowska presented theories known in the history of social thought, restricting herself to a critical commentary. The factors that make up the physical environment are climate and soil. Ossowska cites, in turn, Aristotle, Ibn Khaldun, Montesquieu, Hippolyte Taine, Ellsworth Huntington, Gaston Bouthoul, Karl Marx, Melville Herskovits and Marcel Mauss. She admits that the factors influencing the morality of social groups occur in numerous causal relationships and are often intertwined. This is a contributing factor to the difficulties involved in isolating and classifying them. The fundamental criterion that she strived to be guided by was the consideration of the clarity of the issues presented. "We also took into account how the referred authors themselves saw the dependencies they were observing, and in what language they formulated them" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 28). The type of soil conditioning the type of economy could be classified as an economic factor, and for this reason she gave little attention to this matter. Referring to Herskovits's empirical arguments, Ossowska

challenges the version of the assertion acknowledging the climate as the most important determinant of morality. It is a factor equally as important as others jointly determining the ethos in question (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 20–29). The way in which the issues discussed are presented suggests that Ossowska does not have her own theory on how morality is determined by the physical environment. Admitting the eventuality of creating such theories, she emphasises that these factors should be treated as components of complex causal chains (Kiciński 1984, p. 50).

Morality as a dependent variable

Maria Ossowska takes a clear stance on the idea of morality being conditioned by race and gender. The classic distinction between white, black, red, and yellow races is useless; races thus distinguished do not manifest attributes that allow one to put together adequate theories. “I am unable to cite any contemporary theories that would responsibly link the morality of some group to race” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 29). In her earlier works, she dealt with the conditioning of morality by gender, when the issue of women particularly interested her. Here, she already had clearly formed views. She distinguished four interpretations of the relationship between gender and morality. In the first case, it is about the influence of the different biological structures of men and women. Men are attributed with a greater tendency to fight, which explains their frequent participation in spectacles featuring a significant dose of brutality. Women show less of a tendency to commit criminal deeds “at least when it comes to what’s known as wet work” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 29). Such opinions include the statement that women are simultaneously more merciful and more cruel than men. According to Maria Ossowska, we are unable to provide an answer about when we are dealing with the influence of a biological or a cultural factor, for example, the influence of role models prevalent within a given social environment (Ossowska 1986b, p. 29).

In the second interpretation, the emphasis is on who the author is of the moral directives. In Ossowska’s opinion, female role models “correspond too clearly to the interests of men for there to be any doubt of their authorship”. They resemble the “living ideal of the good and faithful servant”. Both the Ten Commandments and the Declaration of Rights of 1789 are the work of men, written with men in mind (Ossowska 1986b, p. 30). Ossowska believes that pederasty and lesbian love were treated differently in the penal codes. The rigour towards homosexuality was driven by the repulsion that men felt

towards their own sex. They did not feel it in relation to female homosexuality (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 29–30).

In the third, gender and its impact on morality are expressed in the statement that the same deeds are judged depending on who performed them: a woman or a man. The demands of gender morality were placed mainly on women. The chastity prescribed before marriage and fidelity after marriage testify to the harsher judging of women in regard to sexual morality. Ossowska draws attention to the fact that women are stricter judges for their own sex than for men. In her opinion, such judgments are doubly dependent: on the gender of the one who judges, and of who is being judged (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 30–31).

Attention turns in the fourth interpretation to a particular deed being judged on account of whom it was performed in regard to: against a woman or a man. Ossowska mentions that during the war, the Germans preferred not to execute women in public (Ossowska 1986b, p. 31). The interpretations singled out fit within the pattern of deliberations in which Ossowska sought specific attributes of morality. There is a noticeable effect here of her earlier findings, constituting their own, independent research. This causes Ossowska not to distance herself from the views referred to, and to adopt her own position in keeping with the opinions of other writers.

Maria Ossowska regarded demographic factors as significantly shaping a group's morality. Citing Montesquieu, she indicates the necessity to differentiate norms depending on how often interpersonal interaction occurs. Where there is a great deal of interplay, norms that defuse conflict and serve to satisfy the need for privacy are essential. No less important a factor is group size. Ossowska quotes the opinions of Bronisław Malinowski and Claude Lévi-Strauss, recognising reciprocity as the fundamental principle of coexistence in small groups. In the European tradition, Hesiod highlighted this directive, prescribing that one care for one's neighbour. The size of a social group is directly linked to the sanction of condemnation by public opinion, which can have an effect. This dependence, formulated by Ralph Linton, seems convincing to Ossowska, "as long as one does not include the family in these small groups" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 33).

Generally, rapid population growth coexists with poverty. It is therefore difficult to determine which of these factors has a greater influence on the formation of moral attitudes. This phenomenon is most often accompanied by disregard for human life (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 33–34). Ossowska considers population growth a factor explaining the "fact of the full entitlement to abortion or the fact of homosexuality not being condemned" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 34). Referring to the views of Riesman, she stresses that he

recognised the rate of population growth as the main variable influencing the shaping of role models with a specific cultural orientation. "Societies with a very large surplus of births and significant economic expansion prefer people with a certain inner core" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 35). A high natural rate of population growth and a high mortality rate favour the retention and imitation of traditional models of behaviour. And where the birth rate is falling, while production remains at an unchanged level, "man orienting his behaviour according to others' judgments thrives" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 35).

Maria Ossowska writes that, regarding the age-dependent determinants of morality, one can reiterate the same distinctions that were made in relation to gender. She cites the views of Aristotle, who considered the age-dependence of character. A different set of traits occurs in each phase of life. Youth is characterised by intense passions and the drive to satisfy them. The variability of desires is accompanied by a definite sense of honour and aspiration to be victorious and supreme over others. "They believe they know everything, and they are self-assured. They like fun" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 36). The prime of life is marked by insecurity, suspicion and modest demands. The older people get, the more they love life. "They are guided rather by what is useful, and not what is noble. Their passions are weak, but they like profit, and are slaves to this love" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 6). In old age, moral rules are often broken, as people succumb "to the voice of Eros" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 36). Ossowska stipulates that more than one biological determinant had a cultural genesis. However, she believes that "some kind of dependence [...] of moral attitudes on age seems to be undeniable" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 37).

The views of Jean Piaget and Sigmund Freud, among others, make up the content of the second interpretation. Children who themselves draw up the rules to be followed in their group tend to create a morality of mutual respect and working together; this could be called a morality of good. Morality created under the pressure of one's elders is a morality of one-sided respect and duty, of discipline and obedience. The demand for obedience from a child is not always desirable in adults. The same deeds are judged differently, depending on whether the doer is an adult or a juvenile. The lengthening of the average human lifespan and the increasing number of people of advanced age entail certain cultural transformations. Maria Ossowska admits that at the current stage of research, she is unable to ascertain their nature. She is concerned with the newly emerging phenomenon of the increasing duration of marriages, a change that renders the expectation of fidelity significantly more demanding (Ossowska 1986b, p. 39).

An important factor for the development of morality is that of the ongoing intergenerational relationships. The asymmetry in the relationships between

parents and children is a significant co-determinant of children's moral development. A so-called superego is formed in children under the influence of their parents. The concept of expiatory punishment could only emerge within the framework of the kind of relationship that binds parents and children, assuming the child loves their parents. Here, Ossowska seems to share Piaget's position. The morality of discipline and obedience, described as a morality of duty, characterised the view of thinkers such as Kant and Durkheim. The generational difference that went unnoticed by Durkheim was linked to his vision of the homogeneous society. In keeping with Piaget's views, Maria Ossowska believes that if not for the difference in generations, "there would not be certain forms of morality or certain forms of religion" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 39). Ossowska's criticism of Piaget's views boils down to recognition of the validity of Denys Harding's question. About the type of morality of working together in a group distinguished by Piaget, Harding asks why the desire to interact with a bunch of peers should not lead to individual subordination to the same degree as does the desire to obey one's elders (Harding 1966, quoted in Ossowska 1986b, p. 39).

Spatial mobility is also a demographic factor. Here, Ossowska draws on the views of Talcott Parsons. Taking American society as his example, he shows that increased migration contributes to a decrease in family size. It favours the persistence of the two-generational family. In the area of morality, only the parents' duties towards their children are accentuated, leaving the care of frail parents to institutions. The opinion that a decrease in family size causes an increase in criminality among juveniles seems plausible to Maria Ossowska (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 41–42).

How people are judged is affected by social mobility. Where there is migration and emigration, people are judged based on who they are now, rather than who they were in the past. This thesis is supported by Ossowska's own observations and the studies of other writers. For example, Alexander Gerschenkron links social mobility to the processes of industrialisation. This tendency is countered by the policing of the system; the police are interested in an individual's entire life to date. In a police state, both the police and citizens use the knowledge of others to their own benefit (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 42–43).

The persistence of the "nomadic lifestyle" is favoured by social mobility. Ossowska used Huntington's views to characterise this group. Nomads in the strict sense are characterised by fast orientation, endurance and courage; they rely on themselves alone, and they know how to work together when in danger. They are capable of leading people and obeying orders, and at all times, they are ready to fight. One of the components of their code of honour

is hospitality as a trait conducive to survival, since their own existence at times depends on the hospitality of others (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 44–45).

Dynamism of this kind has never been something feared by, for example, the Gypsies. Their aversion to manual labour is well known. "The moral code of the Gypsies is rife with magic, with defilements and purifications" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 46). In diverse climate conditions, they have maintained their original hierarchy of values. Ossowska believes that the endurance of these cultural models constitutes an interesting and uninvestigated theoretical issue. She treats the lifestyle of nomads, and the tendency to kill off the elderly and cripples that this lifestyle is attributed with, along with the admissibility of abortion, as one of the possible causes. After all, it is not certain whether such an attitude towards the elderly can be observed in all groups of this kind. For example, during periods of drought, a mother in the Nambikwara tribe cannot carry more than one child (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 46–48).

Another factor shaping the morality of social groups is urbanisation. The conviction that the city is a source of corruption has long been known and has long held strong in numerous social communities. One proponent of such an opinion was Redfield, whose views are cited by Ossowska. He considered societies existing outside the processes of urbanisation, or isolated from them, to be more closely knit. In his opinion, it is the conviction of one's own lifestyle being the right one that is decisive. He regarded life in the city as a factor both destructive and creative for the development of morality, since the diversity of lifestyles in the city requires the protection of one's own moral system. The city favours the inclination to "convert" others to one's own lifestyle. One can observe processes of individualisation in attitudes and a fading away of the collective family responsibility. The city's role in moulding egalitarian and democratic tendencies is gaining importance, while the significance of public opinion is declining (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 48–49).

Urbanisation is most often linked to the phenomenon of industrialisation. Maria Ossowska bases her comments on the mutual relations between these phenomena on the views of Janusz Ziółkowski. The employment of rural folk in industry brought about a change in the city lifestyle. "The countryside ceased to be the provider of cheap domestic servants. [...] The demise of domestic servants in industrialised countries entailed the disappearance of the culture of revelry" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 51). Where urbanisation proceeded without industrialisation, the class of the lumpenproletariat formed – a phenomenon observed in post-colonial countries. The disappearance of personal social relations in the city led to changes in the

development of built-up areas. New housing estates were expected to “restore the rural neighbourly bond [...] and the directness of interpersonal interaction” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 52). This would satisfy the nostalgia for one’s lost rural life. The bucolic ideal, already known in antiquity, has its roots in the psyche: for example, the practice of declaring work in the garden as one’s hobby is characteristic of the English and the Australians (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 51–53).

One of the factors modifying morality is human husbandry. In her introduction, Ossowska makes the caveat that the reflections concerning this issue have the nature of a “cursory review of various economic factors” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 53). Her deliberations begin with an analysis of the ways of obtaining a livelihood. Here she draws on, among others, the studies of Kluckhohn and Montesquieu (although I have doubts whether one could cite Montesquieu as an author of a “study”), according to which the rights of a given social group depend on how livelihood needs are satisfied. Agriculture and breeding, on the one hand, and hunting and gathering, on the other, favour a dualistic grasp of the world. In Eastern cultures, this concept has a moral aspect, reflecting the struggle between Good and Evil. The type of economy has, on more than one occasion, been a determining factor in the social status of women and the structure of the family. Polygyny characterised pastoral societies, whereas in hunting communities, a large number of women and children in the family constituted unwanted ballast (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 53–54).

Technological progress contributed to a change in how slavery, which had become unprofitable, was viewed. Marx emphasised the connection between productive forces and social relations. The manner of production is the basis of the class division of society. Maria Ossowska analyses the formation of character types found in capitalism. Referring to the views of William Lecky, she distinguishes between the types of speculator and the working man, both of whom pursue financial well-being. The former is marked by prodigality, the latter – by caution. Industriousness is linked to moderation, order, composure and patience – a catalogue of bourgeois virtues that determine respectability. Forethought and foresight are both a duty and the guiding principle of one’s whole life. The speculator is restless, acquisitive, prone to breaking the law, but also capable of generous gestures. According to Lecky, virtues are shaped mainly by circumstances. The next stage is the construction of a model and building theories upon it. In industrialised societies, responsibility for one’s word was valued the most highly, due to there being numerous occasions for breaking commitments. Industrialisation is not conducive to ornamental virtues, but does favour the

development of principles of social coexistence. Maria Ossowska believes that “the sociological approach to moral matters shown by this author deserves emphasis and recognition” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 56).

Her observation and analysis of the transformations in customs related to the processes of industrialisation seem interesting, and made it possible to determine which of these changes were connected to industrialisation, and which to the fact that the industrialisation occurred under a particular political system. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the prevailing belief was that morality – like other aspects of societal life – was subject to development. The twentieth century refuted this view. Examining whether belief in general progress has become a part of the worldview of contemporary Chinese, who did not think in such categories before the revolution, would be an interesting research task. Processes of industrialisation taking place under varied conditions may constitute enormous research territory for the research of moral transformations. According to Ossowska, one could investigate the moral effects resulting from the industrialisation of countries adopting European and American technological achievements. She distinguished between countries adopting foreign moral patterns together with the technological advancements, countries opposing both the models of Euro-Atlantic culture and their own tradition, such as China, and finally those countries “that are industrialising but sticking to their own traditions at the same time” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 57).

Maria Ossowska also distinguished other manifestations of technological progress influencing morality. One of these was the invention of gunpowder – the leading cause behind the “twilight of knighthood” and the rules of combat peculiar to that state. The rules of fair play changed. The technological progress of today has brought about changes in how war is waged. Warfare no longer solely involved clashes between soldiers of hostile sides, as it also increasingly involved the civilian population. The new means of communication led to an increase in tolerance and criticism of local moral codes. Parental authority declined. Being able to take measures to prevent pregnancy triggered transformations in sexual morality (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 57–58).

One of the factors affecting morality is wealth. Ossowska stresses that Hesiod and Franklin – writers from different eras – concurred in their recognition of wealth as a factor conducive to the persistence of moral convictions. Poverty affects morality just as importantly. To analyse such determinants, Maria Ossowska drew on the views of Oscar Lewis, who argued that it favours the creation of a specific subculture. The culture of the poor has its own varieties, its own rational elements and specific defence mechanisms.

Their lifestyle is an astonishingly enduring phenomenon, passed down from one generation to the next. It is a supra-regional and supra-national culture, and its main features include a lack of privacy, herd mentality, alcoholism, the usage of physical violence against women and children, sexual freedom, familial solidarity, and matrilocalism combined with the cult of masculinity. Social attitudes feature resignation and fatalism, manifested among other things in the lack of aspirations for advancement. Unemployment, whether total or partial, is a persistent phenomenon. The predominant feeling is that of distrust towards the authorities, accompanied by a hatred for their representatives, the trade unions, and healthcare institutions. Religiosity is superficial (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 59–60). Maria Ossowska argues that this is not a culture of poverty at all, since the lifestyle of the poor peasant and many primitive peoples is different. The culture of poverty, therefore, requires social stratification. This characterisation of the lumpenproletariat exceeds spatial and national boundaries. Ossowska considers this a valuable “ideal type” in the Weberian sense, giving a better orientation in the moral life of the society under study (Ossowska 1986b, p. 61).

Maria Ossowska attributes great importance to how property rights are regulated in the shaping of moral attitudes. The type of ownership (state, social, and particularly private) affects family structure and how inheritance works. It is the basis of class economic interests as a factor determining moral opinions. Ossowska relates this to her own thoughts on the chivalric and bourgeois types of morality that she distinguished. As a Weberian ideal type, bourgeois morality was reconstructed based on works by authors considered to belong to the middle class. She reconstructed chivalry morality based on literature written by or dedicated to the aristocracy. This does not mean that the nobility or bourgeoisie assimilated an ethos appropriate to their class. A chivalric type of code can be found among the highlanders of the Tatra Mountains and in the Mediterranean Basin. Representatives of various social classes were proponents of utilitarianism, a movement in ethics aiming to eliminate suffering and multiply good. Bourgeois writers were frequently under the spell of the role models of the nobility (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 63–64). “Hence the general conclusion that class-based economic determinants can constitute an important but by no means the only factor shaping moral attitude” (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 64–65). The various systems behind the organisation of societal life are an additional hindrance to classification.

The division of labour and its role in shaping social relations is the last of the economic factors analysed. Maria Ossowska recognises Mandeville as the precursor of this direction. His thought was later developed by Adam Smith,

elaborated upon by Marx, and further explored by Durkheim. The mechanical type of solidarity is dominated by law-based repressive sanctions, whereas organic solidarity – by contracts and the demand for compensation for breach of contract. This led to the equalisation of partners and contributed to personal autonomy and individualisation. “In societies bound by organic solidarity, a group is cohesive precisely because the people are different” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 67). Criticising Durkheim’s position, Ossowska cites Malinowski, who “persuasively questioned Durkheim’s view of the repressive nature of law in primitive societies” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 67). Her doubts are raised by Durkheim’s belief in progressive equality in society. “The principles governing the exchange of benefits [...] between the members of a group and its leader [...] entail equality between partners only in the sense that they are bound in the same way by observance of the contract” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 67). In her opinion, Durkheim failed to notice that the differentiation of occupations is followed by their hierarchisation, and as a result, diverse ethical codes may emerge, frequently contradicting one another. “Besides, he himself stressed that there exist as many moralities as occupations, and that some of these moralities proclaim contradictory directives” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 68). Marx believed that the division of labour furthered the depersonalisation of interpersonal relations. Drawing on research into the psychology of morality, Ossowska highlights the disparity in moral rules governing interpersonal relations. Of personal and impersonal relations, the latter are less demanding. This is an unpleasant consequence of the division of labour for those who see interactions between people as being unique (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 69–71).

Ossowska posed a question regarding the influence of social groups on the formation of individual morality: “To what extent does the heterogeneity of contemporary societies, the existence of a plurality of various social groups, violate the uniformity of morality?” (Ossowska 1957b, p. 368). Occupational morality is an example. The main axis in Ossowska’s deliberations focuses on the issue of whether it is an expression of colloquial morality developed for specific situations in life, or whether we are dealing with something that constitutes a separate morality. She classified certain types of occupational ethics (e.g. medical or legal) unreservedly as the adaptation of colloquial morality to situations specific to particular social roles. She does have some reservations regarding merchant ethics, as it contains elements that are unacceptable in colloquial morality (dishonesty in praising one’s wares) (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 347–352).

In Ossowska’s opinion, another example is class morality, which has a threefold meaning. In the first, the rules and manners of behaviour

change depending on the social class to which the recipient belongs. Class distinctions are manifested in the morality of the individual, subscribing to different rules of conduct towards members of their own class or other social classes.

The second meaning is expressed in the individual's conviction that the different social classes should correspond to their respective systems of moral norms and values. The principles subscribed to may therefore apply equally to all social classes. A distinguishing feature of this type of class morality is the conviction that each social class should have its own set of rules governing its actions. Where there exists a society differentiated in terms of class, then when it comes to judging, the affiliation of both the one performing an action and the one upon whom the action is performed is taken into account.

The third sense of class morality is expressed in the conviction that specific moral views bear the stamp of the class that created them. Therefore, there are as many moralities in society as there are social classes in it. Class stigma may manifest itself in different behaviour towards members of other classes, or in the construction of differentiated role models. This does not have to be an essential manifestation of the class character of morality (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 354–356), since characterisations of class morality are not entirely precise due to the fluidity of the notion of class. Here, it is the distinctness of the criteria adopted for the distinguishing of a social class that constitutes the basis of the differentiation. Some cite economic factors, while others, in turn, distinguish social class based on an ideology characteristic of a given collective (Ossowska 1957b, p. 357).

Discussing the role of functional factors in the formation of morality, Ossowska draws attention to the possibility of defining "the moral physiognomy of people united by a common situation in a given arrangement of forces" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 359). An example is the formation of morality based on the reactions of opposition groups towards those they are fighting against. Freedom in sex life is sometimes contrasted with sexual rigour, while the ambitions of personal perfection observed among personalists are with the Marxist way of evaluating based on a person's social performance (Ossowska 1957b, p. 359).

Maria Ossowska, analysing the issue of factors that could influence the formation within a given society of groups differing in lifestyle, focused on searching for criteria that in "civilised" societies shaped groups standing out in terms of their ethos (Ossowska 1986b, p. 71). She considered the class factor the most important. The class nature of morality is manifested in the content of the rules that serve to protect the economic interests of a given class, an example being *petit bourgeois* morality. Another manifestation of

the class determination of morality is the change in the content of moral rules depending on social status. Here, the morality of the plantation owners of the southern US serves as an illustration. The dictate of marital fidelity and sexual abstinence applied only to them, and not to the slaves, "whose multiplying to the maximum was to the advantage of the owners" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 72). The class nature of morality is manifested in the differences in judgments, depending on the social class to which the doer of a deed being judged belongs. For example, a nobleman's liability for murder differed from that of a peasant (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 71–72).

The criterion of class nature allowed Ossowska to distinguish between noble and petit-bourgeois morality, as well as bourgeois morality as a fusion of the previous two. This image is completed with the proletarian ethos, the peasant ethos, and (analysed in a causal sense) the lifestyle of the lumpenproletariat. A detailed analysis of the distinguished types of ethos was the subject of her considerations in earlier works (Ossowska 1986a; 1986b). Here, in a synthetic form, she recalls the conclusions concerning the chivalric and bourgeois ethos, supplementing them with remarks on the morality of workers and that of peasants.

Another type of problem is how social class, possessing its own ethos, is distinguished. The classes identified by the Marxists or singled out based on economic criteria are not the only ones that have their ethos. In Ossowska's opinion, Weber's position represents a distinct approach. He distinguishes groups with their own ethos based on status, sense of superiority, and their own "honour". A characteristic feature of these groups is the lifestyle one has to adopt to become a fully-fledged member. Belonging to a group is determined not by one's possessions, but by accepting its system of values. "These groups intersect with the classes described economically" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 76). Life in the privileged strata focuses on the present and on exploitation of the past, from which they draw the justification for their status. While emphasising a sense of honour, they despise any physical, economic or artistic activity. Opposing the enriched "parvenus", they are prepared to accept the latter's children into their community, as long as they are raised beforehand in keeping with the lifestyle they follow. Aggrieved, they live for the future, believing, for example, that they have been called upon to fulfil an important mission.

The classes distinguished on the grounds of an economic criterion are characterised by their attitude to production. Classes singled out because of their lifestyle show a specific attitude towards consumption. In societies where the distribution of goods is based on relatively permanent foundations, there is a tendency for status to shape the stratification. "Every

abrupt economic transformation threatens this stratification and is conducive to the formation of stratification based on an economic basis" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 76–77).

In the analysed descriptions of class-based morality, Maria Ossowska was interested in the sets of judgments officially professed. She did not explore in depth who acted in a particular way and what moral dispositions they were equipped with (Ossowska 1957b, p. 360). Despite the generality of such statements, Ossowska admits that "it is hard to doubt that various social groups (whether, depending on the concept of class we use, we call them classes or not) subscribe to essentially different sets of moral views" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 360).

Ossowska refers to her earlier studies, in which she compared the ethos of the Polish intelligentsia and French bourgeoisie. She also cites the concept of Dupréel, in which the "virtues of honour" are described as virtues characterising a minority convinced of their superiority over the greater part of society (Ossowska 1986b, p. 78; 1986a). This sense of superiority is justified by setting high standards for oneself (*noblesse oblige*) and cultivating virtues that enable one to enjoy recognition among the lower classes. It is at the same time a kind of dam protecting the privileged class from infiltration by people from the lower classes. Ossowska draws attention to other aspects of social stratification. Privileged groups "like not to notice that they are such" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 78). Such a situation encourages their "self-deception", and allows them to restrict their socialising to others within their own sphere.

An expression of the dependence of ethos on social phenomena is Durkheim's assertion of the division of labour and the differentiation of moral rules. Ossowska observes that different moral features were attributed to public officials and to Bohemians – groups singled out on the basis of principles that were not always clear (Ossowska 1986b, p. 79). She does not address the morality of the officials, only mentioning that "William Whyte and Charles Mills wrote of bureaucracy" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 79). A different ethos is attributed to artistic groups that oppose mediocrity. In the past, an artistic lifestyle was criticised, and this also provided justification for artists' lowly status. "The actor was in defiant opposition to the bourgeoisie, because the latter treated him like a clown and denied him burial in consecrated ground" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 80). The current state of the artistic world has undergone a significant transformation, as it has become a financially stable group and enjoys substantial social recognition. One can observe the fading away of bohemianism in many countries. "There is no reason for rebellion since those against whom one rebelled have disappeared" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 80).

Ethnic groups that have blended into the broader social organism also have a distinct lifestyle. In Poland, the Roma are such a group, enduring "with their cult of independence and disdain for work" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 80–81). The Roma's sense of separateness derived from their cultural tradition and their social position. Aware that they constituted a group on the margins of society, they created a morality dividing the world into their own and outsiders, which was expressed in a certain manner of behaviour, which Ossowska refers to by stating that "it is laudable to steal from outsiders, while it is strictly forbidden to do so within one's own group" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 81).

An analysis of moral conflict provides a conclusion to the reflections concerning the social determinants of morality. Moral conflicts can take many forms. Ossowska distinguishes the conflict between solidarity and honesty, as well as the conflict between the rules of occupational and general morality, of duty and feelings, and so on. Not every situation in which one should make a choice implies a conflict of moral rules. Dupréel's concept, which Maria Ossowska cites, assumes the existence of a contradiction between two different moral codes in every moral conflict. In his opinion, this testifies to the heterogeneity of society. The resolution of conflicts based on an adopted set of norms and judgments is carried out with a sense of rightness and independence. It is a given that somebody else could resolve them in a fundamentally different way. In Dupréel's opinion, conflicts are irresolvable (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 370–371).

Maria Ossowska addresses this stance with great caution. In her opinion, not all moral conflicts testify to the presence of different moral orientations. The recognition of moral systems' distinctness is dependent on the existence of contradictory rules within them, or a different kind of hierarchy of norms or judgments (Ossowska 1957b, p. 371). Analysis of the social determinants of morality ultimately became the basis of Ossowska's assertion that one cannot speak of a single morality regarding a society. "We are ultimately confronted with diversity, which gives an impression of chaos, since not only different groups of people resolve the same issues in different ways, but [...] various issues tangle with each other beneath the same label of moral issues" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 72). In her conclusions, Maria Ossowska claims that "if somebody were to want to sketch a map of the various ethos within a single contemporary society, they would have to lend it a rather complex form, and they would find it very troublesome to determine its contours due to diverse intersections encountered along the way, and the absence of clear criteria for differentiating" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 81). She referred to hypotheses from the sociology of morality that she had considered in her earlier works. The

attacking classes tend to proclaim asceticism, “which they usually abandon once they achieve stability in power” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 82). The victorious class imposes its models on the conquered classes, or adopts the models of those against whom it has fought. Classes of lower social status imitate the models of the class immediately above them. Ossowska, citing Veblen, argues that the aspirations of the imitating classes “do not leapfrog over the rungs of the social ladder [...], but above all embrace their immediate neighbours” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 82). An example of this is the proletariat adopting the lifestyle of the petite bourgeoisie.

Another type of depiction is the juxtaposition of individual and group morality. Ossowska stipulates here that such a contrast cannot be taken literally, as only the individual may judge and take action. The distinctness of individual morality from that of the group is expressed in the formulation of judgments or norms of a different kind, depending on whether the individual is acting as part of a team or on behalf of a group (for example the state), or autonomously, on their own (Ossowska 1957b, p. 362). In Ossowska’s opinion, the most important issue here is whether the dual nature of state or individual morality is a special case of a certain dualism permeating individual morality. Acting on behalf of the state, understood as activity on behalf of the group, corresponds to the type of conduct by the individual for the good of another. The morality of the state and its citizens should not be equated with the type of morality that serves to maintain a group’s sense of distinctness. The morality of the state, which is in fact the morality of the *raison d’état*, contains a defined concept of the good that the power of the state constitutes. “It is only with this defined goal that group morality is granted a special character” (Ossowska 1957b, p. 364).

Contrasting the morality of the individual with the morality of the state involves comparing the judgments and norms of an individual acting on their own behalf with those of an individual acting on behalf of the group. Success, regardless of its consequences, is taken into account, in contrast to a system of judgments and norms geared towards or not geared towards achieving success. Here, we are dealing with a set of judgments and norms that take into account certain factors acting as inhibitors (Ossowska 1957b, pp. 365–368). “What one generally has in mind when talking about the morality of the group is essentially conduct guided by judgments and norms that take regard solely of life success understood as acquiring for oneself adequate material resources, power, and might” (Ossowska 1957b, p. 368).

Regarding those acting on behalf of the group, there is evident consent in colloquial morality for acting solely to achieve success. This is simultaneously behaviour inconsistent with the system of judgments and norms present

in everyday life. Maria Ossowska, referring to the thesis of the dual nature of individual morality, describes this feature of morality as the duality of different hierarchies of good, which is simultaneously a certain duality within this same hierarchy of good. An example of this is an aggressive and brazen person who, acting on behalf of the group, encounters a completely different moral qualification than a person behaving in a similar manner in their own interest (Ossowska 1957b, p. 368). The differentiation of morality is therefore not an effect of group influence. It is the differentiation of "the individual morality of certain defined content in relation to the individual morality of other content, combined with the juxtaposition of the situation of a person acting in their own interest and a person acting in the interest of another" (Ossowska 1957b, p. 369).

The dependence of morality on the political system constitutes a different kind of conditioning. Drawing from the anthropological observations of Abraham and May Edel, Ossowska observes that groups that do not have political organisations (the Inuit, the Navajo Indians) do not know war. Remarks concerning the impact that a totalitarian system has on the formation of collective morality constitute a significant portion of her deliberations. She relied on the views of philosophers such as Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Stanisław Ossowski to discuss this issue. They make up a significant portion of the reflections that Ossowska used to define the concept of morality. Referring to Aristotle's views, she emphasises that a totalitarian regime seriously restricts the individual's autonomy; the organising of associations, whether convivial or political, is forbidden. "Furthering one's education, the development of a sense of one's own dignity, and mutual trust are not allowed" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 83).

The main objectives of a totalitarian system include the suppression of outstanding individuals, relying on small-minded people, the spreading of mutual distrust and a sense of powerlessness. Under the conditions of terror, polarisation takes place within the sphere of morality. Two extreme stances emerge: (1) taking advantage of the situation to achieve self-interested benefits; and (2) a heroic opposition to the rules imposed. There is constant conflict between obedience and dignity. Where there is no explicit opposition to violence, two mechanisms emerge to adapt dignity to the situation that has arisen. Where the coercion is ideological, one tries to believe in the officially proclaimed ideology. The second way involves belittling the forced behaviour and justifying it because the values one has sacrificed are considered less important than those achieved through conformity (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 83–84). Bruno Bettelheim, who was a prisoner in the camps at Dachau and Buchenwald, described the changes in morality in a

concentration camp. His analyses pertained to ways in which human dignity was broken by people being forced to reject the values they cherished, and via methods of shattering interpersonal solidarity. The formation of attitudes involved the infantilisation of the personality of the individual subjected to the constant coercion of absolute obedience (Ossowska 1986b, p. 88).

There are momentous moral consequences in a regime in which a system of rewarding obedience and punishing undesirables is maintained. The manner of exercising government is of enormous formative significance, on a par with the system of justice. "After all, with its aid one can bring about a situation in which being an ordinary, decent human being begins to require heroism" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 84).

Maria Ossowska analysed Montesquieu's views on the formation of morality in specified conditions of a political system. He distinguished three fundamental types of political systems: monarchy, despotic rule, and republic. Monarchy takes regard of people's rights, emphasising what it is that distinguishes the individual. It appeals to the notion of honour, demanding privileges and distinctions for itself. This produces a kind of morality in which truthfulness is valued as a sign of courage, rather than as respect for the truth. Displaying good manners is a manifestation of pride. Civil virtues are not valued, since they serve others. The monarchical system favours degenerate forms of loyalty, an example of which is the court morality type.

Despotic states do not respect the law. Everyone is a slave, "and everybody in this respect is equal. Self-aggrandisement is not possible in them" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 85). Despotism is based on fear, and aims mainly to make a bad citizen of everybody, "because only then can a person become a good slave" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 85). Montesquieu's views align with the position taken by many French writers attacking absolutism. For Maria Ossowska, they constitute a contribution to reflections over the history of despotism, where the predominant feeling was that of uncertainty. Modern despotism wields an extensive police apparatus, enabling the effective enslaving of citizens. This takes place through surveillance and the generating of an atmosphere "in which a minor infringement has a magical effect, and defiles a person irrevocably; in which one has to carry the burden of the past" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 87).

A feature of modern despotism is the manipulation of the law. Morally reprehensible acts are punished significantly more leniently than having different political views, and collective responsibility is also restored. Maria Ossowska believes this to be an effective praxeological procedure for instilling fear in everybody. In this way, the social bond is violated, and solidarity – which "at any moment might become dangerous" – is

counteracted (Ossowska 1986b, p. 87). An important feature in modern despotism is the punishing of would-be suicides. Citizens are required to display obedience and constant approval for the style of wielding power; suicide is treated as an act of disloyalty towards the government, just as for Catholics it constitutes an act of disloyalty towards the Creator" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 88).

Ossowska includes the centralisation of power among the phenomena that threaten morality. "It involves people being deprived of their personal aspirations, a vanishing of the ability to decide and bear responsibility for that decision" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 88). Perfectionist ambitions are not valued, and what is desirable is a mediocre person whose behaviour can always be anticipated. This thesis is exemplified in Whyte's work, which characterises the "man without edges".

Centralisation and institutionalisation are associated with bureaucratisation. Ossowska referred to Merton's views to characterise this phenomenon; for him, bureaucracy is a type of organisation with precisely defined hierarchy and roles. The predominant type of action of the bureaucrat is categorisation: placing each case "in the right drawer", without taking its individual character into account. Attitude towards the supplicant is depersonalised, and any manifestation of personal treatment is considered cronyism, nepotism, or the like. Such an attitude angers the supplicant, who is usually forced to yield to the public official (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 89–90).

Maria Ossowska included social roles among the factors determining morality. In her opinion, they are overlooked by the authors of moral directives, who strive to lend the recommendations a general form. The differentiation of social roles (due to age, gender, occupation, or type of social structure) is accompanied by particular expectations and demands, which are reflected in the duties and judgments of an individual performing a role. The persistent division of social roles may constitute an obstacle to achieving moral directives prescribing mutual help. An example is India, where the caste system prohibits granting help to or performing tasks for a member of another caste (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 90–92).

Another factor influencing morality is family structure. To analyse this phenomenon, Maria Ossowska made use, among other things, of observations in cultural anthropology, and in particular the "description of the astounding wealth of different family arrangements combined with the exceedingly diverse distribution of emotional emphasis" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 92–93). The division into patrilineal and matrilineal families is highly differentiated, which for the sociologist of morality signifies the necessity of taking into account the changes in women's position in the family and their

role in the economy. The distribution of emotional emphasis in the family has also varied. For Lévi-Strauss, this constitutes a fundamental cause behind the failure in attempts to establish regularities. Based on contemporary American literature, Ossowska investigated the impact that family structure and the emotional relationships in the family had on people's attitudes. The authoritarianism of parents, in particular the father, shapes weak and aggressive people who practise the cult of strength and blame their milieu for their situation.

Ossowska, referring to Mead's views, writes that a sense of security in the family does not foster a tendency towards competitiveness. And a family in which competitiveness exists accelerates the process of children maturing. Citing the Edels, Ossowska claims that moral principles are shaped by a persisting system of familial obligations. If these are like benefits ensuring existence to all, then slogans of love thy neighbour are absent from the given collective. In such a society, there is no concept of social justice, "because particular benefits apply to particular people" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 95). Unlike in Euro-American culture, moral principles are not subjected to generalisation, but are "given only in the form of concrete variants, changing together with the family position of the one they apply to" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 95).

In a family treated as a kind of economic system, an attitude towards property is formed. Family prestige played a significant role in shaping morality. In aristocratic circles, where marriages were a matter of convention, infidelity was considered natural. For example, in Italy, the institution of official lover was condoned. In England, "care was taken to accommodate illicit unions by appropriate neighbourhood selection" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 96). The importance attached to ancestry favoured nepotism. "The accumulation of offspring of different fathers under a single roof did not violate the family *esprit de corps*. The mother applied her talents to set up her relatives favourably" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 96–97).

In Ossowska's view, the family bond is reinforced by a situation of danger. The family was respected in the middle class. Strengthening of the role of the family was evident in Poland during the occupation, and particularly among Jews. The prohibition of incest guarded the family's integrity. Dupréel believed that the strength and scope of kinship this proscription covered were indicators of the family's position in society. Verifying the accuracy of Dupréel's thesis on broader historical material seems a tempting task to Maria Ossowska (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 97–98).

Analysis of the processes of upbringing within the family constitutes a separate section of the reflections on the formation of human attitudes.

Maria Ossowska drew on the views of Znaniecki, who distinguished between the well-bred person, the person of work, and the person of leisure. Well-bred people are the inheritors of traits of the knightly ethos. Relying on authority, they do not show initiative in action. The morality of this group was suited to group activity to only a small degree. Their low capacity for adaptation in situations of radical social transformations was conducive to a sense of confusion. In Ossowska's view, the best part of Znaniecki's reflections is the "characterisation of well-bred people, meaning the circles of the pre-war intelligentsia, whom Znaniecki knew in person" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 100). His description of working people is something she considers particularly insufficient. Znaniecki treats them as a homogeneous group, showing interest in economic matters. In Ossowska's opinion, working people constitute a heterogeneous collective, comprising peasants, labourers, and craftsmen. Their sole common feature was forcing children to work, combined with little care for their personality development. In his characterisation of people of leisure, Znaniecki draws attention to the emphasis in their morality on social functions and being good at accommodating others. This reminds Ossowska of Piaget's descriptions of the peer group. He placed his focus on the symmetrical relations between these groups, whereas Znaniecki emphasised their fun-seeking character.

In another work, Ossowska analysed the role model of the "person without edges", meant to replace Franklin's "credit-worthy person". Her characterisations concerned the role model appearing in the United States after 1945 (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 99–100). Many elements of the new model of the "person without edges", such as good relations with others or the skill of manipulating people, resemble Znaniecki's description of people of leisure, which Ossowska seems not to have noticed.

A factor shaping morality is knowledge of reality and the nature of humanity. In Ossowska's opinion, different levels of knowledge on causal relations constitute the primary source of divergence in the judgments and norms of conduct. This is shown by, among other things, descriptions of methods of conduct concerning children, relatives, or people displaying diverse forms of deviation – such as the mentally ill, or criminals, and so on. How a human being is defined can contribute to the popularisation of a specific role model, a thesis confirmed by the influence that psychoanalysis has had on the spreading of the "ideal of man well suited to his surroundings and internally harmonised" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 102).

Maria Ossowska finds the conditioning of morality by worldview particularly important. She shares Kotarbiński's position, according to which, in their most extreme versions, ontological views do not necessarily affect

“ethical issues soberly posed” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 103). Worldview is “a complicated whole, the themes of which, unquoted, do not seem so neutral for morality” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 104). Such themes include determinism, indeterminism and a conviction regarding the direction of the universe’s development.

Ossowska leans towards repealing the question about the influence of worldview on morality. She is convinced that the diverse ways of answering this question would also reveal that moral needs condition the worldview. An example of the influence that certain aspects of a worldview have on morality is the notion of human nature and the belief in the unity of all living things. The concept of human nature was derived in antiquity from the worldview. “Essentially, the train of thought was the other way around, because the notion of nature was carved out on the basis of moral directives” (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 104–105). A conviction of the unity of the world served ethicists for the promotion of altruism and justification of egoism, since looking after oneself is also advisable for the sake of others (Ossowska 1986b, p. 105).

Ossowska also analysed the views of Ethel Albert and Clyde Kluckhohn. She stresses that, according to Albert’s theory, to understand the system of values of such a collective, one would have to possess a knowledge of metaphysics, ways of understanding, psychology and the theory of cognition. Kluckhohn believed that one could predict what values are subscribed to on the basis of worldview. The conviction that matter can be mastered is proof that science is valued. The opinion that man is not a fallen being allows one to assume that he should enjoy life. In Ossowska’s view, both parts of the relationship are judgments. The positive value given to mastery over matter is the cause of the positive valorisation of science. In the second case, a “good opinion of man entails a negative attitude towards mortification” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 106).

In Maria Ossowska’s firm opinion, religion is a factor exerting a significant conditioning effect on morality. Through her analysis, she was able to distinguish five varieties of relationship occurring between religion and morality. The first of these has the character of genetic dependence. In her opinion, “this is really not so much about the dependence of morality on supernatural beings, whose existence religion postulates, while morality here is understood as a certain set of judgments and norms” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 107). The gods who create morality are simultaneously the guardians and judges of deeds following the death of man. Providing examples from cultural anthropology or the history of ancient culture, Ossowska emphasises that the gods do not always take this duty upon themselves (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 107–108). In her opinion, the question of whether morality was

revealed by God or whether it was supra-dimensional and interconfessional in nature was already settled in the eighteenth century.

Morality is perceived as a fully autonomous field, as testified to by numerous examples from the history of ethics (Confucius, John Locke, Anthony Shaftesbury). According to Ossowska, those who consider that belief in a universally binding morality must be connected to fideism are mistaken.¹ The examples she gives of the creators of moral norms prove that "they could do so precisely because they had made morality completely independent of religion, which after all is so different in different parts of the world" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 109).

The second kind of relationship, described as logical, is connected to the issue of whether the fall of religion necessarily entails the fall of morality. An example of this relationship is the directive to strive for eternal happiness. After all, it requires one to accept the existence of God, the existence of an immortal soul, and to receive from God guidelines on how to live to be redeemed. Ossowska is unable to give such moral directives, which, in her opinion, would remain dependent on the truths of faith. The same moral rules exist in different cultures and are based on various religions. An example of this is the command to love one's neighbour, present in both Christianity and Buddhism. Divorce is sometimes condemned both due to the indissolubility of the sacrament of marriage and for the sake of children's welfare. Thus, the strongest form of the connection between moral norm or judgment and religious justification is taken into account here (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 109–110).

The third type is psychological dependence, springing from the process of upbringing. "This relationship is formed in the minds of people who, since being children, have been served with moral directives combined with the truths of faith, people for whom a member of the clergy was the spokesman of morality" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 110). In this case, the authority of a man of the cloth is the factor constituting the basis of the relationship. Ossowska draws attention to Piaget's studies, which show that morality shaped in symmetrical group relations does not require a religious authority.

The fourth kind of relationship involves the noticeable influence of religion on moral norms and judgments. It does not have to be expressed in the provision of justifications for moral thought, by which it differs from logical dependence. "We too can yield to them [dependencies – W.M.], not

¹ In her book *Mysł moralna oświecenia angielskiego*, she writes in the chapter "Moralność niezależna się od religii" [lit. Morality becomes independent of religion]: "European moral thought has long known this kind of independence, to say nothing of Asian thought, where we find it much earlier on" (Ossowska 1966, p. 108).

knowing about them at all, and without associating them with religion in its institutional form, which supports the distinction of this dependency from psychological dependency" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 110). As an example, Ossowska indicates the attitude towards animals in Asian countries, where some of them are objects of worship. This is also testified to by:

- The anthropocentrism characteristic of Christianity and Marxism.
- Euphemistic vocabulary concerning the erotic sphere, contributed to by Christianity tainted by Manichaeism.
- The condemnation of homosexuality and monogamy as an expression of the influence of the religion of Israel (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 110–112).

According to Ossowska, the last dependency is the most important. "This is about the relationship between religiosity and the moral standard of man" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 113). It is very similar to the genetic dependency. "In the case of the first dependency, with which this is frequently mixed up, it was about the conviction that God is the creator of moral judgments and norms" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 113). What is important in the final relationship is the belief in God being their creator, which simultaneously constitutes a prerequisite for them to be listened to. We are dealing here with a direct appeal to God as the highest authority justifying morality. Belief in God is often perceived as a condition for respecting norms, and the fear of supernatural sanctions is considered the most effective means against immoral behaviour. In stressing the importance of this issue, Maria Ossowska does not take a clearly defined position. She is content with merely presenting the conclusions of her observations. In her view, they can help formulate future survey questions, constituting the beginning of empirical research. Another issue of interest to her is the verification of Durkheim's thesis that the mystical-imperative character of moral rules is tied to their long-standing relationship with religion. "It would be interesting to check whether we are dealing with such an imperative character there where religion and morality have no connection with one another" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 115).

Maria Ossowska investigated the conditioning of moral judgments and norms in relation to the individuals with whom people come into contact, as well as in terms of the social distance and its type in the relationship. Aspects analysed were age, gender, occupation, social role and its related prestige, as well as the "type of bond (experiences) connecting partners" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 116–121). Ossowska presented numerous examples testifying to the variability of moral rules. In her opinion, the general form given to rules of conduct is conditioned by both cultural and historical factors. "It is a most

deceptive form, and investigating the different shades of rules in everyday practice is a rewarding task for the sociologist of moral life" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 119).

Outstanding personalities within a given collective, together with its past, are factors that influence morality. Personality, or more precisely, its individual expression, is treated by Ossowska as the basis beneath the differentiation in moral judgments made (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 121–122). The works of Karl Marx, Charles Dickens, Bernard Shaw, and others serve as examples of how influential ideas can change moral opinions in society. "The role of Gandhi, Martin Luther King or Albert Schweitzer is widely known, and not questioned by anybody" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 123). In Ossowska's view, to be able to understand some of the moral features of a given society, one has to refer to its past. The norm prescribing neighbourly help in the United States or Australia was formed during the pioneering years. The double morality of the Roma formed under conditions of alienation and repression. "Let us remember that as recently as in the eighteenth century, the murder of a Rom went entirely unpunished both in our country and elsewhere" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 213). In Poland, informing on others was considered one of the worst activities. "That the prolonged subjugation to foreign rule may have contributed to this is probable" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 123).

Morality as an independent variable

Analysis of morality as a variable conditioning cultural phenomena completes the deliberations. These are usually variables that mutually affect each other. As a classic example of such influence, Ossowska gives the relationship between moral directives and economic principles. "In Puritan ethics, the Marxists saw a set of views conditioned by the development of capitalism, while in the same ethics Weber discerned a factor jointly conditioning the development of economic relations" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 126). The Puritan dynamic attributed to ethics was possible because it had created a culture of guilt rather than a culture of shame. This distinction is drawn from Ruth Benedict. A culture of guilt characterises a "society that implements absolute moral standards, and counts on people developing a conscience" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 127). A culture of shame, in turn, is based on external sanctions, in opinions expressed regarding people's deeds. "When honour commands one to be up to the models set for oneself, then a person might suffer, although nobody knows of their unworthy conduct. But confession can free them

of the feeling of guilt" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 128). But there is no place for confession in a culture of shame.

The next section of Maria Ossowska's deliberations is taken up by an analysis of the views of Margaret Mead, Clyde Kluckhohn and Joseph Leighton. Ossowska cites Milton Singer's position, questioning Mead's division of cultures into two types. He challenged the research that constituted the basis of this division and the influence that sense of guilt exerted on technological development. In his opinion, the industrialisation of Japan, China and India was not accompanied by a heightened sense of guilt. Progress, therefore, depends not on a sense of guilt, but on personal moral responsibility (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 129–132). Other authors' criticism is directed against the majority of primitive cultures being recognised as cultures of shame (Robert Redfield, Hans Kelsen). In their opinion, "primitive man has a sense of guilt incomparably more often than civilised man, because he feels morally connected both to the world as a whole and to his own group" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 130). Maria Ossowska has major reservations regarding the findings of reflections on the differentiation between a culture of shame and a culture of guilt, and the way in which they are applied. She seems to fully share Singer's criticism of this distinction, as well as the thesis of civilisational development based on the moral responsibility of the individual.

Maria Ossowska identifies a different kind of dependency between morality and economics in Mandeville's views. He emphasised the civilisational role of evil, contributing to the development of society. In his opinion, human faults and aspirations for luxury, which incline people to search for new needs and stimulate manufacturing, ensure that people have work. That requires an appropriate political system, in which "the whims of the rich are to provide work for the throngs of the poor" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 132; 1966, pp. 188–190).

Morality also affects the political situation. Ossowska points out that the causes explaining the demise of great powers have been discerned in the collapse of morality. The increase in sexual freedom and the fading of family feelings have been classed among the main symptoms of moral decay. An example here could be the ancient Greeks, among whom a "crisis of marriage and the reign of the courtesans" occurred (Ossowska 1986b, p. 133). Reducing the number of children through miscarriage, the killing of infants, and the so-called *exposition*, by which strangers were able to take in children abandoned by their parents, were common practices. Maria Ossowska believes that in its late phase, Hellenistic culture had little interest in the family, despite the "full bloom of the Greek polis" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 133).

Morality induces people to abide by humanitarian principles in combat, leading to a softening of its consequences (Ossowska 1957a, p. 4). To begin with, Ossowska applied a definition of combat phrased by Kotarbiński, who wrote: "John fights Peter whenever they pursue incompatible goals, they know this, and therefore in their actions they reckon on the actions of their opponent" (Kotarbiński 1938, p. 5, quoting after: Ossowska 1957a, p. 5). Ossowska also adopted certain preconceptions of this definition, above all that people do not necessarily fight voluntarily, because their participation in combat is normally forced on them by external circumstances (Konstańczak 2015, p. 9). Therefore, not only does an armed clash constitute combat, but so too does a game of chess, a football match, a skirmish between lawyers during a court hearing, or a parliamentary debate.

Ossowska makes a distinction between combat and conflict, which has various causes resulting not only from the organisation of society, but in particular from the individual predispositions of individuals. This is why, after Vilhelm Aubert, she accepted that it could assume various forms, such as a conflict of values, a conflict of interests, or a conflict of beliefs (Ossowska 1955b, p. 161). However, although it stimulates action, in the long run conflict is exhausting, which is why it should be brought to an end as quickly as possible. Society determines the approved manner in which conflicts are conducted and resolved. Thus, the way in which conflict situations function and are resolved depends on ingrained habits resulting from life experiences and the level of cultural development, particularly the political culture of the collective in question. Universal rules and methods of conflict resolution do not work here. Ossowska adopted the position that, in the interests of every society, there should exist prohibitions limiting the negative consequences of conflicts. Originally, these referred to particular ways in which combat was conducted, above all morally disapproved ways of conducting combat (Konstańczak 2015, p. 10).

Ossowska is concerned primarily with manifestations of armed combat. She discerned the causes of the human propensity for destruction more in the existing social order, in culture, than in individual inclinations. In the logic of war, individual rationale plays a significantly smaller role than the interests of the collective concerned (Konstańczak 2015, p. 9). Analysis of combat tactics allowed Ossowska to identify factors that condition this phenomenon. Among them, she lists those which, in her opinion, are of an indisputably moral character. These are: (1) consideration for others' suffering; (2) respect for others' dignity; and (3) a sense of and respect for one's own dignity (Ossowska 1955b, p. 301). The first and second factors fit within the area of social virtues, since they refer to the principles of good coexistence. The third

factor, relating to the order of ornamental virtues, is positioned within the perfectionist current of moral ideas.

Morality exerts a different kind of influence on art. Ossowska analysed hypotheses linking art to sexual morality. According to the first, the strictness of restrictions results in the sublimation of the sexual urge, which is expressed in artistic creativity, which in turn is conducive to the development of art. The second hypothesis proclaims that moral rigour in the area of eroticism contributes to a restriction of artistic creativity. A certain level of sexual freedom is supposed to contribute to unconstrained artistic expansion. Ossowska seems to lean towards the second of these theses. The examples she gives testify to tolerance in matters of sex, furthering the development of art in the history of humankind, while sexual rigour has contributed to its suppression (Ossowska 1986b, p. 134). The next section of her reflections constitutes an analysis of the possibility of art influencing man. Attention was drawn to this matter in antiquity by Plato, who wished to expel poets from his state. In his opinion, they contributed to a weakening of citizens' moral and social vigilance. Aristotle and Polybius believed that music tempered customs. According to Aristotle, art was a cleansing force.

Maria Ossowska notes that whether art purifies feelings or cleanses one of feelings, whether it raises the level of emotions or eliminates them, is an unknown (Ossowska 1986b, p. 136). Referring to the views of Tatarkiewicz, she writes that in the Middle Ages, an excessive liking for beauty was denounced as a symptom of sensuous lust. "Equally worthy of condemnation is art if used for purposes other than religious or educational" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 136). In Ossowska's opinion, modern times are characterised by the contradictory nature of views on the influence that art has on morality. Shaftesbury, as a representative of the aristocracy, links moral feeling to good taste in aesthetics. Jean-Jacques Rousseau saw art as a threat to morality.

The Romantic era combined moral sensitivity with aesthetic sensitivity, while Neo-Romanticism separated the two. Maria Ossowska also cites the views of Stanisław Ossowski, who "spoke of the role of aesthetic experiences as the source of inner renewal, as a refuge in moments of doubt [...] of the connectedness that forms between people together admiring the same work of music, or the same book" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 137–138). A presentation of Durkheim's views closes the reflections on morality's relations with art. Durkheim believes there to be a conflict between art and morality. The aesthetic development of society threatened morality. A trait of art is that it rebels against duty and compulsion. Morality, in turn, requires discipline and obedience to authority (Ossowska 1986b, p. 139).

In Maria Ossowska's opinion, morality influences law to a greater degree than vice versa. This judgment is based on Jerzy Wróblewski's position. "Somehow it seems to me that morality permeates law even in those parts of it that seem to be as far from morality as possible" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 140). An expression of such influence is the tacit acceptance of monogamy in matrimonial law. "The so-called legal feeling is usually nothing other than moral feeling, just as the law of nature we appeal to when our legislation proves inadequate is moral" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 140). After Zygmunt Ziemiński, Ossowska cites the moral concepts contained in the Code of Civil Procedure of the People's Republic of Poland. These include good manners, wicked purpose, concerns of decency, and so on.

Ossowska also draws attention to the moral implications of the law's functioning. Too many laws and their severity may provoke undesirable consequences and stunt respect for the law. In her opinion, the abolition of punishment for practising homosexuality in England is an expression of legal conservatism in the face of transformations that had taken place in the area of morality. "Sometimes the law can precede morality, just as the formal equality of illegitimate children can precede their moral equality" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 140–141). There are also situations when the moral sense has to wait for the right expression to be found in law.

Moral norms in societal life

An integral part of the sociology of morality for Maria Ossowska is the ontogeny and phylogeny of moral norms in societal life. With regard to the matter of the emergence of norms, she distinguished theories founded "based on whose interests they serve" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 143). Such a position was represented by the Sophists (Callicles), Nietzsche, Mandeville and the Marxists. Ossowska warns against an excessively broad understanding of the notion of interest, which could render theoretically sterile the thesis proclaiming that the genesis of moral norms is always governed by somebody's interest (Ossowska 1986b, p. 145). She expressed her own position concerning the matter of the opposing hypotheses, proclaiming that morality is the product of the weaker or of the stronger. "Meanwhile, it is highly probable that both contain a grain of truth, and that instead of necessarily reducing the explanations to just one, the opposite is what should actually be done – considerably multiplying the types of groups acting together in the creation of morality" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 144).

Another explanation comprises genetic theories, which take into account the social dynamics and determinants of moral norms. An example of this is a theory held by the classics of Marxism, rendering morality dependent upon class structure. This could be verified "by ascertaining the existence or nonexistence of changes in the content of moral rules adopted in a given society in connection with the transition of power from the hands of one class to another" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 145).

In the past, the development of moral norms was identified with progress. Maria Ossowska believes this practice to have been conditioned by three factors. First of all, the development of morality was presented as unidirectional, possessing just one proper line of development. Secondly, a preference for one's own value systems imposed ethnocentrism and a hierarchisation of the analysed cultures on the researchers. Thirdly, the descriptions of facts became mixed with the researchers' postulates in the pictures presented of the evolution of moral norms. According to Ossowska, the ambiguity of the word "morality" constitutes an additional hindrance, "which led to people not knowing precisely what kind of development was actually being outlined" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 146).

Morality was juxtaposed with non-moral, legal and aesthetic phenomena. It was the development of judgments and norms as well as behaviours praised or reproved by judgments, and recommended or prohibited by norms (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 146–147). Moral progress was understood as the multiplication of praiseworthy behaviour. Sources of morality were discerned in animals or in the human psyche, for example, in maternal instinct, "so as to gain concessions of some kind for one's fellow humans, to curb selfishness and cultivate self-sacrifice" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 147).

Maria Ossowska is most convinced by the concept of the evolution of moral norms formulated by Redfield, who believes that anthropology and archaeology enable the positing of hypotheses regarding the moral development of humanity. To begin with, people fulfilled their duties because they were an integral part of their reality and were connected directly to their existence. The most important was the moral order. Changes occurred alongside the development of food production and the rise of cities. Civilisation imposed the primacy of the technical order over the moral order, and at the same time, urbanisation contributed to the crystallisation of great moral ideas.

In Maria Ossowska's opinion, a strength of Redfield's views is that there is no pattern of a one-directional grasp of morality in them (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 147–149). However, based on the modest data, "we cannot infer much about the morality of people who left behind nothing in writing" (Ossowska

1986b, p. 149). We are dealing with a significantly more favourable situation where written sources exist. Nevertheless, Ossowska is convinced that we must realise that there existed certain groups who did not express the views recorded in these documents. There are too many variables in the field of morality for one to be able to speak of a good knowledge of the laws governing it. Such is the view of Lecky, with which Ossowska agrees, just as she agrees with the opinion that "there exists some kind of order in the appearance of certain sets of virtues under certain conditions" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 149). For her, this view is also pertinent for the modern day. The intensifying dynamics of change in role models and the differentiated character of the institutions shaping citizens' moral attitudes provide grounds for this. The way in which internal transformations of factors shaping morality contribute to change in moral directives, and what role the diffusion of moral norms plays, is an interesting matter (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 149–152).

The functioning of moral norms in society is linked to the ways in which they are implemented and assimilated. Maria Ossowska claims that "the term 'assimilate' requires more of a person than the term 'acknowledge'" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 152–153). The assimilation (internalisation) of a particular norm requires one, in the colloquial sense, to adapt to it in one's conduct. This resembles Ossowski's concept of recognised and experienced values. The implementation of norms involves the application of a system of rewards and punishments for abiding by or transgressing them. Emotional attitudes conducive to their observance also develop. The form of sanctions varies, depending on the culture of the society in which they are applied (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 154–155).

Alongside the ways of implementing moral norms there exist legally institutionalised methods of bypassing them. Ossowska drew on Harold Lasswell's and Stephen Kaplan's observations to analyse this phenomenon. They introduced the notion of "counter-behaviour", which covers, for example, bribery or staging marital infidelity in order to secure a divorce in the US. The hiring of people to participate in the staging of marital betrayal takes on an institutionalised form. Ossowska gives another example of the institutionalised form of violating a husband's exclusive right to his wife. This is achieved through the kidnapping of someone else's wife, the motive being to humiliate the man, who – under the pressure of public opinion – has to react. The custom described here also includes established forms of compensation for the person wronged. In regard to the "counter-behaviours", Ossowska notes the continuing tendency to treat violations of this kind leniently. She believes they are often a result of an anachronistic system of norms persisting in the society in question (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 155–156).

The phenomenon of the assimilation and bypassing of moral norms led Ossowska to formulate a question about the kind of conditions under which a particular distance forms between the directives professed and their realisation in everyday life (Ossowska 1986b, p. 156). The existence of norms in a given society that are considered right but are not observed could be indicative of moral corruption. Moral directives might be going unobserved because of excessively ambitious role models being adopted in the society concerned. Apart from expressing such conjecture, Ossowska asks why life in certain cultures is valued so little, and how it is possible to reconcile proclaimed respect for all living beings with the ruthless exploitation of other people, for example in India. Drawing attention to the religious factor, namely belief in reincarnation, seems to be an attempt at an answer.

Compatibility or discord between the rules of conduct proclaimed and the actual rules is an important feature of the development of European moral thought. One can observe in it a constant process of aligning directives with practice, as testified to by the charging of interest on money borrowed, or the breaking of merchant solidarity. These are examples of suiting catchphrases to the conduct preceding them. Ossowska points out that how the disparity between what people proclaim and what they do is perceived is not a matter of indifference. Norms can also be interpreted in such a way that no disparity is noticeable. In the closing stage of her reflections on the matter, she expresses the conjecture that “conformity between an imperative and practice is perhaps not a need that everybody has” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 157).

Moral norms functioning in the life of society have been subjected to typology. Ossowska draws attention to the tendency towards blurring the differences between the typology of ethics and of morality. This is a practice characteristic of Anglo-Saxon writers, “who use the word *ethics* to denote both some kind of theoretical discipline and a certain set of norms observed by a particular group” (Ossowska 1986b, p. 158). In Maria Ossowska’s firm view, a typology of ethics can become a typology of morality if the directives of one ethical system are strongly internalised by the group.

Maria Ossowska grounded her typology of morality on the views of Georges Gurvitch, who distinguished eight types of morality, linking them to types of collective and social class. These kinds of morality are: traditional; finalistic; of virtues; of encouragement and reprimand; imperative; of symbolic ideal models; of aspirations; and creative and active. These types may differ dichotomously, when their character is mystical or rational, intuitive or reflective, rigorous or emphasising natural gifts (*dons naturels*). They can be characterised by a tendency towards expansion or restriction, rigour or liberalism, and collectivism or individualism.

Traditional morality is characteristic of patriarchal cultures. It is to be found, for example, in the Old Testament, in the Iliad and in the Odyssey, and in the landed nobility. Finalistic morality is specific to the middle classes and free-competition capitalism. The morality of virtues is witnessed in calm societies not undergoing great transformations, for example mediaeval societies (Gurvitch 1958, quoted in Ossowska 1986b, p. 159). The morality of encouragement and reprimand influences people through evaluation of the consequences of deeds performed and intended, and is to be found in societies in a state of transformation, in which the influences of various cultures intersect. Imperative morality, or in other words the morality of duty and repression, was present in France following the Revolution (Ossowska 1986b, p. 159). The morality of ideal models is distinctive of periods of class struggles, strikes and revolution. The morality of aspirations was encountered during the Crusader wars, and among participants in resistance movements. And creative morality accompanies societies that plan, for example the proletariat in power, pioneers and artists (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 159–160).

In Maria Ossowska's opinion this is a typology based on diverse and seemingly overlapping criteria, which clarifies little even with recourse to the author's comments. "Both the rubrics and the social framework Gurvitch assigns to them give rise to both questions and caveats" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 161). His deliberations demonstrate a philosophical and abstract character, which does not satisfy the cognitive expectations of the reader of an empirical bent. A similar style of reflections is seen in Bergson's distinction into closed and open morality. For these reasons, Ossowska decided to omit this author's considerations, merely signalling the possibility of such a distinction.

Interest in a typology of morality grew with the collapse of the belief that morality had developed in a single direction. A tendency to search for various lifestyles on an equal standing then emerged. This allowed Benedict to develop cultural models embracing diverse but recurring ethos, two of which were the focus of Maria Ossowska's attention: the Apollonian and Dionysian models of morality. A classic example of Apollonian morality is the morality of the Zuni Indians. The predominant aspects of their lifestyle are moderation and an aversion to standing out and to leadership; there are no severe sanctions or expressive forms of behaviour here. The opposite is seen in the model of Dionysian culture, characterising for example the Kwakiutl. Rivalry, and the humiliating of others, is constantly present among them. "In this culture there is always somebody insulting or being insulted by somebody else, who is the winner or the defeated and shamed" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 162). With regard to the views of Benedict, Maria Ossowska's

position is one full of reserve and scepticism. This is reflected in her citation of Linton's criticism of Benedict reducing all features of a particular culture to a single basic tendency. In Ossowska's opinion, it is hard to doubt that "wanting to obtain a unified image may contribute to a distortion of reality" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 162).

With regard to morality's connections with other factors, Ossowska insists that "we had no ambition of exhausting the matter" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 124). The main goal here was to illustrate and systematise theses and judgments in the area of the sociology of morality. The verification of these claims constitutes the main task for the future. Ossowska emphasises the multiformity of the determinants of morality. The factors analysed influenced the shaping of attitudes, behaviours and the norms regulating them. Changes in moral stances and behaviour usually lead to change in the directives, which in turn modify attitudes and behaviour. This is why Ossowska believes that one should always be aware of the dependence that has occurred. Ossowska's deliberations usually tackled somebody else's thesis concerning the determinants of morality. As a result of her analysis, she most often ascertained that a given factor was neither sufficient nor essential for a particular phenomenon to be included within the scope of morality (Ossowska 1986b, p. 208; Karpiński 1989, p. 62). She conducted further exploration in the direction of finding additional factors sufficient for obtaining a moral qualification for a phenomenon undergoing analysis. For these reasons, her considerations regarding the determinants of morality most often boiled down to ascertaining a relationship of conducive conditioning (Ossowska 1986b, p. 209; Karpiński 1989, p. 63). This is the most frequently reoccurring pattern in Maria Ossowska's research. She usually overturned theses of the existence of stronger, exceptionless relations, hardly ever encountered in the field of morality. When analysing the issue of universally recognised moral norms, she drew attention to the proceeding standardisation of upbringing, furthering the gradual proliferation of a uniform type of norm. She was of the view that this was not conducive to research, and indeed even hindered the explaining of the differentiated nature of morality (Ossowska 1986b, p. 192).

Chapter 5

Methodological Issues

Research methods and tools

In her concept of sociology of morality, Maria Ossowska analysed the methods used in research into morality's relationships with other areas of societal life. Her methodological remarks concerned the ways in which research was conducted – both her own and that of other writers. Durkheim's course *On the General Physics of Law and Morality* anticipated two methods: historical research and comparative ethnography, along with statistical analyses of breaches of moral norms. The introduction of a quantitative variable was intended to determine an objective factor in moral facts, which made it possible to measure the degree of compactness of societies. This is achieved by recording the number of suicides in society, the increase in organic solidarity, and the change in the number of rules with repressive sanctions compared to those with restitutive sanctions.

Durkheim's programme was developed further by Lévy-Bruhl. The physics of morality was intended to establish how morality evolved in relation to other social phenomena, and the method comprised comparative historical research. The analysis of past and contemporary images of morality was intended to be conducted without assuming a single-directional development of this phenomenon. The concept of natural morality was discarded. One had to remember that morality was strictly connected to and delineated by the conditions in which the researched collective was living. Maria Ossowska points out that Lévy-Bruhl announced his pioneering research rather than conducting it himself (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 193–195).

Practising these methods requires "travel in time and space" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 195). Ossowska refers here to the opinions of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, as well as her experience gained from reconstructing aristocratic and bourgeois morality. "With the appropriate sources at their disposal, the sociologist of morality can search for the dependencies in question in history, for example by tracing transformations in role models according to which

the younger generation fashioned and raised itself" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 195). Historical materials can vary, as evidenced by Riesman's usage of high literature, and Whyte's and Kłoskowska's usage of the press, while Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Leites analysed role models advocated in cinema (Ossowska 1986b, p. 196).

Contemporary morality can be studied through participatory observation, interviews, and questionnaires. Ossowska doubts whether the latter two would yield reliable results, as respondents care more about themselves coming across favourably than about the truthfulness of their answers. She sees significant potential in applying the historical method, as evident in her analysis of literature on youth hooliganism. "The multiplying hypotheses concerning that asocial youth can be of interest to the sociologist of morality both on account of the factual side of the issue, and for its methodology [...] since history shows that the existence of hooligans is not specific to the modern day" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 197). In her opinion, this is a matter related to the multitude of factors conditioning morality.

Ossowska sees similar problems in explaining these factors in relation to transformations in the area of sexual morality. "The revolution in sex life is usually treated as a revolution that embraced the whole of society" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 199). She believes that one should check which groups, and to what degree, it applies to. In her opinion, significant differences will emerge. "I think that until empirical research proves otherwise, it is safer to treat the said revolution solely as a bourgeois revolution" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 199–200).

Maria Ossowska formulated five hypotheses explaining the transformations in the area of sexual morality, hypotheses which she believes apply to civilisation in general: (1) the economic emancipation of women; (2) the influence of Freud's views and the role of psychoanalysis; (3) encountering different mores and customs during the war; (4) the need for quick sexual gratification on the frontlines and the commercialisation of this domain; and (5) the secularisation in socialist countries. She only discussed some of these in detail. Women achieving success in their careers may have contributed to their sexual attraction. Economically independent, when unable to bear being in an unhappy marriage, they could demand a divorce (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 200–201). Ossowska is convinced that this is the most frequently occurring factor and the most significant.

Ossowska points out that for the United States, the most characteristic phenomena are the impact of psychoanalysis and the commercialisation of sex. The latter became visible in every advertisement, "whether for laundry soap or shoe polish" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 202). Participation in wars meant

absence from the country, which in turn weakened family bonds and the prohibitions in place. Soldiers encountered cultures and people whose sexual codes and practices were more liberal than those they had been brought up with (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 201–202).

The furthest-reaching changes in sexual behaviour can be observed in young people who have had no part in war, for example, in Sweden. Ossowska believes that the hypothesis of secularisation has little explanatory power. The regimentation of sex life is characteristic of Puritanism. The fading of the conviction that sex is sinful is indeed connected to the secularising of life in Christian countries where such a belief took root. In the Soviet Union, this change should have been far-reaching, yet a set of phenomena typical of Puritanism was observed there (the condemnation of divorce, inequality for illegitimate children, and so on). Due to the scarcity of comparative studies, it is impossible to determine whether in places where secularisation is supported, we are only seeing its propagation or whether it accompanies sexual freedom (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 198–201).

Antonina Kłoskowska introduced the concept of a personality model to sociological deliberations regarding role models. It is a general notion, created by selecting and abstracting from a particular reality. The role model differs from the model of personality in that it recreates the regular functioning of a given institution. When comparing the scopes of the notions of role model and personality model, a higher level of generality is indicated in the latter, and it is even treated as one of the types of role model. A personality model is a specific type of model that encompasses particular personality traits and dispositions, and it differs from the role model in that no specific character is concealed within (Kłoskowska 1959, pp. 46–71). Maria Ossowska severely criticises the usage of the Polish word “model”¹ in Kłosowska’s concept. She believes that using it in sociology causes unnecessary conceptual confusion. Ossowska claims that the Polish word “model”, unlike the word used in “role model” (*wzór*), can be replaced by the word “type” in many cases (Ossowska 1986a, p. 8). In comparative research conducted for the purpose of formulating laws governing the development of moral life, benchmark concepts are important as research tools. In her deliberations, Maria Ossowska cites the distinction made by Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim between ordering reality through classification and through benchmark concepts. The latter include the idea of typological concepts. Classification should be exhaustive and separable. An extensive set of names

¹ The Polish term for role model is “*wzór*”, which, apart from having the meaning “model” in English, may also be translated as pattern or example [translator’s note].

is necessary for the different divisions in the natural sciences. A typology, still constituting a research tool, does not have to fulfil the criteria placed before classification. A specific feature of the term “type” is its association with the word “typical”, which makes it possible to “reserve this concept in science only for those uses where a benchmark element comes into play” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 375). Therefore, the word “typical” will be associated with “ideal” or “classical”. An example is Weber’s notion of the ideal type, which – embracing the set of most distinctive and common traits – constitutes a benchmark. At other times, taking a particular object as a model causes it to be considered typical.

The ideal type is characterised by the gradability of its traits, enabling the positioning of the object under study at a specific distance from the model. Maria Ossowska distinguished two methods of gradation. The first considers the distinctiveness of the traits and the repetitiveness of their occurrence. An example could be the particular ethical style of Puritan morality. Ossowska notes that over time, when the morality of other countries and eras began to be compared to it, it started to constitute a benchmark. “As long as it is not actually treated as a model, it simply constitutes an ordinary general notion, and not a type in the terminology we are proposing” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 377). This enables the application of this notion as either a general concept or a specific type, depending on the researcher’s needs. The second method of gradation is dominated by a tendency to find the essential features determining the repeatability of the phenomenon under analysis.

Weber treated the ideal type as a researcher’s construct. Maria Ossowska believes that such concepts can sometimes form spontaneously, for example, the concepts of Christian morality or bourgeois morality. Her reflections on bourgeois morality lead her to conclude that “it would be impossible to point out its author, and it did not form in anybody’s individual office” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 378).

The blurred and incoherent nature of the concept of morality does not pose a threat to empirical research in the sociology of morality. There is an analogy here with the situation of the sociology of religion, which occupies a better position due to the institution and role of the priest. The valuable research results achieved in the sociology of religion prove that in science, one can conduct research without having a strict definition of the object of study. Therefore, the sociology of morality is not alone in its situation. Deliberations over the conditioning of morality by non-moral factors were of such a nature. In Ossowska’s view, even if it were to turn out that a factor being analysed was not moral in character, the relationship identified would not change in any way. “At the most, it would turn out that due to the

absence of boundary posts we'd intruded into somebody else's territory" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 208). She postulates that the problem of blurred and incoherent notions should be addressed by methodologists, indicating the place and the limits of their applicability. Aware of the difficulties that arise when determining the relationships between phenomena that condition morality, she writes that they should not discourage the researcher from further exploration. One should "conduct one's work with one's eyes open to all the risks that threaten it" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 370).

The concept of interest, which, in Ossowska's view, contains a psychological assumption, is often used in studies of morality. Belief in predestination may have silenced scruples, serving the interests of its adherents. The hedonism proclaimed by the French moralists aided the fight against religion, which constituted a pillar of the *ancien régime*. It was in the Enlightenment that the concept of interest became widespread. It was used then by Bentham, among others. For Helvetius, it was a fundamental term; Maria Ossowska describes his concept of interest as psychological. It is a subjective concept of interest, according to which stating that "realisation of the state of affairs S lies in the interest of X" is equivalent to stating that "X desires S". "Our interests are determined by our desires, and ultimately by our passions" (Ossowska 1985a, p. 352). Surveys of interests present in society, therefore, boil down to identifying actual desires, while desires consisting of expectations and needs are relatively long-lasting.

This view was shared by Bentham, who used yet another concept of objective interest. "Realisation of the state of affairs C lies in the interest of X" does not mean that "X desires C", but that "C is good for X", since there are sometimes situations when X's conviction is not taken into account. An example of this is the activity of a social reformer who fights for women's equality without seeking the opinions of those concerned. The dispute over the psychological character of this concept may take the form of a dispute concerning the means to achieve mutually accepted goals. Therefore, an important role here is played by the world of values. This is evident, for example, in a situation of measures related to the promotion of pro-health attitudes, where a smoker who is aware of the harmfulness of smoking prefers to live a shorter life, but to enjoy it more. Maria Ossowska notes that this is now a dispute about values (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 353–355). She realises that psychological and objective concepts of interest may prove too broad for colloquial intuition. The pursuit of self-interest is, after all, combined with concern for oneself and certain goods one has. For Ossowska, the desire for the state of affairs C was connected to the realisation of interest, while

the convergence of interests and desires is independent of their object (Ossowska 1985a, p. 356).

In the analysis of social determinants, the concept of interest is used by researchers for identifying categories of doctrine. This most often means sets of ideas that serve the interests (not always economic) of those in power, ensuring that the privileged class have the possibility of holding on to their status. This is reflected in the creation and propagation of role models, which favour a specific vision of social order, one that suits the interests of these classes (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 359–362). The character of a given group's ideology is connected to its situation. The artistic products of a social class, therefore, express the prevailing tendencies – of domination, separatism, fear, regret, or rebellion, and so on. They reflect the moods of the collective concerned and, at the same time, constitute a tool for influencing other groups (Ossowska 1985a, pp. 362–364).

According to Maria Ossowska, analyses of social determinants conducted using the concept of interest come up against the following difficulties:

- They require certain assumptions regarding the human psyche, “the social conditioning of which one could only ask about up to a certain point, since it is precisely these assumptions that make it at all possible to identify determinants of this kind” (Ossowska 1985a, p. 365).
- These assumptions are usually made on the basis of obviousness, due to which they typically escape the researcher's attention. Lending them the character of detailed sentences, one can demonstrate their applicability in a specific case, and thereby avoid the elliptical character of one's own reasoning (Ossowska 1985a, p. 367).
- In acknowledging the truthfulness of a psychological assumption adopted in the characterisation of a particular doctrine, one should verify whether it has been properly applied (Ossowska 1985a, p. 368).

Maria Ossowska presumed that these tacit assumptions in the analysis of factors conditioning morality could have a significant impact on research findings. Montesquieu, Huntington, Durkheim, Malinowski and Kluckhohn accepted that behind every moral norm lies some kind of need to which the norm constitutes a response (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 209–211). Ossowska drew on Malinowski's views to show that in functionalism, searching for a need behind every valid norm is tied to an instrumental conception of culture. It is understood here that culture allows a person to satisfy their more fundamental needs – of food, sleep, safety and protection from foul weather. A moral or customary norm, therefore, always serves to meet a particular need, which is why, when investigating the moral norms of a specific society,

one should look for the needs that they serve. Research regarding norms should be conducted in the context of the other norms functioning in the society in question. The logical value of this thesis is dependent on the concept of need. In a broader conception, need cannot be falsified, but in a narrower sense, it becomes patently false. In a broad sense, need becomes a psychological concept, which allows it to be found behind every custom and norm commanding that it be nurtured. Such an understanding of need renders the explanations insufficient (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 211–212).

Theorists use a narrower concept of need, signifying the realisation of such conditions which are essential for a person to survive. They are needs acknowledged as reasonable and approved, opposed to fleeting whims, and take on a value-giving character. A central need for Malinowski was biological survival in an individual and group sense. Maria Ossowska demonstrates the unfoundedness of the thesis that, since behind every moral norm some kind of need is concealed, then norms serving survival should be given greater emphasis in every group. Many societies do not have norms that were established due to the need to survive. Sometimes, norms of no significance are emphasised. And sometimes there are also norms that are detrimental to the biological survival of the group (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 212–214). According to Ossowska, examples negating the thesis of the functionalists are *expositio*, abortion, the exploitation of minors for labour, and majoritarianism. “If certain behaviours’ pernicious character for society were always to encounter society’s resistance, then in ours alcoholism should be an object of particularly severe condemnation” (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 216–219). The code of chivalric combat was detrimental to the biological survival of the individual and the group. The way of thinking among Poland’s landed gentry, despising profit, was described similarly by Ossowska. She considered it disastrous not only for the nobility but for the country as a whole.

Moral norms do not appear to Ossowska as serving the need for survival. The theory of needs is therefore in a situation similar to that of the theory of interests. Malinowski, who maintained that every moral norm always serves needs of some kind, also provided examples of norms violating them. Montesquieu knew that moral norms serve not only biological needs. Mandeville emphasised that politicians frequently exploited morality. And Dupréel distinguished a group of ornamental virtues as difficult, providing a sense of superiority to those in possession of them. The functional conception of moral norms serving survival imposed itself mainly on researchers of primitive cultures. There, it was easy to discern some kind of sensible need in every norm. In rounding off her reflections on the functionalist explanation of morality, Ossowska cites Merton’s opinion that

it was a theory constituting an exaggerated reaction to the theory of relics dominant in the period of reconstructing the developmental phases of culture (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 21–22).

Among other things, it is tacitly accepted that every norm serves some kind of need. For Maria Ossowska, these assumptions take the form of psychological sentences. A researcher postulating the necessity to draw up new rules due to the population becoming denser assumes that people wish to avoid conflict. The opinion that human life is cheap where the rate of childbirth is high is based on the assumption that we tend to disregard objects of which there are too many (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 222–223).

In comparative studies, research into primitive cultures plays a special role. Richard Brandt pointed out that it is easier there to ascertain causal relationships, formulate hypotheses, and verify them. Factors conducive to this are the multitude of such cultures, their mutual isolation, their independence and their simple stratification. Fewer variables there shape human behaviour. The usually small number of group members facilitates the identification of individuals modifying modes of action (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 202–203).

Ossowska also indicates difficulties encountered in the study of primitive cultures. These include problems mastering the different conceptual schemata, resulting, for example, from unfamiliarity with the local language. She sees two ways to overcome such difficulties. An example of the first is that of Westermarck's conduct when investigating reactions to behaviour praised or reprov'd in the researcher's own culture. "In this ready-made case, one brings along one's own pre-prepared conceptual grid and strives to see how the society in question fits into it" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 204). However, this method does not allow for the recording of moral judgments that are not present in the researcher's culture. A way out of this is the second method, involving the researcher "suspending" their own morality and monitoring recurring "psychological reactions of condemnation or recognition, and description of the stimuli to which these reactions constitute a response" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 205).

A difficulty common to both methods is determining the moral character of the responses noted. In McDougall's opinion, they must be disinterested responses. As a result, researchers have often denied the presence of a moral character in the reactions of primitive societies. According to Ossowska, arguments that are important for the concept of morality, and with whose help a particular rule is advocated, do not yet testify to the motives on account of which a given norm is promoted and followed. Such reasoning refers to benefits associated with adhering to a given rule due to its

upbringing effects. That does not mean that a person behaving in keeping with a particular norm always has to expect such a benefit. "If we were to make the moral character of a rule dependent on the arguments supporting it, then it would only be right to remove the commandment 'Honour thy father and thy mother' from the domain of morality, since in Holy Scripture it is accompanied by the words: 'so that you may live long in the land the Lord your God is giving you'"² (Ossowska 1986b, p. 206).

The fundamental difficulty for the researcher of moral views in a given society involves the ascertaining and defining of a moral situation. One then has to determine the intensity with which these situations occur. "Because comparisons of moral judgments in different societies cannot be limited to the assertion of the presence of certain judgments in one case, and their absence in another, but must also establish [...] what and for what one is willing to sacrifice in one case and the other" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 207). These preferences must not be underestimated, despite the impossibility of measuring them. "Missionaries [...] have had to learn the hard way, on more than one occasion, that issues of great import to them had no meaning at all for their flock" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 207).

A critique of functionalism

The oldest variety of functionalism is the thesis that behind every moral norm lies a specific need, the satisfying of which is essential for the group's survival. Maria Ossowska addressed a different version of functionalism – evolutionist functionalism, phrased in the spirit of the concepts of natural selection and adaptation. Based on Merton's views, she recorded the charges against it. Her reflections focused on the example of a functional analysis of the prohibition of incest.

The first part of the analysis consists of reflections on the concepts of function and dysfunction. The functionality of any norm can be determined by the criterion of effectiveness. If its observance serves the achievement of the group's goals, then the norm is functional. It becomes dysfunctional when it becomes an obstacle to the group's aspirations or brings undesirable effects. In such research, opposition usually leads to judgment. Researchers are not always capable of correctly identifying the values functioning within a given group. In the researcher's opinion, the ascertaining of the functioning of a particular norm often occurs as a result of observing positive effects

² Deut. 5:16 (author's note).

on the life of the group in question. According to Ossowska, the positive impact of a norm's action is sometimes understood by functionalists as consequences advocated or actually realised in the group. Ossowska's objection is that functionalists are mixing up intention and function. Anticipated effects must be distinguished from actual effects. "Sometimes the intended consequences coincide with those realised, but this relationship might not exist" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 224).

Maria Ossowska cites Merton, who distinguished explicit and hidden functions. Consequences that are intended and socially acknowledged are explicit. Hidden ones include those not intended, determining the group's existence. Moral judgments are usually grounded on intended consequences, which leads to a simplified picture of reality. When bearing in mind hidden consequences, the researcher will be dealing with a more complicated situation, but also a more complete one. Behaviours subject to condemnation can generate positive effects. Such a situation occurs, in Ossowska's opinion, as the result of an established way for creating proscriptions and commands, in which a tendency to develop causal chains prevails. In line with this schema, "good and evil do not mix". Maria Ossowska, citing Mandeville, notes that "in the meantime evil can spring from good, or good from evil, like a chick from an egg" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 225). In her opinion, an interesting issue is how undesirable consequences, the result of "bad causes" on a par with phenomena conceived as positive, affect researchers' reasoning.

Quoting Merton, another charge concerns the thesis referred to as the postulate of universal functionalism. It is illustrated by Malinowski's thesis that "every custom, material object, idea or belief fulfils a vital function". In Merton's opinion, this is an effect of the tendency persisting among the functionalists to discern only those consequences that, in their opinion, are beneficial, and related to moral norms being respected. The failure to notice other possibilities, providing the same effects, determines the thesis described by Merton as "the postulate of indispensability". This is expressed in the statement that "other than it is, it cannot be". Therefore, every norm should simultaneously serve all group members. Ossowska notes that this thesis does not apply to societies with an elaborate structure. On the other hand, accepting it relieves functionalists from answering the question of whom the norms adopted in a given group serve most (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 225–226).

Maria Ossowska conducted a detailed analysis of evolutionist functionalism using the example of the prohibition of incest. George Murdock's views served as the basis for her reflections. As a result of his research, he formulated eight empirical theses, which were confirmed in

all examined cases regarding the prohibition of incest. The next stage was to verify the hypotheses explaining this prohibition. After his analysis, he concluded that adequate explanations concerning all facts pertaining to incest were only possible on the basis of four disciplines taken together: psychoanalysis, sociology, psychology, and the anthropology of culture. Psychoanalysis argues that reactions to incest are not innate, but are connected to the structure of the primitive family. Psychology and sociology provide explanations of the proscription of incest and the importance attached to it. The family possesses important social value, since it fulfils numerous essential functions. The prohibition of incest stretches beyond the nuclear family, since, according to behavioural psychology, learned reactions tend to manifest themselves in similar conditions. Murdock notes that norms constituting a consequence of established reactions can only be binding when bringing favourable outcomes, thereby becoming stronger. If they do not bring benefits, they succumb to discrimination and, in time, are replaced by other norms (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 228–234).

Maria Ossowska does not find Murdock's explanations sufficient. In evolutionary functionalism, the rationalisation of the world is explained by appealing to the phenomenon of natural selection of those forms of collective life that serve it best. Ossowska believes that this is "rationalisation strongly associated with the one-sided image of the consequences of norms in action that is suggested by turning attention to their functions but overlooking their dysfunctions" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 235). Such a picture of reality does not explain the persistence of behaviour that is condemned and prohibited, which testifies to the ineffectiveness of the norms and the 'functionality' of counter-norms. An example of such practices is institutionalised prostitution, which fulfils numerous important functions, such as sexual satisfaction, the elimination of frustration, and so on. Dysfunctions connected to prostitution include the humiliation of both parties, and the spreading of venereal disease. According to Ossowska, a functionalist is in an alternative situation. They will consistently claim that society is guided by norms, which, in the process of selective choice, have proved the best for them. Then they will "have to abandon the condemnation of prostitution, condemnation that must be non-functional since it loses in the fight for existence" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 237). For the functionalist, maintaining the condemnation of prostitution would mean abandoning the demand for universal functionalism. And in Ossowska's opinion, for both theoretical and moral reasons, this possibility is more appealing (Ossowska 1986b, p. 237).

Cultural relativism

An analysis of functionalism as a scientific theory applied in research on morality led Maria Ossowska to reflect on a rational way to explain moral rules. Adopting Durkheim's evolutionistic stance, one would have to acknowledge that moral rules – irrespective of their content – always serve group coherence. Breaking accepted rules also favours that, since it contributes to consolidation among those reacting with moral indignation. Ossowska notes that if we take into account, above all, the content of moral rules, then their accumulation of irrational factors (for example, magic and religion) becomes a problem. Another factor threatening rationality is the ignorance of the relationships between the phenomena to which a given rule applies. Certain norms are patently false empirical sentences, for example, the ban on looking at one's mother-in-law on pain of losing one's eyesight among the Navajo Indians. In Maria Ossowska's opinion, it is hard to find a rational answer to this problem (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 250–251).

Maria Ossowska concludes her analysis of cultural relativism with reflections regarding the application of functional theory in studies of morality. Her starting point is the thesis of relativism as a consequence of functionalism. This phenomenon was a response to the unilinealism persisting in research. She is aware of those aiming to reverse this perspective and to emphasise the distinctiveness of different types of culture. This stance, described by Ossowska as *laissez-faireism*, allowed for no preferences of moral norms and judgments whatsoever, emphasising respect and tolerance for all cultures. Citing Redfield, Ossowska writes that with the "neutrality and respect for the right to satisfy needs in one's own way" that results from this position, it would only "be right to extend that to embrace Hitler's crematoria" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 243). She observes that the thesis of cultural relativism seems to be on the defensive, since "we are going back again to emphasising the universality of certain values connected to the commonness of certain situations in life" (Ossowska 1986b, p. 243). Despite the existence of similar sets of needs, differences will continue to persist in terms of their hierarchy and the means of achieving them. Once an agreement is reached regarding the means, differences will persist regarding the goals. "For the Zuni, peaceful coexistence may still be a goal, while the Comanches will prefer to find an outlet for themselves in sowing unrest and fomenting strife" (Ossowska 1986b, pp. 243–244).

For Ossowska, moral relativism is connected to the matter of contrasting the hunger for the absolute with the changeability and historicity of moral phenomena. Moral norms acquire a universal flavour thanks to the social

tendency to grant them absolute force. In Ossowska's view, this is rather an effect of habit and an expression of a hunger for the absolute than a statement of fact. "But that hunger should be treated as something that is expressed in proposals rather than in a description. This is about the conviction that the judgments and hierarchies we adopt should become universal. However, if this has not yet become the case, then this should be attributed solely to a certain blindness that will disappear when others adopt our culture. Here we are somewhere between a postulate and a prognosis" (Ossowska 1985b, pp. 17–18).

Chapter 6

Reception and Continuation of Maria Ossowska's Work

Reception

From the outset, Maria Ossowska's scientific work sparked intense interest within the academic community. There was uniform emphasis on the fundamental quality of her *Foundations of the Science of Morality*, which lay in its distinction between normative and descriptive approaches in the study of moral phenomena (Kotarbiński 1949; Jankowski 1963; Lazari-Pawłowska 1966c; Nowak 1972; Kiciński 1984). It opened up the possibility of demystifying the content of diverse ethical systems, leading to an enhanced standard of ethical culture and moral tolerance. Ossowska's research contributed to the formation of theoretical self-knowledge pertaining to the possibilities and justification of specific ethical systems. Emphasis was placed on the pioneering character of her academic work, the theses of which are upheld to this day by the philosophy of science and methodology (Nowak 1972, pp. 160–162; Lazari-Pawłowska 1975, pp. 91–99).

It has been pointed out that what was achieved in the *Foundations of the Science of Morality* is "rather the levelling of the ground for construction, a kind of ingenious clearing away of the rubble. [...] So it is not so much the 'Foundations of the science of morality' as rather an 'Introduction to the science of morality' that we have before us" (Kotarbiński 1949, p. 428). Ossowska agreed with the critical remarks concerning the effects of her work. In the book's conclusion, she indicated that painstaking analyses were necessary for one to be entitled to make such a statement.

Ossowska's omission of Petrzycki's remarks was given as one of the main obstacles to achieving better results. He had indicated the impossibility of defining a class of objects covered solely by a common name. Ossowska was faulted for a lack of criticism, leading to her practising a "cult of words" combined with a "cult of colloquial language" (Kotarbiński 1949, pp. 427–430; Lande 1948, pp. 255–257). In relation to Maria Ossowska's academic oeuvre,

this was described as “linguistic phenomenalism”. It led to the development of a theory of the use of axiological words rather than the construction of an axiological theory. At the basis of this judgment lies the conviction that science begins where it breaks from the colloquial point of view, since colloquial thinking is grounded on common sense, expressed in superficial structures. Thinking in terms of idealisation, on the other hand, constitutes the essence of scientific thinking (Nowak 1974, pp. 122–123).

Maria Ossowska never undertook the role of constructing an axiological theory. This seems understandable, considering the assumptions of the research programme for a descriptive science of morality. Scientific terms, as a component of a specific axiological theory, always remain associated with their colloquial meaning. After all, whether a given expression takes on axiological sense in colloquial moral awareness depends on this (Smoczyński 1989, p. 345). Ossowska’s programmatic criticism meant that in her deliberations over moral utterances, “Ossowska was more interested in profound structures than in superficial structures” (Karpiński 1989, p. 61). Referring to the category of common sense helped on more than one occasion to determine the object of research in the science of morality, but at the same time, it did not constitute the main goal of Maria Ossowska’s cognitive explorations.

The descriptive study of moral phenomena became for Maria Ossowska the basis for statements concerning her logical and genetic links with neo-positivism. It was noted that these links were based on the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw school (Lazari-Pawłowska 1975, p. 94; Kiciński 1983a, p. 566). Researchers of Maria Ossowska’s oeuvre have drawn attention to, among other things, how she was aware of positivism being credited with the emergence of descriptive studies of morality. Ossowska asserted, however, that “not every positivistic ethics was descriptive in character, while descriptive ethics was not explicitly connected to the positivist conception of science” (Ossowska 1957b, p. 20). Since positivism shies away from value judgments in science, the science of morality may be classified as an expression of this paradigm. However, Maria Ossowska avoided the “smuggling in” of her own hierarchy of values, typical of positivism, as testified to by her great caution in formulating conclusions from objectively analysed facts (Kiciński 1997, p. 90). This does not mean that she disregarded the role of evaluation in science. Her postulate for a departure from value judgments concerned only the descriptive and explanatory function of science, and as such, a constitutive condition for science in general. One can only do this at a meta-ethical level. Evaluation is an action that is non-scientific in character at the stage of descriptive knowledge of specific moral

phenomena. Therefore, it cannot be treated as a component of scientific reflection (Smoczyński 1989, pp. 333–335).

Maria Ossowska's research stance is marked by caution in the formulation of generalisations. This is the dominant feature of her works, affecting their reception within the circle of her readers. A predominance of analysis over synthesis characterises her works, along with an absence of unambiguous and definitive conclusions, which hinders or even makes it impossible to identify Ossowska's position, or to classify her into a particular philosophical orientation. The restraint evident in Ossowska's works, bordering on an aversion to a normative ethics, as well as the recognition of her descriptive studies of morality as scientific, have become the basis for the opinion that she should be classified among the representatives of neo-positivism. Even if such a classification is correct, it certainly does not constitute the sole possible and exhaustive attempt to indicate the determinants of Ossowska's works and the theoretical positions she took (Ślęczek-Czakon 1989, pp. 104–105). Proponents of the neo-positivist style of practising the science of morality pointed to numerous value judgments in Maria Ossowska's works (including Neyman 1977; Nowicka 1977, 1997; Lazari-Pawłowska 1966c, 1975; Kiciński 1983a, 1984, 1989). Her programmatic non-presuppositionality, which led her to forgo a working hypothesis, was correlated with a position accepting the possibility of creating a scientific normative ethics. In aspiring to develop an independent descriptive grasp of moral life, she had no intention of questioning the value of normative ethics. She was particularly interested in following attempts to create a logic of norms, and felt that all types of deductive reasoning were possible in the field (Ossowska 1970, citing: Czerniawski 1973, p. 218).

We are therefore dealing with two different approaches regarding the classification of Maria Ossowska's works. The view proclaiming the neo-positivistic character of the science of morality takes into account its association with the demand for a dispassionate and objective treatment of the research object. However, among those in favour of this view, one can encounter remarks suggesting the appearance of Maria Ossowska's value judgments in the course of the research procedures. Nevertheless, this did not clash with the call for a "dispassionate observer" in the science of morality (Kiciński 1997, p. 90).

Opposing this opinion is the view that such classification of Ossowska's works is unwarranted, that it seems to rely on the consequence of assuming a connection with the hierarchy of values preferred by neo-positivism. Maria Ossowska avoided doing that. She expressed her opposition towards such attempts to classify the science of morality that she was building. She linked

the effects of her research with the Socratic tradition, without disregarding the negative results most frequently obtained (Ossowska 1983, p. 409).

In regard to the findings of Maria Ossowska's research into the concept of morality, attention was drawn, among other things, to the fact that the delineated area of analysis embraced those classes of designators that were sometimes included within the scope of morality and sometimes excluded from it. The main reason for this situation was evident in her application of the "programmatic plebiscite method", leading to an evaluation of judgments or an evaluation of conduct. Thus, at the meta-ethical level, Maria Ossowska encountered the same problems, while the effects of the classification seemed questionable and contentious (Lande 1948, pp. 262–263).

The fact that Ossowska did not reveal the criteria for the essence of moral judgments and norms was also pointed out. These criteria are tied to a pro-societal orientation commanding one to respect another's good while maintaining disinterestedness. The application of this criterion is evident in the analysis of individual and group morality, as well as the asymmetry of praise and reproval, which are specific features of moral judgments. This influence can be observed in the analyses of perfectionism, where Ossowska distinguishes a moral aspect (relating to societal life) and an extra-moral aspect (relating to the sphere of personal traits, serving only the individual). A tendency to apply pro-social criteria of morality was also present in Maria Ossowska's activity when she polemicised with Frenkel's views. It becomes clear that she considered pro-social consequences and the actor's intentions the decisive factors in moral judging, or treated them as a qualification for the class of moral judgments (Kiciński 1989, pp. 171–176).

In accepting Ossowska's conviction that morality is a multidimensional and incoherent phenomenon, attempts were made to construct several types of concept of morality. Based on intuitively applied criteria, a few relatively coherent wholes were distinguished, their task being to embrace all semantic intuitions connected to morality. The idea was to clearly distinguish those phenomena that are the object of analysis in regard to a specific research intention.

The following criteria were proposed for building a definition of morality:

1. Psychological – related to the sense of duty, prompting one to observe the norms, or a sense of guilt in the event of transgressing them.
2. Sociological – enabling the definition of a moral norm due to the specificity of its social functions or the sanctions applied.
3. Systemic – we classify all norms constituting a certain whole, creating an ethical system or ethics, e.g. Catholic, Protestant, Kantian, etc., among the moral norms.

4. Content-related – non-formal in character and enabling the definition of a moral norm by the specific type of factors associated with it, such as respect for life, telling the truth, and so on.

The last of these criteria is connected to the problem of relativisation, since it is sometimes used in two versions: (1) without relativisation, in which activities of a certain type and their corresponding norms are considered moral on the grounds of unambiguous associations without delving into the axiological assumptions (that one should tell the truth, one should respect others' property, one should take care of the weak, and so on), or (2) with partial relativisation, which requires analysis of the axiological context and the context justifying the norm in question. The moral character of a norm will therefore depend on when it is recognised as such by a given social group (Lazari-Pawłowska 1966, pp. 34–37).

The above proposal takes into account the possibility of building an arbitrary definition of morality. In practice, however, one can only apply analytical and regulatory definitions in this context. The problem with such a method of definition is the necessity of applying partial analytical and regulatory definitions, respecting the ways of understanding morality in the culture and in natural languages as a constituent part. On the other hand, taking into account the analytical factor leads to effects similar to those obtained by Maria Ossowska. As such, not only are efforts aimed at building a single analytical definition of the concept of morality doomed to failure, but so too are attempts to construct a few concepts based on the distinguished criteria. Various concepts of morality may be constructed on this basis, and a variety of linguistic proposals would emerge even after taking into account only the arbitrary definitions projecting within the area of specific criteria. Therefore, the proposal to distinguish a few concepts of morality may be treated as an attempt to create order among the definitional criteria rather than as a solution to the problem of there being no definition of the concept of morality (Kiciński 1989, pp. 55–62).

Establishing the specificity of moral norms is therefore possible to a significantly greater degree than Ossowska suggests. A methodological weakness was pointed out in her typological approach, with its tendency towards classification. She considered it essential to find a criterion enabling the correct classification of all judgments and norms. "She treated moral norms, and probably other social norms as well, as heavily objectivised entities, while their equally objectivised character was subjected to testing by means of criteria referring to individual experiences" (Kiciński 1989, p. 74).

The solution pointed out implies a possibility arising from this approach, which requires one to assume that there exist sensations unequivocally possessing a moral character. In contrast to Ossowska's position, it is accepted that one of the main sensations is the sense of moral duty or obligation. For the validity of this thesis to be confirmed, the fact that people distinctly feel the moral character of sensations accompanying a certain number of judgments and norms must be established empirically.

In regard to other judgments and norms, on the other hand, they are confident that they do not have such sensations. The primary objective of this approach is to determine the specific nature of these sensations. An individual who is capable of forming a view of the nature and specificity of their own moral and non-moral sensations will have the psychological criterion for their own individual concept of morality. Norms and judgments that are indisputably moral, closely correlated with these sensations, can be distinguished on the basis of such a criterion. In addition, norms and judgments unquestionably non-moral are distinguished; in their case, there is no doubt as to the occurrence of these sensations. One can also distinguish judgments and norms in regard to which the nature of the accompanying sensations is uncertain.

The individual concept of morality thus obtained can, for the sociologist and psychologist, constitute a valuable research fact – to which Maria Ossowska did not attribute undue significance. This allows the researcher of morality to conduct analyses that detect interpersonal differences in the understanding of morality. The essence of this proposition is to correctly determine the problem in methodological terms rather than to define to what degree it is possible to carry it out (Kiciński 1989, pp. 73–80).

Maria Ossowska's personal sympathies and antipathies with regard to moral phenomena also had a significant impact on the shaping of the concept of morality. She highly valued human goodness and dignity, and as a person acknowledging the moral subjectivity of all living beings, she did not justify human dignity by invoking the argument that humans possess a soul or hold a unique position among living beings. She denied dignity to those who did not conform to specific rules. However, the "negative procedure" for determining what dignity is gave rise to doubt concerning the methodology. After all, for one to assume, even hypothetically and very tentatively, that such and such behaviours constitute a violation of dignity, one must have already held beforehand some concept of dignity, outlined in the most general of terms, and have a fairly clear view as to which issues the notion of dignity refers, and to which it does not apply (Kojder 2015, p. 53). Her substantial methodological culture would not allow her to justify human

rights by invoking "natural dignity". The content of this notion is concretised thanks to account being taken of social perceptions of human rights and freedoms. She was not a proponent of the deductive style of formulating detailed human rights and freedoms, and such a stance does not differentiate her from that taken today by defenders of human rights (Kiciński 1997, pp. 90–91).

Modifying her position on the concept of morality, Maria Ossowska distinguished two divisions. One, by bringing together the rules of conduct dictated by kindness towards others (soft virtues), she associated with the moral current of hygiene of social coexistence. The second division, drawn from the perfectionist current (hard virtues), prescribed respect for the dignity of the individual. It was pointed out that hard virtues could be included among virtues related to the principles of social coexistence, since they defend the good that one's own dignity constitutes.

The modification of Ossowska's views became the basis for the construction of a typology of the moral feeling of social collectives. Morality was recognised as an instrument for the harmonising of the interests of the individual and their group. The basic criterion distinguishing types of moral orientation was how the individual justified the values and norms commanding respect for oneself and others. The following types of moral orientation were distinguished:

- Pro-social, commanding respect and consideration for the good of others. It constitutes a kind of "lubricant", mitigating social friction, while at the same time constituting a fundamental factor of social bonding.
- Dignity-based, commanding self-respect as a value. This may be treated as reinforcing the pro-social orientation, or as its counterweight. It introduces an axiological element between the group and the individual, as it allows the individual to treat themselves on a par with others in terms of moral value. The individual can thereby make positive moral judgments about actions that serve to realise their own goods.
- Reciprocal, inducing respect for an equilibrium of goods that is beneficial to oneself and others. This orientation is expressed in the principle of "I give so that you may give" (*do ut des*). The egocentrism contained here can range from "nothing for free" to "always try to reciprocate".
- Rigidistic, commanding respect for rules, the violation of which is unconditionally something bad. This orientation concerns norms of absolute moral content and is treated as an indicator of the moral character of norms.

All orientations have a complex character, but each is characterised by certain essential features that distinguish it from the others (Kiciński 1983b, pp. 96–101).

Maria Ossowska's introduction of ethos as a new cognitive category in the sociology of morality was seen as overcoming the limitations of the subjective category of *Weltanschauung* (Podgórecki 1995, p. 277). In studies of morality, the concept of ethos was not only a research tool, but also made it possible to characterise the concept of morality. The position that Ossowska took in regard to this concept has been shown to have evolved. When analysing bourgeois morality, she employed her own construction of ethos as a certain kind of morality, constituting a system of particular features: a set of bourgeois virtues.

Tracing the social determinants of morality, Maria Ossowska considered ethos a concept broader than morality, and as such, easier to define. Here, one can observe a shift in the position regarding the secondary nature of moral values. She recognised moral values as having to be based on a specific hierarchy of non-moral values. Due to the difficulties in defining the concept of morality, she understood ethos as a defined hierarchy of values adopted in a given society. It was expressed in a set of behaviours distinctive of the group concerned, a set containing a certain core of dominant values from which derivative values could be deduced (Mejbaum 1989, pp. 86–87).

In the final stage of her scientific work, Maria Ossowska employed a fullyformed concept of ethos, strongly emphasising its connections with the notion of the role model, described as a meta-stance. A system of values, normative in character, takes on the tangible form of a person who is the object of imitation. Yet this is not a characterisation of an individual's morality, since the main feature of ethos is its application for the study of collective morality (Podgórecki 1976, p. 277; Mejbaum 1989, p. 88; Goćkowski, Hołowiecka 1981, p. 160).

The foregoing of a description of morality in an individual dimension in favour of the anthropological category of ethos was described as a success in terms of theory. The enrichment of ethos with the idea of meta-stance enabled the descriptive perspective to be combined with the normative. It was now possible in sociology to simultaneously analyse both the sphere of social facts and postulates. "This is an approach that is epistemologically possible, because ethos, as a model of behaviour recommended within a given community, may be treated jointly as a model both real and normative" (Podgórecki 1995, p. 278). This resulted in numerous works reflecting on the concept of ethos, as well as sociological analyses of the peasant ethos, undertaken by Podgórecki, Goćkowski, Siekierski, Tischner, Sokołowski,

Halamska, Fedyszak-Radziejowska, Styk, Kiciński, Mariański, Zdrenka and others.

It has been noted that Maria Ossowska's depiction, in which ethos is treated as a model of expected and recommended behaviour, may be combined with the notion of behaviour popularised by Anthony Giddens. His theoretical position is likened to the situation of ethos because it combines the normative and factual aspects of social reality. It has been pointed out that the endeavours to adequately explain this notion were preceded by Maria Ossowska's convincing portrayal (Podgórecki 1995, p. 278).

The sociology of morality as an empirical science initiated in Durkheim's school is still in a state of creation and crystallisation (Mariański 1989, p. 5). In this context, Maria Ossowska's work is described in sociological literature as innovative and constitutes an important contribution to the development of the new scientific discipline. Nobody before her had presented a comprehensive programme of research on the sociological aspect of morality (Piwowarski 1966, pp. 67–70; Nowak 1972, p. 6). This raised the question among researchers of her oeuvre as to how this discipline should be treated: as an integral part of the science of morality, an independent discipline within the subject of general sociology, or as a certain aspect of the sociology of culture? Ossowska's position situates the sociology of morality as a descriptive science, practised within the science of morality. As has been pointed out, however, Ossowska provides the grounds for treating the sociology of morality as a distinct field of general sociology (Piwowarski 1966, p. 71). It constitutes, as the result of deliberate research intent, a systematically ordered branch of general sociology. Such a classification is possible thanks to Ossowska's deliberations and search for specific regularities in the tendencies of collective behaviours in diverse but interconnected fields. These regularities indicate moral behaviours and opinions shaped by social conditions. Therefore, such elements as moral approval or disapproval cannot be reduced to issues that are the subject of other branches of sociology (Podgórecki 1964, pp. 197–198).

A significant problem in the sociology of morality is the interpretation of the claim that morality is a social phenomenon. The absence of a clear-cut position on this matter is emphasised as a characteristic feature of Maria Ossowska's work. She addressed only the interpretation of morality as a social fact in Durkheim's views, focusing on pointing out the weaknesses of his idea. She concentrated instead on the actual issues of the science, which require a comprehensive and uniform approach. A materialist or humanist interpretation of the social fact leads to the adoption of specific conceptions

of morality, and within that, theories, directions, and methods of research (Piwowarski 1966, p. 73).

Only on the grounds of Maria Ossowska's entire works is a response to the above charges possible. A distinctive feature of her scientific style is the tendency to avoid unambiguous statements in situations that might upset the image of the research findings being as objective as possible. This is evident in the example of the concept of morality. She chose not to reveal it, choosing instead in her *Foundations of the Science of Morality* to abandon her working hypothesis.

Maria Ossowska's conception of the sociology of morality is described as a set of statements based on the conviction that its social conditioning, as an internally differentiated phenomenon, can be encapsulated in a web of social variables. Because of how the social genesis and the functions of specific moral norms are considered, such a grasp of the sociology of morality is classified as part of the deliberations within cultural theory. In its metatheoretical aspect, it contains a systematisation and critical analysis of views from the sociology of morality. These views serve a dual role: both as a source of hypotheses and as the object of study (Karpiński 1989, pp. 60–65).

Ossowska's critical reflections are primarily oriented towards identifying weaknesses in the conception of social determinants of morality. She was noted to have not countered the criticised claims with her own views, which is described as a kind of *docta ignorantia*. As a result, one can see the limited explanatory power of these theories. For these reasons, the considerations conducted by the author of *Sociology of Morality* are treated as "the ground being cleared for sensible deliberations in this particular area" (as with *Foundations of the Science of Morality*) (Jankowski 1963, p. 162).

The programme of the sociology of morality is also interpreted as atheoretical, and as such, it has a solely sociographic character. The analyses conducted by Maria Ossowska remained at the same level as the views studied; they were based on the collection and systematisation of materials (Neyman 1977, pp. 77–78). The individual elements of these conclusions align with Ossowska's opinions. In her introduction to *Sociology of Morality*, she wrote that the fundamental aim of her work was to find, collect, and systematise views and test hypotheses in the area of the sociology of morality (Ossowska 1986b, p. 17).

There is another side to the science of morality that draws attention, namely, considerations in the anthropology of morality. This is regarded as a manifestation of and factor in the anthropologisation of thought, constituting an expression of the formation of a new era in the history of European culture: that of postmodernism. Maria Ossowska demonstrated

a substantial interest in cultural otherness, particularly in relation to moral judgments and norms (Nowicka 1997, pp. 83–85).

In Ossowska's works, one can distinguish three types of application of examples drawn from foreign cultures. Firstly, she employed the category of ethos to resolve typological problems, enabling her to conduct comparative studies on class and cultural differentiation in developed societies. As such, her reference to the aristocratic cultures of Japan or the Incas was intended to highlight the fundamental elements of the system of European culture. Secondly, examples of moral judgments and norms from foreign and genetically different cultures were used by Ossowska to verify hypotheses concerning the determinants of morality. The more genetically distant and diverse the cultures regarding similar variables, the more legitimate the hypothesis under verification became. And thirdly, Ossowska incorporated examples from foreign cultures into her teaching (Nowicka 1977, pp. 91–93).

Maria Ossowska thus comes across as a precursor of many elements of cultural and social anthropology. Her *Sociology of Morality* is therefore described as the anthropology of morality, the science of culturally variable moral norms and their realisations (Nowicka 1997, pp. 85–86). It is emphasised that deliberations on the sociology of morality constitute an integral and sometimes indistinguishable part of discussions classed under cultural theory (Karpiński 1989, p. 61).

Analyses of Maria Ossowska's methodological themes have pointed out that her sociology of morality can be understood in two ways. Firstly, the sociology of morality, as broadly understood, encompasses an analysis of the social references of moral currents defined in terms of content, and therefore typological and historical issues, together with historical claims relating to specific societies and cultures. Secondly, the narrower understanding refers to historical sources, but does not aim to formulate claims regarding specific societies or cultures. The issues and claims addressed in *Sociology of Morality* are therefore anachronistic and ahistorical (Karpiński 1989, p. 64).

It has been pointed out that, for Ossowska, the systematisation and critical analysis of views in the sociology of morality was both an object of her deliberations and a source of research hypotheses (Karpiński 1989, p. 65). These were usually the conceptions of cultural theorists, among whom she preferred those who had experience in research in the field. In her reconstructions, Ossowska took into account the different semantic layers of a particular writer's views. In addition, the analysis of sources of historical materials, carefully selected in regard to the degree of perception and scope of influence, *hic et nunc*, played an important role in her research. The theorists emphasise that the principal directives Ossowska was guided by

in her selection of ethical texts for analysis include the conviction that they constituted an element of the moral feeling of the people from the same period from which these writings originated (Kiciński 1984, p. 17).

A notable feature of Maria Ossowska's reflections on morality is the comparative method, despite historical analyses predominating in most of her works. However, in contemporary societies, participatory observation has prevailed. She distrusted all survey research due to the emotional biases of respondents and researchers, and her overriding methodological directive recommending objectivism, therefore, seems understandable. Her characteristic reticence in expressing her own attitudes towards the issues analysed is interpreted not as a principal methodological assumption, but as a singular method of preventing the possible distortion of the content being conveyed (Kiciński 1984, pp. 14–18).

There are explicit references to functionalism, understood as a theory present in sociology and cultural anthropology, as well as a methodology, in Ossowska's works. Functionalism, which in the study of moral phenomena assumes that every moral norm serves a need of some kind, is, in her opinion, theoretically sterile and false. She reveals the weakness of this theory, which involves the psychological concepts of need and interest, rendering it sterile or patently false. For these reasons, Ossowska rejected this theory as of no use in sociological studies of morality. Only the methodological directive of functionalism, which prescribes the study of the functioning of moral norms and judgments in a particular society, has heuristic value. When stating that she borrows this methodological directive from functionalism and applies it in her studies, Maria Ossowska stipulated that it should not be treated as a functionalist confession of faith. In her opinion, the adoption of functionalism's methodological thesis does not mean acceptance of its empirical thesis (Ślęczek-Czakon 1989, pp. 107–108). It has also been shown that functionalism is present in most of Ossowska's deliberations on moral issues. These are:

- Issues of the social differentiation of morality, in which the conditioning of moral opinions and social models by objective attributes of the social structure and environment of the community concerned (for example, climate, or population density) constitutes the actual area of research.
- Analyses of the functional relationships between morality and other cultural facts, as well as their historical-genetic relationships (such as Weber's concept of the relations between Puritan ethics and entrepreneurial ideology).
- The evaluation of functional relationships in the moral development of the group, as a feature of historical materialism.

This is the pattern of deliberations applied by Maria Ossowska in the sociology of morality, most often expressed in her critique of the conception of social determinants of morality. Ossowska's methodological programme was described as scientific functionalism, despite its anti-functionalistic stance (Kurczewski 1977, pp. 47–53).

An analysis of Maria Ossowska's attitude towards functionalism, as well as the manner in which she criticised this theory, has allowed her continuators to draw up the following observations:

- In her critique of functionalism, Ossowska focused on its falsification, and not on its possible adaptation for the needs of the sociology of morality. This is a feature of her general approach to scientific theories, as expressed in her analysis of the possibilities of disproving theories, coupled with a simultaneous lack of interest in the possibility of creating them.
- She saw the social reality in all of its complexity. She treated scientific theories in a strictly categorical manner, based on the criterion of truth and falsity. When facts are ascertained that negatively verify the legitimacy of a theory, such treatment excludes the possibility of its modification and bypasses the mechanism of the development of science.
- Maria Ossowska did not discern a difference in the way she and the writers whose works she discussed treated scientific theories. She demanded that theories unambiguously explain complex reality, disregarding the fact that these writers had different opinions. She took insufficient account of their objections or efforts aimed at perfecting their theories.
- It would seem that she did not take into account the fact that a functional analysis of the moral norms adopted in a given group cannot disregard historical transformations or cultural dynamics. This is particularly important if conducting a functional analysis of morality in a dynamic society. Ossowska observed that the changeability of the group situation could be a reason for the inadequacy of functional analysis. At the same time, new prospects related to the description of the mechanism behind the fading and forming of moral norms and values open up before the researcher. She did not treat her research as an example of the constructive adaptation of functional methods.
- In her analysis of the critical assumption of the social functions of specific moral norms, she overlooked Malinowski's directive prescribing the study of moral norms in the context of other social norms. Resolving the problem of the functionality of moral norms solely on the basis of their

content, suggesting particular needs, while disregarding knowledge of the culture as a whole and the conditions of existence of the society in question, is unjustifiable.

- Ossowska's adoption of biological survival as the fundamental need satisfied by a norm does not seem the most favourable version of verifying functionalism. The optimal situation would therefore be to accept the meaning that the analysed norm has for the cultural system of the group in question.
- Maria Ossowska's opinion is acknowledged as sound in regard to insufficient care being given in studies into the consequences of observing the norms recognised in a given society. This is probably the result of an eufunctional and not dysfunctional orientation regarding the aspects of the culture being investigated. Bearing in mind how the previous generation of scholars neglected this issue, attempts have been made to demonstrate that so-called primitive cultures are an adaptive group instrument, constituting an internally varied and structural whole, developed precisely over the generations.
- The pertinence of Maria Ossowska's indication of the dangers threatening functionalism should it apply an insufficiently explored concept of social need has been emphasised.
- Ossowska indicated difficulties encountered by functionalism applied in analyses of complex societies. In such conditions, the functional meaning of a moral norm may prove unclear or controversial.
- Maria Ossowska's conclusion that evolutionistic functionalism must lead to the recognition of reality as the best possible in every phase of development is disputed. Attention is drawn to the fact that only cultural mechanisms enabling better group adaptation are highlighted here.
- Maria Ossowska analysed functionalism exclusively as an empirical claim, even though apart from the empirical claim, she had discerned in the functionalistic thesis methodological guidelines prescribing that one search for the needs served by the norms being studied. Regardless of the above, the said guidelines maintain their value, suggesting that the social functions of norms be studied. If research were to reveal that certain norms are dysfunctional, that would not contradict the methodological directive of functionalism.

Although Maria Ossowska did not undertake an analysis of functionalism from the angle of its methodological directives, one can find broad and creative application of such in her research. This provides a basis for the assertion that the cognitive methods in her sociological work demonstrate a

functionalist perspective, especially in regard to the methods used (Kiciński 1984, pp. 38–45).

Maria Ossowska's research stance is frequently described as cognitive moral relativism, while the position she takes is known as axiological neutralism (Lazari-Pawłowska 1975; Nowicka 1997; Kiciński 1997). Although she never explicitly stated so, Ossowska leaned towards axiological relativism, though negating it on an emotional plane. Such an assertion is grounded on her position in regard to the absolutisation of moral judgments. In her view, a hunger for the absolute was an expression of weakness stemming from emotional needs. What vexed her the most in traditional moralism was the incontestability, the apodicticity and the categorical character of its postulates. Unable to believe in the possibility of an exhaustive ordering of moral life, she preferred a general knowledge of ethical orientations, combined with the ability to sublimate them under the appropriate conditions (Lazari-Pawłowska 1975, pp. 95–97; Kotarbiński 1966, pp. 3; Mariański 1989, pp. 181–182).

One can come across opinions that the position of moral relativism is shaped mainly under the influence of neo-positivism. The main argument supporting this thesis is the application of the model of the natural sciences, free from any value judgments, in the study of morality. This is why the sociology of morality treats the object of research solely as a product of social life, differentiated historically, geographically and culturally. Such an approach limits the cognitive possibilities of the sociology of morality to small and stable cultural communities.

At the same time, it is pointed out that highly developed societies, characterised by disturbances in their cultural development, or weakly developed communities whose independent development is in danger, are the subject of contemporary sociological studies. An error was therefore made in the assumptions of the sociology of morality, which limited its capabilities to analysing contemporary reality. The conviction that all moral values and norms are the product of society curtails the role and perspective of the individual, rendering it impossible to conduct deliberations on morality in terms of development. Morality, understood relatively and instrumentally in sociology, separates it from existential issues and the possibility of assigning value. The neo-positivistic approach of sociology, by eliminating the problem of absolute and universal values, limited its field of research to socially conditioned values and particularist norms, thereby making it impossible to introduce fixed valuing criteria or research the process of development in moral intuition. This is why a way of understanding moral values based on other philosophical conceptions is proposed. Treating

moral values in absolute terms would determine the direction of man's moral development and open up the field of existential reflection on the meaning and purpose of human life. The sociology of morality would then be fundamentally enriched with a new area of research, acquiring an autotelic sense, addressing values characterised by universality and endurance (Pawełczyńska 1992, pp. 207–212).

The position that the thesis of morality as a social fact requires the aspectual nature of scientific research to be taken into account is an expression of such a tendency. The fact that humans possess their own personal lives, frequently free of influences from their surroundings, is highlighted. As a being living in numerous dimensions, he creates society and is shaped by it. Morality as an object of research cannot be treated solely as a product of social and cultural factors. It is shared by those making up society. It is there that it develops and breaks down, integrating and giving direction to human activities. The sociologist studying the social manifestations of morality must be aware, in terms of research, of the limited nature of the field of moral experience, which essentially involves the relationships between morality and social life (Mariański 1990, pp. 13–18).

The opinion regarding Maria Ossowska's moral relativism is linked to her general worldview. Such an assertion is based on her conviction that it would be difficult to indicate universal moral norms, a conviction combined with her disbelief in the existence of objective values. At the same time, she is noted to have not considered values relative, nor has she considered judgments and norms unjustifiable. The certainty regarding the absence of universal moral norms was, for Ossowska, a natural consequence of her research into the morality of diverse cultures, eras, and social environments. An additional argument is that one cannot prove validity in axiological disputes as one would do in the case of disputes regarding facts. However, it is emphasised that this is an opinion to be treated with much caution. Maria Ossowska would probably disagree with such a qualification, claiming that relativism is not sufficiently justified as a general philosophical or methodological doctrine. Her scepticism towards doctrines proclaiming the absoluteness of values was a consequence of her methodological stance, treating with distrust all doctrines incapable of being thoroughly justified, including those proclaiming the relativity of all values (all the more so if this were to lead to the recognition of the validity of nihilism). Maria Ossowska's attitude towards the issue of the absoluteness of values and the justifiability of norms is described as agnosticism, involving the assertion of the impossibility of norms and values being justified by somebody whose thinking is marked by

precision and who demonstrates an appropriate standard of methodological culture (Kiciński 1997, pp. 94–95).

Maria Ossowska's character exemplified moral principlism. She was guided in life by carefully selected models, as she demonstrated a high degree of not only moral perfectionism, but also her private morality, which was convergent in many respects with Christian morality, despite her having parted ways with Christianity and being critical of many of its elements. She was shaped by Christian culture, which was expressed in her perfectionist aspirations and in her allocentric attitude (Kiciński 1997, pp. 94–96).

Continuation

Maria Ossowska prepared the ground for broader and more extensive sociological reflection. Addressing selected themes in morality, corresponding to a specific collective, she conducted analyses that required "travel in time and space", which was not conducive to the formation of expert opinions on the present day. That was a task undertaken by Mariański, whose work is dominated by themes connected to research into the moral condition of contemporary society. He conducted a review of the definitions of the sociology of morality and put together his own definition. In his portrayal, the sociology of morality examines the scientific-empirical explanation of mutual relations between morality and society (Mariański 2006, p. 104). He reveals new aspects and the complexity of these relations. Janusz Mariański emphasises the scientific-empirical character of the discipline, juxtaposing the analytical, descriptive, and explanatory study of the reality of moral phenomena with the axiological, normative and postulative concepts of morality (Jasińska-Kania 2010, p. 300).

Mariański advocates pluralism, a multitude and diversity of research methods in the sociology of morality, indicating the necessity to adjust them to the research issues and the context. He is aware of the strengths and drawbacks of the various research methods and techniques (historical-comparative, autobiographical, observation, interviews, tests and surveys – in regard to the latter arguing with Ossowska's rejection of them) and various kinds of quantitative and qualitative research (Jasińska-Kania 2010, p. 301).

One of the predominant research topics in his work concerns values of fundamental significance to the understanding of moral issues. The framework of his analyses, focusing on values, encompasses issues such as human dignity, the meaning of life, freedom, justice, the family, the preservation of life (including contraception and euthanasia), religion, social

order and reinforcing factors. The complementary element creating morality is that of norms. Mariański reflects on moral norms in reference to the norms contained in the Ten Commandments, including love of neighbour, truthfulness, property, marital fidelity, sexual behaviour, role models, and so on.

Mariański's deliberations also address issues that fall within the category of moral and social attitudes, taking into account the emotional, cognitive and behavioural dimensions. His reflections are set within contemporary dimensions and identified in the context of pragmatism. This made it possible to identify two fundamental features: the inclination to acquire all goods and make use of services for the purpose of satisfying individual needs, mainly connected with pleasure (consumptionism), and "learned moral helplessness", connected to the inability to surmount the new challenges that are posed by the modern world.

In Mariański's reflections on morality, certain questions reveal his concern for social conditions and how a good society should be constructed. Where sociology is concerned, he puts forward the demand that, as something close to people, it not be restricted solely to description and explanation without the function of supporting people in their attempts to organise their common home. Among its fundamental tasks, he includes searching for answers concerning what is changeable and what is enduring in the norms constructed on the moral values adopted and on the newly forming social and moral bonds. How can moral consensus be built in a highly pluralised society, with its "polytheism" of values and norms? In Mariański's works, as with Ossowska, there is a focus on maintaining the collective order, although one can also discern concern for the good of a particular person. He points to the necessity for giving meaning to human life in the existing conditions of moral relativism. This is possible through the individual's recourse to and acceptance of enduring values (universal good); responsibility for one's own life demands it. He sketches out a perspective of creating the conditions in which individuals, responsible for themselves, would function better in the human community (Zemło 2015, pp. 133–159).

The cultural paradigms of post-modernity

Zygmunt Bauman is among the creative continuators of deliberations on moral issues, including the issue of role models, which Maria Ossowska initiated. Neither the character nor the primary purpose of these reflections allows for even a synthetic presentation of Bauman's oeuvre. However, by way of introduction, a few words need to be said regarding the fundamental

components of his conceptions concerning the transformations observed in the sphere of morality.

In his critical analysis of the modern era, Bauman did not point out its fundamental weaknesses, that is, the domination of instrumental rationality, the development of technical civilisation, or finalistic thinking. Expanding on explorations dedicated to the adiaphoristic consequences of those properties, he focused on transformations in European culture from the second half of the twentieth century. These led to the emergence of a totally new formation: postmodernity. Here, the way of thinking in categories of projective utopia that had dominated in the era of modernism was shattered and replaced by an appreciation of heterogeneity, ambivalence and permanent variability. "Postmodernity is like modernity stepping into maturity; modernity looking back on itself from a distance rather than from within, taking stock of profits and losses, subjecting itself to psychoanalysis [...]. Postmodernity is modernity finding out about its own impossibility; self-controlling modernity – consciously recoiling from what it used to do subconsciously" (Bauman 1995, p. 314, quoted in Brzeziński 2015b, p. 163). Bauman emphasised clearly that postmodernity is an opportunity for the development of morality. "The postmodern perspective fosters wisdom; postmodern conditions hinder the actions prompted by this wisdom. Roughly speaking, this is the reason why we are experiencing postmodern times as a state of crisis" (Bauman 1996, p. 323, quoted in Brzeziński 2015b, p. 168). The development of postmodernity is threatened mainly by consumerism and the process of individualisation. "People tossed into a postmodern society have, so to speak, no escape; they have to look their own moral autonomy in the eye, and as such their own, unappropriated and inalienable moral responsibility" (Bauman 1994, p. 84, quoted in Brzeziński 2015b, p. 32). This is due to a distinctive feature of life in fluid modernity: the extreme difficulty of discerning oneself in the dense network of dependencies, rules and rights subject to permanent variability (Brzeziński 2015b, p. 165).

Bauman's critique of most of the transformations taking place in the contemporary world was correlated with the need to think in terms of alternatives. This creates an interpretative context for his vision of "morality without ethics", in which he asserted the dysfunctionality of code ethics in relation to the development of individuals' moral sensitivity. Bauman refers to the philosophy of dialogue, particularly to the works of Emmanuel Levinas, and postulates basing moral acts on totally different foundations: on pre-societal sources of morality. He also questions the possibility of appealing to an external gauge that enables the assessment of one's commitment to the

good of the Other. In Bauman's depiction, morality is born on every occasion of an "I–Other" relationship, and therefore cannot be universalised. Because a constitutive feature of "being with the Other" is the uncertainty deriving from the impossibility of satisfying the needs of the other person, this morality has no room for rationality, reciprocity or a sense of fulfilment. Despite Bauman's increasingly pessimistic assessment of the condition of postmodernity, he indicates the opportunities that the vision of "morality without ethics" entails. When talking about the possibilities of contemporary sociology, he points to the potential for applying the constitutive properties of his own conception to other planes of social life, including politics. Last but not least, one should note that Bauman devotes a great deal of attention to the need for expanding individual moral responsibility to embrace global society (Brzeziński 2015a, p. 44, 2015b, pp. 162–168).

Bauman developed his concept of postmodern role models by analysing the pilgrim model, which was shaped in the modern era. He emphasised that neither this nor his other concepts of role models are universal. One cannot apply the models' classification and characterisation either to the lowest or to the highest classes. In his concept, Bauman distinguished the models of the pilgrim, the stroller, the vagabond, the tourist, and the player. Whereas the first of these refers to the modern era, the rest are situated in postmodernity (Bauman 1994, *passim*).

When analysing modernity, in which Maria Ossowska discerned the strengthening and dissemination of bourgeois models, Bauman referred to the figure of the pilgrim, which had become established in sociological literature under the influence of Weber's hypothesis of a "selective affinity" between Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. In Bauman's interpretation, the pilgrim figure personifies the main features of modern human life: "intentionality" and the habit of assessing every fragment of life and every achievement in life from the point of view of whether they bring one closer to or take one further away from the moment of reaching one's goal; therefore, pilgrimage is not a choice, but destiny. Achieving salvation, the destination point of the pilgrimage, is the sole and most important goal in life, to which everything else is to be subordinated.

In the Calvinist version of Puritan ethics, Weber indicated the necessity of leading a life filled only with good work, leading to the ultimate goal. Therefore, every action brings one closer to the goal, or takes one further from it – but it is then useless, meaningless, and reprehensible from the point of view of rational man. It is therefore an ardently religious model.

Yet, this model of life can also exist in a secular form. Just as Ossowska, who noted the secular nature of Franklin's role model, Bauman, striving to

free morality from religion, writes that in its secular form, the pilgrim model can be a model of modern man's life strategy. The goal of the pilgrim in the secular version is "to fulfil their vocation" – meaning the consistent and fully accomplished construction of identity. The purpose of the pilgrimage determines the choice of means, while a rational life demands that the route be calculated and that the travel conditions, costs, and the efficiency of the methods of transport be analysed.

Both the religious and secular models of the pilgrim were moulded in a stable and potentially transparent social world. A modern world in which life could be planned with a high degree of confidence and determination, because the social system there was grounded on immutable and objective principles, uninfluenced by the individual's plans or their implementation. The pilgrimage was a lifelong plan, a project in which constant and consistent effort was made to achieve the central, unchanging goal. The consistent realisation of the construction of individual identity was to proceed pursuant to the successive stages of this plan. Successive achievements were viewed here as investments, laying the foundations for the realisation of further specific goals that ultimately led to the main objective. The accumulation of this capital promised a future of comfortable consumption.

According to Bauman, this vision was still distant and accessible to few, since it depended on the goal currently desirable remaining unchanged in the future, on the entitlements already achieved (contributions of capital) still being as valuable as today and not succumbing to devaluation. In postmodernity, though, these conditions are not fulfilled, and the pilgrim model loses its appeal as a prototype of a sensible life strategy. Bauman stresses that the "pilgrim" metaphor he uses refers only to the middle classes, to which he applies the Hegelian definition of freedom based on law as an understood necessity, where the life of individuals involves the identification of what is constantly necessary and inevitable, and acting accordingly. Only in this way could one free oneself from a painful clash with the world of norms (Bauman 1994, pp. 10–13).

The Stroller

For many researchers, the stroller has become the crowning symbol of modern existence. The perspective of the stroller or observer expresses a contemporary way of seeing the world, a type of experience. The observer and the observing are doomed to ignorance and conjecture, giving almost unlimited freedom of interpretation. This makes the stroller, hidden in the crowd, the director of plays in which passers-by, unknowing and

unprotesting, are the cast. A walk in the city becomes an experience of freedom, independent of the will or whims of others. It is freedom born of ignorance, powerless, the kind that has no impact on reality. Superficial in nature, one could say it's a façade. The stroller's world is a theatre, its stage the street, pedestrians its involuntary actors, and the stroller – a director of plays devoid of prologue and closure. Life is a game in which nobody is who they seem to be. This cultural paradigm was shaped in modern society, a society of strangers, people with neither the hope nor the inclination to overcome this alienation. The conditions of postmodernity favour democratisation of the stroller model, leading to its far-reaching transformation. It is a model for those in possession of time and money, but who also have aesthetic desires: it is for customers. As Bauman notes, the modern-day stroller unwittingly yields to will that is realised through the desires awakened within them. In this mass spectacle of a shopping promenade, nothing depends on or belongs to them; not the scenery, not the script, not the directing.

However, there is still room here for unanticipated events, for surprise, for unbridled adventure. To prevent this, the world of shopping made its way into the stroller's home, where – ostensibly – the stroller achieves the peak of sovereignty and liberty. This became possible thanks to television. Inside private dwellings, the television screen took over the function of urban space outside, becoming the central and most willingly frequented catwalk of the postmodern stroller. The unprecedented scale of the sensations, the panache and the ability to rapidly change images opened up the possibility of experiencing perpetual adventures within everyday life. Television reality imposes itself as a world perfect in every respect through the power of obviousness and persuasion, becoming the standard and the measure for everyday life. Bauman claims that "we are all strollers [...] every day, everywhere" (Bauman 1994, p. 26). We live in a paradise of a world of shopping; in a gigantic monument filled with baubles, one in which we can disguise ourselves at will. In the world of the stroller, things are devoid of dead weight, and only the satisfaction one knows how to extract from them gives them significance (Bauman 1994, pp. 21–26).

The Vagabond

At the dawn of the modern era, the aimless vagabond was a negation of the prevailing order. The vagabond eluded control, did not have to respect the existing norms, and found it easy to abandon a place where he did not accept the norms being followed. The situation changed at the decline of the modern era. Vagrancy is becoming an asset, because it does not

threaten social order, as the order is maintained with the aid of enticements – gentle enslavement beneath the false guise of freedom of choice. Vagrancy is no longer seen as threatening and is becoming essential for the self-reproduction of the social order, dependent on the power of temptation based on diversity and a kaleidoscopic variability of bait. The durability and continuity of goals, which demarcate the monotonous rhythm of life and the limitedness of needs, testify to backwardness or ignorance, and for the new social order is destructive and of little use. Postmodernity is characterised by variability in one's resolutions, habits and preferences. The vagabond is shifting from the margins of society to mainstream postmodern life. If people in modernity were "pilgrims through life", then today "we are all (to a small degree) vagabonds". Like the pilgrim, the vagabond spends life on the road and treats every situation in which they find themselves as transitory, since life is mainly movement and change. However, unlike the pilgrim, the vagabond doesn't know where the wandering will take them; nevertheless, this is not treated as a problem, since meaning is drawn solely from the wandering itself. The most important thing is the capacity for being on the move; the vagabond is attracted by hope unfulfilled, pushed by hope dispelled. Their route is the cemetery of hopes and disappointments, yet the vagabond knows well what they are running from; they just have little idea of where they are heading. What matters is achieving maximum satisfaction today, rather than forming lasting affiliations and relationships. The vagabond treats their environment as a collection of opportunities to be taken advantage of. They treat the world not as a garden, but rather as a pasture (Bauman 1994, pp. 27–30).

The Tourist

Travelling has long been a thing. Merchants, soldiers, students and pilgrims all travelled, but nobody was a tourist. The tourist is a product of modernity, and the goal of their journeying is to collect impressions. They are driven by a desire for adventure. The tourist does not succumb to the influences and rules of the world they visit, and when paying for it, they expect their demands to be fulfilled. The world visited by the tourist should deliver experiences different from those lived through to date. It is the tourist's home that sets the criterion for their assessment of the experiences and otherness so anticipated, while their extraterritoriality relieves them of responsibility for the situation and conditions in the world they travel in. While discovering, the tourist wishes to remain unrecognised. The tourist "assimilates without being assimilated; 'tames' the foreignness of others, proudly flaunting their

own foreignness. And all this (so the tourist believes) without bringing the devoured world into disrepute, without straining its virginity" (Bauman 1994, p. 32).

The places visited are marked by hiking trails, which are supposed to be safe and free of surprises; they are meant to serve the collection of impressions. Bit by bit, everybody in the postmodern world is a tourist; wherever they are, they are passing through. Every stop in life is treated as a hotel close to places of interest. For accumulated experiences to have their appropriate value, a home is needed; a home, as a postulate, justification or excuse, to be able wherever one is to feel "away from home". The domesticity of everyday life is meant, without restraint, to serve the experiencing of a life of pretence thanks to what the hotel offers, because we know that it is "only a hotel" (Bauman 1994, pp. 30–33).

The Player

The player operates in a world of permanent risk and the related uncertainty, while guile is their sole means of survival. Their entire effort is directed towards winning, which can be achieved by many paths: cooperation with a partner, or a victorious fight against an opponent. The competition leaves no room for fondness, mercy, or helping one another. The nature of the game is defined by the rules appropriate to it, which release the player from any scruples in pursuing the goal of winning; the game is war, and it ends in victory or defeat. But it is also merely a game, and it does not deserve to be treated in any other way.

Successes and failures are an inherent part of this model, comprising endless battles, contests, matches and encounters. Regarding the other models, Bauman claims that in the postmodern world, we are all players to a small degree, and we have no say in the matter. In the postmodern world, devoid of any rules whatsoever, life is a series of games, provided that we have abandoned rules altogether. There is therefore neither necessity nor chance here, while risk calculation replaces certainty, and gambling replaces determination, as the rules of meaningful action (Bauman 1994, pp. 33–36). "Not everything can happen in this world, but nothing has to happen either; also little is irrevocable, and little is unrecoverable. How the card is played becomes all the more important" (Bauman 1994, p. 36).

One might say, quoting Bauman, that the models presented above demonstrate that contemporary culture prioritises individualistic consumerism over concern for the Other. Long-term commitment and selfless sacrifice have been devalued, while private, individual happiness

remains the highest good, rather than the struggle against the suffering of others (Brzeziński 2015b, p. 168). To paraphrase Ossowska's claim regarding Stoic ethics, one could say that the models sketched out by Bauman are largely an expression of an ethics of resignation.

The bourgeois ethos – universal or global?

One should also note the voluminous study devoted to the comparative juxtaposition of the chivalric and bourgeois ethos (personified by the characters of Don Quixote and Robinson Crusoe). In addressing the issue of the universalisation of the bourgeois ethos, Marcin Zdrenka sought to determine what made the content of both paradigms (ethos) useful or redundant. Confronting the bourgeois and chivalric traditions (liberal and feudal), the author adopts the assumption (to be found in Ossowska's work in the form of interference of noble and bourgeois models) that moral culture is the effect of currents and traditions rubbing off each other. The classic bourgeoisie, aspiring for emancipation, is defined here as the "fighting bourgeoisie". Upon the moment of victory, it was transformed into the modern bourgeoisie, which Zdrenka described using the term "quashed bourgeoisie" (Zdrenka 2003, p. 115).

The theoretical framework for deliberations concerning the universalisation of the bourgeois ethos was set by two elements. The element of reflection on the relationship between chivalric and bourgeois ethos is expounded upon and reconstructed after Maria Ossowska. The second element, concerning metaethical provenance, is an analysis of Alasdair MacIntyre's theory of morality. His deliberations concerning universalisation of the bourgeois ethos are accompanied by the call for introducing a programme in the moral canon that demolishes and reconstructs the entire universe of European culture (Zdrenka 2003, p. 117). However, MacIntyre's analyses led him to claim that these of the universalisation of the bourgeois ethos cannot be substantiated; the difference in methodological approaches – meaning the incoherence of Ossowska's and MacIntyre's concepts – stands in the way. This gives rise to problems with universalisation, since there can be no question of continuing the research conducted by Ossowska within the outlined framework. Because the search for a universal bourgeois ethos risks betraying one of the main principles of the research project, ultimately Zdrenka asserts that "if morality is to be universal, then it is no longer (specifically) bourgeois. Since that is so, then the wording of the main thesis is faulty" (Zdrenka 2003, p. 244).

However, later in his reflections, Zdrenka formulates the hypothesis that a member of the bourgeoisie is an emotivist. This claim is accompanied by several theses: that contemporary moral discourse is in a state of unconscious disintegration, while a manifestation of this crisis is the non-conclusiveness of moral disputes coupled with the false conviction that objective and rational standards for resolving them exist. The causes of this disintegration should be sought in the collapse of the teleological model of thinking about morality during and after the Enlightenment. This is why the only concept sanctioning this state of affairs in moral philosophy is emotivism. A way out of the crisis is not possible without a return to the bosom of Aristotelianism, Thomism or another conception of morality constructed on a teleological order. The features of ethos identified as bourgeois have their deeper roots in the processes of the general transformation of modern European morality, which follows the path of the decline of teleological ethics, the problems of contemporary ethics, and emotivism. Hence, the hypothesis in its extremely simplified version: "A Bourgeois is an emotivist" (Zdrenka 2003, pp. 246–247).

The dissimilarity of the deliberations lies in the departure from the historical entanglements present in Ossowska's work, and the adoption – following MacIntyre – of the way of seeing moral content influencing the current moral situation. Citing MacIntyre, Zdrenka indicates the dismantling of the Enlightenment's teleological way of thinking about good (virtue), which deprived moral actions of a cause-and-effect type of rationality. Hence, too, moral actions can be rational and right not only by the power of anachronistic justification deriving from tradition. The chivalric ethos already seems like a relic of the past, having lost its power of influence. The ethics of virtues stemming from antiquity is already normatively anachronistic and sterile in its justifiability of action. The bourgeois ethos is based on the new criterion of the rightness of judgments, which is determined by the utility and efficiency of the action, tying the action to its purpose, and the aptness of the choice of means – to success. This is a new type of instrumental rationality, the core of which is calculability and effectiveness, the attachment of rationality to what is beneficial, effective, and useful. However, rationality reduced to the dimension of utility loses sight of the issues of purposefulness and purposelessness. "We lose sight of thinking about the actual purpose of action: thinking in terms of *how?* might entirely obscure our thinking in terms of *what for?*" (Zdrenka 2003, pp. 267–268). This could lead to interpersonal relationships being granted a manipulative dimension, since the sphere of instrument expands while the sphere of purpose shrinks. The bourgeois, pursuing pragmatism, belittles the debate about goals, while the Enlightenment philosopher seeks to justify moral norms anew, basing

them on the existence of an autonomous sphere of Reason (Zdrenka 2003, pp. 278–279). This leads Zdrenka to the observation about the bourgeois character of generalisation; therefore, where there is the search for a universal morality, there is most probably a bourgeois moral culture. However, this has led to the disintegration of the functionalist understanding of the concept of “good”, as well as the emergence and petrification of the opposition between what is absolutely moral and what serves instrumental, non-moral purposes (Zdrenka 2003, p. 279).

Referring to Bauman, who negates the category of universalisation as an anachronistic invention of philosophers and proposes using the word “globalisation” instead, Zdrenka ostensibly suspends the issue of bourgeois morality. “After all, whereas universalisation is a conscious process of introducing order, of amalgamating, of categorising according to a single criterion, and constitutes an effect of man’s rational effort, globalisation “happens” by itself, it is not projected, but is rather noticed, thanks to the surprising features constantly reappearing anew (Bauman 2000, pp. 5, 75, 122, quoted in Zdrenka 2003, pp. 280–282). Both philosophers of the Enlightenment and moralists – the instigators of the bourgeois ethos – desired to lend their projects a global dimension (in the sense of universal). They sought a universal skeleton key, granting meaning and moral value to their actions in extremely different places and situations.

So far, Zdrenka agrees with Bauman. But by placing the emphasis on a different aspect of reflection, he searches for universal characteristics of a different global process: emotivisation. Emotivism itself, he claims, is “the polar opposite to the project of a systemic placating of the normative sphere, essentially flowing from the same spring as the Enlightenment projects of justifying morality” (Zdrenka 2003, p. 281).

Following Weber and MacIntyre, Zdrenka notes two predominant types of attitude in emotivist culture: the Rich Aesthetes (Veblen’s vanity class), and the Managers (the mature character of Robinson Crusoe), and writes that in the modern day these two antagonistic types of attitude have merged (Zdrenka 2003, p. 283). His rationale for this assertion is MacIntyre’s position, claiming that “our society is a society in which bureaucracy and individualism are equally partners and antagonists. And it is precisely in such a cultural climate of that bureaucratic individualism that the emotivist personality feels at home” (MacIntyre 1996, p. 81, quoted in Zdrenka 2003, p. 283). It is the great McDonald’s, feeding the unproductive masses with an illusion of life, and the world of the Aesthetes, conjuring up the semblance of free and autonomous decision-making in one’s choice of action. Such a bleak vision of the future is not at odds with the conception of a division

into Aesthetes and Managers, and, therefore, the bourgeois is an emotivist (Zdrenka 2003, pp. 285–286). The essence here lies in the emphasis on justifying the meaningfulness of action through practical utility, understood in an extremely instrumental manner. Emotivism, disclosing the form of disputes, especially of a moral nature, reveals that contemporary discussions rely essentially on emotional manipulation. Therefore, in the light of the deliberations conducted, the bourgeois and the emotivist are similar, drawing their vision of the world and the way they react from the same source; thus, the bourgeois is an emotivist, or emotivism is, in its essence, bourgeois.¹

Zdrenka owes the conclusions that he reached through painstaking inquiry (as he describes it) to the possibility of shifting the centre of gravity from the sociological analyses conducted by Ossowska to MacIntyre's theory of morality. Universalisation has bourgeois Enlightenment roots, being grounded on the non-functionalistic understanding of the term "good" (Zdrenka 2003, p. 289). One would like to say that in a certain sense, Zdrenka repeated the path of reflection taken by Hume, for whom emotions were the basis for issuing moral judgments (Hume 1919, p. 16). The source of the weakness of universalisation would seem to be here, since reason does not deliver any moral sanction for the existence of the world, as it does not deliver moral sanctions (Baczko 1971, pp. 212–213). "Reason is entirely inactive, and can never be a source of a factor as active as the conscience of moral sense" (Hume 1952, p. 254). Reason can therefore provide knowledge on the means for resolving, but it can never deliver knowledge about purposes (Jedynak 1974, pp. 76). In the light of this assertion, that disjunction, the loss of the possibility of connecting the Enlightenment debate about ends and means, seems totally understandable. Reason, participating in judgment, instructs us about the qualities of deeds and their consequences, but in itself is not sufficient for issuing praise or moral condemnation (Ossowska 1966, p. 288). As Hume said, no moral value or norm flows from any knowledge of facts or any reasoning about the relations between ideas (Hume 1952, p. 254). Bauman is fully aware of this when he writes of the necessity of the transition to liquid modernity.

¹ Zdrenka writes: "Henceforth 'bourgeois' means simply 'instrumentally rational'; 'managed effectively managerially'; but also 'hedonically aesthetic'; 'rational' but also 'superstitious'; finally – 'universal' or 'global', despite being 'subjective' or 'individual'" (Zdrenka 2003, p. 288).

Summary

The path that Maria Ossowska travelled can be synthesised in the title of this book, *Ethic and Morality*. The sociology of morality, initially conceived as a branch of the science of morality, has today become a fully autonomous sociological discipline. In this book, we have traced a certain process in which reflection on “ethical man” gradually evolved into reflection on “moral man”. It was the Polish scholar Maria Ossowska who provided the stimulus for establishing and developing a sociology of morality, creatively elaborating on Durkheim’s conception of the physics of customs, which was advanced by Lévy-Bruhl as a project for the science of customs. She joined the global current of sociological reflection by formulating a programme for the science of morality.

Fully aware of the dangers, entanglements, and pitfalls present in the tradition of research on ethical issues, Ossowska adopted the postulate of the objective study of the phenomena of moral life. By applying the methodological achievements of sociology, she identified objectivity as one of the chief directives of the programme for researching morality. Control of the researcher’s personal predilections, the pursuit of knowledge while refraining from judging the phenomena being studied, became the overriding research directive. The sociology of morality thereby maintained the characteristic set of features of the scientific frame of reference, coalescing into a scientific canon of conduct. This was a consequence of choice, primarily dictated by Ossowska’s neo-positivist grounding in classic scientific discourse, which took into account the tradition of research into issues within the scope of morality. She strived to maintain the neo-positivistic paradigm of this science, usually avoiding – but sometimes not revealing – being guided by values that she had a preference for. To put it in the most general terms, her findings concern the issues of moral phenomena in philosophical-historical and social terms. The inclusion of these issues,

which she elaborated and developed in her research, is already widely regarded as expressing fulfilment of the requirement for claims within the scope of the sociology of morality to be organised in the form of scientific theory. Today, the sociology of morality is recognised worldwide, mainly thanks to the academic works of Maria Ossowska and Zygmunt Bauman, while the sociological field of moral issues has lived to see the compilation of a lexicon in Poland (Mariański 2015b).²

The ontological approach to studying morality as a social phenomenon allows Maria Ossowska's proposed understanding of morality to be situated in an area close to Durkheim's conception. The negative outcome of efforts to define the object of research in the sociology of morality became her main inspiration for further exploration. Studies conducted led to tangible results in the form of a conclusion asserting the possibility of practising the sociology of morality despite the absence of a specified object of research. Analysis of the scope of the concept of morality led Maria Ossowska to the conclusion that setting borders to this concept has a moral dimension, just as the choice of judges for the bench influences the operative part of a verdict. She realised that on every occasion, the choices made meant having to accept limitations, but they are necessary due to the nature of the issues being addressed.

By referring to the concept of ethos as a research tool and a new cognitive category, Ossowska proposed a practical solution to the difficulties in studying moral phenomena. As a term referring to groups, ethos contained values of a non-moral character upon which moral values are derivatively superimposed. The concept of ethos underwent a gradual revolution in Maria Ossowska's works. As a concept broader than morality, ethos was something she understood as: (1) a type of morality constituting a defined set of virtues (e.g. bourgeois); (2) an hierarchy of moral values constituting an integral part of a values system – its main core; (3) a role model, in which moral values constitute an object of imitation within a given social group. It was Maria Ossowska's firm belief that ethos, as a term fundamental to the sociology of culture, should relate to groups, which is why she referred to observable, recurring and established behaviours of group members. The scope of ethos embraced the area of non-ethical inquiry, opening up the possibility of making findings and then conducting analyses of the specifics of moral phenomena. In Ossowska's intention, the concept of ethos created

² In a textbook on the sociology of morality published in the United States (Hitlin, Vaisey 2010), Gabriel Abend highlighted Maria Ossowska's contribution to establishing the social determinants of morality (Mariański 2015a, p. 11).

the possibility for resolving difficulties related to the separation of moral judgment and moral norm. The introduction of ethos, understood as a role model, was connected to the derivative nature of moral judgments, thereby enabling the determination of a hierarchy of values cherished and pursued in a given group.

In sociological reflection on the specifics of moral issues, the above assertions are of utmost importance. They provide justified grounds for far-reaching caution, even scepticism, prompting the resignation from and sometimes rejection of in-depth descriptions and analyses of models postulated and propagated as reality consciously created through the deliberate actions of propaganda-forming institutions. Interpreting Ossowska's message, role models identified in the social reality, and present in the form of manufactured and disseminated social behaviours, should not be treated on a par with the conscious creations of models conforming to the guidelines of ideological or philosophical assumptions, and as such having a limited and, in their essence, a kind of "artificial" and derivative character, because that would threaten conceptual chaos, blurring the main features of the image of social reality found and described, leading one down the blind alley of negligent cognition and false knowledge. Treating the role model as understood by Ossowska on a par with the role model conceptions resulting from their authors' deliberate elaboration, we often risk falling into the trap of proliferation. It was precisely such dangers that Ossowska wanted to avoid when constructing her programme of the science of morality, free from the influences, prejudices and personal convictions of the researcher.

The fully-formed conception of ethos entails the disclosure of criteria for distinguishing the concept of morality. Ossowska's pro-social orientation has become apparent here. The divisions distinguished in morality referred to the principles of the "hygiene of coexistence" in society, and to the perfectionist current in morality, commanding one to respect one's own and others' dignity. Such a way of framing morality, referring to a catalogue of pro-societal and ornamental virtues (soft and hard), demonstrates a strong connection with Dupréel's concept. Maria Ossowska sought the specificity of moral behaviours in social relationships. In her explorations, morality appears to be an effect of the social nature of humans, although she would most likely deny such an assertion. She presented a position in her works refuting the possibility of determining the essence of human nature, although there is a distinct lean towards the social character of moral issues.

On an epistemological level, Maria Ossowska's conception of the sociology of morality shows numerous links with Weber's sociology. One could say that she is inspired by it. This is most evident in her first work on the

sociology of morality, in which Ossowska referred to the concept of ethos, adopting Weber's ideal type to frame moral phenomena as phenomena of a specific type. In her work *Moralność mieszczańska* (Ossowska 1985a), she frequently described the phenomena she was analysing as being "of a certain type in the Weberian sense". In the evolution of her scientific work, this allowed Maria Ossowska to distinguish between aristocratic and bourgeois morality. There are also traces here of inspiration from Veblen's work, which consequently became an expression of a particular research strategy. This strategy was used for analysing moral phenomena in contemporary societies. At the same time, Ossowska expanded her research, enriching it with reflection on the morality of social groups differing in terms of culture. Thus, the sociology of morality is not merely an eclectic collection of issues connected with ethical reflection. Apart from the analysis of specific types of morality, it is above all the result of creative effort in codification. The regularities identified in the sociology of morality are of a general nature, enhanced by a specific variable that occurs as either dependent or independent. The anthropological accents in Maria Ossowska's works are most visible in the area of methodology. Using a functional method, she analysed moral norms and the behaviours they applied to. Presumably, the evolutionistic functionalism present in Maria Ossowska's studies of moral phenomena is – alongside her interest in cultural anthropology – an effect of the influence of Durkheim's and Malinowski's views. There is a certain feature in Ossowska's works that is noticeable here: a combination of a methodological regime, prescribing a strict course of research, and a fleeting, sometimes ephemeral and multiform sphere of values manifested in various ways in the life of the societies analysed. The transition to the world of anthropology allowed Maria Ossowska, as it were, to "pass into another sphere". From the cold, ordered, necessary and consequently overwhelming world governed by the laws of logic, she was crossing into a world full of unexpected situations, differences and colours of human behaviour, sometimes totally different from the rest. One might say that Ossowska was thereby able to spread the wings of her creative imagination and venture into a land of fascinating research inquiry, rich in conclusions, freed from the tight corset of the methodological regime.

Yet, Ossowska did not feel thus exempted from the demands of scientific procedure. On the contrary, alongside the main methodological directives of functionalism, her scientific technique demonstrated a similarity to the research style of Ranulf, whom she valued for his integrity in research proceedings. One could see that she had similar methodological preferences. Ossowska would often withdraw from the option of obtaining even indirect

research when the results would not allow it. She valued Ranulf for the objectivism of his research, for his detailed verification of hypotheses, and his scepticism when assessing the validity of conclusions. The same trait of integrity in her research, expressed in her caution against accepting easy conclusions too hastily, is present in all of her works.

The character of the sociology of morality designed by Maria Ossowska is such that it initiates further deliberation. It is oriented towards defining a certain whole, and it opens the way for continuation. Ossowska was well aware of the danger of errors she was exposed to during her research. She expressed this in numerous suggestions that her hypotheses should be verified and her research ideas subjected to detailed analysis. In this sense, her research efforts, organising, classifying and verifying moral phenomena, constitute a successful attempt towards creating a sociological sub-discipline. Her conviction that the interdisciplinary development of research in the social sciences was necessary found a well-established position. This is further supported by the multifaceted nature of her competencies and outlook regarding the research object. The mutual control of methods, their coupling, and the comparability of the results are undeniable qualities of disciplines thus formed – among which the sociology of morality is listed. Its emergence may be treated as an expression of the “natural” need for development in the social sciences.

The question arises as to what one should attribute opinions that Maria Ossowska's works constitute a kind of levelling of the ground beneath the construction of a new science (Kotarbiński 1949), or the accusation of *docta ignorantia* in the matter of moral aspects of social phenomena (Jankowski 1963). A distinctive feature of Maria Ossowska's work was her inclination to challenge the theories she analysed. The hypothesis that, apart from the methodological directives of functionalism, she referred to Popper's method of falsifying scientific theories without actually revealing it, needs to be verified. An attempt to compare Ossowska's concept with Petrażycki's views, using an arbitrary definition of morality, also seems an interesting task. For Petrażycki, the basis for a definition of the concept of morality was a psychological criterion, which Maria Ossowska considered insufficient. Interesting attempts to define this concept, undertaken in contemporary sociology, use precisely this criterion (Kiciński 1989).

Maria Ossowska's concept of the sociology of morality continues to inspire many contemporary researchers. Her creative scientific oeuvre is cultivated by a group of her students and continuators, and her theoretical findings have been applied in, among others, the sociology of science, law, and the countryside, as well as in anthropology and ethnology, in descriptive

studies of morality, and in other disciplines of the broadly conceived humanities. Despite this, her works have not yet been fully explored for their research potential. There is still room for further exploration and in-depth analysis of Ossowska's deliberations. The use of her proposals for addressing problematic issues in the research areas of sociology, anthropology, ethnography, and research methods, therefore, seems interesting. Some of them are being developed by contemporary sociologists of morality, and for example quantitative methods – which Ossowska tended to avoid – are used by Kiciński and Mariański.

These inspirations have not been fully utilised to date. Little is known of the hypothetical theoretical consequences of a possible paradigm shift in research on morality. Maria Ossowska's thesis on the increasing dissemination of moral norms due to the global standardisation of moral norms and behaviours would undergo verification. It may then turn out that the sociology of morality is enriched with new research issues, and acquires an autotelic sense, addressing values imbued with features of universality and durability. However, in the study of moral issues, current findings are moving in a different direction. One can rather observe the spreading of immoral behaviours, treated as evil undergoing globalisation, while at the same time there are indications of the impossibility of coming up with solutions that enable effective counteraction against the adverse consequences of manifestations of evil in an unstable world (Bauman 2006a).

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Professor Wojciech Misztal, PhD, is a faculty member at the University of Warsaw, in the Department of Sociology of Social Change, at the Faculty of Applied Social Sciences and Resocialisation.

Wojciech Misztal's book, which serves as an excellent 'showcase' of Polish sociology, presents Western readers with the central strand of academic work by one of the classic figures in Polish sociology, particularly in the field of the sociology of morality. [...] In this book, he depicts the intellectual trajectory undertaken by Maria Ossowska, beginning with ethical considerations (homo-ethicus) and arriving at fully developed sociological concepts (homo moralis). This is the first work of such significance in Polish academic literature on the sociology of morality.

On 13 August 2024, fifty years passed since the death of Maria Ossowska. Publishing Wojciech Misztal's book titled Ethics and Morality. Maria Ossowska's Concept of Sociology of Morality in English is a highly appropriate way to commemorate this anniversary.

It is therefore a welcome development that we now have a comprehensive and well-informed intellectual biography – a much-needed contribution to the academic community. Thanks to its accessible form, this publication can reach a broader audience, making it inclusive not only for sociologists and psychologists of morality but also for scholars in the fields of education, moral philosophy (ethics), and perhaps even moral theology, thereby highlighting the interdisciplinary appeal of the book.

A fragment of Prof. Janusz Mariański's review